PLC 1999

1999 PLP 435 (PLC)

SHAUKAT ALI Versus Messrs ZEAL PAK CEMENT FACTORY and another

Jurisdiction / Court
Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh
Decided Date
Appeal No.HYD-430 of 1997, decided on 10th March, 1998.
Honorable Judges
Ahmed Yar Khan, Chairman
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1999 PLP 435 (PLC)
Forum / Court Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh
Bench Members Ahmed Yar Khan, Chairman
Parties SHAUKAT ALI Versus Messrs ZEAL PAK CEMENT FACTORY and another
Primary Law (a) Administration of justice
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1999 PLP 435 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: (a) Administration of justice as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1999 PLP 435 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh bench comprising: Ahmed Yar Khan, Chairman.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1999 PLP 435 (PLC) (SHAUKAT ALI Versus Messrs ZEAL PAK CEMENT FACTORY and another). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

(a) Administration of justice

Representation

  • Rana Mehmood Ali, Representative for Appellant.
  • Nemo for Respondent.

Headnotes / Summary

.

Passing of judicial order and administrative order

Judicial' order could not be passed unless and until relevant Court passing such order had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon matter involved

Administrative order would not go through judicial process and could only be passed on administrative grounds for which conferment of jurisdiction and judicial powers was not necessary. (b) Administration of justice...

Orders admitting suit and application

Kinds--Admission orders were generally of two kinds

one which were recorded by lower Courts at the time of presentation of civil suits and applications while other kind was that which were passed by superior Courts at time of "Katcha Peshi"--Admission orders passed by lower Courts were of administrative nature and would not require judicial consideration while admission orders at the stage of "Katcha Peshi" required judicial consideration by superior Courts, (c) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)...

Ss, 25-A & 35

Admission of grievance petition

Validity

Grievance petition filed under S. 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 was dismissed by Labour Court on ground that Presiding Officer of Labour Court who ordered admission of application at relevant time was holding additional charge of Labour Court concerned and no jurisdiction was conferred on that Labour Court under S. 35, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and that said Labour Court was riot competent to pass order of admission of grievance petition-Validity

Admission order passed by Presiding Officer of Labour Court whet lead additional charge of concerned Labour Court, was an administrative order which did not require judicial consideration and could not be said its without jurisdiction

Order dismissing grievance application, was set aide, in circumstances and matter was remanded to Labour Court concerned for proceeding further on merits.

Judgment & Decree

3. After hearing the learned Representative for the appellant, I have come to the conclusion that the crucial point to be decided in the present appeal is as to what is the status of "Admission Order", Either it is a Judicial Order or is only an Administrative Order, Obviously a Judicial Order cannot be passed unless and until the relevant Court who passes such order has got the jurisdiction, to adjudicate upon the matter sub judicial before it, On the other hand an Administrative Order does not go through the Judicial Process, and can only be passed on administrative grounds for which conferment of jurisdiction and Judicial Powers is not, necessary. I have consulted Black's Law Dictionary which defines the various terms as under:‑‑

Addition: Implies physical contact, something added to another, structure physically attached to or connected with building itself. Mack v. Eyssell, 332 Mo. 671. 59 S.W. 2d 1049. Extension; increase; augmentation. Mayering v, Miller, 330 Mo. 885, 51 S.W. 2d 65,

66. That which has become united with or a part of; Additional: This term embraces the idea of joining or uniting one thing to another so as thereby to form one aggregate. Ex parte Bodies, 200 S.C. 379, 21 S.E. 2d 4.8; Charge: V. To impose a burden, duty, obligation, or lien; to create a claim against property; to assess; to demand; to accuse; to instruct a jury on matters of law. To impose a tax, duty, or trust. In commercial transactions, to bill or invoice; to purchase on credit. In criminal law, to' indict or formally accuse; Judicial Order: One which involves exercise of judicial discretion and affects final result of litigation. Happy Coal Co. v. Brashear, 263 Ky. 257 92 S.W. 2d 23.27 See also Decision; Decree; Judgment; Order; Judicial Power: The authority exercised by that department of Government which is charged with declaration of what law is and its construction. The authority vested in Courts and Judges, as distinguished from the executive and legislative power. Courts have. general powers to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between two persons and parties who bring a case before it for decision; and also such specific powers as contempt powers, power to control admission and disbarment of attorneys, power to adopt rules of Court etc. A power involving exercise of judgment and discretion in determination of questions of right in specific cases affecting interests of person or property, as distinguished from ministerial power involving no discretion. Inherent authority not only to decide; but to make binding orders or judgments. Fewel v. Fewel, 23 Cal. 2d 431, 144 P. 2d 592.

594. Power to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before Court for decision. Power that adjudicates upon said protects the rights and interests of persons or property, and to that end declares, construes and applies the law; Jurisdiction: The word is a term of large and comprehensive import, and embraces every kind of judicial action. Federal Land Bank of Louisville. Ky v. Crombie, 258 Ky. 383, 80 S.W. 2d 39.40. It is the authority by which Courts and judicial officers take cognizance of and decide cases. Board of Trustees of Firemen's Relief and Pension Fund of City of Marietta v. Brooks, 179 OKI. 600. 67 P.2d 4.6; State v. True. Me 330 A. 2d

787. The legal right by which Judges exercise their authority. Max Ams. Inc. v. Barker. 293 Ky. 698, 170 S.V' 2d 45.48. It exists when Court has cognizance of class of cases involved, proper parties are present, and point to be decided is within powers of Court. United Cemeteries Co. v. Strother, 342 Mo. 1155, 119 S.W. 2d 762, 765; Harder v. Johnson, 147 Kan 440, 76 P. 2d 763,

764. Power and authority of a Court to hear and determine judicial proceeding. In re: de Camillis' Estate, 66 Misc. 2d 882, 322 N.Y.S.2d 551,

556. The right and power of a Court to adjudicate concerning the subject‑matter in a given case. Biddinger v. Fletcher, 224 Ga. 501, 162 S.E. 2d 414,

416. Areas of authority; the geographic area in which a Court has power or types of cases it has power to hear; Jurisdictional limits: The Constitutional or statutory parameters within which judicial power may be exercised such as limits based on the monetary value of the action. See Jurisdictional amount.

4. I intend to examine the facts of the present litigation in perspective of the abovementioned definitions as given in the Black's Law Dictionary. The facts indicate that the relevant application under section 25‑A of the I. R. O., 1969 bearing No. 111 of 1996 was presented before the concerned Officer, who recorded his note thereon. There was no Judge and the additional charge was with the learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No. II at Karachi, hence the concerned officer brought that application to Karachi and presented it before the learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No. II at Karachi ,who was also holding the additional charge of Court No.VI at Hyderabad. The learned Presiding Officer, Court No. II, admitted the aforesaid application for regular hearing by recording the following words:‑‑ "Admit and register. Issue notice to respondent."

5. In my view the admission orders are generally of two kinds. The one which are recorded by lower Courts at the time of presentation of civil suits applications etc.; while the other kind is that which are passed by the superior Courts at the time of Katcha Peshi. I am of the humble view that the admission orders passed by the lower Courts are of administrative nature and do not require judicial consideration while the admission orders at the stage of Karcha Peshi require judicial consideration by the superior Courts. So far as the present order is concerned it appears to be an administrative order which did not require any judicial consideration. The matter was presented before the Sindh Labour Court No. VI as well. Since the application was within time and had no other legal defect, hence the learned Presiding Officer, Sindh. Labour Court No. II, Karachi, passed the abovementioned administrative order. As such I am of the opinion that the admission order passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No. II, Karachi, whereby the said petition was admitted, was an administrative order and is not hit by the plea that it was without jurisdiction. The result is that the present appeal is allowed and the impugned order, dated 21‑11‑1997 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No.VI at Hyderabad, is hereby set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Sindh Labour Court No. VI at Hyderabed, for proceeding further on merits. H.B.T./253/K/Lab. (Trib.) Appeal allowed.