P L D 1969 Dacca 950 (PLP)

The plaintiff‑petitioner thereafter filed a petition on 9‑9‑68 for vacating the above stay order on the grounds mentioned therein. The learned Munsif rejected the petition with an observation: ‑ "I find no reason to vacate the order No. 77 dated 5‑7‑

68. Hence plaintiff's petition be rejected." Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner moved this Court under section 115, C. P. C. and obtained the present Rule. Mr. Moinul Huq, learned Advocate appearing for the plaintiff petitioner has contended that the learned Munsif failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him to correct the order No. 77 dated 5‑7‑68 which order was not in accordance with law. His grievance is that in view of the provisions of section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to stay further proceedings of the suit on the ground that some proceeding over the self‑same property was pending before the Board of Revenue. The said order not being covered by section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, the learned Munsif failed to exercise jurisdiction to review the alleged order under his inherent power. It appears from the order sheet that the plaintiff made repeated prayers on several occasions, viz.. on 14‑2‑68, 15‑4‑68 5‑6‑68 and 5‑7‑68 for stay of further proceedings of the suit on the ground of pendency of a connected appeal before the Board of Revenue over the self‑same matter. The learned Munsif on the basis of his repeated prayers, in exercise of his discretion, stayed the suit till disposal of the appeal by the Board of Revenue for the ends of justice. He seems to have passed the said order in exercise of his inherent power under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that no Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties. That section only gives a mandate upon the Court not to proceed with the trial of any suit when another suit on the same subject between the same parties involving the same issue is already pending in another Court. The section has thus limited scope and application and will come to play only in the given circumstances mentioned therein. In the instant case the facts being different the provisions of that section cannot be said to have any application here. Now the question is can a Court stay the proceedings of a suit when the facts are not convered by section

10. In my opinion, even if the bar of section 10 is not applicable to the facts of a particular case but the Court considers that the suit be stayed for the ends of justice to avoid unnecessary harassment to any party, the Court may in exercise of its inherent power under section 151 may grant such stay. The hands of the Court are not tight. In a fit case the Court may grant stay in a suit for the ends of justice in exercise of its inherent power for the reasons to be recorded by it. A proceeding over the same subject‑matter having been already pending before the Board of Revenue which is a Revenue Court within the meaning of section 57 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, the learned Munsif stayed the further proceedings of the suit for the ends of justice till disposal of the said proceeding by the Board of Revenue. The learned Munsif passed the said stay order under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that order was not at all hit by section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this connection, the cases reported in A I R 1950 Pat. 363, A I R 1948 Nag. 297 and A I R 1947 Lah. 28 and relied on by the learned Advocate for the opposite‑parties may be referred to. In all those cases it has been held that in a case not covered by section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code the order for stay may be made under section 151, C. P. C. if the Court considers it necessary to make such order in the interest of justice and in order to avoid unnecessary harassment to any of the parties. The facts of the Patna case are almost identical to the facts of the present case. In that case on application for stay of a rent suit instituted in the civil Court was filed on the ground that a connected proceeding under the Tenancy law is pending before a Revenue Officer in respect of the lands in suit. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court considering the legal position held as follows:‑ "The learned Munsif has considered the applications for stay and has rejected the applications on the grounds given in his judgment. He has unnecessarily encumbered his order with reference to, S. 10, Civil P. C. which was no, application to the cases at all. The application for stay if at all, can be entertained only under S. 151 Civil, P. C. and in exercising his discretion under S

151. Civil P. C., the Court has perfectly justified in rejecting the applications. In revision it would not be open to this Court to interfere unless it holds that there was any material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of that jurisdiction, or there was any serious miscarriage of justice. In applications for stay of this character, no hard and fast rule can be laid down that the applicant is necessarily entitled to a stay of the rent suit pending before the civil Court merely because there is an application under section 40, Bihar Tenancy Act pending before the Revenue Officer. It would all depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether the stay should or should not be granted." The principles enunciated therein rightly apply to the facts of the present case. It cannot, therefore, be said that the order No. 77 dated 5‑7‑68 was not in accordance with law. This order, as I have indicated earlier, was passed on repeated prayers of the plaintiff. That being the position the learned Munsif refused to interfere with that order or vacate the same on the subsequent prayer of the plaintiff as he was satisfied that there was no reason to vacate the said order. The impugned order of rejection dated 9‑9‑68 thus suffers from no legal defect nor can it be said that the learned Munsif rejecting the application to vacate the order No. 77 has in the exercise of his jurisdiction acted illegality or failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him. Hence I am unable to accept the contentions of the learned Advocate for the petitioner. It should, however, be pointed out here that if the Revenue Authority does not dispose of the matter within a reasonable time or if the Board of Revenue keeps it hanging for an indefinite period, the civil Court will not be bound to wait for the decision of the Revenue Authority and it will be fair on its part to vacate the stay order and proceed with the trial of the suit. The Court which granted stay has power to alter or amend its order to suitable circumstances. With respect to procedural matters there B exists in the Court inherent jurisdiction to review, alter or amend orders relating to them. The grounds, however, on which this inherent jurisdiction has to be exercised are similar to those in Order XLVII, rule 1, C. P. C. only the technicalities of Order XLVII will be excluded. The case of Mst. Allah Rakhi v. Mst. Raj Bibi and others (P L D 1957 Lah. 70) may in this connection be looked at. Be that as it may, since I find no illegality or material irregularity in the order complained of, I have no other alternative but to reject the petition: The Rule is accordingly discharged. The parties will bear their own costs. S.A.H. Rule discharged.