P L D 1966 (W (PLP)

Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to‑ (a) any evacuee property as defined in the Pakistan (Admi nistration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957 (XII of 1957); and (b) any property owned by the Central Government, any Pro vincial Government Railway, Port Trust or Cantonment Board and any property managed or controlled by any other local authority under the administrative control of the Central Government or of any Provincial Government.

7. The contention is that clause (b) of section 3 of the Act makes it clear that the provisions of this Act are not to apply to any property owned by the Central Govern ment, and as the land on which the buildings in dispute stand is admittedly the property of the Central Government, it, there fore, follows that the buildings themselves have to be deemed to be the property of that Government; and that being so, the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller would stand ousted.

8. In the alternative it is argued that even if the buildings themselves be not deemed to be the property of the Central Government yet the exemption clause will apply for the reason that the Central Government has rights of ownership in the land on which they stand. In other words, it is contended that the term `property' as used in clause (b) of section 3 of the Act, being a term of extensive and comprehensive application it would exclude the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller in the case of those buildings in which the Central Government has property rights of any kind whatsoever, whether in the site or in the super structure.

9. As regards the first contention, the argument is miscon ceived. It is clear that the mere fact that the buildings in dispute are constructed on land owned by the Central Government, would not make them the property of that Government. The buildings would, still remain the property of the private parties who have constructed then at their own expense. The case from the Indian jurisdiction cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners, namely, Messrs Bhatia Co‑operative Housing Society Limited v. D. C. Patel (AIR1953SC16) is clearly distinguishable. In that case it was held by the learned Judges that:‑

"Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (XLVII of 1947) did not apply to premises which belonged to Government or a local authority." These conclusions were reached with regard to premises which had been constructed by a private party on land belonging to a local authority, but after construction handed back to the local authority which then granted a lease for 99 years to this party for the land as well as the building constructed thereon. Their Lordships found that in these circumstances it was clear that although the building was constructed by a private party, yet it was handed back to the local authority and then obtained on lease as property belonging to the local authority. It will be seen that in the Indian case although the building was constructed at the expense of the private party, yet it became the property of the local authority when it was handed over to that authority before being leased out to the private party along with the land on which it was constructed. In the cases before us the position is different. Although the land belongs to the Central Govern ment, yet the buildings have been constructed thereon by the private parties concerned and have not been handed over to the Central Government after construction. In these circumstances, by no process of reasoning can these buildings be treated or deemed to be the property of the Central Government, which merely remains the owner of the land under them.

10. We may now proceed to consider the second contention raised on behalf of the petitioners. The whole argument turns on the interpretation to be placed on the terms `property' as used in clause (b) of section 3 of the Act. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, this term has to be given a full and comprehensive meaning so as to include rights of ownership in any part of the building, namely, whether in the super‑structure or in the land on which the super‑structure stands; and if that is done, then a building standing on land owned by the Central Government would comprise an element or property belonging to that Government, and thus be taken out of the pur view of the Act. On behalf of the respondent‑landlords, it is sub mitted that in order to appreciate the true meaning and significance of the term `property' as used in the relevant clause, it is necessary to bear in mind the purpose for which the Act was enacted by the Central Legislature, and further the well‑known principle of interpretation of statutes that an enactment should not be reduced to a futile and meaningless absurdity by placing too wide or too narrow, an interpretation on certain terms employed by the Legislature to convey its intention.

11. While ascertaining the true meaning of the exemption clause in which the petitioners rely, it would be well to bear in mind certain established principles of interpretation of statutes which apply in cases of the present kind. At pages 6 and 7 of Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, it is stated that :‑ "The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning.‑At the same time, if the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result."

12. Again on page 36, the learned author has observed that:‑ "It is said to be the duty of the Judge to make such cons truction or a statute as shall supress the mischief and advance the remedy."

13. On the same subject the following observations appear in Craies, `Statute Law' pages 82‑83:‑ "The mere fact that the results of a statute may be unjust or absurd does not entitle this Court to refuse to give it effect, but if there are two different interpretations of the words in an Act, the Court will adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of those things . . . Therefore, if a too literal adherence to the words of the enact ment appears to produce an absurdity or an injustice, it will be the duty of a Court of construction to consider the state of the law at the time the Act was passed (a), with a view to ascertaining whether the language of the enactment is capable of any other fair interpretation, (b), or whether it may not be desirable to put upon the language used a secondary (c) or restricted meaning, (d) or perhaps to adopt a construction not quite strictly grammatical. But where the words of an Act of Parliament are plain the Court will not make any alternation in them because injustice may otherwise be done."

14. In the same contest their Lordships of the Supreme Court have made certain very valuable observations in the Commissioner of Income‑tax, Karachi v. Mst. Khatija Begum (P L D 1965 S C 472). "The words of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature had in view." "To arrive at the real meaning it is always necessary to get an exact conception of the aim, scope and object of the whole Act, to consider according to Lord Coke (i) what was the law before the Act was passed; (ii) what was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided ; (iii) what remedy Parlia ment has appointed; and (iv) the reasons of the remedy."

15. The term `property' has been defined as:‑ "the right and interest which a man has in lands and chattel's to the exclusion of others. The term `property' is a generic term of extensive application, and while strictly speaking it means only the right which a person has in relation to some thing, or that dominion or indefinite right of user and disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or objects, it is frequently used to denote the subject of the property, or the thing itself which is owned or in relation to which the right of property exist. In the former sence it extends to every species of valuable right or interest, in either real or personal property, or in easement, franchises and incorporeal hereditaments and in the latter to every thing which is the subject of ownership, or to which the right of property legally attach or in other words every class of acquisitions which a man can own or have an interest in."

16. It appears to us that in clause (b) of section 3 of the Act the term `property' has been used not to indicate an indefinite right of user and disposition, but to denote the subject of that property or right, or the thing itself which is owned by the Central Government or in relation to which the rights of property exists. Viewed from this angle it is easy to see that the things which are intended to be included in the term `property' as used in this exemption clause are buildings, and not land. This is apparent from the heading of this section itself, namely, "Act not to apply to certain buildings," which leaves no doubt that the Legislature intended to exempt buildings owned by the Central Government, Provincial Government, etc. Further, this intention also becomes clear from the Preamble to the Act which describes the object which this legislation is intended to achieve, namely‑‑ "To make provision for the control of rents of certain class of buildings within the limits of the Cantonment areas, for the eviction of tenants therefrom and matters connected therewith." The Preamble to the Act as well as the heading of section 3 make it abundantly clear that the Legislature was all along intending to deal with only buildings and not with the land on which they have been constructed.

17. This distinction further becomes clear when we refer to the provisions contained in a parallel legislation, namely, the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. In that Ordinance there is a separate definition of "rented land" and the term `landlord' and `tenant' have been defined in relation not only to buildings but also to rented lands as such. In the Act with which we are concerned there is no provision for dealing with rented land, for the obvious reason that the renting or leasing out of lands in the Cantonments is a separate subject dealt with under the Cantonment Act, etc.

18. The definitions of the terms `tenant' and 'landlord' as contained in the relevant clauses of section 2 of the present Act are also confined to buildings and do not cover the case of rented land. It is true that in the definition of the term "building" as contained in clause (a) of section 2 of the Act, it is stated that building means "any building or part of a building, whether residential or, not together with all fittings and fixtures therein, if any, and includes any gardens, grounds, garages and outhouses attached or appurtenant to such building or part, and vacant land, . . . . . .", but it is clear that the reference to vacant land is to that land which forms a part of the buildings, and not to land which is rented our separately as land.

19. The true meaning to be given to the term `property' as used in clause (b) of section 3 of the Act also becomes clear by reference to subsection (11) of section 17 of the Act, which pres cribes that:‑

"Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or else where, the Central Government or the Provincial Government, or Railway, a Port Trust, a Cantonment Board or any other local authority may also apply to the Controller to seek eviction of the tenant from its building whether owned, hired or requi sitioned, in the event of non‑payment of rent within the period hereinbefore prescribed or for infringement of any of the terms of possession or occupation." From this clause it becomes clear that the exemption mentioned earlier in clause (b) of section 3 of the Act relates to buildings owned by the Central Government, etc., and that this exemption can be waived by the Government or other authority concerned which can then invoke the provisions of the Act and the jurisdic tion of the Rent Controller to seek eviction of the tenant from such building.

20. Lastly, it has to be stated that if the interpretation convassed on behalf of the petitioners is accepted, then almost all the buildings situate in Cantonment areas would stand excluded from the purview of the Act, for as we have already stated, most of these buildings have been constructed on land owned by the Central Government but leased out to private parties. As a necessary consequence of this interpretation the Act would be rendered a futile and absurd piece of legislation

a result which would not have been intended by the Legislature, and one which must be avoided by the Courts by placing a proper interpretation on the terms employed by the Legislature to make its meaning and intention clear. The Legislature must be presumed to be aware of the fact that in the Cantonment areas the land is usually the property of the Central Govern ment whereas the buildings constructed thereon are private buildings.

21. For the foregoing reasons we are of the view that the term `property' as used in clause (b) of section 3 of the Act, has to be given a restricted meaning so as to confine it to buildings owned by the Central Government, and the other authorities mentioned therein. The exemption clause is not to be extended so as to include within its purview private buildings constructed on Government land, simply for the reason that Government has rights of property in the sites on which these buildings stand. On this view of the matter, it is clear that the Rent Controller and the appellate authority had the jurisdiction to regulate the relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of these buildings which are not owned by the Central Government. The petitions, therefore, fail and are hereby dismissed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs. S. Q. Petitions dismissed.