2002 SCMR 134 (PLP)

10. Pursuant to the order dated 1‑11‑1995 passed by the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in Civil Revision No.837 of 1994, the District Judge, Sahiwal, took up the appeal for its decision on merits. The petitioner took up the plea that the respondents' appeal was hopelessly barred by limitation as they themselves filed the appeal before the District Judge choosing a wrong forum and they were fully aware of the value of the suit for the purposes of court‑fee and jurisdiction because the same was enhanced vide order dated 9‑10‑1977 by the trial Court and the respondents thereafter submitted the amended plaint accordingly. The petitioner pleaded that they intentionally selected the wrong forum, as such, they deserved no leniency in the matter of condonation of delay. On the contrary, the respondents argued that the jurisdictional value given on the face of the decree sheet was Rs.39,000, as such, the appeal was prosecuted in good faith before the learned District Judge.

11. The learned District Judge, Sahiwal, after hearing the parties vide order dated 18‑4‑1996, held that the respondents prosecuted their appeal before the District Judge in good faith which subsequently turned out to be a wrong forum. The return of the appeal and its formal presentation of 25‑1‑1992 after the judgment of the High Court in R.S.A. No.21 of 1983 would not render the said appeal barred by time as by that time, the jurisdictional value of the District Court was enhanced to Rs.2,00,

000. Resultantly, vide order dated 18‑4‑1996 the learned District Judge overruled the objection of the petitioner on the point of limitation.

12. The petitioners filed Civil Revision No.684 of 1996 against the aforesaid order in the Lahore High Court which has been dismissed through the impugned order dated 19‑11‑1998. Hence, this petition for leave to appeal.

13. We have given our anxious consideration to the entire facts of the case and the documents appended with this petition. We are sorry to hold that this is one of many other cases wherein parties are trying to non‑suit their adversaries simply on technical grounds. It is admitted by the parties that upon the decree sheet prepared by the trial Court while dismissing respondents' suit through its judgment dated 14‑6‑1982, the jurisdictional value of he same was mentioned as Rs.39,

000. On this basis the respondents filed an appeal before the learned District Judge, Sahiwal, because at that time his pecuniary jurisdiction was Rs.50,

000. It was the act of the Court demonstrated in the decree sheet which prompted the respondents to file the appeal before the learned District Judge. So, in this background, it would really be a barsh view to non‑suit the respondents for approaching the wrong appellate forum of the learned District Judge, Sahiwal.

14. Similarly, when the respondents were directed by the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court vide his order dated 19‑11‑1991 passed in R.S.A. No.21 of 1983, his direction to the learned District Judge to pass an order for the return of memo. of appeal to the respondents for its presentation before the proper Court was also simply to prolong the litigation as by that time the jurisdiction of District Judge had already enhanced to Rs.2,00,000 with effect from 14‑6‑1986 during the pendency of the aforesaid R.S.A. So, the proper order to save the time and expenses of the parties should have been that the appeal of the respondents before the learned District Judge, Sahiwal, 'be considered as pending' instead of entering into all this rigmarole which had consumed considerable time of the Court and prolonged the agony of the parties. As already stated, all this litigation in this case subsequent to the judgment of the trial Court is going on for all these years due to the fact that the amount of Rs.39,000 was mentioned by the trial Court in its decree sheet. It was the act of the Court in preparing the decree‑sheet in this manner which led the respondents to file an appeal before the learned District Judge, Sahiwal.

15. The maxim "Actus curiae neminem gravabit" (an act of the Court shall prejudice no man), as already stated, is now fully engrained in our system of administration of justice. This principle was considered by this Court in the case of Rashad Ehsan and others v. Bashir Ahmad and another (PLD 1989 SC 146) in the following words: the maxim ' Actus curiae neminem gravabit' comes into play, with a view to obviate hardships and which may otherwise be the result of the errors of the Court itself. Thus, where a, non -compliance with the mandatory provisions of a law occurs by complying with the direction of the Court, which is not in conformity with the law, the party complying therewith is not to be penalised. Indeed, the law becomes flexible to absorb such abnormalities and treat the infractions as harmless. Where the directions issued while administering the law have been followed but it is found that the authority itself had acted in deviation of the law in some particulars, the party acting in accordance with such ' directions is not held to be blameworthy.

16. In the case of The State v. Asif Adil and others (1997 SCMR 209) it has been held that it is a well‑settled proposition of law that a party should not be made to suffer on account of act/omission on the part of the Court or other State functionaries. Reference in this behalf is also made to the following cases:‑‑ (i) Muhammad Hanif and others v. Muhammad and others (PLD 1990 SC 859); (ii) Fateh Khan v. Boze Mir (PLD 1991 SC 782); (iii) Abdul Rashid v. Abdul Salam and others (1991 SCMR 782); (iv) Muhammad Afsar v. Mst. Munawar Jan (PLD 1961 (W.P.) Lah.199); (v) Central Exchange Bank Ltd. v. Ch. Dilawar Ali Khan and others (PLD 1965 (W.P.) Lah. 628); (vi) Mian Ijaz Iqbal and others v. Faisalabad Chamber of Commerce and another (PLD 1983 Lah. 1); (vii) Hafiz Muhammad Ahsan v. The State (1987 P.Cr.LJ 2434); (viii) Ghulam Haider and others v. Mst. Raj Bharri and others (PLD 1988 SC 20); (x) Muhammad Ramzan and another v. Haji Karim Bakhsh and 5 others (1988 CLC 448); (xi) Iqbal Ahmad v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan and 3 others (1989 CLC 1365); , (xii) Abdul Rashid v. Abdul Salam and others (1991 SCMR 2012); (xiii) Naseer Ahmed v. District Judge, Multan and 4 others (PLD 1992 Lah. 92); (xiv) Iftikhar Baig v. Muhammad Azam and others (1996 SCMR 762); (xv) Imran Ashraf and 7 others v. The State (2001 SCMR 424); (xvi) Ghulam Hussain v. Jamshaid Ali and others (2001 SCMR 1001); and (xvii) The State v. Asif Adil and others (1997 SCMR 209).

17. There is another principle of law that Judges are duty‑bound to apply the provisions of law in their true perspective and the same cannot be avoided simply on the ground that the said provisions of law were not brought to their notice by the parties. I am fortified in this regard from an earlier illuminating judgment rendered by this Court reported as PLD 1992 SC 236 where it was held as under:‑‑ "

18. The learned counsel who represented the respondents in the High Court by not bringing to the notice of the High Court the law laid down by this Court on the subject did not render good service to their clients. Besides, it has been laid down by this Court in Muhammad Sarwar v. The State (PLD 1969 SC 278) that a Judge must know the adage that a Judge must wear all the laws of the country on the sleeves of his robe and failure of the counsel to properly advise him is not a complete excuse in the matter."

18. It is also to be appreciated that the litigation in this case was started as far back as in the year 1977. Nearly quarter of a century has passed and the end of litigation is not within sight. The trial Court dismissed the suit as far back as on 14‑6‑1982. More than 19 years have gone by but even the first appeal against the said judgment has hot been disposed of by now. The petitioner has tried to non‑suit the respondents simply on technical grounds. It is an established principle of law that the cases of the parties be decided on merits and technical knock‑out should sparingly be resorted to. However, the petitioner in this case has successfully embroiled/involved the respondents in technicalities for a period spreading over more than two decades. This state of affairs has certainly contributed to the pendency of cases before the higher forums. Unless and until this sort of practice is not arrested with an iron hand, the pendency in the Courts would never come to an end and the parties would spend their entire life and earnings in litigation. Reference in this behalf is made to the cases of Imran Ashraf and 7 others v. The State (2001 SCMR 424), Nazir Ahmed and another v. Muhammad Din and others (2000 SCMR 440), Imtiaz Ahmad v. Ghulam and two others (PLD 1963 SC 382) and the case of Manager, Jammu and Kashmir, State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and another (PLD 1975 SC 678).

19. Resultantly, for what has been stated above, the instant petition being devoid of any merit is dismissed and leave declined.

20. Before parting with this judgment we observe that we may have awarded heavy costs against the petitioner in the present case but since the same was not adverted to at the time of hearing of the petition, as such, we consider it proper not to impose the same in spite of the fact that circumstances of this case demand that heavy costs should have been inflicted upon the petitioner. Q. M. H. /M. A. K./S‑141/S Petition dismissed.