2025 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

ADNAN-UL-KARIM MEMON, J.

This petition outlines a dispute where the petitioner, previously employed as a Welfare Officer (WO) at the Overseas Pakistanis Foundation (OPF), challenges his termination/discharge from probationary service order dated 03.3.2014 based on the allegations that he lacked requisite qualification for appointment as Welfare Officer under Overseas Pakistanis Foundation Employees (Service) Regulations, 1993.

2. Petitioner's counsel argued that the petitioner properly qualified and appointed on 18.6.2012 as Welfare Officer (OPF) Grade-6 in OPF Regional Office, Karachi, was illegally terminated/discharged from service despite positive performance of two years as the probationary period was one year and extendable to another year, however, no order for extension was passed, which deemed to culminate the probationary period and was deemed to be confirmed employee. He asserts that the termination/discharge from service, based on disputed qualifications and domicile, which violated natural justice as the impugned order disclosed second class Bachelor's degree in Social Sciences, however, petitioner has B-Com degree and three years working experience as Welfare Officer in different fields. Counsel requested the Court to declare the termination/discharge from service order as unlawful and direct reinstatement of the petitioner, and confirm his right to the position he held previously, citing the NIRC's lack of jurisdiction and relying on the cases of Tanvir Iqbal Siddiqui v. Principal O.P.F. [1994 SCMR 958], Managing Director, Overseas Pakistani Foundation v. Federation of Pakistan [2020 PLC 81], Farzana Iftikhar v. Federal Secretary, Overseas Pakistanis Foundation/Chairman Overseas Pakistanis Foundation Islamabad [2022 CLC 237], Aitchison College v. Muhammad Zubair [PLD 2002 SC 326], Selling of National Assets including PIA at throwaway price [2019 SCMR 1952], Syed Mahmood Akhtar Naqvi v. Federation of Paksitan [PLD 2013 SC 195], Mrs. M.N. Arshad v. Miss Naeema Khan [PLD 1990 SC 612] and judgment of Reshawar High Court in W.P. No.5347-P/2019 to support his contentions. He prayed for allowing the petition.

3. The Assistant Attorney General argued that the petitioner's termination/discharge from service was lawful due to unsuitable qualifications discovered during his probationary period. She asserted that the petition is not maintainable, citing Supreme Court's precedent regarding OPF's status having non-statutory rules of service, and submitted that the petitioner's failure to utilize available appeal procedures disqualifies him to contest the petition. She concluded that there is no right to appointment, promotion, or transfer, and requested dismissal of the petition.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their assistance.

5. The petitioner, holding a Bachelor of Commerce and a Diploma in Civil Technology, applied for a Welfare Officer position at the Overseas Pakistanis Foundation in response to a 2012 advertisement. He was interviewed, his documents were verified, and he was offered a one-year probationary appointment, which he accepted, starting on June 18, 2012. His background was also verified by police. He performed his duties satisfactorily, received positive performance evaluations, and was recommended for service confirmation. Despite this, he was issued an explanation memo in January 2014 regarding alleged qualification discrepancies and domicile issues. He responded, asserting his qualifications were known and verified during the hiring process and denying domicile allegations, offering further verification. Nevertheless, his services were terminated/discharged in March 2014, which he claims was unlawful and without due process of law, leading him to file this petition. The petitioner also alleges wrongful termination following proper hiring and satisfactory performance, whereas OPF maintains the termination/discharge from service was justified due to the petitioner's lack of suitable qualifications i.e. second class Bachelor's degree in Social Sciences for the subject post, during probation, and disputes the petition's legal standing under Article 199 of the Constitution.

6. It is well-settled principle that the judiciary, as the ultimate protector of individual rights and obligations under the Constitution, has the authority to mandate the proper formulation of policies to ensure fairness and transparency. However, it is settled law that it is within the domain of the competent authority to prescribe the required qualifications and experience in the recruitment process for any post. The Courts cannot force acceptance or interchange any other qualification equivalent to the specific post with a specific qualification advertised for inviting applications for recruitment or setting the benchmark for promotion of employees to any particular post or grade on attaining any particular length of service. It is crucial to understand that unless explicitly stated in the job advertisement or the respondents' recruitment policy, this Court cannot assume that a higher/minimum/ equivalent qualification automatically implies the acquisition of a lower one, or that a candidate with a higher qualification is inherently more suitable than someone meeting the specific requirements advertised or equivalent degree as this Court's role in recruitment matters is limited. However, it can assess the legality of the recruitment process but cannot substitute its judgment for the employer's regarding the design, needs, or selection criteria. The Courts should not attempt to compare different degrees, determining the equivalence or suitability of academic qualifications for a particular position is a specialized area best handled by the employing institution itself, based on its specific needs and requirements. Courts are not equipped to make such determinations under Article 199 of the Constitution. In this particular case, the petitioner does not meet the advertised requirement of post-qualification i.e. second class Bachelor degree in Social Sciences and experience, however, he has Commerce degree and for that petitioner claims that which is at par with the Social Sciences more particularly the subject of Economics is common. This assertion cannot be accepted at this stage in terms of definition of Social Science, which relates to man/woman as a member of society, or of any component part of society, as the State, family or any systematized human institution and or any field of knowledge dealing with human society, as Economics, History, Sociology, Education, Politics, Ethics, etc. However, so far as the Economics as a subject is concerned, that needs to be looked into by the respondent-department, if they find Social Science degree at par with Commerce degree based on the certain subject as this Court is not a position to decide the case in favour of the petitioner based on the aforesaid analogy, for the reason that the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the case of Muhammad Sadiq and others v. University of Sindh and another [PLD 1996 SC 182], established that High Courts cannot act as appellate bodies over statutory decisions regarding qualification recognition. The authority designated by law holds the exclusive power to determine if a qualification meets specific requirements. This principle extends to the understanding that, as per recruitment rules, social science degrees are not equivalent to commerce degrees. Furthermore, the equivalence assigned by external bodies, such as universities or government agencies, is not binding on specialized statutory bodies like the Pakistan Engineering Council (PEC). For example, the PEC is not obligated to accept a university's classification of certain science degrees as engineering qualifications. In the case of Fida Hussain v. The Secretary, Kashmir Affairs and Northern Affairs Division, Islamabad [PLD 1995 SC 701], the Supreme Court clarified the distinct roles of the government and the PEC. While the government retains the power to determine the suitability of civil servant qualifications for promotion, the PEC holds the sole authority to equate academic degrees. However, the PEC's authority is limited to degree equivalence; it cannot dictate government promotion policies. Essentially, the government decides who gets promoted, and the PEC decides if two degrees are academically equivalent. Therefore, the argument that possessing a similar qualification in commerce or economics automatically makes a candidate eligible, even if he/she does not meet the advertised requirements, is without merit.

7. The second issue is whether a probationary employee can be terminated during his probation period without a stated reason. This issue has already been definitively addressed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Agha Salim Khurshid's case [1998 SCMR 1930], which clarified the scope and rights of a 'probationer,' such as the petitioner in this case. The ratio decidendi of the referenced judgment establishes that if a probationary employee's termination is not due to misconduct, there's no legal requirement to provide reasons or conduct a formal inquiry. Essentially, probationary employees cannot claim the right to a show-cause notice based on the principle of audi alteram partem before termination/discharge from service, as this contradicts the very nature of probation period. To further clarify this point, we refer to the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Rizwana Altaf v. Chief Justice High Court of Sindh and others [2020 SCMR 1401].

8. The fundamental purpose of probation is to assess a new employee's ability and potential to succeed within the organization and to determine if his/her services will benefit the employer. We are of the view that probation provides a mutual evaluation period, allowing both the employer and employee to decide if continued employment is desired. This understanding of probation, when applied for a reasonable duration, cannot be considered discriminatory. Only upon successful completion of the probation period, deemed satisfactory by both parties, should an employee's service be considered for confirmation. The Supreme Court, in the case of Muhammad Iqbal Khan Niazi v. Lahore High Court through Registrar [2003 PLC (C.S.) 282], has affirmed this principle. Case laws cited by the counsel for the petitioner are of no help to him due to peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case.

9. Based on the principles established in the aforementioned Supreme Court judgments, this petition is deemed inadmissible at this stage and is, therefore, dismissed with pending application(s). UN/D-5/Sindh Petition dismissed.