P L D 1967 Lahore 1126 (PLP)

pate of hearing: 8th March 1967, This is a petition by Bashir Ahmad under section 561‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of proceedings pending against him in the Court of the Special Judge, Multan under section 161, P. P. C., read with section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.

2. On the 28th of November 1963, the petitioner is alleged to have demanded and obtained a sum of Rs. 10 as illegal gratification from one Alaf Din, son of Allah Bakhsh, for returning the security papers required for Hajj application of his maternal uncle Ghulam Muhammad. On this a raid was organised under the supervision of Mr. M. D. Rafique, Section 30 Magistrate who reported that the tainted currency note was thrown by the petitioner on the floor in his presence and he took the note in question into possession from the floor. A case under section 161, P. P. C. and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, was registered against him. After investigation of the case, the papers were placed before the District Anti‑Corruption Committee, which decided that the official be dealt with departmentally in the first instance. A departmental inquiry was held. The petitioner having been found guilty, the competent authority ordered that his increment should be stopped for two years with future cumulative effect. This punishment was imposed on the 22nd of July 1965. On the 24th of August 1966, the Deputy Commissioner Multan accorded sanction to the prosecution of the petitioner under section 161, P. P. C. and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. A case was put in Court against him. He has challenged the competency of the criminal case proceeding against him on the ground that having been punished already, he could not be tried for the offence as it would mean double punishment to him. His learned counsel relies on section 26 of the General Clauses Act, which reads as under:‑ "Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence." It is contended by reference to fifthly of section 53, P. P. C., that as his increment was stopped for two years, it amounts to forfeiture of property and he cannot be punished again. I am unable to give effect to the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner since the petitioner was only dealt with departmentally in the inquiry for misconduct and not for an offence. He was imposed a penalty for misbehaviour, which though amounting to punishment, was not a conviction for an offence. He is now being proceeded against for the offence that was alleged to have been committed by him and no authority has been produced before me on his behalf that if a person has been proceeded against departmentally and has been punished, the offence which he may also have committed stands purged and no longer remains triable or punishable in a regular Court in accordance with the law. The learned counsel appearing for the State has on the other hand referred me to S. A. Venkataraman v. Union: of India and another (A I R 1954 S C 375), which interpreted Article 20(2) of the Indian Constitution. It was held that: "The language of Article 20 and the words actually used in Article 20(2) afford a clear indication that the proceedings in connection with the prosecution and punishment of a person must be in the nature of a criminal proceeding before a Court of law or judicial tribunal and not before a tribunal, which entertains a departmental or an administrative enquiry even though set up by a statute, but which is not required by law to try a matter judicially and on legal evidence. It is true that the Commissioner appointed to make an enquiry under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 is invested with some of the powers of a Court, particularly in the matter of summoning witnesses and compelling the production of the documents and the report, which he has to make, has to be made on legal evidence adduced under sanction of oath and tested by cross‑examination; but from these facts alone the conclusion does not necessarily follow that an enquiry made and concluded under the Act amounts to prosecution and punishment for an offence as contemplated by Article 20(2) of the Constitution." It was further held that in order to enable a citizen to invoke the protection of clause (2) of Article 20 of the Constitution there must have been both prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence. The words "prosecuted and punished" are to be taken not distributively so as to mean prosecuted or punished. Both the factors must co‑exist in order that the operation of the clause may be attracted. The Supreme Court of India took a similar view in Maqbool Husain v. State of Bombay (A I R 1953 S C 325). What is more relevant is that in A. M. S. Muhammad Qasim v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise Madurai (A I R 1962 Mad. 85), a Full Bench held that "the imposition of a civil penalty such as confiscation or seizure or a penal tax by the administrative agencies employed to implement the law relating to income‑tax, customs etc., will not thereby absolve the transgressor from liability to criminal prosecution, if he is liable upon those identical facts Such imposition of civil penalties will not amount to a conviction and sentence under the criminal law in any sense, so as to attract the application of the doctrine of `double jeopardy'." I, therefore, see no force in this contention.

3. It was secondly contended that as the offence was committed as far back as 1963, it could not be prosecuted in 1966 or 1967. This contention is also misconceived, because there is no period of limitation for the prosecution of the offender. In M. S. Khawaja v. The State (P L D 1965 S C 267), it was held that the view that time is of the essence for the competency of a criminal prosecution cannot be accepted as of universal application. Limitation does not apply to criminal prosecutions and it is also inappropriate to examine questions of delay through the actions of the Government or the prosecution authorities as if they gave rise to equities on the same footing as in a civil matter inter partes. Every prosecution for a criminal offence is to be deemed to have been commenced and continued in the public interest as "a duty of the State."

4. For the reasons stated above, there is no force in this petition, which is dismissed. A. H. Petition dismissed.