P L D 1991 Supreme Court 246 (PLP)

MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, C.J.‑ These appeals through leave of the Court are directed against the judgment dated 13‑3‑1975 of the High Court; whereby the appellant's settlement appeals were dismissed as time‑barred. The facts as narrated from the appellant's side are that the properties involved were transferred to the respondents under the laws relating to settlement of displaced persons. The Evacuee Trust Board riled petitions under section 4(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 for declaration that these properties were attached to Lakhshmi Narain Mandar. A Settlement Commissioner vide order dated 16‑10‑1967 dismissed these petitions. The order was not announced in presence of the parties. The appellant Department came to know of the order on 24‑11‑1967 and applied for the copies on the same day. The copies were delivered on 18‑12‑1967 and the Settlement Appeals under section 4(4) of the said Act were filed on 16‑1‑1968 i.e. within 30 days of the said date of delivery of the copies of the order. When the appeals came up for hearing they were dismissed as time‑barred on the ground that the period of 30 days for filing of appeals is from the date of the knowledge i.e. 24‑11‑1967. However, it was held that the appellant was not entitled to the exclusion of the time spent in obtaining the copies nor the plea of the appellant that Section 5 was attracted, was accepted. Leave to appeal was granted to consider: whether, the time spent by the appellant in obtaining copy of the order of the Settlement Commissioner dated 16‑10‑1967 could be allowed for computing the period of limitation for riling an appeal in the High Court. Tahir Ali and others v. Chief Judge, Karachi Small Causes Court and another (PLD 1963 SC 147) was noticed when granting leave to appeal. The High Court relied on Chairman Evacuee Trust Property v. Muhammad Din (PLD 19.71 Lah. 217). It was held therein as follows ‑‑ "Sections 5 and 12 have specifically been made applicable to the appeals competent under section 19 alone. The intention of the Legislature to exclude the application of the Limitation Act with regard to the appeals under subsection (4) of Section 4 is clear inasmuch as if they had intended that it should apply, there was no limitation on their power to make a provision similar to that of subsection (3) of section

19. No maxim of law is of more general and uniform application than expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a maxim meaning "express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another". It is never more applicable than in the construction and interpretation of statutes (Broom Leg. Max.) whenever a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular form, it necessarily includes in itself a negative, viz. that the thing shall not be done otherwise. The expression of a condition excludes the doing of the act authorised, under other circumstances than those so defined. It is, indeed, a principle of logic of common sense, and not merely a technical rule of construction. We are, therefore, clear in our mind that the provisions under section 5 of the Limitation Act do not reach subsection (4) of section 4 of the Act. The appeals since they were preferred after the expiry of 30 days from the date of knowledge are time‑barred." . The view held in the Lahore case of 1971 was dissented from in a judgment from Sindh High Court District Evacuee Trust Committee, Hyderabad v. Lakhano and 2 others (PLD 1973 Note 19 at Page 30). Learned counsel for the appellant also cited Syed Faiz Ali Shah v. Chief Administrator of Auqaf (PLD 1974 SC 17), Wali Muhammad and others v. Wali Muhammad and another PLD 1974 SC 56 and Ghulam Hussain Shah v. Ghulam Muhammad PLD 1974 SC 344 to support his contention, that under section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act provisions contained in section 12 thereof would be attracted to the appeals riled under section 4(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. Learned counsel for the appellant also cited Ramdutt Ramkissen Dass v. E.D.Sassoon & Co. (AIR 1929 P.C. 103). The question involved is: whether, section 29 of the Limitation Act would permit the application of secdon 12 of the Limitation Act to the appeals under section 4(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. Section 29 reads as follows. "29. (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect Section 25 of the Contract Act, 1872. (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that Schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law ‑‑ (a) the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply. (3) Nothing in this Act shall apply to suits under the Divorce Act. (4) Sections 26 and 27 and the definition of 'easement' in section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in territories to which the Easements Act, 1882, may for the time being extend." It is not denied that the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act is a special law and sub‑clause (a) of subsection (2) of section 29 would be attracted. It is also not denied that the period of limitation provided in the Limitation Act and the special law are different. The essential condition for application of section 29(2) thus stands satisfied. Accordingly, sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 would straightaway become applicable to Appeals under section 4(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act. And section 12 of the Limitation Act relating to exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining copies would thus become applicable. The reasoning in the Lahore case of 1971 missed one important point. Accordingly, with respect correct conclusion with regard to section 12 was not reached. It is true as held therein that for the appeals provided under section 19 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, it is specifically provided in subsection (3) thereof that sections 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act shall apply in computing the period of 15 days provided in the said section. From this it was assumed that if the application of sections 5 and 12 was intended by the legislature, to appeals under subsection (4) of section 4, similar provision would have been made therein. Thus, it was ~through this indirect reasoning that on application of the maxim relied upon in the Lahore High Court judgment, it was thought that what had not been expressly provided in section 4 was excluded. In nutshell the entire reasoning leads to one conclusion that although the application of section 12 was not expressly excluded regarding appeals under subsection (4) of section 4, it would be deemed to have been excluded on account of the application of a maxim and by reference to the provision of section 19 and thus section 12 would be impliedly excluded. In this reasoning the use of the word "expressly' in clause (a) of subsection (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act was not given due importance. Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 as provided therein %hall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law". Thus, in order to avoid application of the said provisions of the Limitation Act including section 12 the exclusion by a special or local law had to be express. And as there is no such express exclusion, their application could not have been excluded by implication as implied exclusion is not visualised. One of us (Mr. Justice Muhammad Afzal Zullah) was a party to the judgment in the Lahore case of 1971. The fact that he was not the author thereof will not make any difference. The rule laid down therein regarding section 12 as now discussed and discovered is with respect, not correct and to the extent indicated above has to be overruled and the Karachi view of 1973 is upheld/approved. That being so, section 12 of the Limitation Act is attracted to the appeals filed before the High Court in these cases. The judgment impugned before the High Court was not announced in presence of the parties instead it was ordered therein that the parties were to be informed. There is no rebuttal of the assertion from the appellant's side that the appellant came to know of the judgment impugned before the High Court on 24‑11‑1967 which would be presumed to be the date thereof for him. If that is the starting point and if as held above the time requisite for obtaining the copies is allowed, the appeals would have to be treated as within time. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. All these cases are remanded to the High Court for fresh decision on merits of the appeals, which shall be deemed to be pending before it. AA./C‑73/S Appeals allowed.