P L D 1954 Lahore 720 (PLP)

RAHMAN, J.‑This is a revision petition presented on behalf of Muhammad Aslam Khan who has been declared to be a dangerous goonda under section 13 of the Punjab Control of Goondas Act, 1951, (hereinafter referred as the Act). The Tribunal which made the declaration consisted of the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police, Campbellpur. The revision petition came up for hearing before one of us sitting in Single Bench. It was considered that some important questions of law arose in the case, which called for adjudication by a larger Bench. This Bench was, therefore, constituted to hear the revision. It is provided by section 18 of the Act that no appeal shall lie from any order made by a Tribunal functioning under the Act, but that in relation to an order passed inter alia under section 13 the High Court may call for the record of the case, and if the Tribunal appears‑ (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law ; (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally,‑ the High Court may make such direction as it may deem sufficient for the rectification of the error or omission and the Tribunal shall conduct itself accordingly. Section 24 of the Act further lays down that no proceedings taken or orders passed under the Act, shall be called in question other wise than as provided in the Act itself. Section 25 of the Act declares that the provisions of the Act and any order made or action taken thereunder would have effect notwith standing anything inconsistent therewith, contained in any other enactment for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such other enact ment. The grievance sought to be made out on behalf of the petitioner is that the Tribunal in this case did not disclose the name of a single witness examined during the enquiry, to the petitioner, that the entire evidence was recorded in camera in the absence of the petitioner and his counsel and that the provisions of section 8 of the Act were not complied with by the Tribunal inasmuch as the petitioner was not supplied with a copy of such portion of the informa tion laid before the Tribunal under section 7as was not to be kept secret. The short answer to this contention is provided by section 7 itself. Subsection (1) of that section authorises a Tribunal to take cognizance of a case only on information laid before it by a Police Officer, not lower in rank than an officer‑in‑charge of a police station, who has taken part in the investigation of the case. Subsection (2) empowers the officer laying the information, if he thinks fit to enclose any of the particulars mentioned in the first sub section, in a sealed cover and to request that the same may be kept secret. It is further laid down in this subsection that on such a request being made, the Tribunal shall order that such particulars shall not be disclosed at any stage of the enquiry and that the names and particulars of witnesses cited in support of the allegations contained in the information shall not be disclosed until such time as such witnesses are produced in evidence ; provided that if the said officer or the person conducting the prosecution before the Tribunal desires that the name of any witness may not be disclosed at all, the Tribunal shall order accordingly. This is a very comprehensive provision and gives ample powers to the Tribunal to withhold all information which the Police Officer mentioned in the section may desire to keep secret. In the present case such a request was made by the officer laying information before the Tribunal and the latter consequently could not be said to have exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering accordingly. Moreover, under section 6 (1) (c), a Tribunal may, inter alia, by written order for reasons to be stated in writing, record the statement of any witness in the absence of the person complained of and his counsel. Such an order exists on the file and the Tribunal has com mitted to writing certain reasons for that order. It would, therefore, follow that in this respect also the order passed was not ultra vires of the Tribunal. Mr. Tasadduq Husain on behalf of the petitioner tried to argue that this Court could go into the sufficiency and reasonableness of the grounds on which the Tribunal thought it fit to exclude the accused and his counsel while recording evidence in camera. He took his stand on the fact that section 4 (2) of the Act declared the proceedings to be judicial in character within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. He tried to make out that the Tribunal was a Court subject to the criminal revisional jurisdiction of this Court. Learned counsel has not been able to cite any authority to show that the Tribunal functioned as a Court or has all the incidents of a Court. In any case, it is a special Tribunal created by the Legislature, for the first time, to perform certain functions which did not fall within the purview of the ordinary courts previously. It cannot be said, therefore, unless the Act itself so provides, that there B would be any power in this Court to revise the orders passed by the Tribunal under the Cr. P. C. Even if it is a Court, it is a Court of special jurisdiction and this Court has been given only restricted powers of revision under section 18 of the Act. Unless learned counsel can bring his grievance. within the narrow confines of that section he would be out of Court. He cited certain authorities relating to orders passed by Subordinate Criminal Courts, which have no direct relevancy to the point raised in this case. We are unable to hold in these circumstances that the Tribunal either exercised jurisdiction not 'vested by law or failed to exercise any jurisdic tion so vested or acted in the exercise of that jurisdiction illegally. The contention consequently fails and cannot be acceded to. Mr. Tasadduq Hussain then suggested that he could attack the order of the Tribunal as passed with ulterior motives and having no genuine relation to the grounds mentioned in section

13. He attempted to bring the case within the habeas corpus rule as embodied in section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was pointed out to the learned counsel that section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contemplated some sort of custody to which a petitioner was subjected, but here no question of custody arose and consequ ently the rule of habeas corpus would not be attracted to the case. The learned counsel had to concede that this was the correct position. The next grievance put forward on behalf of the petitioner was that he had submitted a list of 62 D. Ws. to the Tribunal, out of which only 8 were summoned and three of the latter were also not examined, being M. L. As. who were attending the Budget Session of the Punjab Legislative Assembly at the relevant time. We cannot see, however, that the petitioner should have any legitimate cause for complaint in this behalf. There is a note on the file to the effect that the petitioner closed his defence evidence, after examining five witnesses. It does not now lie in his mouth to urge that his defence had not been recorded in full. It was then contended that the procedure adopted was illegal inasmuch as, while the case was at the defence stage, a Court witness in the person of Lady Doctor Salima Akhtar, was called and examined in camera, in the absence of the petitioner and his counsel. It was contended that the petitioner was not informed of the contents of her statement and was given no opportunity to explain the evidence she gave against him. It, this connection reference was made to Notification No. 4467‑HG-51-34787, dated the 9th June 1951, which promulgated rule No. 5 under the Act. This read with section 10 of the Act, according to the learned counsel, made it clear that the Tribunal had to apply warrant‑case procedure to the trial, as in a summary case. The petitioner should, therefore, have been given opportunity to explain the evidence of the Court witness against him, under section 342 of the Cr. P. C. Section 11 of the Act appears to confer power on the Tribunal to summon at any time and examine a person who, in its opinion, is capable of giving information relevant to any matter under enquiry. The provisions of clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 6 have to be read along with this section and it follows that the procedure adopted by the Tribunal could not be described as illegal. As to the complaint that the petitioner was not offered an opportunity to meet the version of Dr. Salima Akhtar, we are convinced that the petitioner was not prejudiced in his defence, as at the end of the prosecution case he was put certain questions by the Tribunal and in one of them it was specifically mentioned that Dr. Salima Akhtar had made allegations of a serious character against his conduct. The petitioner, therefore, knew perfectly well what case he had to meet. Mr. Tasadduq Hussain frankly conceded that he was unable to attack the vires of the Act itself. He thought that the enactment, though its provisions may work harshly in some cases, was not beyond the powers of the Legislature to enact. No other point was taken before us in this petition which fails and is hereby dismissed. A. H. Petition dismissed.