P L D 1964 Dacca 48 (PLP)

SALAHUDDIN AHMED, J.‑The petitioner have obtained the present Rule nisi calling upon Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to show cause why a writ of mandamus or an appropriate writ of like nature should not be issued directing them to rescind, withdraw or cancel the orders of requisition dated 21st September 1960, in L. A. Case No. 15/60‑61(4) made by the Deputy Commissioner of Khulna, and served on the two petitioners.

2. The impugned orders related to C. S. Plot Nos. 1351, 1353, 1354‑1358 and 1352/1423 of Monza Debnagar P. S. Daulatpur, in the District of Khulna, which the petitioner claim as owners. The petitioners aver that they are Mohajirs of India having migrated to Pakistan in 1950 and that they have since settled down in Pakistan and have acquired its nationality. They have been carrying on business in jute and jute bailing under the name and style of Messrs Faiz Ahmed & Co. and with a view to expand their business they acquired certain lands including the aforesaid C. S. Plots. The petitioners stated that subsequently for the purpose of expansion of their business and further investment they sold out of their aforesaid lands a plot measuring 82 decimals. At the instance of respondent No.3 (Daulatpur Traders & Co. Ltd. P. S. Daulatpur, Khulna), lands comprised in the C. S. Plot numbers mentioned above were requisitioned by an order, dated 21‑9‑60 under section 3 of the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, 1948 (hereinafter called the said Act) for a public purpose. The said order of requisition, directed the petitioner to place requisitioned lands at the disposal of respondent No. 3 (The Deputy Commis sioner, Khulna) with effect from 24‑9‑

60. Against this order of requisitlon, the petitioners preferred an appeal before the Com missioner of Khulna which was dismissed on 9‑10‑

61. The petitioners have averred that the order of requisition is illegal, inasmuch as it has not been passed or signed by the Deputy Commissioner and also as it does not disclose or specify any clear or definite purpose. The petitioners further state that the requisition is for the aggrandisement of private parties who are rivals of the petitioners in trade and, is, therefore, mala fide and not for a public purpose. The petitioners further averred that they themselves proposed to set up a jute press.

3. On behalf of the respondents, two sets of affidavits‑in -opposition have been filed, respondents Nos. I and 2 in their joint affidavit and Respondent No. 3 in a separate affidavit have traversed the statements made by the petitioners. The sum and substance of their affidavits is that the order of requisition has been legally made for a public purpose and in public interest, namely, construction of godowns for storing jute and establish ment of pucca jute press by respondent No. 3 which is a well- established limited company registered in Pakistan and doing bona fide business in jute export. It is further said that although the requisition has been made at the instance, and for a public purpose. It was also said that the petitioners, who could not produce satisfactory evidence of their Pakistani nationality, have been doing merely `aratdari' business in jute. The petitioners have sold out a portion of their lands and one of them, namely Faiz Ahmed, sold out his only jute godown in Daulatpur. They have also been trying to sell all other lands as well. Antecedents of the petitioners show that they have no desire, much less any plan, to set up a pucca jute press in East Pakistan, nor have they means to do so. On the contrary, respondent No. 3 is a well‑established firm of East Pakistan and is able to construct jute godowns and pucca jute press. After due enquiries it was found that the petitioners did not utilise their land for any useful purpose but allowed them to remain vacant. The order of requisition was made after a thorough enquiry which was attended by the petitioners.

4. At the hearing of the Rule, it was contended, in the first place, on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned order was bad, because no specific purpose had been mentioned in the said order. Although section 3 of the Act provides that the District Magistrate, which includes Deputy Commissioner, may requisition any property for a public purpose or in public interest, there is no provision in the Act which makes it obligatory that the purpose of the requisition shall be mentioned in the order of requisition itself. It is, however, advisable that the purpose of the order of requisition should be set out in the order to examine whether the said purpose would amount to a public purpose. In certain circumstances the failure to set out the purpose of the order may be a good piece of evidence to show that the order was not made in good faith. If however, from the materials put before a Court it transpires that the purpose of the impugned order amount to a public purpose, the mere fact that it was not so set out in the order will not of itself vitiate the order. Irrespective of the fact whether any specific public purpose is mentioned in the order or not a Court is entitled to consider the question whether the property has been. in fact, requisitioned for a public purpose or in public interest. In the case of Mr. Nur Hussain v. Province of East Pakistan and others (P L D 1960 Dacca .31), a Division Bench of this Court, following certain decisions of India Courts, namely, the case of State of Bombay v. Bhauji Munji and another (AIR 1955 S C 41) and the case of Satya Narayan Nathani v. State of West Bengal and another (A I R 1957 Cal. 310), has held that although it is desirable to mention a particular purpose in the notice of requisition, the non‑mention of the specific purpose for which the property is being requisitioned, does not ipso facto vitiate the order of requisition if it is found, as a matter of fact, that the requisition is for a particular public purpose. The materials on record clearly show that the object of the requisition in the present case was to enable respondent No. 3 to set up a pucca jute godowns. Considering the socio‑economic condition of our country, there is no doubt that the purpose of requisition mentioned above is a public purpose and is in public interest generally, apart from the profit which the proposed object may bring to an individual or to a corporate body. It has been averred by the respondents that the setting up of a pucca jute press is in furtherance of development of commerce and industry of East Pakistan for which top priority has been given in the second five year‑plan sponsored by the Government of Pakistan. We have, therefore, no doubt whatsoever that the requisition has, in fact, been made for a public purpose.

5. It was next argued on behalf of the petitioners that there is no valid order of requisition inasmuch as the impugned order was not made or signed by the requisitioning authority, namely, the Deputy Commissioner. This matter has been traversed by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 who have categorically stated that the order was, in fact, passed by the Deputy Commissioner. This statement is supported by the records placed before us by the learned Advocate‑General. On a reference to these records it is also cleat that the order of requisition was legally served upon the petitioners by leaving an authentic copy of notice of requisition with an adult member of the petitioners' family. The said copy of the notice of the requisition has been annexed to the petition and the annexure clearly shows that it is an authentic copy of the said order of requisition. There is, therefore, no substance in this contention as well.

6. The petitioners have further contended that the requisition of the said land for Respondent No. 3 is male fide and not for a public purpose, inasmuch as the requisition is for the benefit of private persons, namely, Mansur Ali and his group who are rivals of the petitioners in trade. It is true that the requisition has been made at the instance and for the benefit of respondent No. 3 to enable it to set up a jute godown and a pucca jute press; but it is common knowledge that the economy and property of Pakistan depends to a great extent on Jute industry and any measure to develop this industry through private or official agency is for a public purpose and in public interest generally. Besides, the antecedents of the petitioners in the matter of their jute business show that they were never serious about their business. They were doing merely `aratdar' business and far from promoting their business, they sold out their only jute godown. On the other hand, as a result of an enquiry by a competent authority, it has been found that respondent No. 3 is a bona fide registered firm doing business in jute for a pretty long time and capable of setting up a pucca jute press in East Pakistan. We accept the statements made by respondent No. 3 in its affidavit‑in‑opposition that it is exporter of jute while the petitioners are `aratdars'. It is, therefore, obvious that there is no question of rivalary between the petitioners and respondent No.

3. From the material on record, we are satisfied that the requisition has been made in good faith and for a public purpose.

7. In view of a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Abdus Sobhan v. Province of East Pakistan ((1962) 14 D L R 486). We also thought it fit to investigate the question whether the requisition was genuine and legal and not merely a camouflage for acquisition under the Act. On an examination of the records placed before us by the learned Advocate‑General, we are satisfied that the land and question was urgently required and, therefore, it had to be requisitioned to meet an immediate necessity. It does not appear from the records that the requisitioned properties were ever proposed to be acquired. On behalf of respondent No. 3 it was pointed out to us that the proposed pucca jute press could be dismantled and recovered. It was further more argued that a pucca jute press could be established on a land which may be possessed for a number of years and that, thereafter, the same may be removed elsewhere. We cannot, in these circumstances, held that the purpose of the impugned order was to acquire the property in question. We are, therefore, satisfied that the requisition has been made bona fide and for a pressing necessity. In conclusion we would like to refer to a matter in regard to which there seems to be considerable misconception which we think should be dispelled and set at rest once for all. It is not a condition precedent that the applicant for writ must be citizen of Pakistan. We know of no law which debars a person who is not a national of Pakistan from owning properties in Pakistan. and subsequently unless there is a specific status which debars a non‑national from obtaining relief by way of writ there can be no question that he can maintain an application for an appropriate writ and obtain relief thereon if he is so entitled. The Rule is, therefore, discharged for reasons set out above. MUR SHED, J.‑I agree. S. B./K. B. A. Rule discharged.