P L D 1963 Supreme Court 147 (PLP)

(a) the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." In view of the above provisions of section 29, the learned Judges of the High Court held that the Karachi Rent Restriction Act being a special Act, the provisions of section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act would apply. But in their view the petitions for revision under subsection 11 E R X H L C 703 of section 15 of the Act could not be regarded as being included within the terms "appeal or review of judgment" occurring in section 12 (2) and hence they held that the Chief Judge had not acted illegally in refusing to give the benefit of section 12 (2) to the landlords. In this view of the matter they dismissed the writ petitions. It is not and cannot be disputed that the Rent Restriction Act is a special Act. The period of 30 days has been prescribed under subsection 11 E R X H L C 703 of section 15 of the Act as a period of limitation under the special law. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that in view of the provisions of section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act, the time during which they were procuring a copy of the order of Rent Controller was not to be reckoned as part of the period of 30 days which was prescribed by subsection 11 E R X H L C 703 of section 15 of the Act. To this it was answered on behalf of the respondents that section 12 (2) was not attracted to revision. Hence the short question for consideration in this appeal is whether the expression `appeal' in section 12 (2) has been used in a restrictive sense so as to exclude a revision petition. Upon construction of the word `appeal' used in section 12 (2) there has been divergence of judicial opinion. Some of the Courts in India adopted a restricted construction of the word `appeal' and laid down emphatically that it does not include revision. On the other hand some of the Courts construed the expression in a broader sense. There is, however, plainly no such preponderance in either direction so as to render it clear that there is any settled course of decisions on this question. The word `appeal' has not been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. In Wharton's Law Lexicon `appeal' has been defined as "The judicial examination of the decision by a higher Court of the decision of an inferior Court". In The Attorney‑General v. H. J. Sillem and others 11 E R X H L C 703 Lord Westbury described an appeal in these terms: "An appeal is the right of entering a Superior Court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of the Court below." Story in his work on the Constitution, (Vol. II) has pointed out that the characteristic of an appeal is a revision of a judicial proceeding of an inferior Court so that the mode in which the power is exercised is wholly immaterial. In the case of Nagendar Nath De v. Suresh Chandra De (59 1 A 283) the question as to what amounted to an appeal' under Article 1252 (2) of the Limitation Act arose. The following obser vations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in that case are both suggestive and significant "There is no definition of `appeal' in the Civil Procedure Code, but their Lordships have no doubt that any application by a party to an appellate Court asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a Subordinate Court, is an `appeal' within the ordinary acceptation of the term, and that it is no less an appeal because it is irregular or incompetent." This view also finds support from the observation of ire Judicial Committee in Raja of Ramnad v. Kamid Rowthen and others (53 1 A 74). Their Lordships while referring to civil revision Petition observed: "From the judgment an appeal in the form appropriate to such a case from the Munsif's Court i.e. a Civil Revision petition was preferred to the High Court of Madras." From the above it is clear that the remedy, which has been given to the aggrieved party by way of revision, does not differ in essence from a right of appeal. It is true that under the Code of Civil Procedure a distinction has been made between a revision petition' and an appeal. Under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure a revision petition only lies where an appeal does not lie. But here we are dealing with a revision petition, which had been filed under a special Act, namely Rent Restriction Act, 1953. It cannot be said that the special Act deals with revision petitions in the same sense as it is used in the Code of Civil Procedure. In this Act, before the amendment of 1962, there was no provision for appeal. The only remedy available to an aggrieved party against the order of Rent Controller was to file a petition before the Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court, Karachi to whom the power of revision had been delegated by the Central Government. At the relevant time subsection (1) of section 15 reads as follows: "The Central Government may on an application to be made within 30 days of any order made by the Rent Controller under this Act call for the record for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of the order and as to the regularity of the proceedings, if any, in which the order was made, and may pass such order thereon as it deems fit, and may stay the order of eviction pending the hearing and disposal of the matter." Thus the revision provided in the above subsection has all the characteristics of an appeal. In other words the revisional power under this Act is not subject to any specified restrictions like those mentioned in section 115, C. P. C. It is therefore clear that the word revision in this Act has not been used in the same sense as what is technically known as a revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such was the intention of the Legislature is also clarified by the recent amendment of the Act. By amendment of 1962 section 15 has been replaced completely, and the present sub section 15 (1) is as follows "Any party aggrieved by an order passed by a Controller may, within 30 days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the District Judge, Karachi or to such other judicial officer as may be empowered by the Provincial Govern ment to hear such appeals." For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the word `appeal' occurring in section 12 (2) should be construed in a broad sense so as to include a revision under the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953. Lastly it was contended that subsection (1) of section 15 of the Act did not require that the application should be accompanied by a copy of the judgment and order and therefore, the exclusion provided by section 12 (2) did not apply. A similar question arose in Jijibhoy N. Surti v. T. S. Chettyar (A I R 1928 P C 103) and it was held that in reckoning the time for presenting an application, the time required for obtaining a copy of the decree and judgment must be excluded, even though by the rules of the Court it was not necessary to obtain such copies. For the reasons given in the above case we are also unable to uphold this contention of the respondents. These appeals, therefore, should be allowed, and the cases remitted to the Chief Judge, Small Causes Court, Karachi to be heard on merits. The appellants will have the costs of these appeals. A. H. Appeals allowed.