1999 PLP 1511 (CLC)

(3) Whether the description of the suit property is incorrect, if so, what is the correct description? (4) Whether the suit is time‑barred? (5) Whether this Court lacks jurisdiction to try this suit? (6) Whether the suit is bad for non joinder of necessary parties? (7) Whether the plaintiff is owner of the disputed property measuring five Marlas in possession of the defendants Nos. l and 27? (8) Relief.

2. Parties produced their oral as well as documentary evidence and after evaluating the same the suit of the petitioner/plaintiff was decreed by the learned Civil Judge, Tehsil Mailsi District Vehari vide judgment and decree, dated 22‑12‑1979. Respondents preferred an appeal in the Court of District Judge, Vehari, which was entrusted to Mr. Muhammad Aslam Soomra, Additional District Judge, Vehari who vide his judgment and decree, dated 26‑1‑1981 accented the appeal and reversed the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. The learned lower Appellate Court while reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court set aside the findings on Issues Nos. 5 and

7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that in view of the admission of para. No. l of the plaint and the record of the Cooperative Society transfer of half portion of the Ehata in favour of the petitioner stands proved. The title of the petitioner was also supported by Chief Manager, Muhammad Afzal P.W.1 and Muhammad Nazeer, P.W.2 but in record of right the name of predecessor -in‑interest/respondent Imam Din is also mentioned. Learned counsel submits that the entries were not incorporated in accordance with law as no change could be taken in the Revenue Record without any appropriate order or without effecting any entry in the Mutation. The status of the respondents at the best is that of tres‑passer and they were mere licensee of the petitioner and no title is created in their, favour. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that the finding recorded on Issue No.5 by the learned Appellate Court is not correct as provision contained under section 32 of the Colonization of Government Land Act are not attracted and the findings that according to section 36 of the said Act the jurisdiction of Civil Court is specifically barred and the only competent Court which is empowered to dispose of such like matters is the Collector of the District is also against law. Learned counsel further, contended that the learned lower Appellate Court while deciding issue No.7 has also ignored the oral as well as documentary evidence produced before him and has misdirected himself in holding that the petitioner/plaintiff failed to prove that he was the sole allottee of the entire Ehata and that the defendant/respondents were licensee under them. Learned counsel has placed reliance on PLD 1964 (W.P.) Lah. 224 and AIR 1928 Lah. 121.

2. Learned counsel for the respondents states that the petitioner has failed to produce any proof about his entitlement and only Competent Authority according to sections 10 and 12 of the Colonization Government Land Act is Collector. He further, contended that possession of the defendants/respondents has been admitted even by P.W.2. Learned counsel further submits that respondents/defendants have admittedly constructed house over the land in dispute and they are in continuous possession of property in dispute and after promulgation of the Government Punjab Housing Act, 1975 target date being 20‑12‑1973, respondents being in the occupation much before that date, were entitled to the transfer of the same. He has also referred to the report of Local Commissioner in this behalf and contended that under provision of section 41 the suit was not competent. He further contended that the land being State land the petitioner has no right or title to claim the same.

3. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties at some length and perusal of the record I am of the view that learned Additional District Judge was legally justified while deciding Issues Nos.5 and 7 recorded this finding that Ehata in disputed still rests in the Provincial Government and proprietary right has not been granted to any person. The position of the plaintiff is till as a state tenant. It is not proved from the record that petitioner/plaintiff instituted the suit as claiming himself to be the owner of land. The claim of the petitioner before the learned trial Court was that petitioner being allottee from the Government Cooperative Society is entitled to retain the land but record shows that the dispute land was never transferred in the name of Housing Society as the same was still shown as a State land. The petitioner if at all was aggrieved then the proper forum for him was not the Civil Court as has been held in Ata Muhammad and others v. Mst. Khurshid Begum PLD 1964 (W.P.) Lah. 224:‑‑ "We now come to the last contention raised on behalf of the appellants, namely, that the plaintiff's suit was hit by section 36 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act. The section lays down that‑‑ 'A Civil Court shall not have jurisdiction in any matter of which the Collector is empowered by this Act to dispose and shall not take cognizance of the manner in which the Provincial Government or Collector or any other Revenue Officer exercise any power vested in it or in him by or under this Act'. It is contended that the question of cancelling the sale in favour of the defendants or their ejectment could clearly be dealt with by the Collector under section 32 of the Act and for that reason the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred. We do not see any merit in this contention for the reason that section 32 of the Act is intended clearly for a different purpose. The marginal heading of the section is; Powet of re‑entry in case of squatters and tres‑passers'. The body of this section is to the effect that‑‑

When the Collector is satisfied that any person has taken or is in possession of land in a Colony to which he has no right or title, the Collector may, in addition to any other powers he may possess, forthwith re‑enter upon the land and resume possession of it and take possession of all crops, trees and buildings thereon on behalf of the Crown without payment of any compensation whatsoever'. The language employed in this section clearly shows that the power vested in the Collector is to safeguard the interests of the State and to save State land from illegal occupation by sequesters and tres‑passers. The section is not intended to be operated for the benefit of one private party contending against another. In other words, any dispute regarding title between two private parties cannot be adjudicated upon under section 32 referred to above. That question one which can only be dealt with by a Civil Court." As in the light of the above it is an admitted fact that either the petitioner or respondents have got no title over the land in dispute and the petitioner claiming his possession being allottee from Cooperative Society, which fact has not been borne out from the record of the said Society. Both the petitioner as well as respondents are admittedly in possession and occupation of the same. The petitioner has also admitted this fact that the predecessor‑in- interest of the respondents was put in possession by him and 5 Marlas of land out of his possession was given to the defendants/respondents. At this late stage when the parties constructed their residential houses over the land in dispute and the title does not, vest in any of them, being State land, the finding recorded by the learned Appellate Court, on Issue No.7 is correct and the parties it at all aggrieved could settle their dispute before the Court of competent Jurisdiction i.e. Collector. I find no illegality and infirmity in the Judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge. The revision petition has no merits and the same is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs. H.B.T./Q‑18/L Revision petition dismissed.