1984 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

5. I refrain from giving any opinion on the two points raised by the learned counsel for the appellant because in my opinion, the appellant not being a `civil servant' cannot invoke our jurisdiction. The appellant's stand is that he is a civil servant and the learned counsel for State also supports this stand, though on different considerations. Moulvi Sirajul Haq, Advocate, however, stated before us that he is doubtful of the status of the appellant and perhaps he is to be treated as a "deputationist", so as to exclude him from the definition of the term "civil servant", occurring in the two statutes referred to above.

6. It is not disputed that .a person who is on deputation from a province to the Federation, is not a "civil servant", and as such he cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. The learned counsel for the appel lant has argued that to determine whether a person is on deputation or not, it must clearly be found whether there is an element of lending and borrowing between the two Governments. According to him, in the present case, the appellant was not borrowed by the Federal Government, but he was selected through an examination held for that purpose and then appointed in the Foreign Affairs Group. Further that, Provincial Government by itself had not lent him to the Federal Government nor the Federal Government had borrowed him from the Provincial Govern ment. The Government's stand, on the other hand, initially appeared to be that the appellant had severed his connection with the Provincial Government and was holding the post of Director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Federal Government, and as such, he was a "civil servant" for all purposes within the ambit of the definition given in the two statutes referred to above.

7. The term "deputation" has not been defined anywhere. Accord ing to the dictionary meaning, "deputation" means‑"act of deputing a person or persons ; deputed or appointed to transact business for another". Under the strict dictionary meaning, the appellant is not a "deputationist" because he was not appointed to work in place of any other person and also because there is no lending and borrowing between the two Govern ments. In my opinion, however, in the present case, the dictionary mean ing, in spite of absence of definition of the term, cannot be used to inter pret the word "deputation", occurring in the two statutes. No doubt, it is the foremost elementary rule of construction that words and phrases used in a statute are to be interpreted in their ordinary meaning, neverthe less that rule is not of universal application, the intention of the Legislature being the supreme consideration. Again the principle of literal construc tion does not apply to interpreting technical words, phrases and terms which are used in their technical meaning if they have acquired one. The word "technical" is broad enough to include the statute relating to service matters. In the case of Ram Adhar Singh v. State of Bihar (A I R 1954 Pat. 187), the Patna High Court had held that the words "dismissal, removal and reduction in rank", as occurring in Article 311 of the Indian Constitution are technical words. I entirely agree with this enunciation of law, and on the same analogy, my view is that the word "deputation" too is a technical word. Now it is an accepted principle of interpretation that when dealing with a particular profession or business, it shall be presumed that words and phrases are used with particular meanings in which they are used and understood in that particular profession or business. The same view was taken to case of Khanpur Textile Finishing Mills v. R. P. F. Commissioner (A I R 1955 Pb. 130). I may add that in such cases, the presumption would always be in favour of technical meaning unless the contrary intention is manifest. Again m cases where the word used has acquired a technical meaning, which is well‑known, then it has to be presumed that the Legislature used the word in that sense and with that meaning, rather than in the ordinary sense. For that purpose, we have to see as to what interpretation has been given to the term "deputation" or "deputationist" in matters relat ing to service. Fortunately, the establishment Division which deals with the terms and conditions of service of persons serving in connection with the affairs of the Federation, made the position clear in Establishment Volum I, page 389, Chapter IX, where under section A under the bead General, the following paragraph lays the guideline The same is repro duced hereunder :‑ "Hithertofore, the term "deputation" has not been formally defined. However, according to the practice in vogue, a Government servant begins to be regarded as a "deputationist" when he is appointed or transferred through the process of selection, to a post in a depart ment or service altogether different from the one to which he permanently' belongs. He continues to be placed in this category so long as he holds the new post in an officiating or a temporary capacity but ceases to be regarded as such either on confirmation in the new post or on reversion to his substantive post. . The term "deputationist" does not cover the case of a Government Servant who is appointed, within his own department or cadre in accordance with the rules of transfer applicable to his particular department or cadre, to a post other than the one on which he holds a lien." In my opinion, the above guideline which is in the nature of instructions has the force of law. For this conclusion, I would rely on the cases of Pakistan v. Shaikh Abdul Hameed (P L D 1961 S C 105), Province of West Pakistan v. Din Muhammad (P L D 1964 S C 21), Government or West Pakistan v. Dr. A. A. Aziz (P L D 1966 S C 188) and Habibur Rahman v. West Pakistan Public Service Commission (P L D 1973 S C 144). In the last mentioned case, the other cases were also taken into consideration, and it was observed that instructions embodied in the departmental memoranda operate as a rule.

8. To sum up the above discussion, I am of the opinion that though the term "deputation" has not been defined in the two relevant statutes, the same being technical term has to be understood in the sense in which it was understood by the authorities dealing with the service matters. The office memorandum, referred to above, clearly lays down the guideline for determining the status of a person as a "deputationist". The appellant being a confirmed employee of the Provincial Government and having a lien on the permanent post in the Province, would remain a "deputationist" with the Federal Government as long as he is not confirmed under the Federal Government, and his lien in the Provincial Govern ment is not terminated or unless he reverts to the Province. Though the respondent Government does not admit that the appellant has a lien in the Province, nevertheless, they have not been able to satisfy us that the appel lant who admittedly was confirmed in the Provincial Government agreed to the termination of his lien under that Government. In spite of being asked, no evidence was produced before us to show that the appellant, who admittedly was confirmed under the Provincial Government, lost his lien in accordance with the rules of service applicable in this respect.

9. In view of what has been stated above, I am of the opinion that the appellant being on deputation from the Province to the Federation, is not a "civil servant", and as such, he cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. The result is that we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction, leaving it for the appellant to approach the appropriate forum for remedying the wrong done to him. The Federal Government can also undo the wrong, if it so desires, by rescinding the order of retirement of the appellant and by reverting him to the Province, leaving it to the Governor to pass such order as he deems fit.

10. There shall be no' costs in this appeal. BRIG. (RETD.) ABDUR RASHID (MEMBER).‑It is true that the term deputationist has not been defined in law. However, it could not be denied that deputation implies, implicitly or explicitly, the element of borrowing and lending. In the instant case this important element is missing. This would mean that the appellant was not a deputationist because not only that there is no lending and borrowing in this case, the fact that he has been retired by the President under section 13 (ii) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, he has been, for all intents and purposes, treated as a civil servant within the meaning of the definition. This is as far as one position goes. However, in this situation our jurisdiction stands barred under section 13 (11) of P. C. O. 1981.

13. The other position, beneficial to the appellant, is that if he were treated as a deputationist, as is the essence of the above judgment, then the orders purported to have been passed by the competent authority in exercise of section 13 (ii) of the Civil Servants Act (Act LXXI 1973) must also be regarded as void ab initio. This would then lead us to the logical conclusion that since the appellant happened to be a confirmed employee of the Punjab Provincial Education Department; the Governor alone was competent to pass any orders be deemed appropriate. All that the Federal Government would in this situation be competent to do, was to revert the appellant to the Provincial Government.

14. Whether we take one position or the other, the fact of the matter is that the appellant has been rendered jobless. For the Federal Service Tribunal to say at this stage that the appeal is not competent and that we have no jurisdiction is tantamount to denial of justice to an aggrieved and talented civil servant even though legally this may be the position. Which ever forum, the appellant turned to now and it would, most probably, be Punjab Service Tribunal. his appeal may be dismissed as time‑barred. The appellant has to be saved from such a cul de sac and this is the way I look at the present appeal.

15. I am glad that the learned Chairman in his foregoing judgment has stated: "The Federal Government can also undo the wrong if it so desires by rescinding the order of retirement of the appellant and by reverting him to the Province, leaving it to the Governor to pass such order as he deems fit." I would build on this foundation and say that this is a fit case for resubmission to the President under section 23 of the Civil Servant Act, 1973 which reads as under :‑

"Saving.‑Nothing in this Act or in any rule shall be construed to limit or abridge the power of the President to deal with the case of any civil servant in such manner as may appear to him to be just and equitable; Provided that, where this Act or any rule is applicable to the case of a civil servant, the case shall not be dealt with in any manner less favourable to him than that provided by this Act or such rule." '

16. With the above addition, I concur to the judgment. A. E. Appeal dismissed.