P L D 1978 Lahore 382 (PLP)

(ii) If a relief under Order XXXTX, rules 1 and 2, C. P. C. is not available in view of the Supreme Court authority cited as 1974 S C M R 461. whether the souse relief carp be obtained on an application under section 151, C. P. C ?. " (iii) The amount of its. 79,155 recoverable from the petitioner is to be recovered as arrears of land revenue and whether it can be stayed in such proceeding because such amount is to be deposited under protest and then a suit is to be filed for the recovery of the same ? The learned counsel far the petitioner wanted time to examine the proposition of law.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued the case at length and has prayed for the grant of a stay order, and contended that the stay order must be granted in such circumstances because if Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2, C. P. C. is not applicable the provisions of section 1510 C. P. C.? can easily be invoked.??????????????

4. As far as the maintainability of the application under section 151, C. P. C. i.e. inherent power of the High Court is concerned, it may be stated that this power can be invoked only if it is necessary in the ends of just or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court but this power cannot be exercised where there is a specific prohibition of a particular act and the Court is not supposed to circumvent the prohibition in the exercise of ital inherent power. It has been laid down in Four Friends Construction Company v. Domes Borte, Chashma Barrage, Contractors etc. that unless the application is registered, as to suit the provision of Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2, C. P. C. is not applicable meaning thereby that by filing a suit In forma pauperis along with an application praying for the grant of permission to sue In forma pauperis the petitioner has no right to get any relief in the form of an ad interim injunction. A Court is not supposed to resort to inherent power in order to do something which is other contrary to what is laid down by the Code or which is intended to arm the Court with arbitrary powers. The Civil Procedure Code is exhaustive and comprehensive and there is no room for exercise of any additional jurisdiction under section 151, C. P. C. By the force of the authority of the Supreme Court quoted above no interim relief can be granted at the preliminary stage when permission to sue in forma pauperis has not been given to the plaintiff. The same object, which has been prohibited by the provision of the Code cannot be achieved by invoking inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The power under section 151, C. P. C, is intended to supplement the other provisions of the Code and not to evade) and ignore them so as to invent new procedure suitable to individual cases. In such circumstances, an application under section 151, C. P. C. is neither maintainable nor the dismissal of it is a case decided within the meaning of l section 115, C. P. C, So the revision petition is not maintainable. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Falah-ul-Mominees Trust v. V. P. Abdullah (P L D 19713 Kar. 179). Tire facts of this authority are not relevant because in this case it has been held that; "Courts have inherent jurisdiction to do all things necessary for administration of justice within scope of its jurisdiction." In this case, there was execution of a decree for ejectment and it was held that the Court could provide Police aid for the execution of the same on the ground that such power is incidental power necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction. So, in this authority, the basic principle has been recognised that the Court had the jurisdiction to order for the execution of the decree for ejectment or any incidental power essential to effectuate it even if there is no specific provision can be granted under section 151, C. P. C. in the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. This authority is not relevant. The learned counsel has also relied upon Qaim Din etc. v. Mistri Muhammad Ibrahim (P L D 1960 Lah. 260) which lays down that if the Court had declined jurisdiction on the erroneous assumption that it had no jurisdiction on the admitted facts to grant necessary relief, an application under section 151, C. P. C. can be filed and if no relief is given, tine revision is competent. This authority is also distinguishable and not relevant because, in this case sloe, it' the Court has declined jurisdiction on the erroneous assumption that it had no jurisdiction only then it will ire a case of jurisdictional defeat and revision is competent, but in the present case, the court has given cogent reason that the intended relief has b: en specifically prohibited and cannot be granted under Order .XXXIX, rules 1 and 2? C. P, C. and the same object cannot be achieved by a miscellaneous application under section 151, C. P. C. which, as stated above, is not competent. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon WAPDA through Chairman WAPDA, Lahore v. Muhammad Yaqoob (P L D 1973-Note 12 at p. 20). On the basis of this authority he has argued that the stay order could be granted either under Order XXXIX, or under sections 9:t and 151, C. P. C. According to his contention, if Order XXXIX is not applicable then stay could be granted under section 151, C. P. C. It has already been stated above that no such relief could be granted under Order XXXIX, C. P. C. If that relief cannot be granted the same cannot be given under section 151, C. P. C. The same observation has been given by the learned Judge of the High Court at page 21 of the above-mentioned authority, last para. which reads as under ;

Order XXXIX, rule 2, C. P. C. would not be applicable where the breach of contractual obligation had already taken place and there was no question of preventing it. The trial Court in such cases would have no jurisdiction to issue a mandatory injunction even under section 151, C. P. C." This authority does not advance the cause of the learned counsel but, to fact, goes against him. This case can be examined from another aspect. The petitioner is demanding stay order against the recovery of Rs. 79,155 which is to be recovered as arrears of land revenue. The jurisdiction of the civil Court extends to all suits of civil nature unless taken away by the Legislature in clear words. Section 91 of the Land Revenue Act reads as under;-- "

91. Remedies open to person denying his liability for an arrear.

(1) Notwithstanding anything in section 79 when proceedings are taken under this Act for the recovery of an arrear the person against whom the proceedings are taken may, if he denies his liability for the arrear or any part thereof and pays the same under protest made in writing at the time of payment and signed by him or his agent, institute a suit in a civil Court for the recovery of the amount so paid. (2) A suit under subsection (i) must be instituted in a Court having Jurisdiction in the place where the office of the Collector of the District in which the arrear or some part thereof accrued is situate," and section 172 of the Land Revenue Act excludes the jurisdiction of the civil Court in matters which arc within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers ; "

172. Exclusion of Jurisdiction of civil Courts to matters within the jurisdiction of Revenue Officers.

(I) Except as otherwise provided by this Act, no civil Court shall lave jurisdiction in any matter which Government, the Board of Revenue, or any Revenue Officer, is empowered by this Act to dispose of, or take cognizance of the manner in which Government, the Board of Revenue, or any Revenue Officer exercises any powers vested ire it or him by or under this Act. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of subsection (1). a civil Court shall not exercise jurisdiction over any of the following matters, namely ;

(xv) any claim connected with, or arising out of, the collection by Government, or the enforcement by Government of any process for the recovery of land revenue or any sum recoverable as any arrear of land revenue ; A plain reading of this section would indicate that any amount which is recoverable as arrears of land revenue is to be realised by the Revenue Officer if the person against whom proceedings are taken denies his liability he must pay the same under rotes in writing, at the time of payment and signed by him or his agent and the institute a suit in a civil Court for the recovery of the amount so paid. In view of the provisions of section 91 and section 172 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 mentioned above, no stay in the form of an ad Interim injunction can be granted unletis the amount has been deposited under protest in accordance with the procedure mentioned above. In view of the foregoing discussion there is no force in the revision petition, which is hereby dismissed in limine. S. Q.??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Petition dismissed.