1995 PLP 205 (PLC)

(i) Abdul Jamil v. Registrar of Trade Unions West Pakistan and another (PLD 1971 Lah. 220): (ii) Muhammad and another v. Divisional Commissioner Hyderabad Division (PLD 1966 Kar. 424). Mr. Fasahat Hussain Rizvi, learned counsel for the respondent No.l argued that Government Servants (E & D) Rules 1960 apply to every person who is a member of All Pakistan Services or who is serving in connection with affairs of the Federation and that a Postman is not covered by said rules, because he is neither member of All Pakistan Services nor he is person serving in connection with affairs of the Federation. Learned counsel referred to first proviso below subsection (4) of section 1 of the Standing Orders Ordinance and argued that there were no statutory rules of service, conduct and discipline applicable to the workmen employed in department of posts and hence such workmen were governed by the said Ordinance. While arguing so learned counsel for the respondent No.l wanted word "or" used in first proviso below subsection (4) of section 1 of the said Ordinance, to be read as "and". Learned counsel for respondent No.l was emphatic in contending that Government Servants (E & D) Rules of 1960 stood repealed on 18‑8‑1973 by Government Servants (E & D) Rules, 1973, as the words "these rules apply" appearing in rule 11 of said Rules of 1973, apply to the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960. In support learned counsel for the respondent No.l cited the cases of: (i) Project Director, Karkhana Alaat‑e‑Zari, Bahawalpur v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court and others (PLD 1989 SC 152), (ii) Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Abdul Ghani (1983 SCMR 769), (iii) C.E. Gibbon and others v. Pakistan (PLD 1957 Kar. 956), (iv) Saifi Development Corporation Ltd. v. Workers' Union (PLD 1965 Kar. 347), (v) Mst. Mahmuda Khatun v: Muhammad Habibur Rehman and others (PLD 1965 Dacca 358) and (vi) Syed Byramji D. Mama v. Abdul Qadir and others (PLD 1968 SC 286). In his grievance application filed before the Labour Court, the respondent No.l stated that by virtue of his employment as Mail Peon he was performing duties of postman also. That he was carrying and receiving mail from bus stand at Kandiari. The Labour Court took view that persons of the status of the respondent No.l were workmen covered by the Standing Orders Ordinance. Learned Tribunal observed that it had been his consistent view that the provisions contained in section 1(2)(b) of I.R.O. were also applicable to the employees (wrongly written as employments) of Post, Telegraph and Telephone Departments, even if the same are carried on by or under the authority of the Federal or any Provincial Government where no statutory rules of service etc. are applicable to the workmen employed. Both the Labour Court and the Tribunal have considered the respondent No.l to be a "workman" under the Standing Orders Ordinance. There are no grounds to take a different view. With out‑door duties as a Mail Peon‑cum‑postman, the respondent No.l is also covered by item (xiii) of Schedule 11 below Workmen's Compensation Act 1923 and is "workman" as defined by clause (a) of section of said Act. Since the respondent No.l is "workman" under said Act of 1923, he is excluded from the definition of "Civil Servant" given under clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 1 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 by virtue of sub- clause (iii) of clause (b) of, subsection (1) of section 2 of said Act of 1973. Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960 made under clause (3) of Article 6 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order 1958 and notified through Gazette of Pakistan dated 19‑1‑1960 applied to every person, who was member of an All Pakistan Services or who was serving in connection with the affairs of the Federation. These rules were repealed‑on 18‑8‑1973 by rule 11 of Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. It is difficult to agree with learned counsel for the petitioners that the repeal was not absolute but it was partial, inasmuch as the employees of Postal Department continued to be covered by the said Rules of 1960 even after 18‑8‑1973. Since the respondent No.l is not covered by the definition of "civil servant" the provisions contained in Civil Servants Act cannot be made applicable to him because said Act applies only to civil servants, vide subsection (2) of section 1 of the said Act. Government Servants (E & D) Rules of 1973 have been made by the President of Pakistan in exercise of the powers conferred on him by section 25 of the Civil Servants Act 1973. Since said Act does not apply to the respondent No.l, he cannot be subject to applicability of the said Rules of 1973 which have repealed similar Rules o 1960. On 6‑11‑1986 the Government Servants (E & D) Rules, 1960 were not available, while the Government Servants (E & D) Rules of 1973 were not applicable to the respondent No.l. SAs regards applicability of industrial Relations Ordinance (IRO) is concerned, there is a provision in subsection (3) of section 1 that said Ordinance shall not apply to any person employed in the administration of the State, other than those employed as workmen by certain departments including Posts and Telephone. It was not argued on behalf of the petitioners if the respondent No.l is not covered by the definition of "Workman" given under clause (xxviii) of section 2 of I.R.O. As regards applicability of the Standing Orders Ordinance is concerned, the only provision which can stand in way of the respondent No. 1 is the first proviso below subsection (4) of section

1. Said proviso says that nothing in the Standing Orders Ordinance shall apply to Industrial and Commercial Establishments carried on by or under the authority of the Federal or Provincial Government, where statutory rules of service, conduct or discipline are applicable to the workmen employee thereunder. No doubt the Post Office Department is carried on under the authority of the Federal Government, but there are no statutory rules of service conduct or discipline applicable to the respondent No.1, in case he is held to be not governed by Government Servants (E & D) Rules, 1973. Consequently the Standing Orders Ordinance also applies to the respondent No.l. The authorities cited at the bar on behalf of the petitioner do not help them. In the case of Muhammad and another (PLD 1966 (W.P.) Karachi 424) it was held that it is a rule of interpretation that every word of the statute has to be given a meaning and effect. In the case of Abdul Jamil (PLD 1971 Lahore 220) it was held that it is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that no word used in it is superfluous and that it should be so interpreted as not to render any provision redundant or useless. These authorities were cited in reply to contention of learned counsel for the respondent No.l that the word "or" appearing in the first proviso below subsection (4) of section 1 of Standing Orders Ordinance be read as "and". While arguing so, learned counsel for respondent No.l had also cited certain authorities which follow. In Saifi Development Corporation Ltd. (PLD 1965 (W.P.) Karachi 347) the view taken was that it is a well‑recognised principle of law that to carry out the intention of the Legislature, it is occasionally found necessary to use the conjunction `or' and `and' one for the other. In the case of Mst. Mahmuda Khatun (PLD 1965 Dacca 358), it was observed that conjunction "or" in the Explanation to rule 1 of Order XXXIII of the Civil Procedure Code, is unhappy and in essence and substance it really means "and". In the case of C.E. Gibbon, Deputy Speaker, National Assembly and others (PLD 1957 (W.P.) Karachi 956) it was held that power of Court to construe "or" to mean `and' cannot be denied but such substitution is only authorised when from reading the Act as a whole it becomes apparent that the words used are mistakenly used and perhaps where it is needed to conform to the clear intent of the legislative body. In the case of Seth Byramji D. Mama (PLD 1968 SC 286) reference was made to following rule from Maxwell:‑ "If it can be seen from a wider inspection of the scope of the legislation that the general words notwithstanding that they follow particular words, are nevertheless to be 'construed generally, effect must be given to the intention of the legislature as gathered from the larger survey." The provisions contained in the first proviso below subsection (4) of section 1 of the Standing Orders Ordinance do not present any difficulty in interpreting" and understanding the same. In the case of Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Abdul Ghani (1983 SCMR 769) it was held that the Industrial Relations Ordinance by its scope, over reaches an establishment which satisfies the definition of employer, worker or workman and the establishment. In the case of Project Director, Karkhana Alaat‑e‑Zari, Bahawalpur v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court and others (PLD 1989 SC 152) it was held that the words "Administration of State" appearing in clause (b) of subsection (3) of section 1 of IRO mean persons employed by the State in connection with the activities of the State in exercise of its political, powers, including the action of legislative, judicial and executive wings but not the persons employed in a Cooperative Industrial Establishment run by the Administrator who is appointed by the State. In the instant case the respondent goes out side the definition of "Civil Servant" by virtue of being covered by the definition of "workman" given in the Workmen's Compensation Act. He being employed in the posts department is excepted from the barring provisions contained in subsection (3) of section 1 of IRO. Respondent No.l was doing manual and clerical work, as a mail peon and he was covered by the definition of "worker" or "workman" as given under the Standing Orders Ordinance. The respondent No.l was employed in the posts department, which has now become a Corporation and it is covered by the definition of "Commercial establishment" given in clause (b) of section 2 of the Standing Orders Ordinance. Said establishment is set up under the Federal Government but there are no statutory rules governing service of the respondent No.l as the Government Servants (E & D) Rules, 1960 have been repealed. In the circumstances no exception can be taken to competency of the respondent No.l to invoke jurisdiction of the Labour Court under section 25‑A of I.R.O. Coming to the provisions contained in ‑first proviso below subsection (4) of section 1 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, it may be observed that purpose of the said proviso is that if statutory rules of service or of conduct or of discipline are available for the "workmen" employed in any industrial or commercial establishment carried‑on by or under the authority o: either Federal Government or any Provincial Government, then Standing Orders Ordinance does not apply to such employees. There is no need for substituting the word "and" for the word "or". In the present case the Labour Court took view that persons of the status of respondent No.l were workmen and were covered by the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance. This finding has not been disturbed by the Tribunal. As regards the findings on facts are concerned, this Court while exercising constitutional jurisdiction has limited jurisdiction to unsettle a finding of fact. In the case of Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Ejaz Ahmed Abbasi (1990 SCMR 1713) it was held that where a Labour Appellate Tribunal has appraised the evidence, it was within its domain to arrive at a finding o fact and the High Court in exercising constitutional jurisdiction cannot appraise the evidence and travel beyond its allotted sphere. Contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent No.l was a civil servant' as defined by clause (b) of section 2 of Civil Servant Act, is without substance because the respondent No.l as mail peon was also doing the work of postman and he was covered by clause (xiii) of Schedule II below Worksmen's Compensation Act and he was not a `civil servant' in view of sub‑clause (iii) of clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 2 of Civil Servants Act. For the foregoing reasons we are of the view that no case has been made out for interference with the impugned order. Consequently we decline to exercise our constitutional jurisdiction and dismiss this petition with no orders as to costs. A.A./P‑307/K Petition dismissed.