1995 PLP 655 (PLC)

(e) between a financing bank authorised under subsection (1) of section 34 and a person who is not a member of a society, it shall be referred to the Registrar for decision by himself or his nominee, or if either of the parties so desires, to arbitration of three arbitrators who shall be the Registrar or his nominee and two persons of whom one shall be nominated by each of the parties concerned. A dispute shall include the question whether a person is or was a member of a society and also claims by a society for debts or demands due to it from a member, past member or non‑member or the heirs or assets of a past member or non‑member whether such debts or demands be admitted or not: Provided that if the question at issue between a society and a claimant, or between different claimants, is one involving complicated questions of law and fact, the Registrar may, if he thinks fit, suspend proceedings in the matter until the question has been tried by a regular suit instituted by one of the parties or by the society. If no such suit is instituted within six months of the Registrar's order suspending proceedings the Registrar shall take action as laid down in paragraph 1 of this section." "70‑A. Bar of jurisdiction.‑‑‑(1) Notwithstanding anything provided in any other law for the time being in force but save as expressly provided in this Act‑‑ (a) No Court or other authority whatsoever shall have jurisdiction to entertain, or to adjudicate upon, any matter which the Provincial Government, the Registrar, or his nominee, any arbitrator or liquidator, a society, a financing bank, a cooperative bank or any other person is empowered by or under this Act or the rules or bye‑laws framed there under, to dispose of or to determine; (b) The validity of anything done or an order passed by the Provincial Government, a society, a financing bank, a cooperative bank, the Registrar or any other person referred to in clause (a), under this Act or the rules and bye‑laws framed there under, shall not be called in question in any manner whatever before or by any Court or other authority whatsoever; and (c) No Court or other authority whatsoever shall be competent, to grant any injunction or pass any other order in relation to any proceedings under this Act or any rules or bye‑laws framed there under before the Provincial Government, a society, a financing bank, a cooperative bank, the Registrar or any other person referred m clause (a). (2) The provisions of subsection (1) shall be applicable to proceedings. appeals and revisions pending adjudication or disposal before or in any Court or other authority whatsoever on the date that the Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Ordinance, 1966, comes into force and any order passed in such proceedings, whether before or after the coming into force of the said Ordinance, in regard to matters referred to in subsection (1), shall stand vacated and be without any force.' It is clear from bare reading of section 54 that the jurisdiction o the Courts and the Tribunals is barred in respect of all the matters `touching business of the society'. The terms business of the society has not been defined in Act, 1925 but the same has been interpreted in the case reported as Ch. Nazir Ahmad v. Agha Ahmad Raza Khan (1971 SCMR 305). The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the service matter of employees are not referable to arbitration as these are not dispute touching the business of the society' under section 54 C of the Act, 1925. The same was the view of the Quetta and Sindh High Courts as is clear from the case of Muhammad lqbal and J.J. Miranda v. Fishermen Cooperative Society, Karachi and others (PLD 1978 Kar. 990), therefore, it is held that the matter of termination of services of respondent No. 2 was not covered by section 54 of the Act, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was not barred under section 70‑A of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925.

7. Now coming to the other legal argument that the petitioner society was established only to cater for the needs of its members and it in functioning resemble to a local body but by no stretch of imagination can be called a commercial or industrial organisation, therefore, the grievance petition under section 25‑A of the I.R.O. was not competent. The learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the employees both referred to the bye‑laws of the society specially to bye‑law No. 4 dealing with the objects. The same reads as under:‑‑ Objects, " .The objects of the Society are to promote the economic and social interest of its members and more particularly to lay out, establish and maintain a garden town." Thereafter, reference was made to functions particularly clauses (b) to (d). The same read as under:‑‑ "Functions

5. For the achievement of its objects the society may perform the following functions:‑‑ (a) . (b) to bring into existence construct, manage and maintain works, services and institutions or various kinds for the convenience and benefit of members residing in the town; (c) to sell, mortgage or lease land, houses, house sites and all other properties, movable or immovable, as may be necessary for the carrying out of any of the objects of the society; (d) to construct residential houses and other buildings for private and public use and to provide amenities such as schools, hospitals, parks and playground for the convenience of members." Before proceedings any further it is relevant to refer to the definition of `Workman' as appearing in section 2(xxviii), which reads as under:‑‑ "`Worker' and `workman means any person not falling within the definition of employer who is employed (including employment as a supervisor or as an apprentice) in an establishment or industry for hire or reward either directly or through a contractor whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Ordinance in relation to an industrial dispute includes a person who has been dismissed discharged, retrenched, laid off or otherwise removed from employment in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, lay‑off or removal has led to that dispute but does not include any person‑‑‑ (a) who is employed mainly in, a managerial or administrative capacity, or (b) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity draws wages exceeding rupees eight hundred per mensum or performs, either because of the nature of duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of managerial nature." It is clear from the above definition that it includes persons employed in an establishment or industry therefore, the definition of `Establishment' becomes relevant. The same appears in clause (ix) of section 2, which reads as under:‑‑ "Establishment means any office, firm, industrial unit, undertaking, shop or premises in which workmen are employed for the purpose of carrying on any industry and except in section 22‑EE, includes a collective bargaining unit, if any, constituted under that section in any establishment or group of establishments." While `industry' has been defined in clause (xiv) of the same section and reads as under:‑ ‑ "Industry means any business, trade, manufacture, calling, service, employment or occupation." Now if the above definitions are read with preamble of I.R.O. then it becomes clear that the object/pursuit of the employer is immaterial. The only important thing is employment of persons for carrying out its aims and objects. The definition is wide and takes into folds all sorts of employment. I am fortified in my view by the provisions of section 1(3) of I.R.O. which provides and it shall not apply to categories of employees mentioned in clauses (a) to (h) and subsection (3‑a). If the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner was to be accepted then these categories already stood excluded from the purview of the I.R.O. and there was no point in once again excluding them. On the other hand, this proves that the Legislature wanted to extend the cover of I.R.O. to all sorts of workers except specifically excluded.

8. This is not all. Even the term `Industry' mentioned amongst others includes `Service'. If looked from this angle the petitioner society would be covered even by the term `Industry'. The definition of `Establishment' opens with the words means any office, etc. The society cannot be, at least excluded, from office and the other important ingredient is that it employed workers. The definition of `Worker' as already noted means any person employed in an establishment or industry for hire or reward, therefore, it is concluded that the provisions of I.R.O. were applicable to respondent No. 3 employed by the petitioner society.

9. The upshot of the above discussion is that there is no merit in this writ petition. The same is, therefore, dismissed with costs. AA./C‑55/L Petition dismissed