1969 P Cr (PLP)

HAMOODUR RARMAN, J.‑

This is a direct appeal under Article 58 (2) (c) of the Constitution from the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the High Court of East Pakistan, convic ting the appellants for contempt, under Article 123 of the Constitution and punishing them with detention till the rising of the Court, as also imposing a fine of Rs. 1,000 or in default simple imprisonment for one week, on the first appellant Muhammad Idrish. The contempt alleged was for the violation of an ad interim order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 544 of 1966, from which Civil Appeal No. 60‑D of 1968 was filed in this Court. The said appeal was heard along with this appeal but the same has been dismissed by a separate judgment. This judgment will dispose of the appeal against the conviction for contempt. The order which was alleged to have been violated was passed on the 22nd November 1966, in the following terms: "We accordingly pass an order of injunction restraining the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 from giving effect to the impugned registration granted by respondent No. 1 on the 20th September 1966. in respect of the change of situation of the registered office of the Group from 876, Asadganj Road, Chittagong, to 928/A Amir Ali Choudhury Road, Khatunganj, Chittagong and in respect of Returns of the particulars of the members and office‑bearers of the Executive Committee alleged to have been elected on the 11‑1‑1914 and 13‑12‑65 and further restraining the respondents from interfering with the functioning of the petitioner‑company in any manner until the disposal of the Rule in Petition No. 544 of 1966." The High Court found that this order was not only admittedly served on the appellants but was in fact made in the presence of appellant No. 1 and that in so far as the group led by the appellant No. 1 had continued to function, in spite of this order, it had acted in flagrant breach thereof. Hence the appellant No. 1, who was the Chairman of the Group, was clearly guilty of contempt and the appellant No. 2 was guilty of abetting the appellant No. 1 in such contempt even though he had acted under orders of the appellant No. 1 as a paid secretary of his group. The appellants firstly contended that they have been wrongly convicted, for, the ad interim order of injunction was passed without jurisdiction by the High Court and was, therefore, a nullity. In any event, it is secondly claimed that the appellants had not committed any violation of the order in so far as they had not interfered with the functioning of the group led by Syed Ahmad Mian which claims to have its registered office at 876, Asadganj Road, Chittagong. So far as the first contention is concerned, we have already held, in Civil Appeal No. 60‑D of 1968, that the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Article 98 of the Constitution and, therefore, it cannot be said that the order of the High Court was without jurisdiction or a nullity. The High Court's jurisdiction was, in no way, ousted either by the Com panies Act or by the Trade Organizations Ordinance, 1961. Section 12 of the said Ordinance reads as follows: "

12. Restriction on suits against trade organizations.

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in the articles or memorandum of a registered trade organization, no suit or other legal proceedings shall be instituted or commenced against such registered trade organization questioning the validity or propriety of any act or proceeding of such trade organization or any member thereof or any member of the Executive Committee of such trade organization or of the Executive Committee or other body thereof, or the constitution of, or election or appointment to, such Committee or body, by any member of such trade organization or by, or by any member of, any other trade organization unless such member or other trade organization has made an application, accompanied by such fee not less than one thousand rupees as may be prescribed by rules, referring the matter to the Arbitration Tribunal constituted for the purpose of deciding such references by the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry registered under the Act in pursuance of a licence and such Arbitration Tribunal has given its decision or award thereon. (2) The Arbitration Tribunal constituted under subsection (1) shall consist of not less than three and not more than five members appointed by the said Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry and shall conduct its proceedings and give its decision or award in accordance with the rules made in this behalf. (3) Nothing in this section shall affect any suit or other legal proceedings instituted or commenced before the commencement of this Ordinance." The learned counsel contends that even if this section of the Ordinance cannot override the Constitutional provision of Article 98 of the Constitution it clearly indicates that the Legislature thereby contemplated that any dispute regarding the election, appointment or constitution of the executive committee of such an organization or committees or bodies thereof, arising between the members of the organization, shall be decided by an Arbitration Tribunal constituted for the purpose by the Federa tion of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. It had, therefore, prescribed "another adequate remedy" for the resolving of such disputes within the meaning of that phrase in Article 98 of the Constitution and the High Court had, as such acted improperly in assuming jurisdiction in the face of such "other adequate remedy." This argument is, in our opinion, misconceived, for, in Petition No. 544 of 1966, the only relief that was asked for was for the cancellation or setting aside of certain certificates granted by the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies. We have already held in Civil Appeal No. 60‑D of 1968, that in the writ matter it was not necessary for the High Court to enter into questions regarding the validity of the election or constitution of the executive committee or of the meetings or elections held by the rival groups. In the circumstances, the other adequate remedy prescribed by section 12 of the Trade Organizations Ordinance was not available for the decision of the question as to whether the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies had acted in the lawful exercise of his jurisdiction or in a lawful manner in granting the impugned certificates. The latter section, therefore, was not a bar to the jurisdiction of the High Court in any way. The last contention of the learned counsel namely, that there had been no violation of the order, is also wholly without substance, for, even upon the admitted fact that the group led by the appellant, Muhammad Idrish, claimed to represent and did in fact function as the East Pakistan Timber Merchants Group from 928‑A, Amir Ali Choudhury Road there was a clear interference with the functioning of the Group through the other section at 876, Asadganj, Road, Chittagong. There can be no manner of doubt, therefore, that there was a violation of the order of the High Court. The appellants could not arrogate to themselves the right to decide whether the High Court's order was proper or not. It was clearly their duty to obey the order of the High Court which was made after hearing them. If there were any difficulties, they should have moved the High Court and got the order modified. It is important that litigants must realize that they cannot with impunity flout orders of Courts on their own construction of the orders. In doing so they clearly run the risk of becoming liable to punishment for contempt in the event of their construction turning out ultimately to be erroneous. Having said this, However, we cannot help observing that there was room for some misunderstanding in the present case. It may well be that the appellants reading ad interim order passed in the petition under Article 98 of the Constitution, along with the order in Civil Mule No. 468 of 1964 (the relevant portion of which has been quoted in the other judgment) were under a genuine misconception that the ad interim order passed in the petition under Article 98 of the Constitution did not separate as a bar to the functioning of the group led by the appellant, Muhammad Idrish, at Amir Ali Choudhury Road, Chittagong. If is unfortunate that the legal advisers of the appellants did not think it proper to place their case before the High Court from this aspect or to tender apology to the High Court for their mistaken and unintentional disobedience of the order by reason of the above mentioned misconception as to the scope thereof. Had this been done, we feel certain that the High Court would have taken a more generous view and may even not have imposed such heavy fine on appellant No.

1. It may well have been content with the punishment of detention till the rising of the Court or imposed only a small fine. Learned counsel made an attempt to make good this deficiency by tendering apology before this Court but this is not) the proper forum for the acceptance of an apology in a contempt matter. The apology should have been tendered before the Court of which contempt committed. Br that as it may we feel that since there was room for some misunderstanding in the present case the punishment imposed is somewhat excessive. We accordingly, uphold the convictions but reduce the fine of the appellant No. 1 to Rs. 100, or in default simple imprisonment for one week. With the modification of the sentence, however, this appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.