1986 PLP 129 (PLC)

7. Next, I am also referred to an authority reported in 1979 P L C 112, by the Tribunal, headed by Mr. Justice Ghulam Rasool Shaikh. The case is of the Messrs Rice Research Institute Employees' Union v. Registrar of Trade Unions Hyderabad Region. Hyderabad. The learned Tribunal observed that "Institution of Rice Research was constituted by the Government for the purpose of research in order to improve the quality and quantity of rice and render advice to the growers." Apparently the employees of the institution were Government employees and they were governed by the Civil Service Rules and they could not approach the Labour Court by raising any dispute with regard to their demands. Their terms and conditions are regulated by the Civil Service Rules and their pay scales and other benefits are also prescribed by the Government. Apart from this, the institution is not an industry. The learned counsel for the appellant failed to convince me to hold to the contrary. A similar point had arisen before the Lahore High Court in a Writ Petition No. 74 of 1976 in the case of Pakistan Central Cotton Committee, Karachi v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. III Lyallpur and another. This decision has not so far been reported, but I have been supplied with the copy of the Judgment. This is a detailed judgment and the various aspects of the case pressed before the High Court were fully dealt with and it was concluded that the institution was not an industry and Industrial Relations Order was not applicable. While dealing with the various authorities, final observation which was made in material and it reads as under:- "The function of the Pakistan Central Cotton Committee, petitioner is to undertake agricultural and technological research. This is skin to a function carried on by an Educational Institute. The Government of Pakistan is to be advised by the Pakistan Central Cotton Committee (Petitioner) so that cotton growing is conducted in a manner, which is beneficial to the country. Unless there is a direct nexus between the mills and the Pakistan Central Cotton Committee, its employees cannot be treated as 'workmen'. In the present situation, the mills are not advised directly and, therefore, here is no nexus between the two. In fact there is a comprehensive programme which people from outside countries, specially R.C.D. Countries, participate and are taking training. In short, respondent No.2 is a Research Institution. It is a non-profit-making organization and the work done by it cannot be assimilated with what may be described as an industrial process. The enterprize, if locked as whole, does not indicate that it cannot be considered as 'industry'. In this view of the matter the certification accorded to respondent No.2 as C.B.A. by the Registrar of Trade Unions is also of no avail."

8. Then, there is another Judgment reported in P L D 1976 Lah. 1097, written by Shafiur Rehman, J., (now in the Supreme Court), in the case of K.G. Old, Principal, Christian Technical Training Centre. Gujranwala v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court, Northern Zone and 6 others. It is comprehensive Judgment and deals on the definition of 'industry' and his observations may be summed up in his own words which are quoted as below: "The upshot of the entire discussion is that the use of the expressions 'Business, Trade, Manufacture, Calling, Service, Employment or Occupation' in the definition of the Industrial Relations Ordinance is not in its ordinary dictionary meaning but in its popular and conventional meaning. In the context of industrial and labour laws, these expressions apply to any enterprise which is organised and is systematic depending substantially, if not entirely, on the cooperation between labour and capital, and having as its object, production, distribution and consumption of wealth, or the production or provision of material services. The enterprise as whole has to be looked at to find out its raison determine and any part of it which is incidental, ancillary or an adjunct cannot determine the character of the whole." 9.???????? I am also referred to an un-reported Supreme Court Judgment, dated 9-6-1985, in the case of A.F. Ferguson & Co. the appellants and the Sind Labour Court and another, the respondents. This judgment is not reported, but its copy is before me. The observations made in this judgment pertaining to the definition of clause (xiv) of section 2 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, the words Calling, Service, Employment or Occupation were not to be understood or interpreted in their plain dictionary meaning but they took their colour from the opening words, namely, Business, Trade and Manufacture and the meaning of these words had to be controlled with the reference to the preceding words in the definition and the objects of the Statutes. I may be permitted to quote the following paragraph:- "We observe that after the above judgment was delivered the Lahore High Court as well as a Bench of the Sind High Court has dissented from the view taken by the learned Judges that the dictionary meaning was to be given to the words mentioned in clause (xiv) of section 2 of the Ordinance and that is amplitude could not be curtailed by reference to the old definition of the word 'industry'. In K.G. Old v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court and others P L D 1976 Lah. 1097. Mr. Justice Shafi-ur-?Rehman (now a Judge of this Court) in an exhaustive and detailed judgment, after noticing all the relevant case law including the judgment in the present case, took the view that the 'use of the expressions 'Business, Trade Manufacture, Calling, Service, Employment or Occupation' in the definition of industry in Industrial Relations Ordinance is not in its ordinary dictionary meaning but in its popular and conventional meaning. He went on the add that 'in the context of industrial and labour laws, these expressions apply to any enterprise which is organized and is systematic depending substantially, if not entirely, on the co-operation between labour and capital and having as its object production, distribution and consumption of wealth, production. distribution and consumption of wealth or the production or provision of material service.' In his view the words calling, service, employment or occupation were not to be understood or interpreted in their plain dictionary meaning but took their colour from the opening words, namely, Business, Trade and Manufacture and the meaning of these words had to be controlled with reference to the preceding words in the definition and the objects of the status. This view was followed by one of us (Nasim Hasan Shah, J) while sitting in Lahore High Court in Pakistan Central Cotton Committee, Karachi v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.3, Lyallpur etc. (Writ Petition No. 74 of 1976). And before us, it was further submitted that the distinction between learned professions on the one hand and business/trade/manufacture, on the other was so fundamental and the concept of the two so utterly inconsistent that the same could not be abolished merely by the use of general words like Calling, Service, Employment or Occupation."

10. The judgment quoted above do not permit the dictionary meaning of words, Calling, Employment and Service, but these words are to be controlled by the wordings of the Statute and hence the Research Institutions whether the Research Institute or the Building Research Station are to be termed as according to law not an 'industry'. I, therefore, hold that the Building Research Station is not an industry and the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, do not apply.

11. This leaves me with a definition of 'worker' and 'workman' as given in the definition No. (xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969? "(xxviii) 'worker' and 'workman' means any person not falling within the definition of employer who is employed (including employment as a supervisor or as an apprentice) in an establishment or industry for hire reward either directly or through a contractor whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Ordinance in relation to an industrial dispute includes a person who has been dismissed, discharged, retrenched laid-off or otherwise removed from employment in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, lay-off or removal has led to that dispute but does not include any person-- (a) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, or (b) who being employed in a supervisory capacity draws wages exceeding rupees eight hundred per menses or performs, either because of the nature of duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of managerial nature."

12. The definition of an 'establishment' is as follows:- "(ix) 'Establishment' means any office, firm, industrial unit, undertaking, shop or premises in which workmen are employed for the purpose of carrying on and industry xx xx."

13. The word 'establishment' means any- office which carries the work of an industrial unit. Therefore, Muhammad Mudabbir is not a worker or a workman and he is guided under Rules and Regulations of the Council for Works And Housing Research and the petition under section 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, does not lie. The research council is not an industry nor its employee is a worker or workman according, to the definition of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.

14. The result is that section 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, does not apply as the Research Institute is not an industry and in this respect, I allow the appeal of Building Research Station and Chairman, Council for Works and Housing Research, Karachi, while setting aside the entire impugned order of the learned Labour Court. As regards the appeal of Muhammad Mudabbir, it is accordingly dismissed. A.A.???? Order accordingly.