2026 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

AHMAD NADEEM ARSHAD, J.

Through this Intra Court Appeal filed under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, the appellant has called into question the validity and legality of judgment dated 16.04.2025 passed by learned Single Judge in Chambers pursuant whereto the Writ Petition filed by respondent No.1 was allowed.

2. Tersely, the factual matrix reveals that respondent No.1 was initially appointed as a Teacher on daily wages for a period of 89 days at NCRCLO, Feroz Wattwan, Tehsil Sheikhupura, which appointment was extended from time to time. Subsequently, her services were regularized by the Cabinet Secretariat, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan. However, her services were terminated vide order dated 03.04.2013 on the ground of being "no longer required." Aggrieved thereof, respondent No.1 repeatedly approached this Court by invoking its constitutional jurisdiction. On multiple occasions, the impugned orders passed by the departmental authorities were set aside, representations, were remitted for fresh consideration, and clear directions were issued to decide her case strictly in accordance with law and in parity with similarly placed colleagues who had been regularized. Despite such consistent judicial intervention and explicit directions, the departmental authorities persistently rejected her representations. Ultimately, respondent No.1 again invoked constitutional jurisdiction, whereupon the learned Single Judge in Chambers, after hearing both sides, set aside the impugned orders as illegal and without lawful authority, and directed the appellant-Department to redress her grievance in the light of the minutes of the Cabinet Sub-Committee meeting dated 13.03.2013. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant has filed this appeal.

3. Heard. Record perused.

4. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and going through the record, it has been observed that the respondent No.1 was initially appointed as a Teacher on daily wages for a period of 89 days at NCRCLO, Feroz Wattwan, Tehsil Sheikhupura, which appointment was extended from time to time. Having rendered the requisite length of service, her case for regularization was considered and approved by the Cabinet Sub-Committee in its meeting dated 13.03.2013, along with numerous other similarly placed employees of Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal. However, despite such approval, the services of respondent No.1 were abruptly terminated vide order dated 03.04.2013 on the vague ground that her services were "no longer required," without assigning any reason or affording her an opportunity of hearing, thereby triggering the prolonged litigation between the parties.

5. Admittedly, respondent No.1 was included in the list of employees whose services were approved for regularization by the Cabinet Sub-Committee in its meeting dated 13.03.2013. The said decision has neither been rescinded nor modified and, admittedly, has been acted upon in respect of other similarly placed employees. Denial of the same relief to respondent No.1, without any lawful justification, clearly amounts to hostile discrimination, offending Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.

6. It further transpires from the record that respondent No.1 was compelled to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court repeatedly due to the persistent non-compliance of lawful directions issued by this Court in earlier rounds of litigation. Despite categorical observations and remand orders, the appellant-Department continued to pass mechanical and repetitive orders rejecting her representations. In these peculiar circumstances, it prima facie appears that instead of complying with the mandate of law and judicial directions, the appellant-Department has developed an unwarranted sense of grievance and animosity against respondent No.1 merely because she persistently approached the Court for enforcement of her lawful rights. Such an approach on the part of a public authority is not only impermissible but also strikes at the very root of fair administration and rule of law.

7. It is also evident from the record that the initial order terminating the services of respondent No.1 was passed simpliciter on the vague ground that her services were "no longer required," without assigning any reason or attributing any misconduct. However, when this Court, in successive rounds of litigation, repeatedly directed the appellant-Department to decide the matter through a reasoned and speaking order, an altogether new narrative alleging mal-practice on the part of respondent No.1 was introduced. This shifting stance of the appellant-Department, taken at a belated stage and unsupported by any contemporaneous material, clearly reflects an afterthought aimed at justifying an otherwise indefensible termination. Such an approach not only undermines the credibility of the impugned orders but also offends the settled principle that an administrative action must stand or fall on the reasons originally recorded and cannot be supplemented by subsequently invented grounds.

8. As regards the objection raised by learned counsel for the appellant that respondent No.1 was over-aged at the time of her initial appointment, it may be observed that this contention is wholly misconceived and untenable. The record clearly shows that respondent No.1 was appointed by the appellant-Department itself after considering her credentials, and if there was any issue regarding age, the same stood impliedly relaxed at the time of appointment. It is a settled principle of law that once an appointing authority consciously appoints a candidate after relaxing or overlooking an age condition, it cannot be permitted to turn around at a belated stage and raise such an objection to the detriment of the employee. Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, while dealing with the similar situation, in a case titled "Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Administration Department and others" (2021 SCMR 630), observed as under:- ..Once having employed the respondent, fully knowing his age and extending his contractual employment for years on end, the Appellant cannot now turn around and claim that the Respondent cannot be granted relief because he was overage at the time he was appointed, especially when no foul play or concealment has ever been alleged on part of the Respondent. It is settled law that nobody should allowed to benefit from their own default."

9. In view of the above, this objection, having been raised for the first time after several rounds of litigation, is nothing but an afterthought and cannot be legally sustained.

10. The learned Single Judge has minutely examined the factual and legal aspects of the matter and has rendered a well-reasoned judgment, which does not suffer from any legal infirmity, perversity or misreading of record warranting interference by this Court in intra-court appellate jurisdiction.

11. We are also mindful of the settled legal proposition that discretionary relief granted by a learned Single Judge, particularly where it is based on consistent judicial directions, constitutional guarantees and undisputed record, should not be lightly interfered with in intra-court appeal unless the judgment is shown to be arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law. No such illegality or infirmity has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant.

12. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no merit in this Intra Court Appeal. Even, learned counsel for the appellant, despite hectic efforts, remained unable to persuade us to interfere in the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in Chambers. Hence, the same is accordingly dismissed. UN/P-3/L Appeal dismissed.