2003 P Cr (PLP)

Mr. Azizullah K. Sheikh, while pointed out clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1), with reference to their scope, maintained that in absence of appeal against acquittal, the Appellate Court cannot exercise suo motu power for issuing notice to such acquitted accused. He contended that the question is whether the Court is vested with the power to issue notice to the acquitted accused and according to him, no such power can be inferred from the provision of section 423(1)(b). He went further and contended that even a High Court has no jurisdiction to issue notice for upsetting the finding of acquittal in suo motu revisional jurisdiction into finding of conviction. He pointed out subsection (1)(b) to section 423, Cr.P.C. which empowers the Appellate Court in an appeal from the conviction can reverse the finding or the sentence and acquit or discharge the accused or order him to be re‑tried or altering the finding maintaining the sentence or reduce the sentence. He further contended that under clause (a) in appeal against the order of acquittal, Court can reverse the order and direct that further enquiry may be made or that the accused be re‑tried or sent for trial to the Court of Session or High Court, as the case may be, or find him guilty and pass sentence on him according to law. His further submission was that under clause (d) the Court has power to make an amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper but contended that even clause (d) cannot be invoked for issuance of notice to the acquitted accused for any purpose. He pointed out that the purpose of clause (d) is to give power for passing a consequential or incidental order that may be necessary and just or proper. He further contended that clause (d) came for judicial review before Full Bench of Calcutta High Court in Mahi Singh v. Mangal Khanda (Volume 12 The Criminal Journal Reports 529). In that case the question referred was whether an Appellate Court has power to order for compensation under section 250 of the Code. The question came for consideration in the following circumstances:‑‑ "The petitioner lodged a complaint under section 379/411, P.P.C. against three persons before Duty Magistrate, who convicted the accused. In appeal before Joint Magistrate they were acquitted and the complainant was called upon to show cause why he should not pay compensation of Rs.25 to each accused under section 250, Cr.P.C. No cause being shown, the order was made absolute. High Court issued a rule to show cause why the order for compensation should not be set aside on the ground that Court has no jurisdiction to make an order, in appeal granting compensation. The `consequential' or `incidental' was explained within the purview of the provisions that same must fall under one or other of the two heads: First, there are orders which follow as a matter of course being the necessary complements of the main orders passed without which the latter would be incomplete or ineffective. Such are directions as to the refund of fines realized from acquitted appellants, or, on the reversal of acquittals, as to the restoration of compensation paid under section 250; and for them no separate authority is needed. Secondly, there are orders which, though ancillary in character, require more than the support of a Criminal Court's inherent jurisdiction and could not be passed without express authority. It was further observed that "making of award for compensation would, consequently, seem to need express authority and an order, therefore, is not a 'consequential' or 'incidental' to an order of discharge or acquittal, unless the discharging or acquitting Court has aliunde power to make it. In an original Court it is by virtue of section 250 'consequent' or 'incidental' to an order of discharge or acquittal made there but it is not quoted alike order passed on appeal." Mr. Shaikh also pointed out that Full Bench of Rangoon High Court in Ma Mya Khin v. Mating Po Htwa AIR 1933 Rang. 288 also explained the expressions 'consequential' or 'incidental' orders with reference to section 145, Cr.P.C: employed, in clause (d)(1) of section 423 as follows:‑‑ "It is inadvisable that an attempt should be matte by the Court to define such terms as 'consequential orders' and 'incidental orders', for whether an order is a 'consequential' or an 'incidental' order depends upon the terms of the order under consideration in each particular case and the circumstances in which it is made." Mr. Shaikh also referred the case of C‑Dum v. King‑Emperor AIR 1922 All. 107 wherein the expressions 'consequential' or 'incidental order' used in clause (d) of subsection (1) of section 423, Cr.P.C. were explained in following terms:‑‑ "The only consequential or incidental order, within the purview of the provisions are orders which follow as a‑ matter of course, being the necessary complements to the main order passed, without which the‑latter would be incomplete or ineffective (such as directions to the refund of tines realized from acquitted appellants, or on the reversal of acquittals as to the restoration of compensation paid under section 250 for which no separate authority is needed, and orders which though ancillary in character required more than the support of a Criminal Court's inherent jurisdiction, could not be passed without express authority." Mr. Muhammad Ilyas, learned counsel for the acquitted accused to whom notice has been issued supported the contention of Mr. Azizullah K. Shaikh by contending that notice issued to the acquitted accused in absence of any acquittal appeal is beyond the scope of Appellate power enjoined by section 423 and contended that issuance of notice was in excess of jurisdiction. To support this contention, he referred the case of Shera v. The Crown PLD 1954 FC 141 decided by Federal Court. The facts of the case were the seven appellants including Shera were tried for the offences under sections 302, 149, 148, 366, 149, 379/199, P.P.C. Walia was convicted under section 302, P.P.C. and was sentenced to death. All the accused were convicted under section 148 and were sentenced to suffer six months' R.I. Goman was also convicted under section 379 and sentenced to suffer six months. All the convicted accused preferred appeal in High Court. After the appeal had been preferred a notice was issued to all the convicts other than Walia, to show cause why the finding in regard to the offence committed by them he not altered to that of murder and their sentences be enhanced in revision. The learned Judges of High Court accepted appeal of Walia in part and reduced his sentence from that of death to one of transportation for life. While disposing of the appeal of the other six convicts all of whom had been convicted under sections 148 and 379 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The finding of acquittal recorded by the Sessions Judge in their favour of an offence under section 302/149 was altered under section 423 of the Criminal Procedure Code and they were held guilty or murder. After altering the finding, the learned Judges, acting on the revision side under section 439 of the Code, enhanced the sentence in the case of each of these six convicts to transportation for life. The convicts preferred appeal, which was allowed. The opinion expressed was that there is only one way of reversing a finding of acquittal, and that is for the Provincial Government to file an appeal against acquittal under section 417 of the Code". It was further observed that:‑‑‑ "The Appellate Court can alter the finding only if it maintains the sentence or reduces it. It ignored the qualifications which make the alteration possible, that is, it must maintain the sentence or reduce it. Section 423(1)(a) deals with appeals from orders of acquittal. A finding of acquittal can be convened into a finding of conviction only under clause (a) of subsection (1). Clause (b) of subsection (l) deals only with appeals against orders of conviction." . It was further observed "that therefore, it is obvious that a particular method has been provided whereby an order, of acquittal can be reversed. That method and that method alone can be used for the purposes of upsetting an acquittal. The Judicial pronouncement by Privy Council in case of Nazir Ahmed v. The King‑Emperor ILR 1936 Lah. 629 was referred that where a power is given to do a thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden".. Mr. M. Ilyas Khan, learned counsel, also referred a case from Indian jurisdiction decided by the Indian Supreme Court in Sundar Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1962 SC 1211 wherein the scope of the power of the Appellate Court under section 423(1)(a) was expressed in para. 9 of the report, which reads as under:‑‑ "Reverting then to the argument based on the provisions of section 423(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is obvious that the order of acquittal passed in favour of Rachhpal Singh cannot be set aside unless an appeal had been duly preferred in that behalf against the said order. But do the provisions of section 423(1)(a) create a bar against the High Court incidentally considering the question about Rachhpal Singh's presence and conduct at the relevant time while it is dealing with the prosecution case against the three appellants before it? When the High Court in appeal considered the case against the three appellants, it had inevitably to examine the comment made by Mr. Sethi against the reliability of the witnesses on the ground that their evidence against Rachhpal Singh had not been accepted by the trial Court and that necessarily meant that the High Court had to apply its mind to that problem as well. If in dealing with the case presented before it on behalf of the appellants it became necessary or the High Court to deal indirectly or incidentally with the case against Rachhpal Singh, there is no legal bar at all. It may be that in considering the evidence as a whole, the High Court may have come to the conclusion that the evidence against Rachhpal Singh was unsatisfactory and if it had come to such a conclusion, .it would have examined the said evidence in the light of this infirmity. On the other hand, after considering the evidence, the High Court may well have come to the conclusion, as it has, in fact, done in the present case, that the evidence against Rachhpal Singh is also good and need not have been discarded. In our opinion, there is no doubt that if in appreciating the points made by the appellants before it the High Court had to consider the whole of the evidence in respect of the accused persons, it was free to come to one conclusion or the other in respect of the said evidence, so far as it related to Rachhpal Singh. That is why we think that the point made by Mr. Sethi that section 423(1)(a) precluded the High Court from considering the merits of the order of acquittal even incidentally or indirectly cannot be upheld." Mr. M. Ilyas Khan also contended that even issuance of show?cause notice to the accused as to why he should not be sent up for trial, while granting leave to appeal, was taken to be without jurisdiction, in Dr. R.V. Murthy v. State of Karnataka AIR 1982 SC 677, in that case in an appeal against acquittal the High Court while granting leave to appeal to the State also ordered issuance of notice to the accused to show cause why he should not be sent up for trial even before hearing the appeal on merits. That order was set aside by the Supreme Court with the servation that such cause of action at this stage resulted in gross and substantial injustice to the accused and amounted to a gross misuse of power of the High Court under section 482, Cr.P.C. (as provision analogous to 423, Cr.P.C.). Privy Council in case of Krishna Singh v. King‑Emperor 1928 I.L.R 50 All. 722, by approving the Allahabad High Court's view in Emperor v. Sheo Darshan Singh AIR 1922 All. 487 intended to lay down that neither an Appellate Court nor a revisional Court has power to reverse the finding of acquittal and convert it into one of conviction. Similar situation came before a Division Bench of erstwhile Sindh Judicial Commissioner Court in Judo Rahim v. Emperor AIR 1938 Bind 202 wherein accused was charged with murder under section 302 but was convicted by Sessions Judge only under section

304. On appeal by him, learned Judges of erstwhile Judicial Commissioner Court (Davis J.C. and Lobo, J.) came to the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the charge under section 302 and the question arose whether it was open to the Appellate Court to set aside the implied acquittal of accused by learned trial Judge under section 302 ‑and then liter conviction' under section 304 to conviction under section

302. Having considered this question, learned Judges expressed their view as follows:‑‑ "It is difficult to read into section 423(1)(b) the power to convert an acquittal into a conviction on an appeal against a conviction. We think the words `alter the finding, maintaining the sentence' occurring in section 423(1)(b)(2) must be read as a whole, and we could not in this case, for instance, alter the finding from one of conviction under section 304 to one of a conviction under section 302, I.P.C. and maintain the sentence because we could not for an offence under section 302, I.P.C and maintain a sentence of ten years' rigorous imprisonment. And even if the Judge in this case had imposed a sentence of transportation for life, we do not think we could for that reason have altered the finding from a conviction under section 304 to a conviction under section 302, I.P.C. and then as a Court of revision have enhanced the punishment to one of death under section 439, Cr.P.C. because we do not think the exercise of these powers can turn upon chance. We do not think the exercise of these powers can depend upon the chance that in a case under section 304(1) the Judge has imposed the maximum penalty under the section. We think the better view to take is that clause (b) of section 423(1), Cr.P.C. does not apply to cases of acquirable, partial or total, but to cases of conviction, and that clause (a) applies to cases of acquittal and that if the appellate powers of the Court are to be exercised to convert an acquittal into a conviction, then they should be exercised on an appeal against an acquittal under section 423(1)(a) and not on an appeal against a conviction under section 423(1)(b), Criminal Procedure Code, which is the case here." There is clearly a distinction between reversing a finding and merely altering it. Where an order of acquittal is to be converted into an order of conviction, it amounts to a reversal o: the order. On the other hand, where conviction under one section is altered to a conviction under some other section maintaining the sentence or reducing it or altering it, it amounts merely an alteration of the finding and not a reversal of the finding. Therefore, subsection (1)(b) is not applicable to a case where there is an express order of acquittal and no appeal from acquittal is pending before the Appellate Court. In such a case, the Appellate Court has no power to reverse the finding at all. It cannot by convicting the, I accused of the offence of which he has been acquitted reverse the finding, by recording it as if it were merely an alteration of the finding. This view is in the line of the view expressed by learned Judges of D.B. of erstwhile Sind Commissioner Court in Jado Rahim's case (supra). The upshot of the above discussion is that notice issued to the acquitted accused was a futile exercise and not available under section 423, Cr.P.C. Therefore, the same was withdrawn by short order dated 12‑11‑2002 and these are the reasons for the same. Suo motu notice withdrawn. ?