1989CLC513 (PLP)

3. The appellant disputed the relationship of landlady and tenant between the parties. He claims to be the lessee of the disputed shop having obtained the same from Co‑operative Development Fund and Project. The bona fide need of the respondent was also questioned. Some legal pleas about the maintainability of the application for ejectment were also raised.

4. The respondent examined her sons namely Muhammad Zakir (P.W.1), who is her attorney also and Muhammad Shakir (P.W.2). In rebuttal the appellant examined himself (D.W.1) and Syed Zahid Ali (D.W.2).

5. On the assessment of evidence, both oral as well as documentary, the learned Rent Controller dismissed the application for ejectment vide order dated 16‑3‑1986. The respondent went in appeal, being F.RA, No.225 of 1986, which was allowed by this Court on 19‑1‑1987, with the following directions‑‑ "For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed. I remand the case back to the Controller for decision on merits, that is, whether the shop in dispute is required by the appellant herself or for her benefits or for the use of her son Shakir? The parties are at liberty to produce additional evidence, if they so desire."

6. On remand Muhammad Shakir filed additional affidavit‑in‑evidence, while the appellant filed his own affidavit.

7. The learned Rent Controller, after taking into consideration the evidence adduced by the parties allowed the application for ejectment vide order dated 31 8‑1987, which is the subject‑matter of the present appeal.

8. The record, as it stands, shows that the appellant is tenant of this shop which was originally leased out to Muhammad Zahir. The lease of Muhammad Zahir was, however, cancelled and it was allotted to the appellant. The lease was subsequently restored to Muhammad Zahir, which position is not disputed by the appellant himself. The factum of tenancy between the parties is also borne out from the record. The appellant had earlier filed Rent Misc. Case No.2877 of 1984 (A/2), in which he had himself admitted this relationship. The written statement filed by the appellant in earlier Rent Case No.2531/1984 (Exh.A/3), further makes this position clear.

9. Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, whereunder the application for ejectment was filed, provides as follows:‑‑ "14.????? Delivery of vacant possession:‑‑ (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Ordinance or any other law for the time being in force, the landlord of a building who is a widow, or a minor whose both parents are dead or a salaried employee due to retire within the next six months or has retired or a person who is due to attain the age of sixty years within the next six months or has attained the age of sixty years, may, by notice in writing, inform the tenant that he or she needs the building for personal use and require him to deliver vacant possession of the building within such time as may be specified in the notice, not being earlier than two months from the receipt thereof; (Provided that nothing in this subsection shall apply where the landlord has rented out the building after he has retired or attained the age of sixty years or, as the case may be, has become widow or orphan). (2) The landlord shall not be entitled to avail the benefit of subsection (1) if he is in occupation of a building owned by him in any locality. (3) Where the tenant has failed to deliver the possession of the building under subsection (1), the Controller shall, on application by the landlord in this behalf, order eviction of the tenant from the building in a summary manner, by using such force as may be necessary."

10. For the purpose of this section a widow may seek expeditious remedy, I and in case she fulfils the required conditions, the tenant is liable to be ejected summarily. The evidence of both the sons of the respondent clearly establishes that the respondent is a widow and she requires the shop for her own use. The copy of notice sent under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, postal receipt and A.D. receipt are also on record (Exh.A/11, A/12 and A/13). There is also nothing on record to show that the respondent has rented out any other building after she became widow or that she is to occupation of a building owned by her in any locality. The plea of want of bona fides is irrelevant in proceedings under subsection (1) of section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. In the case reported as M.S. Baroba v. Manzoor Ahmad (P L D 1986 Kar. 407), a Division Bench‑ of this Court observed as follows:‑‑ Accordingly, we hold that in a case under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, the question of "good faith" or "bona fides" is not to be looked into, but the Controller has to see that the landlord fulfils the conditions mentioned in section 14 which we have enumerated hereinbefore."

11. The weighty observations of the Supreme Court in case of Baksh Elahi v. Qazi Wasif Ali, reported in 1985 S C M R 291, may be usefully borrowed here:‑‑ "The object of section 14, therefore, seems to be to relieve this class of landlords from the rigours of an elaborate inquiry as to the good faith of their plea of requirement of the premises for personal use and to put them in possession thereof in the shortest possible time."

12. Mr. Iqbal Kazi, learned counsel for the appellant, who has argued with great ability, has contended that subsection (1) of section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, is a special provision for a specified and special class of persons mentioned therein. According to the learned counsel, it is not open to a widow posing her own need actually to obtain premises for her son, which she can only do under section

15. The case reported as A.S. Mughal v. Mst. Khursheed Azmat Ali P L D 1982 Kar. 406 lays down this proposition. The facts of the reported case are, however, distinguishable, as in that case the provisions of section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, were invoked for the benefit of the married daughter of the landlady alone, which is not the position in the instant case. The respondent has claimed possession of the disputed shop for her own use, although there are admissions on record to the effect that Muhammad Shakir (P.W.2), the son of respondent, who is jobless is to be accommodated in this shop. This judgment of the High Court was, however, set aside by the Supreme Court, a reference of which finds place in the case of Mst. Akhtar Sultana v. Syed Abdul Qayyum, reported in 1985 C L C

534. The relevant paragraph of the judgment of Supreme Court reads as, follows:‑‑ "This brings us to the question as to whether the Rent Controller was justified in allowing the application for ejectment on the ground that the premises was also required for the use of the appellant's daughter. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that in the present case the requirement for the daughter of the appellant was also virtually the requirement of the appellant herself because, she, being old and in urgent need of her daughter's support at every moment of her life, required the disputed premises to accommodate her daughter with her and it had been established on the record that Mst. Mah Jabeen with her children had all along been living with the appellant. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel that the appellant had in fact claimed possession of the disputed premises for her personal bona fide use as well as was clear from paragraph 2 of her application for ejectment and paragraph 5 of her affidavit of evidence. In this context, it was asserted that the allegation, that the premises were required for the use of the appellant's daughter, was subsidiary in nature and the primary requirement continued to be the per‑nal requirement of the appellant herself."

13. The above observations made by the Supreme Court apply with full force to the case under consideration. The personal need of the landlady is there in addition to the need of her son. Again the expression 'personal use' should be given a fair and liberal construction and it must be interpreted to include the use g of family members of such a specified person, other‑vise a minor orphan cannot be benefited out of this beneficial legislation. It is well settled principle that the interpretation of statutes should he beneficial and one which would advance the object of legislation and not one which would lead to its frustration. In determining the meaning of the language employed in any particular passage, it is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles, should in all cases of doubtful significance be presumed to be true one.

14. A point not raised in the memo of appeal, which was touched upon during arguments by learned counsel for the appellant may now be dealt with. It is contended that the disputed property still belongs to Co‑operative Development Fund and Projects and, therefore, the respondent could not seek the ejectment of the appellant. Reference is made to the evidence of Syed Zahid Ali, Project Director. It is difficult to be patient with argument of this kind. The order of Secretary, Labour and Co‑operative Department, Government of Sind (Exh.0/3) provides a complete answer to this contention. This question is again mixed question of law and facts and cannot be agitated at this stage for the first time.

15. Having regard to the above factual and legal position, I see no substance in the present appeal which is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs. The appellant is, however, allowed two months time to vacate the demised premises. H.B.T./M‑653/K????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed.