P L D 1960 (W (PLP)

(5) That you by your conduct have shown insubordination to the University authorities. (6) That you have sent threats to the Vice‑Chancellor and tried to intimidate him. (7) That on the 1st of August 1956 you absented yourself from duty without obtaining previous leave.

2. You are now called upon to state, within 15 days of the receipt of this charge sheet, as to what you have to say in the above matters. Also please state whether you want to be heard in person."

8. The question whether in a given case reasonable oppor tunity has been given to an accused official to show cause against the proposed punishment is a question of fact. In the present case, as already stated, the Syndicate decided on 13‑1‑58 that the petitioner should be called upon to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed and gave him 15 days' time for this purpose. A few days earlier, i.e., on 26‑12‑57 the petitioner bad fallen ill and written a letter (Exh. 37) on 27‑12‑57 intimating to the University authorities that he was proceeding to Karachi for treatment. On 1‑1‑58 he wrote another similar letter (Exh. 38). On 10‑1‑58 he submitted a certificate by the Civil Surgeon of Karachi recommending one month's leave to the petitioner. On 15‑1‑58 the petitioner asked for extension of time for submit ting his explanation against the proposed action, but this request was turned down by the University on 20th January 1958 and the relevant portion of the University's letter may be reproduced with advantage " . . . I am to inform you that your request for extension of the period by 6 weeks cannot. be entertained in view of the Syndicate's resolution on the subject already communicated to you as well as under Civil Services Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules. It is left to you whether you avail of the oppor tunity given to you by the Syndicate."

9. We have examined the Sind Civil Services Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules and we do not find anything therein which would militate against extension of time in a suitable case. On page 18 of the rules there is reproduced a decision of the Government of India to the effect that : "After the inquiry against a Government servant has been completed and after the punishing authority has arrived at provisional conclusions in regard to the penalty to be imposed, the accused officer should . . . . . be called upon to show cause, within a reasonable time not ordinarily exceeding one month, against the particular' penalty proposed to be inflicted." It would thus appear that even the rules in question contemplate that ordinarily time up to one month should be allowed but there is no bar in the decision of the Government of India that in a suitable case time should not be extended beyond one month. It is therefore clear that the University authorities could not legitimately take shelter behind the Sind Civil Services Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules.

10. The facts clearly show that when the University Syndicate decided to give the petitioner 15 days time for sub mitting his explanation against the proposed action, it was known that the petitioner was ill at Karachi. The petitioner had already submitted an application on 10‑1‑58 supported by the certificate of the Civil Surgeon of Karachi recommending one month's leave to the petitioner. It is therefore obvious that the request of the petitioner for an extension of time by 6 weeks was justified and should ordinarily have been acceded to. The refusal of the University authorities to grant the petitioner's request for extension of time in the face of clear evidence that? he was lying ill at Karachi, amounts to refusal of a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner, and for that reason alone the order passed against him stands vitiated, and is liable to be set aside.

11. In this connection there is also another important aspect which may briefly be noticed. The petitioner bad applied on 20‑1‑58 for inspection of certain documents so as to be able to prepare his reply to the' show cause notice, but no reply was however sent to this request. It is clear to us that a refusal to allow inspection of the relevant documents has seriously prejudiced the petitioner and for that reason also it should be held that he was not afforded a. reasonable opportunity to defend himself. As authority for this view we need only refer to Abdul Wasi v. Pakistan (P L D 1957 Kar. 363)

12. We now take up the second main ground urged by Mr. Lari. The Syndicate meeting on 10‑2‑58, which passed the order of dismissal, was attended by the following 9 persons (1) Vice‑Chancellor (Chairman). (2) Mr. Kazi Muhammad Akbar. (3) K. B. S. D. Contractor. (4) Mr. A. M. Nizamani (Director of Education Hyderabad Region). (5) Principal Makhdoom Amir Ahmad. (6) Mr. A. W. Musavi. (7) Prof. A. L. Shaikh. , (8) Dr. N. A. Baloch. (9) Mr. Kazi Ahmad Muhammad. Mr. Lari contends that out of these 9, at least 5 were persons who were strongly prejudiced or biased against the petitioner. According to him the foremost among them was the Vice- Chancellor Mr. I.

1. Kazi, who presided at the meeting. Then there was Principal Makhdoom Amir Ahmad (at serial No. 5) who had voluntarily sworn an affidavit against the petitioner In the previous writ petition filed by him in this Court. The members mentioned at serial No. 7 and 8 namely Prof. A. L. Shaikh and Dr. N. A. Baloch had appeared as witnesses against the petitioner during the inquiry conducted by Mr. Moghul. Finally Mr. Kazi Ahmed Muhammad (at serial No. 9) acted as a prosecutor at the inquiry. Mr. Lad has argued that it is clear that a meeting attended by persons biased in this manner was bound to take a view adverse to the petitioner and the entire proceedings must be vitiated due to malice and mala fides.

13. We consider that there is substance in these conten tions. All the facts of, this case, and particularly the charge sheet served upon the petitioner, clearly show that it was the Vice‑Chancellor Mr. I. I. Kazi who was personally annoyed with the petitioner and who had taken prompt disciplinary action against the petitioner, by suspending him and charge‑sheeting him. It is therefore obvious that any meeting presided over by the Vice‑Chancellor could not act freely in so far as the petitioner was concerned. As regards the part played by Principal Makhdoom Amir Ahmad, Prof. A. L. Shaikh, Dr. N. A. Baloch and Mr. Kazi Ahmad Muhammad, the facts are not denied, but it has been argued by Mr. Tufail Ali and by Mr. Kazi Ahmad Muhammad himself, who has appeared in person, that these persons acted in the discharge of their public and moral duties and they did not entertain any personal bias or malice against the petitioner. In the first place we are not very sure if it was so. No public duty devolved on Principal Makhdoom to volunteer for filing an affidavit against the petitioner in the former writ petition in this Court. Similarly the evidence given by Prof. A. L. Shaikh and Dr. Baloch was not given in their official capacities by reference to any official documents or acts, but was their personal testimony to show as to how the petitioner had conducted himself on the relevant occasions. As regards Kazi Ahmad Muhammad, it is clear that he prosecuted the case on behalf of the employer and it is too much to imagine that while sitting as a member of the Syndicate he would be able to divest himself of the role he had already played in prosecuting the case against the petitioner during the course of the inquiry. Thus, no doubt is left in our minds, that 5 persons out of the 9 who attended the relevant meeting of the Syndicate, were clearly those who were prejudiced in one way or the other, and any verdict given by them stands clearly vitiated and must be set aside. 14. 1n the view which we have taken we are supported by Ghulam Rasool and others v. Crown (P L D 1951 F C 62) and Abdul Wassey v. Pakistan (P L D 1957 Kar. 363). 15. 1n arriving at this conclusion we have also taken into consideration the very learned argument addressed by Mr. Tufail Ali that the Syndicate is a statutory body and no question of bias or malice can arise against such a body. He contended that in the present case under the University Act it was the Syndicate alone which could take disciplinary action against the petitioner, and if the principle of bias vitiating the proceedings was carried to its logical conclusion a situation might arise where all the members of the Syndicate may stand disqualified in a given case, with the result that there would be no competent authority to take a decision in that case. Our answer to these arguments is twofold. In the first place the present is not a case where all the members of the Syndicate stand disqualified, and therefore the question posed by Mr. Tufail Ali as to what will happen in the extreme case where all the members are disqualified is merely of a theoretical nature and interest and we do not therefore propose to decide that point in this case. Under section 14 of Sind University Act the Syndicate comprises 15 members, and the quorum is only of 5 members. It is stated that at the relevant time the full complement of 15 members was not in existence and there were only I 1 members available, out of whom 9 actually attended the meeting. In other words if the 5 persons who were 'ln one way or the other concerned against the petitioner, had abstained from participating in the Syndicate proceedings, and the two absenting members invited specially to attend there would still have been a quorum for conducting the business of the meeting. In any case the rules make it clear that no quorum is required at an adjourned meeting of the Syndicate. The position therefore is that orders could have been passed in this case without the participation of the 5 biased members of the Syndicate.

16. In the second place, we confess that we have not been able to appreciate the reasoning advanced by the learned counsel, It seems to us that a corporate body, like a Syndicate, must of necessity be composed of human beings, and its resolutions and decisions must reflect the mental attitudes of those participating in the meetings at which such decisions are taken or resolutions are passed. If therefore some of the members participating in these meetings are biased in one way or the other, it can reason ably be said that the Syndicate or the other corporate body concerned was biased in that matter to the extent its decision were influenced by the members who were biased. The mere fact that the body which has to take a decision or to adopt a resolution is a statutory or a corporate body, is thus not enough to sustain the conclusion or to support the assertion f that such a body cannot be guilty of bias in any particular case.

17. We consider therefore that, in the first place, the petitioner was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed order of dismissal and, in the second place the proceedings of the Syndicate meeting at which the decision to dismiss the petitioner was taken, stand vitiated by reason of the unfortunate fact that 5 out of the 9 members who attended the meeting were biased against the petitioner. We, therefore, issue a writ of certiorari and quash the order of dismissal passed against the petitioner and direct that he should now be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment and on the receipt of his reply the matter should be considered afresh by the Syndicate which should decide the matter according to law. s The petition is therefore accepted with costs.

18. As the matter has already been pending for a long time, we direct that the petitioner should submit his reply to the show -cause notice within 30 days from today.

19. We are informed by Mr. Kazi Ahmad Muhammad that at the moment there is no Syndicate functioning in the University of Sind. If that is so, then we direct that the petitioner's reply to the show‑cause notice should be considered by the authority which has been vested with the powers of the Syndicate or by any other authority which is competent to deal with the petitioner's case. A. H. Petition accepted.