P L D 2003 Karachi 686 (PLP)

(iv) Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper. The brief facts of the case are that the office of the petitioner, who is a private limited company engaged in the business of manufacturing and supply of paper for packing cement, was visited by respondent No.2, who prepared an inspection note whereby he pointed out deficiencies in the stamp duties on certain documents and directed to pay the requisite stamp duty of Rs.12,45,

281. The petitioner submitted that respondent No.2 had no lawful authority to inspect the documents or assess the alleged deficiency in the stamp duty. Petitioner further submitted that they were not liable to pay any stamp duty as no deficiency existed. They further submitted that notwithstanding their protests respondent No. 2 vide their letter dated 4‑8‑1999 called upon the petitioner to pay Rs.12,45,281 on account of alleged deficiency in the stamp duty. Having no other alternate, adequate and efficacious remedy, the petitioner has filed this Constitutional petition. Parawise comments were submitted by Muhammad Ismail Memon, Deputy Chief Inspector of Stamps, Board of Revenue, Sindh, Karachi on behalf of the respondents. In the comments, it was stated that the petitioners themselves admitted that they were supplying paper bags, therefore, they were liable to payment of stamp duty within the definition of the word "contract". It was further submitted that under the provisions of section 73 of the Stamp Act read with subsection (22‑A) of section 2 of the Stamp Act, respondent No. 2 had authority to inspect a public office with a view to detect the cases of commission of fraud towards stamp revenue. It was further submitted that purchase orders had specifically been included in the definition of the word 'contract' which negated the plea of the petitioner that they had no liability to pay stamp duty or any deficiency. It was further submitted that Article 22‑A of the Schedule to the Stamp Act defined 'contract' and the petitioner‑company dealing in the supply of bags would be liable to payment of stamp duty chargeable thereunder. It was also submitted that respondent No.2 never called upon the petitioner to make payment of any stamp duty but had demanded production of insufficiently stamped contract agreement/purchase orders for forwarding the same to the Collector to stamp them in accordance with the provisions of section 40 of the Stamp Act and further that the order of the Collector passed under section 40 of the Stamp Act could have been assailed by the petitioner before the Chief Controller Revenue Authority under section 56 of the Stamp Act. We have heard the arguments of Mr. Shahenshah Hussain, Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Qazi Khalid Ali, learned Additional Advocate General, Sindh on behalf of the respondents. Mr. Shahenshah Hussain raised the following contentions:‑‑ (i) That Article 22‑A of the Stamp Act was applicable to documents executed by a contractor and the petitioner could not be treated as such as it was carrying on the business of manufacturing and supplying of paper bags. Resultantly, the action of respondent No.2 in applying the provisions of Article 22‑A to the agreement/purchase orders was unlawful. (ii) That the petitioner was not liable to pay stamp duty under section 29 of the Stamp Act as the word 'contract' defined/mentioned in Article 22‑A of the First Schedule to the Stamp Act did not form part of section 29 which, according to him, was necessary for bringing a document/contract/agreement within the purview of the Stamp Act; (iii) That Article 22‑A was not given retrospective effect as a result of which no demand could be based on Article 22‑A prior to the period when it came into force; and (iv) That the demand for payment of stamp duty/deficit stamp duty could not be made unless it was determined by the competent authority under section 31 of the Stamp Act, therefore, the demand for payment of Rs.12,45,821 was illegal and void as admittedly it had not been, determined by the competent authority. Mr. Qazi Khalid Ali, learned Additional Advocate‑General, Sindh on the other hand vehemently objected to the maintainability of the Constitutional petition and submitted that by virtue of the provisions of section 57 of the Stamp Act this Court has been made the referral authority and such reference is to be decided by Bench of not less than three Judges. He further submitted that the petitioner did not allow the competent Authority to make an order for stamping of the documents/agreement/purchase orders in question whereafter he could have approached the Chief Revenue Authority for redress of his grievance in exercise of the powers under section 56 of the Stamp Act but in supersession of the provisions of section 56 of the Stamp Act the petitioner invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court which was not legally permissible. In support of his contention, he referred to the case of Khalid Mehmood v. Collector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore 1999 SCMR 1881 wherein the Supreme Court pronounced that when this Court was the ultimate appellate, revisional or referral authority, then it would rarely permit a party to invoke its Constitutional jurisdiction. He also referred to the case of Mst. Kaniz Fatima v. Muhammad Salim and 27 others 2001 SCMR 1493 wherein it was pronounced that where a particular statute provided, self‑contained machinery for determination of questions arising under the statute and law provided a remedy by way of appeal or revision to another Tribunal fully competent, to give the relief prayed in the Constitutional petition, then an indulgence to the contrary by this Court was bound to produce a sense of distrust in statutory provision and a Constitutional petition without exhausting remedy provided by the statute would not lie. On merits, Mr. Qazi Khalid Ali submitted that the petitioner had not allowed the competent authority to proceed in exercise of the powers in accordance with the provisions of the Stamp Act. He further submitted that by filing this Constitutional petition the petitioner throttled the competent authority from making a determination for payment of stamp duty on the documents impounded by respondent No.2 as such the relief sought by the petitioner at clause (i) of the prayer clause was not available to the petitioner inasmuch as respondent No.2 had only impounded the documents in question which were found to be deficiently stamped to the extent of Rs.12,45,821 and this amount could be claimed only if a determination to this effect was made by the Collector of Stamps in exercise of the powers under section 40 of the Stamp Act. With regard to the contention that the petitioner was not liable to pay stamp duty under Article 22‑A of the First Schedule to the Stamp Act as Article 22‑A was not incorporated in section 29 of the Stamp Act which highlighted/denoted the persons responsible for payment of stamp duty in respect of various bonds, deeds/documents he submitted that the contention was without any substances as section 29 of the Stamp Act did not incorporate or include all the persons on whom responsibility to pay the stamp duty is cast under the different provisions of the Stamp Act and in support of his contention he placed reliance on the very section itself wherein a large number of Articles of the First Schedule have not been incorporated or included nevertheless the liability or responsibility to pay the stamp duty by one of the, parties to such documents/deeds/settlement continues to exist. We have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material on record as well as the relevant provisions of law relating to the facts and circumstances of the ease. It is to be observed that the grievance of the petitioner is that respondent No.2 had illegally and without law authority made the demand of Rs.12,45,821 towards payment of deficit amp duty by letter dated 4‑8‑1999. From a bare perusal of the letter dated 4‑8‑1999, it is to be noted that no where in the letter respondent No.2 had called upon the petitioner to make payment of the sum of Rs.12,45,

821. What had been written in the letter was that on examination of the agreement/production orders entered into between the petitioner and cement factories for supply of papers bags for packing cement, it was found that they were not properly stamped in accordance with the provisions of the Stamp Act and deficit stamp duty of Rs.12,45,281 was payable. The petitioner would have been liable to make payment of the aforesaid amount only after the Collector of Stamps in exercise of his powers under section 40 of the Stamp Act and after taking into consideration the contents of the agreement/production orders had come to the conclusion that they were deficiently stamped and stamps of the aforesaid value were to be affixed thereon. On such order having been made by the Collector of Stamps, the petitioner would have been entitled to approach the Revenue Authority by way of revision/reference under section 56 of the Stamp Act. Section 57 of the Stamp Act gives powers to the Chief Revenue Authority to refer any case referred to it under section 56 to this Court for seeking its opinion on questions raised therein. Sections 58 and 59 of the Stamp Act lay down the powers of this Court and the procedure according to which this Court is to proceed and hear the case for deciding the questions raised in the reference. It is thus to be observed that the Stamp Act has provided a full‑fledged machinery for determination of the issues and questions arising with regard to the deficiencies in payment of stamp duty on instruments covered by the Stamp Act. When a self‑contained machinery is provided in a statute for determination of the questions and disputes arising under such statute then the parties are required to exhaust all the remedies made available to them before the forums especially constituted under such statute and invocation of Constitutional jurisdiction before exhausting the remedies available under such statutes would be premature. The Supreme Court in the aforecited two cases had categorically pronounced that a party would not be allowed to invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan before exhausting the remedies available to it under the specific statute as allowing such action would undermine the scope and power of the forum/authority so constituted for deciding the disputes and questions arising under the statute. It is also to be noted that this Court has been made the referral authority by section 57 of the Stamp Act. In view of the principle propounded by the Supreme Court in the case of Khalid Mehmood v. collector of Customs, Custom House, Lahore (supra), this Court will be reluctant to entertain a Constitutional petition in supersession or by bypassing the elaborate machinery provided for by the Stamp Act for resolution of the disputes/issues highlighted in the Constitutional petition. For the foregoing reasons and discussion, we find that this Constitutional petition is misconceived and not maintainable. Accordingly, it stands dismissed alongwith the miscellaneous application pending therein. M.H./P‑75/K Petition dismissed.