2018 PLP 107 (PLC)
Messrs DEWAN SALMAN FIBRE LIMITED through General Manager Administration and its Attorney/Legal Representative Versus AUTHORITY UNDER PAYMENT OF WAGES and 6 others
| Citation | 2018 PLP 107 (PLC) |
| Forum / Court | Peshawar High Court (Abbottabad Bench) |
| Bench Members | Syed Afsar Shah and Syed Arshad Ali, JJ |
| Parties | Messrs DEWAN SALMAN FIBRE LIMITED through General Manager Administration and its Attorney/Legal Representative Versus AUTHORITY UNDER PAYMENT OF WAGES and 6 others |
| Primary Law | Payment of Wages Act (IV of 1936) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2018 PLP 107 (PLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: Payment of Wages Act (IV of 1936) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2018 PLP 107 (PLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Peshawar High Court (Abbottabad Bench) bench comprising: Syed Afsar Shah and Syed Arshad Ali, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2018 PLP 107 (PLC) (Messrs DEWAN SALMAN FIBRE LIMITED through General Manager Administration and its Attorney/Legal Representative Versus AUTHORITY UNDER PAYMENT OF WAGES and 6 others). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Abdur Rehman Qadir for Petitioner.
- Yasir Zahoor Abbasi, Assistant Advocate General for Respondents.
Headnotes / Summary
S. 15(2)
Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1937, R.8
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance (XXXI of 1960), S.3
Ex parte order, setting aside of
Dispute was with regard to recovery of wages of employees
Authorities arrested one of the Directors of petitioner company in exercise of powers under S.3 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960
Authorities, on the statement of said Director, petitioner company was ordered to make payments
Petitioner company filed application to set aside order but authorities dismissed application on grounds that it was barred by time
No opportunity of meaningful hearing was provided to petitioner company and the directions were perverse and illegal
Order in question gave an impression of an off hand and whimsical order which could have been corrected in its result but was deficient in its contention
Petitioner company did not receive any summons or notice at its registered office and said Director of the company was not authorized/notified manager, therefore, it was an appropriate case for setting aside ex parte order and authorities had jurisdiction under R.8 of Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1937
Application filed by petitioner company was not time barred and authorities incorrectly found that application was time barred
Fair and safe administration of justice demanded decision of cases on merits instead of non-suiting litigants on technical grounds including limitation
High Court set aside orders passed against petitioner
Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan and others 2015 SCMR 630 and Dr. Zafer Ahmed v. Mst. Shamsa and others PLD 2002 Kar. 524 rel.
Judgment & Decree
SYED ARSHAD ALI, J.- The petitioner seeks the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court praying that:- "It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that on acceptance of instant writ petition the impugned ex parte direction dated 09.05.2009 as well as the order dated 15.02.2011 may graciously be set aside with a direction to the Learned Authority/respondent No. 1 to decide the case a fresh after affording full opportunity of hearing and defense to the petitioner, with cost. It is further prayed that the execution proceedings pending before the Respondent No. 1 may graciously be suspended till the final disposal of instant writ petition."
2. Essential facts leading to filing of instant petition are that the petitioner is a private limited company and has its manufacturing unit in Hattar. The Inspector of Factories, Haripur, on 02.05.2009 filed an application/claim under Section 15(2) of the erstwhile Payment of Wages Act, 1936, before the Authority established under Payment of Wages Act, 1936, in respect of the workers of the petitioner company. The said claim was accompanied with a list of workers/employees of the petitioner company. The total number of employees of the petitioners' company, as mentioned in the claim is 1732. On 02.09.2009, a notice was issued to the petitioners. Pursuant to the said notice, one Tariq Nazeer, allegedly a clerk of the petitioners' company, who was working in its manufacturing unit Hattar, appeared before the Authority and stated that the Director Operations of the petitioner company has been arrested by the District Administration under Section 3 of West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 ("MPO") as there was a dispute relating to the payment of salaries of the employees. Similarly, the Labour Officer/Inspector of Factories filed an application before the Authority wherein it was mentioned that one Chaudhary Ayub (Director Operations) of the company is overall responsible person for administration of the accounts as well as for payment of wages of the employees of the petitioner company. Accordingly, on 06.05.2009, the Authority issued directions to produce Chaudhary Ayub before the Authority on 09.05.2009. On 09.05.2009, said Chaudhary Muhammad Ayub (Director Operations) was produced before the Authority and his statement was recorded wherein he has admitted that the employees were not paid the salaries for the month of March, however, non-payment of salary is not his responsibility and payment of salaries was the responsibility of the Chief Executive through HR Administration of the company. On the said date, i.e. 09.05.2009, the following directions were issued by the Authority:- "Ch: Mohammad Ayub Director Operation Respondent No. 2 present through Police and claimant Inspector of Factories Haripur also present. Respondent No.1, despite of notice, not present. He is placed ex parte. Respondent No. 2 submitted reply statement in which he fully admitted the claim. Statement of claimant and respondent No. 2 were recorded. Respondent No. 2 in his statement also admitted the claim. Keeping in view the admission of the claim by Respondent No. 2, who is incharge of the respondent Company, there are nothing in dispute which require further evidence. Therefore, the claim submitted by the claimant is hereby accepted. The respondents are hereby directed to deposit the claim amount of Rs.1,84,35,804/- with this Authority forthwith for onward payment to affected workers. Announced in open Court with no order as to cost. File be consigned to R.R. after necessary completion." Accordingly, Inspector of Factories Haripur, filed an application for execution of the directions for which notice was issued to the present petitioners. Pursuant to the notice, the present petitioner filed an application for setting aside ex parte directions on 12.08.2009. In the said application it was claimed that they came to know about the impugned directions on 03.08.2009. Inspector of Factories, Haripur, filed reply to the said application and after hearing both the parties, the Authority vide impugned order dated 07.11.2009, dismissed the application of the petitioner. The said order was challenged before this Court through Writ Petition No. 543 of 2009. The said petition finally came up for hearing on 11.01.2011 wherein following order was passed:-- "In view of the above, this writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 07.11.2009 passed by respondent No. 2 is set-aside and case/application filed for setting aside ex parte order dated 09.05.2009 is remanded back to Commissioner for Welfare and Compensation (Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936) District Haripur for decision fresh after affording opportunity to both the parties for producing their respective evidence and hearing in accordance with law. The application shall be deemed to be pending and shall be decided within a period of one month positively. " After remand of the case, the Authority recorded the statements of the parties and through impugned order dismissed the application for setting aside the directions dated 09.05.2009.
3. Arguments heard and record perused.
4. The Authority in its impugned order has stated that the present petitioner was placed ex parte vide order dated 09.05.2009 and that one Chaudhary Muhammad Ayub, who was the manager at the relevant time, was arrested under section 3 MPO by the local Administration and he was produced before the Authority while he was in custody. The Authority has also stated that Chaudhary Muhammad Ayub was not notified manager under the Factories Act, 1934. The record further shows that a long list of employees and their claim was provided to the Authority. In the said list various categories of the employees were mentioned. It has also been brought to our notice that all the employees mentioned in the list are not workers. The manner and mode in which Chaudhary Muhammad Ayub was produced before the Authority and his statement was recorded clearly shows that a fair opportunity of hearing and defense was not provided to the petitioner. It is further evident from the record that the present petitioner company was not served at the address of its registered office, as at the relevant time the operation of the Factory was suspended i.e. the unit was closed and the only Director Operations of the company was in police custody. Even otherwise, the entire proceedings were carried out in haste and in a slipshod manner, thus, the principle of natural justice has been seriously eroded. Indeed, the claim, as mentioned in the petition, required scrutiny and verification from the record maintained by the petitioner company. Any authority or state functionary, performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions, who has been given an authority to administer justice and decide disputes between the parties, it is the onerous duty of that authority to provide meaningful, purposeful and effective hearing to both the parties and after giving opportunity to both the parties to put forward their claims, decide the dispute by independently applying its mind to the facts, evidence and circumstances of the case. It is a settled principle of law that justice should not only be done but it should be seen that substantial justice has been done. However, in the present case, no opportunity of meaningful hearing has been provided to the petitioner hence, the direction in impugned order are perverse and illegal. The order impugned gives clear impression of an offhand and whimsical order which might be correct in its result, but is deficient in its contention. It was held in the case of Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan and others (2015 SCMR 630), by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan:- "The exercise of any discretionary power must be rational and have a nexus with the objective of the underlying legislation. Arbitrariness is the antithesis of the rule of law. The legislature, when it confers a wide ranging power, must be deemed to have assumed that the power will be, firstly, exercised in good faith, secondly, for the advancement of the objects of the legislation, and, thirdly in a reasonable manner. Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, reiterates the principle that statutory power is to be exercised "reasonably, fairly, justly and for the advancement of the purposes of the enactment" and further clarifies that an executive authority must give reasons for its decision. Any action by an executive authority which is violative of these principles is liable to be struck down. No other view is permissible." Similarly, in Dr. Zafer Ahmed v. Mst. Shamsa and others (PLD 2002 Karachi 524), honourable Sindh High Court in para 10 of the judgment has held:- "The last sentence in the above order manifestly discloses the indifferent attitude of the learned Family Judge in dismissing the application for setting aside the ex parte order simply on the ground that ex parte order had already been announced. Such a slipshod and rough order is to be refrained from while performing sacred duty of judicial dispensation. Not only a Judge but by way of introduction of new provision in section 24-A(2) of the General Clauses Act every authority, office or person making an order under the powers conferred by or under any enactment is required to assign/record reasons for passing the order. Indeed, if the last mentioned sentence is the only ground for passing the order dated 25-5-2000 it can irresistibly be opined that it is no 'reason' in the eye of law. An order shall be a speaking order and more particularly while dealing with substantive rights of parties a cursory and a groundless order without assigning reasons cannot be conceived, nor would it be treated as a legal one."
5. Hence, through the impugned order, the Authority has deprived the petitioner of its right of reasonable opportunity of hearing. Besides, the order impugned is neither a speaking order nor the proceedings have been conducted in a fair and impartial manner. The said impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law and as such cannot be upheld under any cannon of law. The ex parte order cannot be upheld unless, if from the record it appears that, the conduct of the present petitioner is contumacious and unbecoming. In the present case, when there is nothing on the record to establish that the present petitioner has received any summon or notice at its registered office and Chaudhary Muhammad Ayub was not authorized/notified manager, then it was an appropriate case for setting aside ex parte order and the Authority had jurisdiction under Rule 8 of the Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1937. The application was not time barred and hence, the Authority has incorrectly held that the application was time barred. Even otherwise, the fare and safe administration of justice demands the decision of the cases on merits always be encouraged instead of non-suiting the litigants on technical grounds including limitation.
6. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 09.05.2009 and 15.09.2011 are set aside. Before parting with this judgment, we would like to note that an amount of Rs.4.5 million has been paid and disbursed to the workers which has been admitted by the counsel appearing on behalf of respondents Nos.4 to
6. The learned counsel has stated that his clients have received their dues, hence, the Authority shall decide the claim of other employees strictly in accordance with law. MH/12/P Petition allowed.