P L D 1958 (W (PLP)

3. The seniority inter se of holders of listed posts on the executive or judicial side, as the case may be, is determined by the date of substantive appointment to a listed post.

4. Ali Indian Civil Service Officer substantively appoint ed to a superior post on the executive or judicial side, as the case may be, shall take rank in order of seniority on that side above‑ (a) any holder of a listed post who began to officiate continuously in a superior post oil a date subsequent to the date on which the Indian Civil Service Officer (or any officer junior to him in the Indian Civil Service) began to officiate continuously in a superior post ; (b) any holder of a listed post, whose recognised service is less than the total service of the Indian Civil Service Officer ; (c) any holder of a listed post who, though not falling within the description contained in paragraphs (a) and (b) above, is junior to any person falling within either of those descriptions ; and (d) any Indian Civil Service Officer already substantively holding a superior post who is junior to him in the Indian Civil Service.

5. For the purpose of these Rules alt officer shall be treated as having officiated in a superior post during any period in respect of which the Local Government certify that he would have so officiated but for his absence on leave, his tenure of a special appointment or other exceptional circum stance.

6. Nothing in these Rules shall affect the seniority of any holder of a listed post who was appointed substantively to a superior post in the Presidency of Bombay before the 6th day of October 1925 and in other Provinces before the 9th day of March 1927." Rule 4 (a) was changed in the beginning of the year 1937 but it is not necessary to detail the alteration here. Mr. M. B. Zaman, the learned counsel who argued the case on behalf of the petitioners, contended that the interpre tation placed by the Central Government on the Rules was wrong, because that interpretation gave rights to officers of the Provincial Police Service which were not intended to be given to them. He argued that the Rules were mad: for the benefit of those police officers who had been taken directly in the highest police service and their interpretation in a manner that gave any police officer, other than one who had joined service as a direct recruit equal rights with the direct recruits was not only against the intention of the rule‑making authority but also unwarranted by the language of the Rules. During the hearing of the petition Mr. Inayat Ali Shah, the present Deputy Inspector‑General of Police, C. I. D., who was taken directly in the Indian Police Service before Partition, sought permission to address arguments and as he appeared to be interested in the interpretation of the Rules in the manner that the petitioners wanted them to be interpreted, he was allowed to have his say. The main contention of Mr. Inayat All Shah was that it could not have been the intention of the rule‑making authority that the Rules should allow a person who was originally a member of the Provincial Police Service and even the subordinate police service to claim the same rights as the members of the highest police service enjoyed and, therefore, the interpretation put on the Rules by the Central Government of Pakistan should be held to be wrong.

7. To the above contentions the reply given was that the Rules had not been misinterpreted and the interpretation placed on them was not only warranted by the language of the Rules themselves but also by the interpretation placed on them in the past. It was also pointed out on behalf of the respondents, as was mentioned in the written statement put in by Mr. S. M. Zafar, Advocate, that before placing on the Rules the interpretation which the Central Government of Pakistan had declared to be final, that Government had consulted not only the Indian Government but also the Department of Commonwealth Relations of Great Britain and the interpretation placed on the Rules was in accordance with the views expressed by the above mentioned two authorities.

8. On the 22nd November 1927 the Secretary of State for India with the concurrence of a majority of the Council of India passed the Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, rule 2 of which laid down that the Indian Police Service was to be recruited besides other methods by the promotion, in accordance with Part V of those rules, on the recommendation of Local Government, of members of the Provincial Police Service and it may be that the Rules were made with the object of placing the direct recruits to the Indian Police Service in a better position than promoted officers. It is hardly open to question, however, that if the language of the Rules is clear it will not be permissible to interpret them in the light of what might be presumed to have been the intention of the rule‑making authority, because, just as in the case of statutes, it is to be presumed that the intention was no other than that clearly expressed by the language of the Rules. If, however, more than one interpretation is reasonably pos sible, one may have to gather the meaning of a rule by trying to end out what the intention of the rule‑making authority gas, It is also clear that if a particular‑ interpretation has been placed on the Rules in the past by authorities who had to apply them to cases as they arose, the Court should be reluctant to place a different interpretation unless it came to the conclusion that the interpretation placed by Government for a long time was so palpably wrong that by upholding it the Court would be countenancing the perpetuation of an injustice which had been perpetrated and paying the way for similar injustices in the future.

9. Before taking up in detail the various contentions raised during the hearing, I might mention the Government inter pretation challenged by this petition. This interpretation is attached to the petition as annexure `B', which is a copy of letter No. 10/31/54‑Police‑(I) dated the 21st February 1957 from Assistant Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of the Interior, Karachi, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan, Lahore, and others. The first paragraph of the letter is to the effect that since the interpretation of the Indian Police (Regulation of Seniority) Rules in letter No. 10/31/54‑Police dated 25th December 1954, a number of representations had been received as to the correct interpretation of rule 4 (a). In paragraph 2 of the letter it was said that in order that the position may become clear reference was made to Government of India and the Common wealth Relations Office, London, and the interpretation of both of them was mentioned in that paragraph. Paragraph 3 of the letter is in the following terms:‑

3. The above paragraph clearly shows how the seniority of I. P. Officers vis‑a‑vis promoted officers was determined in pre‑Independence days under the I. P. (Regulation of Seniority) Rules. As these Rules are still in force, the Government of Pakistan are bound to apply these in the same manner. Therefore, the interpretation of the Rules given in this Ministry's letter of even number dated the 25th December 1954, may be treated as having been superseded to the extent indicated by the final and authentic interpretation of the I. P. (Regulation of Seniority) Rules as detailed below:‑ Rule 1.‑These rules are still in force and apply to the regulation of seniority in the Police Service of Pakistan. Rule 2 (i).‑The words 'appointed substantively' mean con firmed in the Police Service of Pakistan. Rule 2 (2).‑No comments. Rule 3.‑This rule is meant to regulate the seniority of promoted officers inter se. In the case of promoted officers the date with effect from which their seniority inter se will be determined will be the date of substantive appoint ment (confirmation of the promoted officers). Rule 4 (a).‑This rule is meant to regulate the seniority of a promoted office vis‑a‑vis a direct recruit of the P. S. P. The seniority of a directly recruited P. S. P. Officer, on substantive appointment to a superior post, will be determined vis‑a‑vis a promoted officer with reference to the date of continuous officiation in superior post in the case of the former and the date of similar officiation in superior post in the case of the latter. In a case, however, where a promoted officer has no continuous period of officiation, immediately before his substantive appointment to the P. S. P. the relative seniority will be determined with reference to the date of substantive appointment to the superior post in the P. S. P. in the case of the promoted officer and the date of continued officiation in the superior post in the case of the direct recruit. Rule__4 (b) __‑

No comments. (c) & (d) Rule 5.‑-No comments."

10. A copy of letter No. 10/95/53‑Police (1) dated the 25th December 1954, which has been placed on the record by the petitioners as Exh. P. 2, shows that it was on the representa tion of Mr. Inayat Ali Shah and Mr. S. D. Qureshi that the Central Government had reconsidered the matter and had arrived at the conclusion that the interpretation they gave in their letter of the above number dated the 16th of October 1954 was incorrect. The letter dated the 16th of October 1954 shows that Mr. Ata Muhammad Noon had officiated from 6th May 1942 to 11th May 1945 in a temporary unreserved senior Police Service of Pakistan post and as the Government of Pakistan had approved of the confirmation of Mr. Ata Muhammad Noon in the Police service of Pakistan though no date of confirmation had yet been fixed his seniority in relation to other officers was to be determined. The letter dated the 16th of October 1954 went on to say that the period of Mr. Ata Muhammad Noon's officiation in the temporary unreserved post will be taken into con sideration for fixing his seniority vis‑a‑vis promoted and directly recruited police officers. In the penultimate para graph of the letter dated the 16th of October 1954 the seniority of Mr. Ata Muhammad Noon, Mr. Inayat Ali Shah, Mr. R. M. Wall and Mr. S. D. Qureshi, the second and fourth of whom are definitely direct recruits and so is possibly the third, was fixed as under: (1) Mr. Ata Muhammad Noon ... ... 6‑5‑1942, (2) Mr. Inayat Ali Shah ... ... 25‑4‑1944. (3) Mr. R. M. Wall ... ... 13‑3‑1945. (4) Mr. S. D. Qureshi ... ... 1‑7‑1943. The date mentioned against the name of each officer is evidently the date from which he started continued officia tion in a superior post. By the letter dated the 25th of December 1954 and a corrigendum to that letter, the seniority of Mr. Noon, Mr. Shah and Mr. Qureshi was fixed as under:‑ (1) Mr. Inayat Ali Shah. (2) Mr. S. D. Qureshi. (3) Mr. Ata Muhammad Noon. No mention was made of Mr. Wall evidently because he had riot put in a representation. It wad said in the letter dated the 25th December that the date of confirmation of Mr. Ata Muhammad Noon in a superior post had not yet been decided by the Government of Pakistan but was being assumed to be as the 1st of September 1947 which was claimed by him to be the date. The letter and its corri gendum further show that Mr. S. D. Qureshi started continued officiation in a superior post on the 1st of July 1943 and Mr. Inayat Ali Shah on the 25th of April 1944, but as Mr. Inayat All Shah had joined the Indian Police Service earlier than Mr. S. D. Qureshi had, he was to be considered senior to Mr. Qureshi because of rule 4 (d) of the Rules and Mr. Ata Muhammad Noon was junior to both of them because he was confirmed on a date subsequent to those on which the direct recruits, Mr. Inayat Ali Shah and Mr. S. D. Qureshi, had started continued officiation in a superior post.

11. An earlier interpretation of the Rules by the Ministry of the Interior. Government of Pakistan, is contained in letter No. 10/1/51‑Police (I) dated Karachi the 14th of April 1951 from Mr. S. N. Bakar, Deputy Secretary to Government of Pakistan, to the Chief Secretaries of the then four Provinces of Pakistan, a copy of which was placed on the record as Exh. R. 2 by the learned counsel for the respondents. That interpretation was as follows:‑ "(a) in the case of promoted officers the date with effect from which the question of their seniority is to be determined will be the date of substantive appointment (confirmation) of the promoted officers ; (b) any officers of the former I. P. (PSP) who may have been confirmed already in the senior scale would be con sidered senior to the promoted officers promoted subse quently to the confirmation of the direct recruits, and (c) any direct recruit confirmed subsequently to the confirmation of a promoted officer will have his seniority determined as follows (i) If the date with effect from which the direct recruit has been continuously officiating is earlier than the date with effect from which the promoted officer (already confirmed) started officiating or was confirmed, then the direct recruit would be considered senior to the promoted officer. (ii) If, on the other hand, the direct recruit started officiating at a date later than the date with effect from which the promoted officer started officiating continuously and such direct recruit was confirmed after the confirma tion of the promoted officer, then the promoted officer would be senior to the direct recruit subject always to the operation of rule 4 (d) of the Seniority Rules." This interpretation does not accord fully with those that followed and which have been mentioned above and it cannot, therefore be said that the averment of the peti tioners that the Ministry of Interior had placed contradictory interpretations on the Rules was baseless.

12. The respondents and one of the three Deputy Inspectors General of Police, who, though not parties originally, were e allowed to address arguments, placed on the record some decisions of different Governments with regard to the Rules. Exhibit R. 1, which is a resolution, dated the 30th of September 1944, of the Government of Bombay, is of no assistance as it deals with the seniority of some members of Indian Police Service inter se and says nothing about promoted officers. Exhibit R. V is a letter dated the 4th of February 1956 from Mr. Ali Hasan, Deputy Secretary to Government of East Bengal (now East Pakistan) to the address of the Secretary of the Interior which quoted four instances of the pre‑Partition period claimed by him as showing that the interpretation placed on the Rules was different from that contained in the Ministry of Interior's letter dated the 25th of December 1954 but as all the four cases mentioned in the letter were of promoted officers, the letter is of no assistance in the present case. Exhibit R. VI is the interpretation of the Government of India, while Exh. R. VII is the letter with regard to the interpretation from the Commonwealth Relations Office, London, wherein it is said that as the interpretation of the Rule was a matter for the Secretary of State for India in Council or the Secretary of State for India and his advisers it was not possible to provide an authentic inter pretation but the position would appear to be as detailed in the letter. Exhibit R. VIII is a copy of U. O. No. 23/25/ 56‑S. E, I., dated the 23rd of January 1957 from the Establish ment Secretary, Government of Pakistan; to the Ministry of the Interior and the Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division) wherein it is said, inter‑alia, that with regard to interpreta tion of rule 4 (a) of the Rules the Ministry of the Interior should fall in line with the interpretation given by the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Government of India. Annexure 'A' to the reply of Nawabzada Muhammad Farid Khan, Deputy Inspector‑General, Railway Police, Lahore, put in through Mr. Jamil Hussain Rizvi, Advocate, is a resolution of the Government of Bombay dated the 8th of January 1943 which shows that the continued officiation of a direct recruit on leis confirmation in a superior post made him senior to a promoted officer who, though confirmed earlier, had started his continuous officiation in the superior post later than the direct recruit did. It is clear from what has been said above that the interpretations placed on the Rules by the different Governments called upon to apply them had not been precisely the same with the result that the Court has to give an interpretation of the Rules almost entirely unhampered and unaided by the interpretations placed on them by the authorities whose primary duty it was to apply the Rules to cases as they arose.

13. One of the main controversies between the parties centred round the application of rule 3 of the Rules. The contention on behalf of the petitioners was that that rule was meant to have application when the seniority of a promoted officer was to be determined in relation to that of a direct recruit and had no application when the seniority of promoted officers inter se was to be determined while it was contended on behalf of the respondents and the three Deputy Inspectors‑General of Police, who had been allowed to partici pate in the proceedings, that the rule determined the seniority of the promoted officers inter se and had no application when the seniority of direct recruits in relation to promoted officers was to be determined It was further contended on behalf of the petitioners that rule 4 was a proviso to rule 3 and when applying the former the latter was to be kept in view. It is difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners in so far as it sought to make rule 3 of the Rules inapplicable to the seniority of promoted officers amongst themselves, because if rule 3 does not apply to that question it would follow that no rule had been laid down in the Rules with regard to the seniority of the promoted officers inter se as the ordinary rule that the date of confirmation determines seniority could not be invoked not only because it leas been departed from in the Rules but also because the Rules deal with seniority in a service and ,not in rank. It is common ground that when a police officer, other than a direct recruit, was appointed sub stantively to a superior post in the police the term "superior post" indicating the post of a District Superintendent of Police and posts higher in rank to that post‑he was made a member of the highest police service which was known as the Indian Police Service in the times of the British and for some time after the coming into being of Pakistan and is now known as the Police Service of Pakistan, and to act on the assumption that the question of the seniority of promoted officers between themselves was left undeterminable by the Rules would be doing the framers of the Rules a great deal of injustice, as by acting on that assumption one would be depicting them incapable of providing a complete code about a matter of no great intricacy.

14. One argument which the learned counsel for the petitioners pressed in support of his contention that rule 3 of the Rules was not applicable to cases in which the seniority of promoted officers inter se was to be determined was that the rule‑making authority had, while making similar rules in the case of a similar service, namely, the Indian Civil Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, which were passed at a meeting of the Council of India held on the same day as the Rules were passed, used the words "inter se" in rule 3 which was meant to determine the seniority of officers who held listed posts but were not members of the Indian Civil Service, and this was, according to the learned counsel, sufficient to prove that rule 3 of the Rules was not meant to determine the seniority of promoted officers inter se. This contention would have been weighty had it not been for the fact that the Indian Civil Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules dealt with three kinds of officers, namely, members of the Indian Civil Service, members of the Pro vincial Civil Service and members of legal profession appointed to hold listed posts and two kinds of service namely, the Executive and the Judicial side of the Civil Service. The term "holder of a listed post" was defined by rule 2 of the Indian Civil Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, which have been copied out in paragraph 5 above, to mean an officer not belonging to the Indian Civil Service who was appointed substantively to a superior post in the Indian Civil Service cadre, whether by promotion from the Provincial Civil Service or by appointment from the legal profession, and it is clear that as rule 3 of the Indian Civil Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules was meant to determine the seniority of holders of listed posts, who had been drawn from two sources and dealt with the seniority of those officers only, the use of the expression "inter se" was necessary. The fact, however, that the seniority inter se of holders of listed posts was dealt with in the rules applicable to them which were passed by the same authority on the same date as the Rules makes it highly improbable that the seniority inter se of promoted officers was left undealt with in the Rules. I would hold, therefore, that the contention oil behalf of the petitioners that rule 3 of the, Rules was not applicable to the question of the determination of the seniority of promoted officers inter se is untenable.

15. This brings me to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that rule 4 was a sort of proviso to rule 3 and the two should be read together. He argued that because rule 3 laid down that a promoted officer could count his seniority in the Indian Police Service (now known as the Police Service of Pakistan) only from the date of his substantive appointment to a superior post which was ordinarily not meant for officers of his cadre, the period of officiation of a promoted officer could not be taken into account when dealing with his seniority in comparison with that of a direct recruit who had been substantively appointed to a superior post. He cited West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Society (1897 A C 647); Madras and Southern Mahratta Rly. Co. v. Bezwada Municipality (A I R 1944 P C 71) and Reference by the President (P L D 1957 S C. (Pak.), 219) to support his further contention that a proviso need not be mentioned as a proviso. There can be no manner of doubt that it is not necessary that before a Court can use a provision in a statute or rules as a proviso to another occurring in that statute or in those rules, the former should be mentioned as a proviso to the latter, but before a provision not described as a proviso to another is, held to be that, it should be clear that the provision, governs the latter and could not have been intended to have and independent existence. It is to be noticed that while the first three clauses of rule 4 deal with the seniority of direct recruits in relation to the promoted officers the fourth clause deals with the seniority of direct recruits amongst themselves. If rule 4 was meant to be a proviso to rule 3 the drafting was inelegant, but as mere inelegance of drafting cannot be the sole test when determining the question whether or not the first three clauses of rule 4 of the Rules are provisos to rule 3, I would proceed to consider whether they are so because even if rule 3 of the Rules applied to the seniority of promoted officers inter se that fact alone could not prevent it from application even in a case in which the seniority of promoted officers in relation to direct recruits fell for determination. The provisions of rule 4 of the Rules are so complete in themselves with regard to matters they cover that no part of it can be reasonably held to be a proviso to rule

3. Moreover, the fact that nowhere in the Rules but in rule 3 has the plural of promoted officer been employed, to some extent indicates that the rule deals with the seniority of promoted officers inter se. And, as I will presently show,' even if the first three clauses of rule 4 be treated as provisos to rule 3, the position will not alter in the least.

16. The next argument on behalf of the petitioners was that if the definition of a "promoted officer" given in rule 2 (1) of the Rules be kept in view when considering that expression as used in rule 4 (a) it becomes clear that the intention of the rule‑making authority could not have been that anyone but a direct recruit should take any benefit from his, continued officiation in a superior post. The contention over looks the important fact that rule 4 (a) itself makes mention of the period of continued officiation of a promoted officer which would show that that period had some relevancy when determining the seniority of a direct recruit substantively appointed to a superior post in relation to a promoted officer who bad been substantively appointed to such a post. It is true that rule 2 (1) makes no mention of the period during which a promoted officer was officiating in a superior post but I know of no canon of interpretation which enjoins that the definition of an expression given in a definition clause is to be substituted for that expression in other clauses and no heed is to be paid to any other provisions that occur in the clause in which the expression, of which the definition has been given, is used. It appears to me that it can scarcely be doubted that rule 4 (a) means that when at the time of the substantive appointment to a superior post of a direct recruit the question arises whether he is to be placed on the seniority list as senior or junior to a promoted officer who is already holding a superior post sub stantively the period of continuous officiation of the promoted officer is to be taken into consideration to this extent that if his continuous officiation started earlier than the continued officiation of the direct recruit, the direct recruit must be con sidered junior to him. If, however, the continued officiation of the direct recruit started earlier than the continued officiation of the promoted officer already holding a superior post substantively, then the direct recruit will be placed on the seniority list above the promoted officer. I will explain what I have said by an illustration. A, a direct recruit, started continued officiation as a District Superintendent of Police on the 1st of April 1949 and was confirmed in that post on the 1st of April 1953 but before the direct recruit was confirmed two promoted officers had been confirmed, one of them, whom I will call B, on the 1st of March 1953, after having continuously officiated from the 1st of May 1949, and the other, whom I will call C, was also confirmed on the 1st of March 1953, after having continuously officiated as District Superintendent of Police from the 1st of March 1949. According to rule 4 (a) of the Rules, when A, the direct recruit, who was junior to both B and C before his confirmation, is confirmed as the District Superintendent of Police he will become senior to B but will continue junior to C, the reason being that the continued officiation of A started earlier than the continued officiation of B but later than that of C who had both been confirmed as District Superintendents of Police earlier than he was. In view of the clear language of rule 4 (a) the intention of the rule making authority must be held to be that the continued G officiation of a promoted officer was not irrelevant when the question of the relative seniority of such officer with a direct recruit came up for determination.

17. It was, however, contended on behalf of the petitioners that even if the continuous officiation of a promoted officer was relevant under rule 4 (a) of the Rules, as originally framed, the amendment made in 1936 by the addition of the words which have been underlined in the Rules copied out in paragraph 4, whereby a promoted officer promoted on a date subsequent to that on which a direct recruit appointed sub stantively to a superior post had started continuous officia tion in that post was to be junior to a direct recruit.' made it clear that the continuous officiation of a promoted officer was not to be taken into consideration at all. According to the interpretation of the Central Government of Pakistan the amendment in rule 4 (a) of the Rules was made to cover cases of those promoted officers who had no period of continuous officiation in a superior post immediately before their substantive appointment to that post and, in my opinion, that interpretation is not open to any question. If a pro moted officer is promoted to a superior post subsequently to the date on which the direct recruit is confirmed in such a superior post the circumstances would be any one of the following:‑ (a) the promoted officer had no period of continuous officiation immediately before confirmation but was con firmed on a date subsequent to that on which the direct recruit started continuous officiation ; (b) the promoted officer had a shorter period of continuous officiation immediately before confirmation than a direct recruit and was confirmed on a date subsequent to that on which the direct recruit was confirmed ; (c) the promoted officer had a longer period of continuous officiation immediately before confirmation than a direct recruit but was confirmed on a date subsequent to that on which the direct recruit was; or (d) the promoted officer started continuous officiation immediately before confirmation on the same date as the direct recruit but was confirmed on a date subsequent to that on which the direct recruit was. In view of the fact that even after the retrospective amendment of rule 4 (a) in 1936 its already existing provision which covers cases falling under (b) above was retained, which retention would not have been neces sary if the expression "promoted at a subsequent date" in the amendment were intended to cover all cases falling under (a) to (d) above, it is clear that the words inserted in 1936 were not intended to have the meaning which the learned counsel for the petitioners wants to have assigned to them. The only case which can, on a reasonable construction of rule 4 (a) of the Rules, fall within the amendment of 1936 is that of a promoted officer who was confirmed in a superior post without having had a period of officiation immediately before confirmation and whose seniority was to be determined in relation to that of a direct recruit who had had a period of continuous officiation immediately before his confirmation in a superior post but was confirmed later than the above‑mentioned promoted officer. What I have said may be explained by an illustration. A, a direct recruit, is confirmed as a District Superintendent of Police on the 1st of April 1953, after having continuously officiated in that post since the 1st of April 1950, and his seniority is to be determined in relation to promoted officers, B and C, of whom B was confirmed as District Superintendent of Police on the 1st of March 1953 without having officiated in the post immediately before his confirmation and C was confirmed on the 1st of February 1953, after having officiated continuously since the 1st of March 1951. A will, on confirmation, be senior to both B and C; to B because B was confirmed after A started continuous officiation and to C because C, though confirmed earlier, started his continuous officiation later than A did. From what I have said, it follows that the claim on behalf of the petitioners that the continuous officiation of a promoted officer was to be entirely overlooked when his H seniority in relation to a direct recruit confirmed in a superior post fell to be determined at the time of the substantive appointment of a direct recruit to a 'superior post is entirely untenable.

18. Having disposed of the above‑mentioned contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners, which were raised with the object of having it held that in no case could a promoted officer who was confirmed in a superior post on a date subse quent to that on which a direct recruit started continuous officiation in a superior post be considered senior to a direct recruit, I pass on to his contention that at any rate a promoted officer could not on confirmation in a superior post, count his period of continuous officiation towards his seniority if he was promoted on a date subsequent to the date of the confirmation in a superior post of the direct recruit ; in other words, that though rule 4 (a) could be invoked by a direct recruit on his confirmation in a superior post, it could not be invoked against a direct recruit on the confirmation of a promoted officer in a superior post. To this contention the reply of the learned counsel for the respondents and those of the three Deputy Inspectors‑General, who, though not parties, were permitted on their own applications to take part in the proceedings, was that the rule was meant as much for the benefit of promoted officer as that of the direct recruits and that there was no reason why a direct recruit should have been placed in a better position than a promoted officer. If it were a matter of con struction of the Rules on the basis of reasonableness or justice, I would perhaps have been with the promoted officers because if a promoted officer has continuously officiated in a superior post in which he has been confirmed, it is to be presumed that he has been considered good enough for the post during the period of his continuous officiation and the fact that he happens to be confirmed later than a direct recruit, who tamed continuous officiation in the post later,, should not make him junior to the direct recruit, but, as I have said before, the matter is to be determined on the language used in the Rules. Now, if the definition of "promoted officer" given in rule 2 is substituted for the "promoted officer" occurring in rule 4 (a), it becomes manifest that a direct recruit is given the right, on his confirmation in a superior post, to push down a promoted officer, that is, an officer who, though not belong ing to the highest police service, before promotion, had been confirmed in a superior post, but there is no rule that allows the same privilege to a person, who, before confirmation in a superior post, was not a member of the highest police service. The ordinary rule that the date of confirmation determines seniority of persons holding similar posts though adhered to in rule 3 has been departed from in rule 4 (a) and as that rule, as worded, gives the benefit of the departure to direct recruits, it is clear that it was not meant to be invoked by officers who were not direct‑recruits. If the intention of the rule‑making authority bad been that a promoted officer could, on confirma tion, push down in the list of seniority a direct recruit already confirmed, rule 4 (a) would have said that an officer confirmed in a superior post would rank in order of seniority with other officers on the basis of the length of the continuous officiation in the superior post. Moreover, as a promoted officer cannot, on his confirmation, push down another promoted officer already promoted, because of the clear words of rule 3 of the Rules, I do not see how, in the absence of clear words to that effect, it can be held that he could do so in the case of a direct recruit. But it appears to me that the matter is clinched by clause (c) of rule 4 which says that on confirmation a direct recruit will rank senior also to a promoted officer to whom he may not be senior under clauses (a) and (b) but who is junior to any promoted officer falling under those clauses. The case provided for in clause (c) is necessarily that of a promoted officer who had longer continued officiation than a direct recruit on whose confirmation the question of seniority has arisen and the direct recruit was confirmed later. Cases of this type may be explained by an illustration. A, a direct recruit, started continuous officiation in a superior post on the 31st of April 1950 and was confirmed on the 1st of April 1953. B, a promoted officer, started continuous officiation in a supe rior post on the 1st March 1950 and was confirmed on the 1st March 1953. C, another promoted officer, started continu ous officiation in a superior post on the 1st May 1950 and was confirmed on the 1st February 1953. A will be senior to both B and C; to C because A started continuous officiation earlier than C was confirmed and to B, to whom he cannot claim to be senior under rule 4 (a). because C, who is junior to A, is senior to B. In the face of the clear provisions in the Rules that a direct recruit can, on confirmation in a superior post, rank higher than a promoted officer already confirmed, it can hardly be urged, without clear words to that effect, that a promoted officer can, on confirmation in a superior post, rank higher than a direct recruit already confirmed in a superior post.

19. I mentioned in an earlier part of this order that even if it be held that rule 4 (a) was a proviso to rule 3, the position will not alter and I will explain this. If rule 4(a) be a proviso to rule 3 which I have held that it is not‑the method of deter mining seniority mentioned in rule 3 would be altered in cases covered by rule 4 (a) and the same result follows if rule 3 and rule 4 (a) are held to be independent of each other. I might here mention that the learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Inayat Ali Shah sought to prove that the interpretation placed on the Rules by the Central Government was incorrect by taking hypothetical cases, which, according to them, would create anomalous situations if the Government interpretation were accepted. The anomalies mentioned by them arose because the other provisions of the Rules were being over looked. If it is borne in mind that the impugned interpretation was intended to apply to those cases in which only one pro moted officer and one direct recruit were in the field, even that interpretation will not create anomalous situations on application. But it is obvious that the mere fact that the impugned interpretation could create no anomalous situations does not prove that it is correct just as the fact that an interpretation will create anomalous situations will not prove that it is wrong if it is in accord with the plain language used in the provisions that have to be interpreted.

20. For the reasons given above, I would hold as under:‑ (1) that rule 3 of the Rules determines the seniority of promoted officers inter se and a promoted officer cannot be placed higher in the list of seniority than any other promoted officer who was confirmed earlier than him in a superior post ; (2) that rule 4 (a) provides that a direct recruit confirmed in a superior post later than a promoted officer is to ranks higher than the promoted officer already confirmed if the direct recruit started continuous officiation in the superior post before the promoted officer did ; (3) that rule 4 (a) also declares that a direct recruit confirmed in a superior post later than a promoted officer will rank higher than an already confirmed promoted officer if the latter had no period of officiation immediately before confirmation, but the direct recruit started continuous officiation in the superior post earlier than the promoted officer was confirmed in such a post ; (4) that rule 4 (a) does not permit that a promoted officers confirmed in a superior post after a direct recruit was con firmed in such a post should rank higher than the direct recruit though the continuous officiation of the direct recruit may have started later than that of the promoted officer, and (5) that rule 4 (a) further provides that a direct recruit confirmed later than a promoted officer will, on confirmation also rank higher than the promoted officer if a direct recruit junior to that direct recruit is senior to the promoted officer. What has been said in (5) above has been provided for in rule 4 (a) because rule 4 (d) provides that on confirmation in a superior post a direct recruit will be placed higher in the seniority list to a direct recruit who, though confirmed earlier in a superior post than him, was junior to the subsequently confirmed direct recruit, otherwise anomalous situations would have arisen.

21. At first sight, it might appear that the latest interpreta tion placed by the Central Government of Pakistan on rule 4(a) of the Rules, as far as it goes, is the same as that given by me in the last paragraph, but from the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the respondents it appears that it is not so. Before mentioning the interpretation which was declared to be final, paragraph 3 of letter No. 10/31/54- Police (1), dated the 21st February 1957 states that the interpretation given in letter No. 10/31/54‑Police, dated the 25th December 1954 should be treated as having been super seded to the extent indicated by the interpretation declared to be final and authentic in the letter. In the written statement put in by Mr. S. M. Zafar, Advocate, who said that he repre sented the respondents, which, though it does not say so, appears from the fact that the name of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan alone is shown as a respondent in its heading to have been put in on behalf of respondent No. 1, it is stated in paragraph 2 (e) that instances existed which showed that in the pre‑Partition Bengal a number of promoted officers were held senior to direct recruits on account of longer continuous officiation and in paragraph 3 it is stated that it was for the first time in December 1954 that Mr. S. S. Jafri as Deputy Secretary gave an interpretation of rule 4 contrary to its accepted interpretation. The reference in paragraph 3 of the written statement is clearly to the letter dated the 25th December 1954. Now, as I have mentioned in paragraph 10 above, according to the interpretation adopted in the letter dated the 25th December 1954 though Mr. Ata Muhammad Noon, a promoted officer, had started continuous officiation in a superior post earlier than Mr. Inayat Ali Shah and Mr. S. D. Qureshi, direct recruits, he was declared junior to them in the seniority list because the two direct recruits had started continuous officiation in a superior post earlier than Mr. Noon was confirmed in such a post. This interpretation of rule 4 (a) was not the same as given by me in the last paragraph but was not adhered to in the letter dated the 21st February 1957 which according to the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents says that the Ministry of the Interior, Government of Pakistan, meant that when they used the expression "promoted officer" in their latest interpretation, they wanted to indicate not only an officer already confirmed in a superior post on the date on which a direct recruit was con firmed in such a post but also one who may be confirmed at a date subsequent to that on which a direct recruit was confirmed. The Government of West Pakistan has acted on the letter as I find that Mr. Inayat Ali Shah and Mr. S. D. Qureshi, who were shown senior to Mr. Ata Muhammad Noon in the Punjab Civil Lists for 1954 and 1955 and the West Pakistan Civil List bearing the date the 1st of January 1957, have been shown junior to him in the West Pakistan Civil List, which bears the date of 1st of July 1957 on its title page, in spite of the fact that though Mr. Ata Muhammad Noon is shown as an officiat ing Deputy Inspector‑General of Police, Mr: Inayat Ali Shah is stated to be holding the post of a Deputy Inspector‑General of Police in a substantive capacity. The latest West Pakistan Civil List further shows that some officers, who were taken in the Police Service of Pakistan later than the petitioners were confirmed as Superintendents of Police, have been placed above the petitioners, evidently because, though promoted officers, they had started continuous officiation in a superior post earlier than the petitioners did.

22. This brings me to the question what order should be passed. In view of the fact that seniority in the list of 'Police Service of Pakistan does not mean the same thing as seniority in rank in the Police Department, it might appear that the petitioners are seeking a relief which does not benefit them but the question is one of the conditions of service of the petitioners and it is by no means unlikely that the fact that they have been shown in the seniority list junior to some officers who should have been shown junior to them might prejudice their chances at some future date. Consequently, I direct that respondent No. 1 shall determine the seniority of the petitioners in accordance with the interpretation of rule 4 (a) of the Rules given in the last but one paragraph at the same time keeping in view the other provisions of the Rules, and shall issue instructions to respondent No. 2 to prepare a list of seniority on that basis. I would, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs because the Provincial Government did no more than carry out the instructions of the Central Government, the Central Government had spared no efforts to ensure that correct interpretation was placed on the Rules, and the three Deputy Inspectors‑General, who took part in the proceedings in addition to not having been impleaded as respondents, did no more than attempt to support the interpretation placed by the Central Government on some of the Rules. RAHMAN, C. J.‑--I agree and concur in the order proposed by my learned Brother. ORTCHESON, J.--‑I also agree. SHABIR AHMAD, J.‑--I want to make it clear that what I have said in the last sentence of paragraph 21 about the dates of confirmation of the petitioners as Superintendents of Police is based on what was stated in Court without being contro verted and is not to be taken to be a finding arrived at after consideration of the relevant material. A. H. Petition accepted.