P L D 1962 (W (PLP)

It may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such .local areas." He relied on the observations made in A I R 1934 All. 499 to the effect that : . "In cases of criminal misappropriation or breach of trust where there is considerable difficulty in ascertaining the exact place where or the exact point of time when the offence was in fact committed, section 182 would apply." He also relied upon the ruling in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. K. P. Ghiara (P L D 1957 S C (Ind.) 176) which states : "Where, in a case for prosecution under section 408 of the Penal Code, there is doubt as to when the idea of embezzlement took root, the only course for the prosecution is to apply the provisions of section 182 of the Criminal P. C. and file a charge -sheet basing the same on uncertainty. The venue of enquiry or trial of such a case, is primarily to be determined by the averments contained in the complaint or charge‑sheet and unless the facts there are positively disproved, ordinarily the Court, where the charge‑sheet or complaint is filed, has to proceed with it, except where action has to be taken under section 202 of the Criminal P. C." The facts in A I R 1934 All. and P L D 1957 S C (Ind.) were different' in as much as the accused person had visited the local areas of the Courts which had taken cognizance and it was uncertain in which of the several local areas the offence was committed. In the present case there is no allegation that the accused came to Karachi at any time, nor is there any uncertainty as to the place of the commission of the offence as indicated by the allegations in the complaint.

7. Section 177, Cr. P. C. lays down that "Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed." Section 179, Cr. P. C. is an exception to section 177, Cr. P. CJB and reads as under "When a person is accused of the commission of any offence by reason of anything which has been done, and of any conse quence which has ensued, such offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any such thing has been done, or any such consequence has ensued." It is obvious that before section 179 can apply the offence wit which a person could be tried must be an offence by reason of anything that has been done and of any consequence which has ensued. Thus both the act and its consequences should be parts and ingredients of the offence. The word `and' in the section is significant in this connection. The plain meaning of the section, therefore, will be that both the act done and the‑consequences should C form part of the offence before section 179 can come into play. All the four illustrations to section 179 bear out the above inter pretation of the section although the illustrations may not be exhaustive and may not control the interpretation of a provision of law. The language of the section itself is plain and un ambiguous.

8. That section 179, Cr. P. C. does not apply to the cases of criminal breach of trust is clear by the fact that specific section prescribing jurisdiction for an offence of criminal breach of trust 1 is included in the Cr. P. C. This is section 181 (2) which reads as under :‑ "The offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any part of the property which is subject of the offence was received or retained by the accused person, or the offence was committed. When there is specific provision prescribing the jurisdiction no general provision like section 179 can come into play to over‑ride the clear and specific provision for the place of trial of offence of criminal breach of trust. I am supported in my view by the case reported in 52 Criminal Law Journal, 1388, which reads as under "After considering the cases to which we have referred, my conclusion is that section 179 has no application to cases of criminal breach of trust. They are provided for by section 181, Clause, (2). According to this clause, the offence of criminal mis appropriation may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any part of the property, which is the subject‑matter of the offence, was received or retained by the accused person, or the offence was committed. This section deals with certain other offences also. There being a specific provision for the offence of criminal breach of trust, the general provision contained in section 179 should not apply."

8. The learned Advocate for the respondent relied on section 531, Cr. P. C. in support of his argument that once a Court had taken cognizance of the offence it would not affect the trial of an accused person although the Court had no territorial jurisdiction in the case. Section 531, Cr. P. C. reads as under "No finding, sentence or order of any Criminal Court shall be set aside merely on the ground that the inquiry, trial or other proceeding in the course of which it was arrived at or passed, took place in a wrong sessions division, district, sub division or other local area, unless it appears that such error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice."

9. In my view section 531, Cr. P. C. applies also to proceed ings in original Courts. The words "No . . . . . order of any Criminal Court shall be set aside . . ." will also apply to the order of issue of process by a Court in original proceedings. I am fortified in this opinion by the remarks in Crown v. Muhammad Khan and others (P L D 1951 Lah. 254 at 261) where it is stated that "Section 531 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the decision of a Court not having territorial jurisdiction is to be set aside only if it appears that the holding of proceedings in a wrong Court had in fact occasioned a failure of justice." To the same effect is the ruling of 'Emperor v. Doraiswamy Mudali (I L R 30 Mad. 94).

10. The learned counsel for the applicant on the contrary relied on the case of Radharani and another v. Rahim Sardar (A I R 1946 Cal. 459) which lays down : "Section 531 cures irregular proceedings wrongly held in a wrong local area unless it appears that the error as to territorial jurisdiction has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. Section 531, however, does not entitle a Magistrate to proceed with the trial in the wrong local area with his eyes open to the fact that he has no territorial jurisdiction. It does not in fact confer a jurisdiction on the Magistrate." I am unable to restrict the application of section 531, Cr. P. C. as is contemplated under the Calcutta ruling quoted above. If section 531, Cr. P. C. applies to cases in original Courts, and I have already said that it does, the interpretation put on the section by the Calcutta High Court will make the section I infructuous and useless for the purposes of its application to the original Courts. The well known principle of law is that meaning and effect should, as far as possible be given to the words of an enactment so as not to make them superfluous.

11. The application of section 531, Cr. P. C. is no doubt governed by the words "unless it appears that such error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice" appearing at the end of this section. In the present' case no such allegation has been made before me. Whether there is a failure of justice or not will depend on the circumstances of each case and an early objection to the jurisdiction in this case cannot indicate that failure of justice has occurred or will occur. The legislature has `in explanation to section 537, Cr. P. C., provided that "In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity, in any proceeding under this Code' has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings." There is no such provision in section 531, Cr: P. C. It appears to me, therefore, that an early objection to the jurisdiction of the Court does not indicate a failure of justice so far as application of section 531, Cr. P. C. is concerned.

12. The learned counsel for the applicant then contended that the complainant is not the person who has suffered by the offence under section 420 and as such he could not file a com plaint under that section. Reliance was placed on the ruling in the case of Surendranath Saha v. The State (P L D 1960 Dacca 528) to the effect that "A complaint under section 420 of the Penal Code, 1860, Must be preferred by. the person who is actually cheated. Person other than one who is actually defrauded has no locus standi to make such a complaint." With due respect to their Lordships the view of the law taken in the Dacca ruling appears to be in accordance with law. An person can move a Court for action against an accused person in a cognizable case. Sections 190 to 197, Cr. P. C. lay down when the Courts will not take cognizance except on the complaint of the persons mentioned in those sections. The offence under section 420. is not included in any of these sections. In Muhammad Rashid v. The State (P L D 1959 Lah. 372) Justice Shabir Ahmad, observed "Though in some cases it would be desirable that the person cheated should initiate the proceedings before the Court moves in the matter, it cannot be said that it is incumbent that the person who has been cheated should initiate criminal proceed ings for the offence." Similarly in Jassumal and others v. The State and another (P L D 1962 Kar. 326) Raymond, J. has also held that complaint under section 420 need not necessarily be made by the person cheated before the Court could take cognizance of the offence.

12. Two more objections were raised by the learned counsel for the opponent. It was argued in the first place that the revision application should have been moved in the Sessions Court and that the High Court should not entertain an appli cation for revision where the applicant could have applied to the Sessions Judge and he bad not done so Reliance was placed on the case of Muhammad Farooq and another v. Rais Hassan Khan (P L D 1960 Kar. 42). Since, however, the revision application has been admitted and argued at length before me I consider it proper to decide the revision on merits and not dismiss it on this preliminary point.

13. The second contention of the learned counsel for opponent was that an accused person has no right to raise a k preliminary point before he is charged. He must wait to defend himself till he is charged‑and if he is convicted his first remedy is, in most cases, by way of appeal. He relied on the case of A. Innasia Pillai and others v. Perumal Chettiar and another (A I R 1953 Mad. 1008) for the above proposition. Reliance was also placed on a case from the High Court of Assam in Banghilal Bhora and another v. Rowtmal Patwari and another (52 Cr. L J 1388) where it was remarked by C. J., Thadani at page 1390 "Upon Mr. Ghose's contention, two points arise for our con sideration (1) would we be justified in quashing a complaint, which, on the face of it discloses an offence, on the sole ground that the Magistrate at Dhubri had no territorial jurisdiction to try the offence, (2) is this a case in which we should accede to the prayer of the applicants to transfer the case to Karimganj to be tried by a Magistrate having jurisdiction, in the exercise of our power under clause (1) of section 526, Cr. P. C. The first point is concluded by the view of this Court repeatedly expressed, namely, that it will refuse to quash a complaint which on the face of it, discloses an offence. On the 2nd point, we have come to the conclusion that it is not a case in which, clause (1) of section 526, Cr. P. C., is necessarily attracted" I am in respectful agreement with the observations made by their Lordships of the Madras and Assam High Courts. The Revision Application I s dismissed for the above reasons. K. B. A. Petition dismissed.