P L D 1965 (W (PLP)

S. 4‑Land acquired by Government under S. 4 (3)‑Continues, even after acquisition, to be evacuee property‑‑Question of inheritance to right of allotment held by deceased‑Within exclusive jurisdiction of Rehabilitation Authorities‑Pakistan Rehabilitation Act (XLII of 1956), Ss. 6 & 18‑Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act (XII of 1957), S. 41‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 9. Muhammad Hassan v. Syed Mumtaz Husain P L D 1965 Lah. 35 rel. Umar Draz Ali v. Khurshid Ali and others P L D 1960 Lah. 834 ref. Sh. Maqbool Ahmad for Petitioner. A. A. K. Lodhi for Respondent. Date of hearing: 14th January 1965. Facts which are relevant for the disposal of this case are; that Muhammad Ali son of Nabi, a refugee right‑holder from East Punjab, was allotted land in Chak No. 630/GB, Tehsil Jaranwala District Lyallpur. He died in 1954 and the land was mutated in the names of Msr. Anwari, his widow and Babu Khan, his uncle with 1/4 and 3/4 shares respectively. Mst. Sughran preferred an appeal against the order of mutation and claimed that she being the daughter of the deceased was entitled to one‑half of his estate. The Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lyallpur, accepted the appeal on the 6th of February 1959, and ordered that 1/2 o]' the land be mutated in her name. The share of the widow was accordingly, reduced to 1/8th and that of Babu Khan, his uncle, to 3/8th. Rehmat Ali respondent, who was not a party to the earlier proceedings, filed a revision 'petition against Mst. Sughran before the Rehabilitation Commissioner. He challenged her status as daughter of Muhammad Ali and claimed that by cancelling land from her name it should be allotted to him. The case of the respondent was that he was a residuary of Muhammad Ali. It may be noticed that the Rehabilitation Authority in sanctioning the mutation of the estate had recognized Babu Khan as the residuary, but the respondent did not implead him as a party in revision nor did he assert that he had a better right than him or that he was a residuary along with him. If the respondent was, in fact, a residuary of the deceased, he should have claimed his right primarily and basically against Babu Khan which he did nor. Under the circumstances, if the respondent had succeeded in revision to establish that Mst. Sughran was not the daughter of Muhammad Ali deceased, the beneficiary would have been Babu Khan and not he. The revision petition, however, was dismissed on the 22nd of September 1959, by Sardar Ata Muhammad, the learned Rehabilitation Commissioner, but he observed that the respondent could, if he was so advised, challenge the status of the petitioner in the civil Court. The respondent, therefore, filed the present suit with the prayer that it be declared that the petitioner (Mst. Sughran) was not the daughter of the deceased Muhammad Ali. He claimed no relief about property, and he also did not implead Babu Khan as a party. Objection was taken by the defendant‑petitioner as to the competence of the suit in the form of a negative declaration by the plaintiff and it was alleged that the plaintiff, in fact, aimed at laying claim to an evacuee property which he could not directly do in a civil Court, the same being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rehabilitation Authorities. The trial Court rejected the plea of the defendant‑petitioner, and held that the suit as instituted was competent. The defendant has filed the revision petition challenging the legality of the order. 2. The first question which falls for determination is whether the suit by the plaintiff for a declaration simpliciter that the respondent was not the daughter of Muhammad Ali was competent. He stated in his plaint that he was furnished with the cause of action by the fact that one half of the estate of the deceased had been mutated in her favour. He has however, not claimed in the plaint the share mutated in favour of the defendant‑petitioner, and sought no relief `about it. The learned counsel for the respondent states that the latter did not claim any relief about the property because he thought that it was an evacuee property and a suit for the adjudication of any right, in respect of the same, was not competent; and that the suit was filed on a direction given by the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner in his order, dated the 22nd of September 1959. He argued that if the plaintiff‑respondent succeeds in his suit, and it is declared that defendant‑petitioner No. 1 was not the daughter of the deceased, the Rehabilitation Authorities will give effect to the declaration and make the necessary alterations in the revenue records. I have no doubt that on none of these considerations a civil Court can entertain a suit in a form which is not warranted by law, nor can it assume jurisdiction which otherwise, does not vest in it. As to the point that the Rehabilitation. Commissioner directed the plaintiff to file the suit, it is no: one which is binding on the civil Courts. The case before the Rehabilitation Commissioner was about the inheritance of Muhammad Ali refugee right‑holder and, consequently, of the mutation in revenue and Rehabilitation records in favour of his legal representatives. The determination of the status of Mst. Sughran whether or not she was the daughter of the deceased was within the scope of his authority and lie should have done so if the decision of this question was necessary for the adjudication of the rights of the A parties in an evacuee property. He dismissed the revision petition, obviously, for the reason that he found no merit in the case of the respondent. The direction given by him to have the status of the defendant determined in the civil Court can at best be interpreted only as an observation to the effect that the plaintiff can resort to a remedy in civil Court if it is available to him. It appears that the Rehabilitation Commissioner was in no doubt about the matter, because if this had been so and he had thought a decision by a civil Court on the question necessary he would have stayed the proceedings to await such a decision. I, however, should not be understood to say that the Rehabilitation Commissioner could validly pass such an order. I am clear in my mind that he could give no such direction. It is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rehabilitation Authorities to decide all questions of allotments of evacuee property and the mutations and they in the performance of their duties, can decide as well all incidental questions in respect of the same. There is no provision in law authorizing the Rehabilitation Authorities to direct a refugee to a civil Court for the determination of his right under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. The direction, even if it had been specific and definite, would not have been binding on the civil Court to entertain a suit which, otherwise, was not competent there. It is, therefore, to be seen independent of the observation of the Rehabilitation Commissioner, if the suit of the plaintiff as framed was competent. 3. The suit is in the form of a declaration. No relief is claimed by the plaintiff in himself. He wishes the, Court to declare the petitioner as not the daughter of Muhammad Ali deceased. I do not agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that a suit for a negative declaration is not competent at all in law. In some cases negative declarations are granted by the Court, and they, in certain circumstances, are necessary. In cases where someone claims to be the son of a person, the latter can, by all means, seek a declaration against him that his assertion is not correct. There indeed may be no immediate threat to the property of the plaintiff but if the assertion is not correct it might tarnish his name in society and further result in serious complications in future, because an assertion of this kind unless effectively repudiated may be used as an evidence to establish one's rights on the basis of implied acknowledgment. The present case is not of this nature. There is no claim of any relationship by the appellant (defendant) against the respondent (plaintiff). Again a suit may be filed in the form of a negative declaration against the defendant with a view to laying claim to a property which, but for such declaration, the plaintiff cannot succeed in getting. In such cases the real claim is not the declaration but the property and no exception can be taken to the form of such a suit. But a simple suit for a negative declaration of this type without claiming any relief about the property will, of course, be not competent for more than one reason. Firstly, it will not be a declaration of any legal status in the plaintiff himself or a denial of a status in the defendant which, if not challenged, may affect or jeopardise the status of the plaintiff, and, secondly, no such declaration can be granted to the plaintiff under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, because the plaintiff, in fact, will be asking for a declaration, not because it is necessary for him to do but because by this device he can lay claim to some property. . It is true that in the present case the property is an evacuee property, and no civil Court can entertain a suit in respect of such property or for the adjudication of any right in it. This, however, cannot change the legal position and a person cannot, on this ground, file a suit for a negative declaration as the plaintiff did in this case, because if such a suit is competent, a civil Court will adjudicate indirectly to respect of an evacuee property which it. is otherwise debarred to do under section 41 of Act XII of 1957. 4. There is yet another aspect of the case. No Court will grant a declaration which is useless or may not be honoured. Assuming such a declaration is granted, the Rehabilitation Authorities will not be bound by it, and they can ignore it altogether, because the judgment is not a judgment in rem and it is, in fact, within their exclusive jurisdiction to decide about such matters. Such a decree of the Court, moreover, cannot preclude a party thereto, to assert his claim before the Rehabilitation Authorities contrary to the declaration, when it is not barred by any law. The principle of res judicata cannot be pressed in service because the same applies to Courts, and the Rehabilitation Authorities are not the Courts as contemplated in, section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. It was next contended that the property has been acquired under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, and being so it has ceased to be an evacuee property and the appellant may be permitted to amend his plaint. The fact that the land has been so acquired, does not change the character of the property, and it does not cease to be an evacuee property. Vide : Umar Draz Ali v. Khurshid Ali and others (P L D 1960 Lah. 834) and Muhammad Hassan v. Syed Mumtaz Hussain (P L D 1965 Lah. 35). 6. It may as well be noticed that the plaintiff bases his claim as a residuary of the deceased. This being the case, if he had any such claim, he could assert it against Babu Khan in whose name the entire estate after satisfying the claim of the sharers was mutated. As already observed, he was not made a party by the respondent either before the Rehabilitation Commissioner or in the suit. Even if the plaintiff‑respondent succeeds in proving that the appellant was not the daughter of the deceased, the beneficiary will not be the plaintiff but Babu Khan, who, in that event, will get the residue of the property i.e., 3/4th after giving 1/4th to Mst. Anwari as the widow. The plaintiff, therefore, has no cause of action, and his plaint merited to be rejected on this short ground. 7. Having given my serious consideration to the matter, I am of the opinion that the suit of the, plaintiff was not maintainable in law. The revision is accepted; the order of the learned Civil Judge is set aside and the suit dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. K. B. A.Petition accepted.