1991 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

(d) `Employee' means a person who has been directly recruited by the Authority or has been absorbed in the service of the Authority on transfer from, or on termination of his lien in his parent department of the Federal or Provincial Government, as the case may be. (3) Retirement from Service. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the order or the letter of appointment of an employee or in the terms of his service or in any other rule applicable to him, the WAPDA employee shall retire from service; (a) In the case of an employee holding the post in Grade-20 or equivalent post, on such date as the `competent authority' may in the public interest direct. (b) In any other case on such date after he has completed 25 years of service qualifying for pension, gratuity, or other retirement benefits or on completion of the 55th year of his age, as the `competent authority' may in the public interest direct, or (c) Where no such direction is given under clause (a) or (b), as the case may be, on completion of 60th year of his age. (4) In the case of those WAPDA employees who, on the date of promulgation of these Rules, had completed 25 years of service or had attained the age of 55 years, an order in terms of clause (b) or (c) of Rule 3, may be passed within six months of the date of promulgation of these Rules. Note:- An employee who is retired under Rule 3 or Rule 4 will be entitled to L.P.R. subject to title, provided he applies within 15 days of the date of issue of the retirement order, and in case L.P.R. is granted the order of retirement shall take effect from the date of expiry of such leave:'

5. The Retirement Rules, 1979, reproduced above, place the WAPDA employees in two categories: (i) that of those in Grade-20 or in equivalent posts; and (ii) of those in other grades. The appellant was a Grade-19 officer and his case fell within the compass of clause (b) of Rule 3 which envisages that an employee in a grade other than Grade-20 shall retire from service after completion of 25 years 'of service qualifying for pension, gratuity and other retirement benefits, or on completion of the 55th year of his age, as the `competent Authority' may, in the public interest, direct. It is not disputed that the appellant had completed 25 years of service qualifying for pension, gratuity and other retirement benefits and his retirement was ordered on attaining the age of 55 years. There does not seem any ambiguity in the provisions contained in clause (b) of Rule 3 that an employee can be retired from service by the `competent Authority' at either of the two stages, one that of completion of 25 years of service qualifying for pension and other retirement benefits, or on. Attaining the age of 55 years, as may be directed by the `competent authority' in the public interest, and there does not seem any bar to the review .of the case of an employee at either of the two stages whichever occurs first, and allowing the employee to continue in service and retiring him from service at the stage of the second event. We are unable to subscribe to the view of a learned Bench of this Tribunal in Appeal No. 163 (L)/86, decided on 12-2-1989 holding that the case of a WAPDA employee once reviewed for retirement from service at the stage of completion of 55 years could not be reviewed again for his retirement from service on completing 25 years service qualifying for pension, gratuity and other retirement benefits.

6. The important question, however, for consideration is whether the impugned order of, retirement of the appellant from service was made by the `competent Authority'. The term `competent Authority' defined in clause (a) of Rule 2 of the Retirement Rules, 1979 means the `Authority' or the appointing authority, or an officer designated by the Authority to exercise powers of the `competent Authority'. The term `Authority' defined in clause (a) of Rule 3 ibid means the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority. The Water and Power 'Development Authority was established under section 3 of the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Pakistan WAPDA Act, 1958), consisting of a Chairman and not more than three Members to be appointed by the Government as provided under subsection (1) Of Section 4 of the Pakistan WAPDA Act, 1958. The `appointing Authority' defined in clause (b) of Rule 2 of the Retirement Rules, 1979 means the officer designated as such in the Delegation of Orders issued by the Authority from time to time. In the case of the appellant, the Chairman of the `Authority' was the appointing authority. The impugned order of retirement of the appellant from service was made by the Chairman and one Member whereas it has been stated before us that the Authority at the relevant time consisted of the Chairman and three Members. Obviously, the impugned order was not passed by the Authority, but it was passed by the appointing, authority and one of the three Members of the `Authority'. By virtue of the definition of `competent authority' contained in clause (c) of Rule 2 of the Retirement Rules, 1979, the impugned order made b5 the Chairman, being the appointing authority, could be the order by the `competent Authority' but for certain orders issued later referred to hereinafter Under office order, dated 4th May, 1980, a copy whereof is Annexure `N' at page 50 of the memo -of appeal, certain instructions were issued for processing of the cases to be dealt with under Rule 3 of the Retirement Rules 1979. Another office order was issued on 20th May, 1980, whereby the Authority had decided that for annual review in accordance with Rule 2 (c) of the Retirement Rules, 1979, the cases of WAPDA employees', who were to complete 25 years service or on attaining the age of 55 years after 1st July, 1980, had to be initiated by the appointing authorities in order to give fair chance to the employees and the review of the cases was to be carried out in the manner indicated therein. It was directed that such cases of officers in B-19 and 20 were to be reviewed by the M.D. concerned and the final order was to be passed by the Full Authority. The same instructions were reiterated in Office Memorandum issued on 3rd May, 1983. The previous orders were amended vide office memorandum, dated 14/15th January, 1984, whereby it was, inter alia, provided that the cases of the officers in B-19 and 20 were to be reviewed by the M.D. concerned and they were to be discussed in the Authority's meeting before the final views were formulated and the final decision was to be taken by the Full Authority. Further, orders were issued under Office Memorandum dated 2-1-1985, whereby the Office Memorandum, dated 14/15th January, 1985 was amended as to provide, inter alia, that the cases of Superintending Engineers, Chief Engineers and the officers of equivalent status were to be reviewed by the M.D. concerned and they were to be discussed in the Authority's meeting before the final views were formulated and the final decision was to be taken by the Full Authority. It follows that the final decision for retirement of the officers of the rank of Superintending Engineers, Chief Engineers and the officers of the equivalent status were to be finality decided for the purpose of retirement by the Full Authority after their discussion at the meeting of the Authority. By virtue of these instructions, the argument by the learned counsel for the respondent that the decision, of retirement of the appellant by the Chairman and one Member, who constituted quorum at the meeting of the Authority under subsection (2) of Section 7 of the Pakistan WAPDA Act, 1958, was deemed to be the order by the Full Authority, does not hold ground. The provisions of the Retirement Rules, 1979 and the effect of the aforesaid orders issued by the Authority from time to time was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Nasir Saeed v. WAPDA, reported in P L D 1987 S C 421, relied upon by the learned counsel wherein it was held that only the Authority was the competent authority to pass orders of retirement envisaged under clause (b) of Rule 3 of the Retirement Rules, 1979 in respect of Grade-20 officers. The same rule applies to the Grade-19 officers as well as they stood' equated with the Grade-20 officers in the aforesaid orders issued by the Authority from time to time. Accordingly, the impugned order of retirement of the appellant from service made by, only the Chairman and one Member was not made by the `competent authority' as envisaged by law. It may also be added that it was urged at the hearing by the learned counsel for the appellant that the tenure and office of the Chairman, who passed the order had expired earlier and he had become functus officio. However, no concrete evidence was made available. Query was made from the departmental represen tatives and they too could not make definite statement. As such, no definite finding can be given on this objection except making observation that if the Chairman had actually become functus officio in holding the office of the Chairman, the impugned order was made without lawful authority on that ground as well.

7. The next question urged by the learned counsel for the appellant, indeed very important in its nature, is that of the requirement of show-cause notice before taking such' action, in the light of the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court in the case of In re: The Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973), reported in P L D 1984 FSC at page 34, partially approved by the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court as reported in .P L D 1987 S C

304. The Federal Shariat Court, while examining, under Article 203-D of the Constitution, the provisions of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, held that the provisions of section 13 (i) and (ii) of the Civil Servants Act. 1973 were repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, and directed that the v should be repealed. Exactly the same ruling was given separately in respect of the analogous provisions contained in the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, the N.-W.F.P. Civil Servants Act, 1993 and the Balochistan Civil Servant Act, 1974. Simultaneously similar provisions contained in the Pakistan Cantonments Servants Rules, 1954 and the Pakistan WAPDA Act, 1958 and few other laws of like nature also were considered by the Federal Shariat Court and it was held that the provisions of those Acts were not repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. The decision is reported in P L D .1986 FSC

200. Both the decisions of the Federal Shariat Court were appealed against before the Shariat Appellate Bench in the Supreme Court. The order of the Curt is reproduced below:

"ORDER OF THE COURT By majority the following appeals are dismissed: Shariat Appeal No. 6 of 1983; Shariat Appeals Nos. 15, 19 and 34 of 1984; Shariat Appeal No. 1 of 1985. And Shariat Appeal No. 14 of 1984, is allowed. The provisions of the Statutes and statutory rules specified below under challenge, in these appeals, are found to be repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam; in so far as they do not provide for due notice of the action proposed to be taken and opportunity of showing cause against such action; (i) Section 13 clauses (i) and (ii) of Civil Servants Act, 1973. (ii) Section 12, clauses (i) and (ii) of Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1973. (iii) Section 13, clause (i) of Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973. (iv) Section 13, clauses (i) and (ii) of Balochistan Civil Servants Act, 1974. (v) Section 13, clause (i) of the N.-W.F.P. Civil Servants Act, 1973. (vi) Sub-rule (3) of Rule 44 of Pakistan Cantonment Servants Rules, 195 framed under the Cantonments Act, 1924. . The competent authorities are hereby allowed a period of six months from today (11-3-1987) to amend the law so as to bring it into conformity with the injunctions of Islam, failing which they shall cease to have legal effect. The appellants in cases other than Shariat Appeal No. 14 of 184 shall pay the cost of those who appeared to oppose them at the rate of Rs.3,000 per individual. The appellant in Shariat Appeal No. 14 of 1984 shall be paid as Rs.3,000 as costs by the respondents therein."

8. There is no mention in the order of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court, reproduced above, of the provisions of the Pakistan WAPDA Act, 1958. It appears from the judgment of the Shariat Appellate Bench in the. Supreme Court that reference to the provisions of the Pakistan WAPDA Act, 1958 was made at the hearing of the appeals. Following observations were mace by His Lordship Mr. Justice Dr. Nasim Hasan Shah in the concluding part of his judgment, which did refer to the employees of the Statutory Corporations like WAPDA, Cantonment Boards and Universities etc. "Thus, although it is not possible to contend that the Holy Qur'an ordains that it is necessary to issue show-cause notice to a person before condemning him and, therefore, the competent authority, acting in good faith, can take the action of prematurely retiring a civil servant as provided for in subsections (i) and (ii) of section 13 of Civil Servants Act, 1973 and the corresponding provisions of the Provincial Service Laws, but I feel that on the basis of the verses of the Holy Qur'an cited above it can fairly be submitted that the principle emanating from the verses, cited above, and the practice of the Almighty Allah which is evidenced therefrom entitles a civil servant to be informed of the reasons/grounds wherefore his retirement has been directed in "public interest". He should be told why the action has been taken against him and in the words of God Almighty be asked to read his own record which has been responsible for the fate that has befallen him. Furthermore, since an appeal is competed before the Service Tribunals against the action taken against him, the affected civil servant will be in a better position to challenge the order passed against him in case he feels that he has not been dealt with justly and fairly. I further feel that no difference exists in this respect between the cases of civil servants who are in the employ of the Government and employees of the Statutory Corporations like WAPDA, Cantonment Boards, Universities etc. I would, therefore, agree with the submissions on this point made by Mr. Khalil Ramday, Additional Advocate-General (Punjab). Hence the employees of all such organisations must also be intimated the reasons/grounds for their premature retirement which may be ordered under provisions similar to those under which the civil servants are liable to be retired. His Lordship Mr. Justice Pir Muhammad Karam Shah made the following observations relating to the employees of the statutory bodies: It appears that the order of the Shariat Appellate Bunch in the Supreme Court did not make mention of the employees of the WAPDA because there was no appeal against the decision of the Federal Shariat Court in that behalf. Thus, the situation at the time the impugned order was made was that there were two decisions of the Federal Shariat Court, one reported as M. Duryab Qureshi v. Chairman, WAPDA ( P L D 1983 FSC at page 17); and another Muhammad Ramzan Qureshi v. Federal Government and others (P L D 1986 FSC 200) that the provisions of section 13 of the WAPDA Act, 1958, which provided for retirement of an employee from service without assigning any reason, were not repugnant to the injunctions of Islam for the reasons recorded therein. These decisions do not seem to have been appealed against. Observations made thereon by Their Lordships in the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court are not reflected in the operative part of the judgment of the Court. In this case, the provisions of the Retirement Rules, 1979 framed under the WAPDA Act, 1958 were resorted to for ordering retirement of the appellant, Thus, the impugned order dial not suffer from any legal infirmity on account of absence of show-cause notice in issuance thereof.

9. The third ground urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the order of retirement of the appellant was not made under bona fide exercise of power. In other words, it is alleged that the order is mala fide. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that the retirement of the' appellant was made on the basis of certain adverse entries recorded by an officer, who had remained junior to him, and were communicated to him after retiring him from service. He placed reliance on certain cases referred to above. He also advanced the argument that since the appellant's case was reviewed earlier at the stage of his having completed 25 years service qualifying for pension and other benefits and he was allowed to continue in service, there was no reason for retiring him on attaining the age of 55 years. As discussed and held above, the question of review for retirement from service could be considered at both the stages and if retirement at the stage earlier in time was not made, the retirement could be ordered at the stage of second event and there could not be any taint of mala fides in doing so, unless there could be any tangible evidence to support the plea of mala fides. Of course, it appears that there had been delay in communication of adverse entries to the appellant, but the learned counsel for the respondents pointed out that these adverse remarks pertained to the period when the appellant was serving with the Mechanised Construction of Pakistan Limited and they were received from there late. The appellant has preferred separate appeal against those adverse confidential reports and this question would be fully considered in that appeal. Since the adverse reports against the appellant were recorded when he was serving with another organisation, the recording of those adverse entries, therefore, does not furnish ground to impute mala fides to the WAPDA authorities in having made order of retirement of the appellant on attaining the age of 55 years. The cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in this respect are not applicable to the facts of this case. Thus, this ground is not tenable.

10. For the reasons recorded above, that the impugned order of retirement of the appellant was not made by the `competent authority', the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The appellant shall be reinstated in service and he shall be entitled to all the back benefits. No order is made for costs. M.Y.H./547/Sr.F Appeal allowed.