P L D 1969 Lahore 886 (PLP)

(a) The word "own" prefixed before the word "occupation" shows that it is the personal occupation of the landlord to establish which, the eviction can be sought. "Own" means "self" and this meaning must be allowed to be maintained while interpreting this clause and no such interpretation should be made which makes this word redundant. The view which I am taking, as I will be explaining later, is the only view in which this word can be given effect to and any other interpretation will lead to complete annihilation of this word. (b) Word "own occupation" in this contest has been used in contra‑distinction from occupation of children. Generally, speaking, need of a landlord to accommodate his children may be called leis need or his valid need, and his previous premises may not be sufficient to cater for all such necks and he may require eviction of a tenant on that count, but then he has two alternatives in that respect. He may frame his suit by saying that he wants to occupy the new premises himself or that he will set up his children in it thus providing them independent residence. If he occupies it himself, then he need not vacate the previous occupation, but may keep the same too with him and in that context it will be he who will be in occupation of both the premises and he can very well say that he required the new premises for his own occupation for catering his need of providing shelter to his dependent relations. (c) If we compare the provisions of Cantonment Rent Restriction Act XI of 1963, with the provisions in hand, the conclusion is inescapable that when the house is to be set apart as a separate place of residence, the law does not allow it to be set apart for all types of relations. Section 17 (4) of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963) reads as follows :‑ "(4) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession (a) in the case of a residential building, if (i) he requires it in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family ; and (ii) be or the member of his family, as the case may be, is not occupying any other residential building suitable for his needs at the time, in the cantonment area concerned or in any local area in the vicinity thereof ; and (iii) he or the said member has not vacated such a building in the said area or vicinity without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act." Word "family" is defined in the Cantonment Rent Restric tion Act (XI of 1963) in section 2 (e) as follows :‑ "(e) "family" of a person means and includes a husband, wife, children, dependent parents, dependent brothers, unmar ried or widowed sisters and a deceased son's widow and children residing with, and wholly dependent upon, that per son." This will show that in the Cantonment Act, a house can be got vacated for being set apart for residence of the various kinds of relations mentioned in the term "family". No such thing, on the other hand, exists in the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Act VI of 1959 and to be more precise a widowed mother (or parents) do not figure in it. In the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959), the only privileged class of relations for whom a house can be got vacated for giving it to them as a separate place of residence are the children of the landlord. If widowed mother is also included in the category of persons for whose indepen dent occupation a house can be got vacated then that would be doing violence to the language of the Statute by unnecessarily enlarging its scope and will tantamount to include such category of persons in it which the Legislature did not intend to include. It is obvious that a Court of Law should not tend to do any such thing. (d) The view which I have taken has also the support of two cases reported in Abdullah Baloch v. .Adam All (P L D 1961 S C 28) and Rustom Khudadad v. Arakan Furniture Mart (P L D 1962 Kar. 79). Both these cases were decided with reference to a corresponding provision contained in Karachi Rent Restriction Act (VIII of 1953), in which it was laid down in section 10 that vacation could be ordered where, "the premises are reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord, for his own use or for the use of any person for whose benefit the premises are held." The stand of the landlord in the case or Abdullah Baloch v. Adam Ali was as follows as reported on page 31 of the decision :‑ "I had not moved the Rent Controller for residential accommodation but for personal use as office. I need an office and also residential accommodation for my brother in Africa who came here as a guest and has to come here permanently." The Supreme Court held that‑ "Requirement for the use of his brother would not satisfy the condition of section 10 (2) (c) (ii) of the Act, in the absence of anything to show that the premises were held by him for the benefit of his brother." Similarly, in the case of Rustom Khudadad v. Arkan Furniture Mart, the learned Judges dealt with the matter in the following terms in para. 4 of their judgment at pages 80‑81 :‑ "The learned counsel for the appellant has confined his challenge to two points only. It is contended by the learned counsel that two of his nephews, aged 19 and 21, respec tively, had lost their father and the anxiety of the appellant `was to make a provision for their livelihood and that he could thus claim the benefit of item (c) (ii) of subsection (2) of section 10 of the Act which merely provides that the landlord should reasonably and in good faith require the premises for his own use or for the use of any person for whose benefit the premises are held. The case of the appellant is that the desire of settling his nephews could reasonably be construed as requiring it for his own use. It would be straining the language of the statute to produce any such result. The use contemplated by the provision is either the personal use of the landlord or for the beneficiaries of the premises. The case falls in neither of these two categories. We have no hesitation, therefore, in upholding the decision of the learned trial Judge that the reason for the certificates so far as this part of the case is concerned is not covered by the provisions of the statute." Respectfully following the line of reasoning in the aforesaid two cases, I am of the opinion that a distinction of the kind which I am making in the instant case is necessary to be maintained in cases where eviction is sought on the basis of a need to provide for such a relation who does not fall within the provisions of section 13 (3) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959). The aim of the landlord, in the instant case, may be laudable from moral ‑point of view but moral virtues cannot be achieved by violation ‑of law on the subject. (e) The word "occupation" is not a term of art and must be given its ordinary dictionary meaning. According to the New English Dictionary by Murray, it means "actual holding or possession of a place or land", and case‑law also supports the same. In Channu Singh v. Khem Karm (A I R 1961 All. 566) it was held that the phrase "occupied by him" means physically occupied by him. In the present case read with the word "own", this means that the needs of the landlord should be such which should compel him to occupy the building himself physically. That this can be the only interpretation of subsec tion (3) (a) (i) under discussion, is clear if we study it with subsection (3) (a) (ii), which deals with non‑residential build jugs. There the requirement of law is that the landlord can get it vacated, if he requires it in good faith for his own use or for the use of any of his male children." Comparing the aforesaid with the clause under discussion, we note that here the word is "occupation" whereas in. the case of nonresidential buildings, the phrase is "use". Obviously, there is a lot difference between a building needed for "own occupation" and a building needed for "own use". A building in physical occupation of a person may also be said as being used by him, but a building may be used by a person without. his being in its physical possession, as for example, by giving it on licence to others or by allowing others to run a business. in it while himself retaining only a sleeping partnership therein The logical deduction of this difference is that when a house is required by a landlord for his own occupation it means that he himself is to physically occupy it, though the need to so occupy it may not have arisen from his personal self, but. due to the circumstances of his life, his social status, vocation,, his social, moral or legal obligations etc. etc., a subject elaborately explained by my learned brother Qadeeruddin Ahmad, J,. in Adaniali Hasanali v. Mst. Rubab Bai (1).

5. When confronted with this situation, learned counsel for the landlord-respondent referred to Adamali Hasanali v. Mst. Rubab Bai and its decision in LTA as reported in Adamali Hassanali v. Mst. Rubab Bai (2) (S. A. Mahmood and Noor-ul-Arfin, JJ.), where ejectment of a tenant had been ordered to allow a land-lady to occupy the house alongwith her ailing (T. B.) husband, and argued, that even though husband is not included in the class of persons in section 13 (3) (a) (i), for whose occupation a house may be got vacated still in that case the Court directed eviction of the tenant on that count. The argument is not correct. A perusal of the said case will show that it was the land-lady who claimed the house for herself where she wanted to shift and live with her ailing husband. Following passages from the aforesaid judgments will support this fact. In P L D 1965 Kar 408-409, it is, written, as follows "The application made on the ground that the respondent needed the premises for herself and her husband who In P L D 1967 Kar. 437, the following passages 438 may be referred to :- "The respondent made an application to the Rent Controller for certificate of ejectment of the appellant under section 10, of the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953, on the ground, that the residential portion of the aforesaid building was required for her own use,

3. The only point which was urged, before the learned Single Judge, and has again been agitated before us, is that the purpose stated by the respondent for the appellant's; eviction, that she required the premises in question for her own residence because of her husband's illness, is not a ground recognised for eviction of tenants under section 13, (3) of the Ordinance, which is to the following effect : The respondent in the present case requires the tenement in question for her own occupation." All these passages show that in the above-noted case it was the land-lady who required the house for her own occupation where she wanted to live alongwith her ailing husband. In the whole debate, which took place before the learned Single Judge (Qadeeruddin Ahmad, J.), the emphasis of the tenant was that a need of the house by the land-lady due to illness of her husband was not a need recognizable under the law. This argument was repelled and it was held that such a need was a genuine need and a land-lady could get a tenant convicted for such a purpose. The learned Single Judge or as a matter of fact, the learned Judges of the Division Bench, nowhere laid down that the land-lady could get the tenant evicted for providing an independent and separate residence for the husband (without herself the same time living with him ; because, as later on held by the Letters Patent Bench r: that case n P L D 1967 Kar. 437, that such a course is permissible only in cases of his children and nobody else. This is clear from the following passage occurring at pages 438 and 439 of the report :- "The Words or for the occupation of any of his children merely relate to situation where an owner desires to provide independent and separate residence for his married or grown-up children." Qadeeruddin Ahmad, J., at page 410 examined the concept of needs and said that needs may differ from man to man and as also with regard to the circumstances of each case. Nowhere, his Lordship said that where the intention is to set up an independent and separate residence for relations other than those mentioned in section 13 and where the landlord himself is not to occupy or live in the premises even there a case for eviction could be said to exist. The two cases of P L D 1961 S C 28 and P L D 1962 Kar. 79, were quoted before him to show that the requirements of a brother or nephew were not the needs of the landlord himself. The learned Judge did not differ from the aforesaid two judgments but simply proceeded to decide the case on its own facts 7iolding that it was the land-lady herself before him who was to occupy the building actuated by the need under discussion and to keep her husband alongwith her.

6. Applying the above law to the facts and the circumstances of the present case, it is clear that here it is not the landlord himself who wants to occupy the premises in question nor like the case of P L D 1965 Kar. 408, he wants to live in that house alongwith his mother. Here his c sole aim, as deposed to by him, in his statement as his own witness, is to separately accommodate his mother in the house in question and to that way to settle the house on her. This is the finding of fact recorded by the landlord by the learned judge himself in para. 5 of his judgment, where he holds, "that she had to be provided a separate house for paucity of accommodation in the house (146-Murree Road), now in occupation of the appellant" before him i.e., the landlord. I am afraid, this is not permissible under the provisions of the Statute. The net result is that the petition filed by the landlord merited dismissal :-

7. The appeal is accepted ; the judgment of the learned District Judge is set aside and restoring that of the learned. Rent Controller, ejectment application, filed by the landlord, is hereby dismissed with costs throughout. A. E. Appeal accepted.