2022 P Cr (PLP)

MUHAMMAD SALEEM JESSAR, J.

By means of instant Criminal Appeal, appellant Farooq Shah has assailed Judgment dated 17.11.2016 passed by learned Sessions Judge/Special Judge (CNS), Jamshoro in Special Case No.33/2014, arising out of Crime No. 04/2014 under section 9(c) of CNS Act, 1997 registered at Police Station, Excise and Narcotic Circle, Kotri, whereby he has convicted the appellant for an offence punishable under section 9(c) of CNS Act, 1997 and sentenced him to suffer R.I. for five (5) years and to pay tine of Rs.500.000/- (Rupees Five Lac only) and in case of non-payment thereof, to undergo R.I. for a further period of one year. However, the appellant has been extended benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C. By the same judgment the trial Court acquitted co-accused Arif Nagori holding that the charge against him could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

2. The concise facts of the prosecution case, as unfolded in the aforesaid FIR, are that on 23-09-2014 complainant AETO Syed Aijaz Ali Shah of Excise and Narcotic Circle, Kotri along with his subordinate staff EC Sikandar Ali, EC Asghar Ali, EC Zulfiqar Ali, EC Bashir Ahmed, EC Piyaro Khan and others left Station in private vehicle vide entry No.4383 at 11.00 a.m. for road checking. They proceeded towards Petaro Toll Plaza, Indus Highway, Jamshoro and started checking near the hotel of Mehboob Khaskheli. During checking a Bed-Ford Truck bearing Registration No.MNC-4465 came from Sehwan side. The driver of the said vehicle was signaled to stop but instead of stopping the vehicle, the driver on seeing Excise Staff tried to run away, but complainant party encircled the truck and apprehended its driver. On enquiry, the driver disclosed his name as Farooq Shah son of Jalal Shah Syed i.e. the present appellant. Due to non-availability of public mashirs, EC Sikandar Ali and EC Zulfiqar Ali were cited as mashirs and in their presence the bags loaded on the truck were checked and the complainant secured 100 bags of Dodi Sawdust, lying under 20 bags of chaff and 5 bags of wooden chaff. On weighing, the weight of the said Dodi Sawdust was found to be 30 KGs in each bag, total 3000 KGs in 100 bags. The chaff was weighed and each bag of chaff contained 15 KGs i.e. total 300 KGs in 20 bags of chaff, while the weight of each bag of wooden chaff was 20 KGs i.e. total 100-KGs in 5 bags. Thereafter, 10 grams of Dodi Sawdust was separated from each bag and in all 100 samples of sealed parcel were prepared respectively in plastic shoppers and brown envelop for chemical analysis and remaining property was sealed separately. From personal search of accused, 6 currency notes of Rs.1000/- in denomination and one note of Rs.50/- in denomination total Rs.6050/- and a CNIC card in the name of accused were secured from his front pocket, while from the dashboard of truck the registration book of said truck, route permit and insurance documents were secured. "Jeay Azmat Imran Goods Transport Company Multan" was written on the body of truck. On enquiry, accused disclosed that he purchased the truck on installments and he had purchased Dodi Sawdust from one Salahuddin Pathan, Hazara Ganj, Quetta, and was going to sell the same to Arif Nagori Mirpurkhas. Such memo of arrest and recovery was prepared on the spot and read over to both the mashirs, who admitted the same and put their signatures on it. Accused and property were then brought at Excise Circle, Kotri, where complainant lodged FIR on behalf of the State against accused.

3. After usual investigation, challan was submitted against accused, while showing accused Arif Nagori and Salahuddin Pathan as absconders. Process was issued against absconding accused, but they could not be arrested despite warrants, ultimately the case was ordered to be proceeded against them in their absence under section 512, Cr.P.C.

4. A formal charge under section 9(c) of CNS Act, 1997 was framed against accused Farooq Shah at Ex.04, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried vide his plea Ex.05.

5. Meanwhile, absconding accused Arif Nagori on obtaining bail, joined the trial and an amended charge was framed under section 9(c) of CNS Act, 1997 against both the accused Farooq Shah and Arif Nagori at Ex.07, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried vide their pleas at Exs.08 and 09 respectively.

6. In order to prove its case prosecution examined complainant Syed Aijaz Ali Shah at Ex.10, who produced memo of arrest and recovery as Ex.10/A, FIR as Ex.10/B, entries of departure, arrival and registration of FIR as Ex.10/C, copy of letter for sending case property to the office of Chemical Examiner as Ex.10/D, chemical report as Ex.10/E. Mashir EC Sikandar Ali was examined at Ex.11. Thereafter, learned SPP for the State closed prosecution side through his Statemeipt Ex.12.

7. Statements of accused were recorded under section 342, Cr.P.C. at Exs.13 and 14 respectively, in which they denied all the allegations levelled against them. However, neither they examined themselves on oath in disproof of the charge, nor examined any witness in their defence as required under section 340(2), Cr.P.C.

8. After formulating the points for determination, recording evidence of the prosecution witnesses and hearing counsel for the parties, learned trial Court vide impugned judgment convicted and sentenced the appellant as stated above and acquitted co-accused Arif Nagori holding that the charge against him could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant has challenged the impugned judgment through this Criminal Appeal.

9. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants as well as learned A.P.G. appearing for the State and perused the material available on the record.

10. Mr. Ghulamullah Chang learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the impugned judgment is contrary to law and facts of the case and is based on surmises and conjectures. He further contended that the same is the result of misreading and non-reading of the evidence available on record, hence not sustainable in law. According to him, the alleged contraband as shown in the case is the grinded powder of the opium and further submits that though the chemical examiner's report is in positive yet the author of he report was not examined before the trial Court, even the report is silent as to how much quantity of liquor, whether Alkaloids or Morphine was available in the powder. Besides. he criticized that per chemical report it was dried powder, therefore, according to the learned counsel, whether dried powder was containing any liquidity of Alkaloids or Morphine and further submits that in absence of such specification of quantity of the alleged contraband, it cannot safely be relied whether the said powder was of narcotic substances and does fall under the definition of the CNS Act 1997. He further contended that from the Dodi Sawdust the intoxicant material viz. Opium is already derived and since centuries Dodi Sawdust is being used in Pakistan, India and other neighboring countries for the purpose of increase in milk of cattle, against heat and for the purpose of keeping children calm and the same is not termed as Narcotic, thus the entire proceedings against the appellants is nullity in the eye of law. He further submits that appellant as well as complainant of this case were well known to each other prior to the incident and such plea was taken by the appellant in his statement under section 342, Cr.P.C. yet the trial Court did not consider the same nor kept it in juxtaposition. He has also focused upon the evidence of the I.O. wherein he has categorically stated that driver of the truck was asked to become a witness to proceedings but he refused; however, his whereabouts were not noted nor even the proceedings in terms of section 217, P.P.C. were initiated against him by the I.O. He further submitted that I.O. himself has admitted that the contraband was refused by the laboratory for testing and again it was submitted through his subordinate; however, it has not been brought on record that in whose custody the contraband was lying in the intervening period, therefore, the question of safe custody of the contraband from the day of its recovery till its depositing in the laboratory does arise. According to him, there is delay of three days in sending the alleged recovered Dodo Sawdust to the Chemical Examiner. He further contended that there are material contradictions in the evidence of the complainant and the prosecution witness/mashir which have been ignored by the trial court. He also submitted that although the place of alleged incident was a busy road, despite that not a single person from the public has been associated as witness or mashir in the case which casts doubts in the prosecution case. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the cases of (i) Shafquat Mehmood v. The State (2015 YLR 2163), (ii) Abdul Qadir v. The State (2015 PCr.LJ 2350), (iii) Ikramullah and others v The State (2015 SCMR 1002), (iv) Nazeer and another v The State (2014 PCr.LJ 1358), (v) Abdul Sattar v. The State (2016 SCMR 909), (vi) Para Din and others v. The State (2016 SCMR 806) and (vii) Abdul Khalique Shah v. The State (SBLR 2019 Sindh 197).

11. Ms. Sana Memon, learned Assistant P.G Sindh opposed the appeal and supported the impugned judgment and submitted that the contraband, in view of the chemical examiner's report, is narcotic substance, therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant. She further submitted that the impugned judgment does not suffer from any illegality or irregularity, which may warrant interference by this Court; however, she could not controvert or specify as to how much quantity of Alkaloids or Morphine the dried powder of the poppy was containing, even this fact has not been specified by the expert who was the author of the chemical examiner's report.

12. Heard arguments, perused record.

13. In the instant case the Chemical Examiner, on the basis of whose report the alleged contraband was claimed by the prosecution to be Narcotics, has not been examined. The report of the Chemical Examiner was produced through the eviderice of the I.O. of the case namely Syed Aijaz Ali, AETO Incharge Excise Narcotic Circle, Kotri, who is also complainant of the case. It would be advantageous to point out the relevant portion from his evidence in order to adjudge the credibility or otherwise of his testimony. In his examination-in-chief he deposed as under: "I then sent the samples of property to the chemical examiner through EC Asghar Ali but they did not receive the same and he returned back. Thereafter I myself took the property to Karachi on 26.09.2014 and handed over to them."

14. Before proceeding further, it may be pointed out that admittedly the alleged incident took place on 23.09.2014 and it is also admitted position that the complainant/I.O. along with other excise staff left the Narcotic Circle Kotri towards place of incident on the aforesaid date in a private Suzuki.

15. In his cross-examination he made following admissions: "The private vehicle was Suzuki with hood but I don't remember its colour. I do not remember the name of driver as the vehicle was rented..... It is correct to say that Mehboob Khaskheli hotel is situated on the main road having tea and sometimes meals..... It was 2.00 p.m. when we stopped the vehicle and started proceedings. I asked the driver of the Suzuki to act as mashir but he refused. It is correct to say that it is not mentioned in the memo or FIR that driver of Suzuki refused to act as mashir. During three hours we did not stop the vehicle on the road as we were busy in the proceedings. It is correct to say that I have not mentioned the number of Suzuki in the mashirnama. EC Zulfiqar Ali and EC Bashir Ahmed weighed the property.... While going towards Sehwan the hotel is on the right side of road and we also stood on the same side. EC Sikandar Ali written the memo on my dictation as well as 161, Cr.P.C. statements of PWs were written by EC Sikandar Ali ..... It is correct to say that I am complainant as well as IO of the case...."

16. The most important evidence and material in the instant case to prove the guilt of the accused/appellant is the report of the Chemical Examiner. The importance of such material in the narcotics cases can be gathered from the following observations of the Honourable Supreme Court made in the case of Taimoor Khan and another v. The State and another reported in 2016 SCMR 621: "Under the provision of section 34 (ibid) read with the relevant rules, the opinion of the notified expert alone is admissible in evidence and the person found in possession of narcotics substance is invariably punished on the opinion of the expert because the Investigating Office r, the Prosecutor or the Judges being not expert on the subject cannot give legally acceptable opinion to this effect. In this way, very heavy responsibility is placed on the qualified Chemical Examiner by the law to give well-reasoned, authoritative and detailed opinion about a particular narcotics substance."

17. From the perusal of the report of the Chemical Examiner, it transpires that the report is silent in respect of the fact as to how much quantity of liquor, whether Alkaloids or Morphine was available in the powder. Besides, even according to chemical report the alleged contraband was dried powder; however, there is no explanation in the report as to how the dried powder was containing any liquidity of Alkaloids or Morphine. In absence of the fact having been specifically mentioned in the Chemical Examiner's report as to how much quantity of Alkaloids or Morphine the alleged contraband contained, it cannot safely be declared that the said powder was a narcotic substance, thus falling under the definition of the CNS Act 1997. Besides, there also seems to be violation of Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001 framed in pursuance of the CNS Act, 1997, particularly Rule 6 of the said Rules which provides that after test or analysis, the result thereof, together with full protocols of the test applied, shall be signed in quadruplicate and supplied forthwith to the sender as specified in Form-II, which shall be signed and stamped by the officer authorized and notified by the Federal Government in the Official Gazette.

18. From the evidence of the I.O. of the case it is clear that although the alleged contraband was recovered on 23.9.2014, but the samples of the property were received in the office of chemical examiner on 26.09.2014 as is evident from the report of the Chemical Examiner Ex.10/E. No explanation has been offered as to whether during the intervening period the contraband articles were placed in safe custody or not which makes the same doubtful. In the case of The State through Regional Director ANF v. Imam Bakhsh and others reported in 2018 SCMR 2039 honourable Supreme Court held as under: "

9. We have noted above that in Criminal Appeals Nos. 526 to 525/2017 and No. 22/2018, safe custody and safe transmission of the alleged drug from the spot of recovery till its receipt by the Narcotics Testing Laboratory are not satisfactorily established. The chain of custody begins with the recovery of the seized drug by the Police and includes the separation of the representative sample(s) of the seized drug and their dispatch to the Narcotics Testing Laboratory. This chain of custody is pivotal, as the entire construct of the Act and the Rules rests on the Report of the Government Analyst, which in turn rests on the process of sampling and its safe and secure custody and transmission to the laboratory. The prosecution must establish that the chain of custody was unbroken, unsuspicious, indubitable, safe and secure. Any break in the chain of custody or lapse in the control of possession of the sample, will cast doubts on the safe custody and safe transmission of the sample(s) and will impair and vitiate the conclusiveness and reliability of the Report of the Government Analyst, thus, rendering it incapable of sustaining conviction. This court has already held in Amjad Ali v. State (2012 SCMR 577) and Ikramullah v. State (2015 SCMR 1002) that where safe custody or safe transmission of the alleged drug is not established, the Report of the Government Analyst becomes doubtful and unreliable."

19. While considering the implementation of the provisions of Rule 6 of the Rules, 2001, Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Imam Bakhsh (supra) held as under: "

15. Rule 6 on the other hand stands on a different footing. It provides that the Report of the Government Analyst, after the test and analysis, is to furnish the result together with full protocols of the test applied. The accuracy of test and analysis and the correct application of the full protocols alone can determine if the recovered substance is a narcotic drug or a psychotropic or controlled substance. "Protocol" means an explicit, detailed plan of an experiment, procedure or test or a precise step-by-step description of a test, including the listing of all necessary reagents and all criteria and procedures for the evaluation of the test data. Rule 6 requires that full protocols of the test applied be part of the Report of the Government Analyst. Every test has its protocols, which are internationally recognized and a test without the observance of its protocols has no sanctity. "Full Protocols" include a description of each and every step employed by the Government Analyst through the course of conducting a test. Hence, the Report under Rule 6 must specify every test applied for the determination of the seized substances with the full protocols adopted to conduct such tests.

16. Non-compliance of Rule 6 can frustrate the purpose and object of the Act, i.e. control of production, processing and trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, as conviction cannot be sustained on a Report that is inconclusive or unreliable. The evidentiary assumption attached to a Report of the Government Analyst under section 36(2) of the Act underlines the statutory significance of the Report therefore details of the test and analysis in the shape of the protocols applied for the test become fundamental and go to the root of the statutory scheme. Rule 6 is, therefore, in the public interest and safeguards the rights of the parties. Any Report (Form-II) failing to give details of the full protocols of the test applied will be inconclusive, unreliable, suspicious and untrustworthy and will not meet the evidentiary assumption attached to a Report of the Government Analyst under section 36(2). Resultantly, it will hopelessly fail to support conviction of the accused. This Court has already emphasized the importance of protocols in Ikramullah's case (supra).

17. Rule 6 also requires the issuance of quadruplicate copies of the Report and the requirement of two signatures on the Report of the Government Analyst in Form-II. Section 36 states that the Report shall be signed by the Government Analyst only, therefore the requirement of two signatures and the issuance of quadruplicate copies, are at best, a good practice, but are merely directory provisions, as their non-compliance does not offend the Act. At this stage it is important to point out that this Court, in a series of judgments, has considered the scope of Rule 4(2) of the Rules, which provides that the samples be dispatched to the Government Analyst not later than 72 hours of its seizure and has held it to be a directory provision. Reliance is placed on Muhammad Sarfraz v. State (2017 SCMR 1874), Gul Alam v. The State (2011 SCMR 624) and Tariq Mehmood v. The State (PLD 2009 SC 39). In Taimoor Khan v. State (2016 SCMR 621) this Court has additionally held that Rules 3, 4 and 6 are mandatory. Deeper examination of this judgment, reveals that reference was only being made to Rule 4(1), whereas, Rule 4(2) was not discussed, separately. This understanding falls in line with the consistent view of this Court regarding Rule 4(2) as referred to above.

18. It is important to underline that even if a rule is directory, its substantial compliance as opposed to strict compliance is required. Non-compliance of such a rule might not invalidate the act but as it provides a legislative process based on public interest, transparency and good governance, its substantial compliance is necessary."

20. In the said judgment honourable Supreme Court concluded as under: "

20. We conclude that Rule 5 of the Rules is directory while Rule 6 is mandatory to the extent that the full protocols ought to be mentioned in the Report of the Government Analyst. Non-compliance of Rule 6, in this context, will render the Report of the Government Analyst inconclusive and unreliable. The representative samples of the alleged drug must be in safe custody and undergo safe transmission from the stage of recovery till it is received at the Narcotics Testing Laboratory."

21. Examining the report of the Chemical Examiner produced in the instant case in the light of guidelines provided by the Apex Court, it is crystal clear that the said report miserably fails to furnish the required details and the Chemical Examiner has not complied with the aforesaid instructions and has not fulfilled the mandatory requirements, thus rendering the Chemical Report to be inconclusive and unreliable.

22. Besides, there is admittedly delay of three days in reaching the samples of the alleged contraband in the office of Chemical Examiner. However, the complainant/I.O. in his evidence has stated that he had sent the samples of property to the chemical examiner through EC Asghar Ali on the very same day but the same were not received by the Chemical Examiner and were returned back. Thereafter, he himself took the property to Karachi and handed over to the Chemical Examiner on 26.09.2014. However, he has failed to furnish any explanation or justification as to why consequent upon return of the samples by the Chemical Examiner on 23.09.2014, he did not take the same again on the same day or at least on the next date and waited till 26.06.2016. In the case reported as Munawar Ali Jatoi v. The State (2012 MLD 1763) a Division Bench of this Court while dealing with this point held as under: "As regards to the positive report is concerned, situation is very alarming. Charas, according to the prosecution case, was recovered from the possession of the accused on 11.5.2008, but it was sent to the Chemical Examiner on 19.5.2008. Delay of about 9 days in sending the Charas to the Chemical Examiner has not been explained. Even for the satisfaction of the Court it has not been brought on record that it was in the safe-custody of the Investigating Officer of the case and there was no chance of tampering...... The alleged sample of the narcotic substance was sent to the Chemical Examiner after delay of 9 days, though as per Rule 4(2) of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, this exercise was required to be completed within seventy-two hours of the recovery, and for this purpose, even there is no plausible explanation has been furnished by the prosecution as to why such inordinate delay was caused in the completion of this exercise by the Investigating Officer."

23. It has also come in evidence of the I.O./Complainant that he along with his subordinate excise staff left the Narcotic Circle Kotri on the date of incident in a private Suzuki. He further admitted in his cross-examination that had asked the driver of the said Suzuki to act as mashir but he refused and that he did not mention in the memo of recovery or in the FIR that driver of Suzuki refused to act as mashir. He also admitted that Mehboob Khaskheli hotel was situated on the main road having tea and sometimes meals and that the said hotel was situated on the right side of the road and they also stood on the same side. He also admitted that during three hours they did not stop the vehicle on the road as they were busy in the proceedings. The I.O. has also not explained as to why on the refusal of the driver of the private Suzuki to act as mashir, he did not take any coercive step although such option was available to him under the law. He also has not explained that during the long time of three hours during which they were busy in completing the recovery proceedings, as to what step they took for procuring private mashirs of recovery from the vicinity or by stopping other vehicles plying on the said road. In this view of the matter it can be said that despite availability of independent persons, particularly the driver of the private Suzuki, none of them was associated by the prosecution either as a mashir or a witness. From such attitude on the part of the I.O. an inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 could be drawn that in case such independent person(s) had been examined by the prosecution, he/they would not have supported the prosecution case. In the case of Bashir Ahmed alias Manu v. The State reported in 1996 SCMR 308 it was held by honourable Supreme Court that despite presence of natural witnesses on the spot they were not produced in support of the occurrence an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order could easily be drawn that had they been examined, they would not have supported the prosecution version. In another case reported as Mohammad Shafi v. Taimur Rehman (1972 SCMR 144) it was held that large number of persons had gathered at the place of occurrence but prosecution failing to produce single disinterested witness in support of its case, therefore no implicit reliance could be placed on evidence of interested eye-witnesses. In the case reported in 1980 SCMR 708, it was observed that no witness of locality nor owner of hotel was produced in support of prosecution case nor any independent evidence to corroborate testimony of the three eye-witnesses was produced, as such, the acquittal was upheld by the Honourable Supreme Court.

24. It is also an admitted position that in the instant case I.O. of the case namely Syed Aijaz Ali is also complainant of the case. Superior Courts have not appreciated such practice. On this point although, there are plethora of case-law, however for the sake of brevity reference is made to the case of Muneer v. The State (2014 MLD 723) only wherein following observations were made: "

18. A complainant of an FIR [as the case in hand is] cannot suitably discharge his duties as an independent and/or fair investigating officer. For this obvious reason, Superior Courts have not appreciated or approved such practice. Under law, an officer of police or of any other force is always obliged to do justice and conduct investigation beyond any doubt, of course, fairly and independently. Otherwise, the investigation made in contravention of Para-3 of the Rule 25.2 [Chapter XXII of Police Rules, 1934 would render the investigation very much doubtful. It is the duty of a police officer who is investigating the crime to discover the truth and actual facts. The investigating officer, it is needless to say, is also an important witness of defence. For achieving this object, the investigating officer in all circumstances shall not be biased. If complainant of case is also investigating officer then in such eventuality the factor of bias cannot be ruled out. Regarding this aspect of the matter reference can be made to the case of The State v. Bashir through Advocate General and others (PLD 1997 SC 108)."

25. In view of above, the evidence of the I.O. of the case who is also complainant of the case cannot be termed to be upto the mark and cannot be relied upon to convict the accused/appellant, more particularly when no independent person has been associated by the prosecution as a witness or mashir of the case and also in view of gross violations of the relevant rules with regard to the Chemical Examination of the alleged contraband.

26. It is also a well settled principle of law that the prosecution is bound under the law to prove its case against the accused beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt. It has also been held by the Superior Courts that conviction must be based and founded on unimpeachable evidence and certainty of guilt, and any doubt arising in the prosecution case must be resolved in favour of the accused. In the instant case prosecution does not seem to have proved the allegations against the accused/appellant by producing unimpeachable evidence, thus doubts have been created in the prosecution version. In the case reported as Wazir Mohammad v. The State (1992 SCMR 1134) it was held by Honourable Supreme Court as under: "In the criminal trial whereas it is the duty of the prosecution to prove its case against the accused to the hilt, but no such duty is cast upon the accused, he has only to create doubt in the case of the prosecution."

27. In another case reported as Shamoon alias Shamma v. The State (1995 SCMR 1377) it was held by Honourable Supreme Court as under: "The prosecution must prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubts irrespective of any plea raised by the accused in his defenc. Failure of prosecution to prove the case against the accused, entitles the accused to an acquittal."

28. In view of aforesaid legal flaws and lacunas in the prosecution case; it can safely be held that prosecution has not succeeded in proving its case against the accused/appellant beyond shadow of reasonable doubt. Needless to emphasize the well settled principle of law that the accused is entitled to be extended benefit of doubt as a matter of right and not as a grace or concession. In the present case, there are various contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses which create doubts in the prosecution case. Even an accused cannot be deprived of benefit of doubt merely because there is only one circumstance which creates doubt in the prosecution story. In the case reported as Tariq Pervaiz v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 the Honourable Supreme Court held as under:- "The concept of benefit of doubt to an accused person is deep-rooted in our country. For giving him benefit of doubt, it is not necessary that there should be many circumstances creating doubts. If there is a circumstance which creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind about the guilt of the accused, then the accused will be entitled to the benefit not as a matter of grace and concession but as a matter of right."

29. For above reasons by a short order passed on 30.04.2019, we had allowed this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment 17.11.2016, handed down by Special Judge (N)/Sessions Judge, Jamshoro (Re: The State v. Farooq Shah and another) only to the extent of the conviction and sentence of appellant. Consequently appellant Farooq Shah, who was present on bail, was acquitted of the charge(s). JK/F-20/Sindh Appeal allowed.