P L D 1963 (W (PLP)

3. The present situation arose due to the following circum stances : Railways was a Central subject before the Constitution of Pakistan came into force on 8th June 1962. It was, however, provided in Article 233 of the Constitution that, "the President shall, on or before the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty‑two, provide for the transfer, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, of the Railways in each Province to the Government of the Province or to an authority constituted in the Province for that purpose". The President in pursuance of this provision passed an order on 9th June 1962, and the Railways thereafter became a Provincial subject.

4. In order to appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel, the relevant provisions of the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958 (Act XL of 1958), may be reproduced with advantage:- "Section 2 (a) Appropriate Government" means in relation to a person serving in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Railway employee and any other person employed by the Central Government or by an organization or body corporate notified by the Central Government, and in other cases, the Provincial Government concerned." "Section

3. Appointment of Special Judges.‑(1) The appro priate Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint as many Special Judges as may be necessary to lay and punish offences specified in the Schedule." "Section

4. Jurisdiction of Special Judges and cognizance of cases by them.‑(1) A Special Judge shall have jurisdiction within such territorial limits as may be fixed by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette and may take cognizance of any offence committed or deemed to have been committed within such limits and triable under this Act upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence or upon a report in writing or such facts made by any police officer." The `appropriate Government' therefore by virtue of clause (2) of section 2 in relation to a Railway employee is the Central Government which under section 3 (1) alone is empowered to appoint a Special Judge to try and punish offences specified in the Schedule of Act XL of 1958 in respect of such persons. Act XL of 1958 is an existing law within the meaning of Article 225 (7) of the Constitution and continues in force under clause (1) of this Article unless altered, repealed or amended by the appropriate Legislature. Article 225 (1) reads as :‑ "Except as provided by his Article, all existing laws shall, subject to this Constitution, continue in force, so far as applicable and with the necessary adaptations, until altered, repealed or amended by the appropriate Legislature." The provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (XL of 1958) will therefore continue to apply and remain in force unless they are amended by‑ Legislature or necessary adaptations are made. It is true that Act XL of 1958 was enacted at a time when the Railways were a Central subject, and the definition, therefore, was in accord with the facts and circumstances as then existed, but the factum of their transfer to Provinces will not by itself warrant a change in all the Laws relating to Railways and their employees, and the adaptations do not become affected automatically by reason of Article 225 of the Constitution. To appreciate this aspect properly the relevant clauses of Article 225 are reproduced: "Article 225 (4).‑For the purpose of bringing the provisions of any existing law into accord, with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may, within a period of two years after the commencing day, make, by Order, such adaptations, whether by way of modification, addition or omission, as he may deem to he necessary or expedient, and any Order so made shall have effect (or be deemed to have had effect) from such date, not being a date earlier than the commencing day, as may be specified in the Order." "Article 225 (5).‑The President maya uthorise the Governor of a Province to exercise, in relation to the Province, the powers conferred on the President by clause (4) of this Article in respect of Laws relating to matters with respect to which the Legislature of the Province has power to make laws". These provisions leave no room for doubt that necessary changes cannot be read as a matter of course in the existing laws by reason of clause (1) of Article 225, after the New Constitutioy came into force. If it had been so, there would have been no purpose in giving powers to the President to make adaptations under clause (4) and to the Governor under clause (5) in respect of laws relating to matters with respect to which Legislature of the Province has power to make laws. In Jabendra Kishore v. Province of East Pakistan (P L D 1959 SC 9), the learned Chief Justice of Pakistan at page 45 observed that the words `so far as applicable' in clause (1) of Article 224, refer to the Court's power to apply the existing law with consequential adaptations until an adaptation order is issued under clause (2) of Article 224 of the Constitution of 1956. On first sight it would give an impression that the Courts can themselves read into the statutes the necessary changes but on thorough examination it is clear that these observations of the Supreme Court refer only to those cases where some provisions in the Constitution warrant an automatic change in the situation prevailing immediately before the enforce ment of the Constitution or in the existing laws, but are not meant to apply where certain subjects have been transferred from the Central to the Provincial or from the Provincial to the Central Legislative sphere and consequently some modifications, additions, alterations or omissions in the existing laws have become necessary. Such modifications, additions, alterations or omissions are required to be effected either by adaptation by some functionary under the Constitution or by Legislature within their respective legislative spheres by making the necessary laws. If it were not so it may lead to uncertainty and confusion in the application of laws because different Courts may form different opinions as to the adaptation of same law.

5. As pointed out earlier the President transferred the Railways in each Province to an Authority constituted in the Province. The change of circumstances in respect of the Railways which was effected by a Constitutional provision may warrant a change in the definition of `appropriate Government' in Act XL of 1958, but it is not open to any one except the President or a Governor of the Province, if authorised by the President with respect to the matters mentioned in the Provincial List, to make any adaptation in this law. The fact that the Railways is a Provincial subject and therefore within the control of the Provincial Government, yet the `appropriate Government' in relation to Railway employees should be the Central Government creates an anomalous situation inasmuch as the Central Government alone, will be competent to appoint under section 3 (1) the Special Judges for the trial of offences committed by the Railway employees ; to sanction prosecution of such employees under section 6 (5) ; to appoint public prosecutors to conduct the prosecutions under clause (6) of section 5 and withdraw prosecutions under section 9 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958. It is however clear that no other interpretation of the words `appropriate Government' is warranted even though serious anomalies might result. It is one of the cardinal principles of the interpretation of statutes that where the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, the Court must give effect to it according to its plain meaning and they are not justified in departing from it. On the intelligible construction put upon the provisions of the statute the `appropriate Government' in the context means only the Central Government and there can be no justification for holding that this word, on account of transfer of the Railways as a Provincial subject, should be understood to mean the Provincial Government, because if we do so it will necessitate the insertion of words in the Act which are not there and such a course is not permissible. The argument of the learned Public Prosecutor that the `appropriate Government' for the purpose of Railway employee is the `Central Government' is therefore unassailable.

6. It was further contended by the learned Public Prosecutor that even if it be assumed that the offences (mentioned in the Schedule to the Criminal Law Amendment Act) committed by the Railway employees in future, are to be tried by the Special Judges appointed by the Provincial Governments, the offences committed before the 7th June 1962, when the Department was transferred from the Centre to the Province, will anyhow be triable only by the Special Judges appointed by the Central Government. The offence in the present case is alleged to have been committed on the 8th February 1962, and it is urged that the only Court which is competent to take cognizance of the case would be that of the Special Judge, who had jurisdiction at the time the offence was committed and he could, therefore, be no other person except the Special Judge appointed by the Central Government. He has also drawn my attention to an unreported judgment of Karachi Bench In re: State v. Rashid Cr. Acq. A. 483 of 1961, where Mr. Ilahi Bakhsh Khamisani and Mr. H. T. Raymond, JJ. observed: "The jurisdiction conferred on the Special Judge for the purpose of trying a public servant is in respect of the offence committed by him. The date relevant for conferring the jurisdiction on the Special Judge is the date on which the offence had been committed and not the date on which accused had been challaned before the Court." I am bound by this interpretation, and otherwise too, I fully agree with the view expressed. It is in perfect consonance with the provisions of section 4 (1) of Act XL of 1958, wherein it is stated that a Special Judge may take cognizance of an offence committed or deemed to have been committed within his juris diction. There is no doubt that he can take cognizance of offences only when a report under section 4 (1) of the Act is presented to him, but the offences of which he can take cognizance are those which were committed or deemed to have been commit ted within his territorial jurisdiction. This clearly implies that for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction on a Special Judge, the time to be referred to is not the time when the complaint is presented but the time when the offence is actually committed. I may also with advantage refer to the provisions of clauses (3) and (4) of section 5 in aid of such an interpretation. By virtue of clause (3), all cases relating to the offences specified in the Schedule and pending in any Court other than the Court of Special Judge immediately before the commencement of the Criminal Law Amendment Act stood transferred to the Special Judge having jurisdiction over such cases after the Act came into force. Similarly if an offence was not included in the Schedule, but was added to it by a notification of the appropriate Govern ment, all cases relating to that offence pending in any Court, other than the Court of a Special Judge before such notification stood transferred by virtue of clause (4) to the Court of the Special Judge having jurisdiction over such cases. These provisions rather make it clear that ordinarily the offences are triable by the Courts which have jurisdiction at the time when they are com mitted, unless there is some law, warranting another procedure. But for provisions contained in clause (3) or (4), the Special Judges would have had no jurisdiction to try these offences, though included in the Schedule and only the Magistrates under the Code of Criminal Procedure could take cognizance of them. These provisions were enacted with a view to giving jurisdiction to Special Judges which otherwise they would not have been able to exercise. I have, therefore, no doubt in my mind that if it was so intended, the Legislature could by making a law, or by Amending Act XL of 1958, provide for the transfer of cases of Railway employees in respect of offences already committed to Special Judges appointed by the Provincial Governments. But in the absence of such provision in law the Courts which already had the jurisdiction.

7. After having given my serious thought to the whole matter I am of the opinion that notwithstanding the order of the President under Article 223 transferring the Railways to the Provinces, the `appropriate Government' under the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act LX of 1958 in relation to the Railway employees means the Central Government and so long as the Law is not altered or amended either by adaptation or fresh legislation whenever a question, in respect of an offence committed by a Railway employee which falls within the purview of this Act, will arise, the `appropriate Government' shall be the Central Government which alone will be competent to grant sanction for the prosecution within the meaning of section 6 (5) and the Explanation appended thereto ; and the Court, which under section 4 of the Act will have the jurisdiction to try the offences, will be that of a Special Judge appointed by the Central Govern ment under section 3.

8. I, therefore, accept this revision petition, set aside the order of Mr. Jameel Asghar, and hold that he having been appointed Senior Special Judge by the Central Government is competent to try the accused. A. H. Petition accepted.