P L D 1968 Lahore 863 (PLP)

"Section 13 (3) (a). The landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession. (i) in case of residential building, if (a) he requires it in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of any of his children; (b) he is riot occupying another residential building, suitable for his needs pat the time in the same urban area in which such building is situated ; and (c) he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Ordinance in the said urban area;" According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the word "own" used as an adjective means " of or belonging to oneself or itself". This would indicate that the use is not necessarily confined to natural or living persons alone. The word "own" is quite apposite in its application to juristic persons, legal entities and inanimate objects as well. The use of the word "his" in the context will not alter its meanings.

4. The term "occupation" is not defined in the Ordinance. Apparently it is used in the section with its ordinary dictionary meaning. It is not synonymous with the word "residence"; as for instance a warehouse in which the goods belonging to a person may be stored will be considered to be in his occupation though he need not necessarily be residing in it. Similarly, the sheds in which the cattle of a farmer are tethered is considered to be in his occupation although he may not be living there. The owner may be residing in the main bungalow and the attached quarters in which his servants are living under him shall be nevertheless deemed to be in his occupation. It appears to me that the term occupation in its present context must be liberally construed. In Queen v. The Justices of the West Riding ((1911) 2 Q B 198) Patterson, J. observed:-- "Even `acutal occupation' would not necessarily mean `residence', because a man might dwell in one parish and rent a house and land in the adjoining one occupying it by his servants." In the same case Wightmen, J. remarked:‑-- .but the word `occupy' is ambiguous. A man may occupy either land or dwelling house without residing." In Baladin v. Lakhan Singh (A I R 1927 All. 214) in interpreting clause (c) of section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Iqbal Ahmad, J. held that the word `occupation' in clause (c) does not necessarily mean `residence' only."

5. In re: The Institute of Radio Technology and others v. Pandurmaji Baburao (A I R 1946 Bom. 212) interpreting an analogous provision in section 11 of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act (XV1 of 1939), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that the words "his own occupation" mean occupation by himself and all persons who are dependent on him. In K. J. Aiyers' Manual of Law Terms and Phrases", 1958 Edition, on page 375, in explaining the term "occupation and possession", it is mentioned that "occupation has a wider significance than residence. A man may occupy a house without residing in it. An association or a body of persons, the members of which cannot possibly reside together, may require a building for conducting a school or running a business, and for this the building must be in their "occupation", directly if the members conducted or run it, or constructively if it is done through others." Therefore, a premises, genuinely needed by an association in order to fulfill and aims and objects for which it is established, may be considered to be required for its own occupation.

6. The expression "for his own occupation" employed in section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the Ordinance bus got to be interpreted fairly, liberally and with a sense of objective realisation C of the facts before the tribunal. in this connection Qadeeruddin Ahmad; J. in interpreting this section in Adamale Hasanali v. Mst. Rubab Bai (P L D 1965 Kar. 408) has observed that:‑-- "the words `for his own occupation' which occur in para graph (a) should be taken to include all genuine requirements of the landlord and not to be restricted to the requirement of a shelter for his own body and the bodies of his children. This is indicated by the words `suitable for his needs' which occur in paragraph (b). The needs of the landlord cannot ` be discriminated so as to separate the inner needs and outer needs of his body because both of them are projected on his environments. His hunger may be projected in the form of a need for a kitchen and his need for physical comfort may be projected in the form of a need for servants; nor can `his needs' be restricted to physical needs in contradiction to social, economic, intellectual, emotional and spiritual needs, which may be projected in the form of a need for a sitting room, for an office, for a wife, for children, for a room reserved for prayers or for a room reserved for maintaining a library. The "needs would differ from landlord to landlord and some of those which may be genuine in one case may not be so in another case; nor is it open to the landlord to declare his needs as his own subjective decisions firstly, because his rights reflect the ideas of the society and secondly because his rights are controlled by the society. The character of the social order to which he belongs places the general limits on his needs and his own characteristics place special limits on them." After all, a landlord, in case he is successful, expects to establish a comfortable house for himself with all the facilities and appurtenances necessary and required by him for the beneficial enjoyment of the premises according to his status, usages and environments; he cannot be forced to lead the life of a recluse in the house meant for his comforts. In shifting to the house vacated for him he may have to carry along with him, the persons attached to his household which are essential and necessary for his homely occupation of the premises.

7. Returning to the facts of the present case, it has been found by the lower authorities that the house in dispute is required by the management in good faith for tile residence of the Imam of the mosque to which it is attached. The mosque is meant to hold congregations led by the Imam in accordance with the commandments of Islam and his services are indispensable for the mosque. The house is wanted by the mosque for its purposes and must be considered to be required by the mosque and its managing committee for its own occupation within the meanings of section 13 of the Ordinance.

8. The learned counsel for the appellant has also argued that the Rent Controller had acted illegally in refusing to grant a reasonable opportunity to the appellant to resummon Ch. Muhammad Afzal, a material witness in the case. The appellant produced Mirza Salim Beg Pleader, Rahimyar Khan to depose that in company with the appellant he saw the Superintending Engineer, Irrgiation Branch who was also the President of the Mosque Committee and during the course of the conversation he had admitted that the notice was sent by the Committee in order to increase the rent and that the house shall be put to auction for lease to the highest bidder. The Superintending Engineer had demanded Rs. 50 as rent from the appellant in case he wished to retain the house as a tenant for the future under the Mosque Committee.

9. The learned Rent Controller had framed the issues in the case on the 16th of March 1962, and adjourned it to the 13th of April 1962, for the evidence. On the conclusion of the evidence of the respondent, on the 13th of April 1962, the case was adjourned to the 18th of May 1962, for the evidence by the appellant. But the appellant summoned his witnesses including Ch. Muhammad Afzal, Superintending Engineer, after a long delay, for the first time on the 11th of May 1962. He deposited the diet money and the process fee for the witnesses on the E 12th of May 1962. The summons sent to Ch. Muhammad Afzal was returned with the remarks that the witness had already been transferred to Sargodha Zone. According to the statement by Abdus Samad (P. W. 1), the Stenographer to the Superintend ing Engineer, the witness had left Rahimyar Khan on 9th of May 1962. It is, therefore, evident that the appellant was himself to be blamed for not summoning his witness in time and not giving his correct address. Under these circumstances the learned Rent Controller declined to exercise the discretion in his favour and grant any further adjournment to the appellant, on the 18th of May 1962, for the evidence of Ch. Muhammad Afzal. I see no illegality in this order, warranting my interference in this second appeal.

10. For the reasons discussed above, this appeal is bound to fail and is dismissed with costs. A.E. Appeal dismissed.