P L D 1966 (W (PLP)

H. T. RAYMOND, J.‑

By this petition, the petitioner Dr. Mumtaz Hussain Pathan an erstwhile Lecturer in Muslim History at the University of Sind assails the validity of three orders marked as Annexures, F, G and H to this petition, the first being the findings and report of the Enquiry Officer, the second being the Resolution of the University Syndicate removing him from service and the third being the decision of the Chancellor of the University rejecting his appeal.

2. The brief facts giving rise to this matter are that the petitioner was appointed in 1955 as a Junior Lecturer in Muslim History at the University of Sind and was confirmed in that post in 1959. He used to be appointed as a Paper‑Setter, Moderator and Examiner in Muslim History at the M. A. (Previous and Final) Examinations. 1n July 1963 'he was again appointed to these three positions for the M. A. (Previous) Examination after which it came to light that he had mis conducted himself in this role. He was alleged to have allowed after‑additions in the answer book of the candidate having Seat No. 441 in Paper No. IV in Muslim History: to have shown undue favouritism to certain candidates in this very paper: to have deliberately and wrongfully reduced the marks originally assigned by him to the candidate having Seat No. 510 in this same paper at the same Examination. The Controller of Examinations reported these alleged irregularities to the Vice‑Chancellor who referred the matter to the Unfair Means Committee which Committee submitted its report thereon to the Syndicate which on 29‑8‑1963 passed a Resolution directing a departmental enquiry. Accordingly, Dr. Imtiaz A. Khan, C. S. P. then Deputy Commissioner, Sanghar was appointed Enquiry Officer who after S holding a thorough enquiry submitted his findings (Annexure `F) to the Registrar of the University. These findings and report were then considered by the Syndicate at its meeting on 24‑5‑1964 at which after studying the report it was resolved to issue a show cause notice to the petitioner as to why he should not be removed from service in accordance with the provisions of the University of Sind Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Ordinances, 1961. The Syndicate then heard the petitioner in person at its meeting on 11‑7‑1964 and resolved that as his conduct has been found prejudicial to the good order of service discipline and unbecoming of a University Employee and he has further been found guilty of having exercised unwholesome influence on the academic, moral and corporate life of the University, he should be removed from the service of the Sind University with immediate effect. The petitioner then preferred an appeal under section 14 of the said Ordinances to the Chancellor of the University and Governor of West Pakistan who by his order dated 31‑3‑1965 rejected the appeal. Hence, the present writ petition.

3. The order of this Court of 17‑9‑1965 admitting this matter to a regular hearing makes it plain that the sole point for considering which this matter had been admitted to a regular hearing was to determine whether the rejection by the Chancellor of the appeal of the petitioner without granting him a personal hearing although he had expressly asked for it in his appeal resulted in a miscarriage of justice. At the regular hearing of this petition Mr. S. M. Raza the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner confined his submissions to this one and only point and urged no other point before us. Relying upon three decisions of our Supreme Court in the case of Chief Commissioner of Karachi v: Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrak (P L D.1959 S C (Pak.) 45), Messrs Faridsons Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan and another (P L.D 1961 S C 537) and Commissioner of Income‑tax, East Pakistan v. Fazlur Rahman (P L D 1964 S C 410), Mr. Raza contended that the rejection of his client's appeal by the Chancellor without granting him a personal hearing was a denial of the Principles of Natural Justice and therefore, resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

4. We have also heard Mr. S. Nasiruddin the learned Advocate‑General of West Pakistan on behalf of the respondents. His main contention was that members of Statutory Bodies are governed by their own rules and that there is no provision in the relevant rules for a personal hearing by the Appellate Authority in cases of appeals by a University Employee on whom a penalty has been imposed. Mr. Nasiruddin relied upon two, cases reported in P L D 1959 Lah. 879 and P L D 1961 Quetta 1, in support of this contention. He pointed out that in this case the Appellate Authority, namely the Chancellor and Governor of West Pakistan had before disposing of this appeal the whole record of the case before him and that the petitioner had in all been given no less than four chances of showing cause in person before the Syndicate and the Enquiry. Officer all of which he made use of. He finally placed before us extracts from the Constitutional and Administrative Law by O. Hood Phillips under the heading "audi alteram partem".

5. We have examined the facts of this case and we observe that the petitioner had been granted a very full and complete enquiry as well as a personal hearing both by the Enquiry Officer (Dr. Imtiaz A. Khan, C. S. P.) and by the Syndicate of the University. The Enquiry Officer examined no less than 13 witnesses including the petitioner and then submitted a detailed report in respect of each of the charges preferred against the petitioner. This report was studied by the Syndicate at its meeting held on 24‑5‑64 at which it reached tentative conclusions in regard to the disciplinary action proposed to be taken against the petitioner. Copies of these Resolutions together with a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer were supplied to the petitioner who was then given a further show‑cause notice within a period of 14 days from the communication of this decision to him to show as to why the proposed penalty of removal from service be not imposed upon him. The Syndicate then considered the cause as shown by the petitioner in his letter of 12‑6‑64 and also heard him in person. This was at its meeting on 11‑7‑64 after which it resolved finally to dispense with the petitioner's services. The petitioner on 27‑7‑64 preferred an appeal before the Chancellor of the University and we observe from the record before us that the Chancellor before disposing of this appeal on two occasions called for a detailed report and Juxta‑Position parawise comments from the University Authorities which were duly submitted to him along with copies of the requisite relevant papers and documents on record. These further reports were called by the Chancellor although the memo of appeal as presented by the petitioner was sent up to the Chancellor accompanied by copies of almost all the relevant documents and papers of the Record and Proceedings of tile Enquiry. It is thus apparent that the entire Record of the Proceedings held against the petitioner by the Enquiry Officer ‑and by the Syndicate were before the Appellate Authority and were considered by him before reaching a decision on this appeal.

6. In view of this factual position, we are not inclined to agree with the argument of the petitioner's counsel Mr. S. M. Raza that the denial by the Appellate Authority of a personal hearing to the petitioner has resulted in a miscarriage of justice or is in violation of the Principles of natural justice. This appeal was considered by the Chancellor under the provisions of section 14 of the University of Sind Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Ordinance, 1961. This rule is in these words:‑

"A University employee on whom a penalty is imposed shall have the right to prefer an appeal, within fifteen days of the receipt by him of the order imposing the penalty, to the appropriate appellate authority specified in column 5 of the Appendix: Provided that where the penalty is imposed by order of the Chancellor there shall be no appeal but the person concerned may apply for a review of the order." Under the Appendix the Appellate Authority in the case of emplopees whose scales of pay carry an initial salary of Rs. 300 or more is the Chancellor. The Proviso to this rule provides that where the penalty is imposed by the order of the Chancellor, only a review against that order will lie to the Chancellor himself and it is clear that such a review does not contemplate a personal hearing. Hence, on the interpretation of section 14 itself, it may well be argued that if a review to the Chancellor from an original order of punishment imposed by him does not contemplate a personal hearing, similarly, when the Chancellor is hearing an appeal from an order of penalty imposed by a Subordinate Authority, he is not bound to hear the appellant in person.

7. Besides, taking a practical view of things, it seems to us that the Chancellor who is also the Governor of West Pakistan must in his capacity as such be called upon to dispose of a number of appeals of an administrative character both from Government employees as well as from employees of Statutory Bodies. If the disposal of each of these appeals demanded hearing the appellant in person, the Chancellor and Governor might have to devote almost the entire day to the hearing and disposal of such appeals at the cost of and detriment to his other duties. It is well‑known that the President of Pakistan and the Governors as the Heads of the Central and Provincial Administration are inundated with appeals and the maxim "audi alteram partem" surely cannot mean that in each case the appellant has to be heard in person. All that is required is that his case should be before and present to the mind of the Appellate Authority and this is assured by the placing of the entire record of the proceedings before the Appellate Authority. In the case of Zafar‑ul‑Ashan v. The Republic of Pakistan (P L D 1959 Lah. 879) a Bench of this Court observed that the principle that where a Statute grants a right of appeal it is presumed to have granted a right of being heard also was clearly intended to apply to cases of a judicial or quasi judicial nature and could not have been intended to apply to departmental or administrative cases which have from time immemorial been governed by rules different from those obtaining in cases of judicial or quasi judicial nature. We are aware that our Supreme Court both in the case of Mrs. Sohrab Katrak and the case of Fazlur Rehman has , made it clear that the maxim "no man shall be condemned unheard" no doubt is not confined to Courts but extends to all proceedings by whomsoever held which may affect the person or property or other right of the party concerned in the dispute: yet, in cases where the Appellate Authority is the Governor of a Province or the President of the country who by virtue of their office are immune from processes of law in the discharge of their duties, appeals made to them by Government Servants or Members of Statutory Bodies, who are controlled by their own rules and regulations determining the conditions of their service, cannot require that the appellant be heard in person. Hood Phillips in his book on Constitutional and Administrative Law has stated "The maxim "audi alteram partem" does not necessarily mean that a person is entitled to be heard orally", and a Bench of this Court in P L D 1961 Quetta 1 held that ‑

"A personal hearing before deciding a matter is not a necessary requirement of the principle of natural justice,. All that is necessary is a full and fair opportunity of making representation or showing cause. Vv hat is a full and fair opportunity depends upon the facts of each case. In some, cases it may be enough if a party has placed his point of view and has shown cause for the consideration of the authority,` and no prejudice is shown to have been caused."

8. Now, in the instant case, the petitioner has been given no less than four chances of showing cause and has used all of them. He was heard by the Enquiry Officer and by the Syndicate on several occasions. His appeal was considered by the Appellate Authority who had the entire record before him and twice called for the parawise comments and detailed remarks of the University Authorities. We are, therefore, satisfied that the denial by the Appellate Authority to the petitioner in this matter of a personal hearing has occasioned no miscarriages of justice and in that view we dismiss this petition with costs. K.B.A. Petition dismissed.