1999 PLP 86 (PLC)

5. A mere perusal of the concluding paragraph of the impugned decision clearly indicates that the learned Labour Court was of the view that no appeal lies against the acceptance of the change by the Registrar of Trade Unions. The learned Labour Court mainly placed reliance on 1997 PLC 434, I have carefully gone through the aforesaid Authority and I have nowhere found that the said authority at any place ruled out that appeal against the acceptance of the change does not lie. On the other hand the following observations made by the Hon'ble High Court in paragraph No.17 (page 441) of the above authority clearly indicate that the dispute as envisaged under section 8(7) of the I.R.O., 1969 does not conclude after the acceptance of the change of office‑bearers by the Registrar. "The word dispute is further qualified by the words ' in relation to the change of officers'. The dispute only arises when the Registrar accepts the change and then a member or officer of union can file an application. In such eventuality Labour Court may order that the elections were held either in the violation of the Constitution or I. R.O., 1969 'directing the Registrar to hold fresh elections, or it another situation when a trade union is aggrieved by the refusal o1 Registrar to register the change, a Labour Court may direct the Registrar to register the change of office‑bearers or hold fresh election, in case a Labour Court comes to a conclusion that there is legal or Constitutional flaw in the election. Order of Registrar approving the change of office‑bearers or alteration in the Constitution is not assailable in appeal before the Labour Court. However, as stated earlier a member or officer of trade union may file application under the provisions of I.R.O. regarding the change of officers." Same view has been expressed by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.M. Kaurejo in a case reported as 1982 PLC

742. His Lordship has observed as under:‑‑

9. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the dispute does not cease to exist as soon , as the change is registered by the Registrar and that the view taken by the learned Labour Court in that respect is not correct. The plain reading of this subsection (7) would make it clear that the two situations arise, firstly, when there is a dispute in relation to the change of the office‑bearers of the trade union, and secondly, when there is a refusal by the Registrar under subsection (5) and that these two situations would be read independently with the latter portion of subsection (7). of section 8(7) of the I.R.O. The language of the section would make it clear that the latter portion of the subsection would apply to both the situations individually. The conclusion, therefore, would be on the plain reading of this subsection that the dispute would not come to an end as soon as the change is registered. The dispute continues as the replaced office‑bearers continue to be aggrieved by the registration of the change and continue to be in dispute in that respect. It has been contended that subsection (5) of section 8 does not give any power to the Registrar to decide the case with regard to the registering of change on its merits as he can refuse to register such change only in case it is in contravention of the provisions of this Ordinance or if it is in violation of the constitution of the Trade Union. It appears he has no power beyond the scope of this subsection to go into the merits of the case with regard to the change. This subsection gives him only a mechanical power to examine as to whether the change would be in contravention of the provisions of this Ordinance or it is in violation of the constitution of the trade union. Accordingly there seems to be no force in contention that since the change is registered the dispute as contemplated in the opening words of subsection (7) of section 8 ceases to exist. What I further find that in view of this subsection (7) the remedy is available only to the aggrieved trade union by the refusal of the Registrar under subsection (5) of section 8 and not to the group of the newly‑elected office‑bearers and the Trade Union alone is competent to file appeal against such refusal. It would, therefore, appear that reading of this subsection (5) in isolation is likely to refusal in misleading situation which obviously is incorrect. One would hardly think that the legislature could have contemplated such an absurdity by providing for relief to an aggrieved party only in case of refusal of approval by the Registrar under subsection (5) and failing to provide for appropriate relief in case of acceptance of the change by the Registrar. When such is the case, Maxwell on Interpretation of Statute at page 199 says "an intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available.

10. Plain reading of subsection (7) of section 8 shows that this provision is neither ambiguous nor mysterious. The observations of the Supreme Court in PLD 1965 SC 527 are relevant in that respect. They read at page 565 as under:‑‑ 'I may here point out that the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. When the words used are clear and unambiguous it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any hypothetical construction. The language of the section being clear it was not open to the learned Judges to read into the matter which was not there by reference to other extraneous constructions.' It would appear from the very wor66 and construction of the provision of section 8(7) itself that an appeal is provided both in case of dispute in relation to the change of officers of Trade Union or refusal on the part of the Registrar to register the change under section 8(5) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. I am, therefore, in respectful agreement with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at in the case of Syed Muzaffar Hussain Shah v. Registrar, Trade Unions, Rawalpindi and 11 others reported in 1980 PLC 908, which authority has overruled the decision reported in 1980 PLC 912 relied upon by the learned Labour Court. " Mr. Ali Amjad learned counsel for respondent No. l placed reliance on 1991 PLC 593 and 1992 PLC 88 whereby the then learned Chairman of this Tribunal held that the appeal against the acceptance of change of office bearers by the Registrar does not lie. In other words it means that the dispute in the change of office‑bearers as envisaged under section 8(7) of the I.R.O., 1969 extinguishes as soon as the change is accepted by the Registrar. Accordingly Mr. Ali Amjad's contention is that an appeal only lies against the refusal of the Registrar to register the change in the office‑bearers and not otherwise. In view of exhaustive observations by our High Court as mentioned above, the dispute as envisaged under section 8(7) of the I.R.O., 1969 does not come to an end after the acceptance of the change the learned Trial Court was not justified to hold that no remedy can be sought from the Labour Court after the acceptance of the change by the Registrar of Trade Unions. Now the question remains as to whether an appeal or an application lies before the Labour Court whereby the dispute in regard to the acceptance of change in the office‑bearers is to be challenged. There is no ambiguity in case of refusal of the Registrar to accept such change, as section 8(7) of the I.R.O., 1969 clearly mentions that in such case an appeal lies. In this connection I have referred to the Black's Law Dictionary which defines the two words "Application" and "Appeal" as under:‑‑ "A putting to, placing before, preferring a request or petition to or before a person. The act of making a request for something. A petition. The use of or disposition made of a thing. A bringing together, in order to ascertain some relation or establish some connection; as the application of a rule or principle to a case or fact. " Appeal "Report to a superior (i.e. appellate) Court to review the decision of an inferior (i.e. trial) Court or Administrative Agency. There are two stages of appeal in the Federal and many State, Court systems; to wit, appeal from trial Court to intermediate appellate Court and then to Supreme Court. There may also be several levels of appeal within an administrative agency; e.g. appeal from decision of Administrative Law Judge to Appeals Council in social security case. In addition, an appeal may be taken from an administrative agency to a trial Court (e.g. from Appeals Council in Social Security case to U.S. District Court). Also, an appeal may be as of right (e.g. from trial Court to intermediate appellate Court) or only at the discretion of the appellate Court (e.g. by writ of certiorari to U.S. Supreme Court). Provision may also exist for joint or consolidated appeals (e.g. Fed. R. App. P. 3) and for cross appeals (where both parties to a judgment appeal there from). Appeal was also the name formerly given to the proceeding in English Law where a person, indicted of treason or felony, and arraigned for the same, confessed the fact before plea pleaded, and appealed, or accused others, his accomplices in the same crime, in order to obtain his pardon. In this case he was called an 'approver or approver', and the party appealed or accused, the 'appellate. Abovementioned definitions denote that an appeal is always against an order passed by the relevant authority. The two authorities of our High Court as mentioned above lay down that cause of action is not only available to a party before the order of the acceptance is passed by the Registrar of Trade Unions, but the party can also approach the Labour Court after the order of acceptance has been passed by the Registrar. In my humble view if the recourse is made to the Labour Curt after the passing of the order of acceptance by the Registrar, then in that case not an application but an appeal would lie. Even otherwise labour laws are of beneficial nature. The provisions of such laws are to be interpreted with a view to facilitate the adjudication of the dispute between the parties on merits and not to dispose of the same on the basis of mere technicalities. My Lord Mr. Justice Muhammad Afzal Zullah in a matter reported as PLD 1990 SC 859 observed that no party should be allowed to suffer because of its wrong act objections so long as the harm can be prevented. Similarly it is observed in 1992 CLC 2165 that a second appeal could be treated as Revision and even the delay it filing the same can be condoned. In a latest judgment reported as 1997 SCMR 260 the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:‑‑ "

9. It is well‑settled that principal object behind all legal formalities is to safeguard the paramount interest of justice and mere technicalities unless offering an insurmountable hurdle should not be allowed to defeat the ends of justice. Refer Manager, Jammu and Kashmir, State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar PLD 1975 SC 687). It was observed by Kaikaus, J., in Imtiaz Ahmad v. Ghulam Ali (PLD 1963 SC 382):‑ "I must confess that having deal with technicalities for more than forty years; out of which thirty years are at the Bar. I do not feel much impressed with them. I think the proper place of procedure in any system of administration of justice is to help and not to thwart the grant to the people of their rights. All technicalities have to be avoided unless it be essential to comply with them on grounds of public policy. The English system of administration of Justice on which our own is based may be to a certain extent technical but we are not to take from that system its defects. Any system which by giving effect to the form and not to the substance defeats substantive rights is defective to that extent. The ideal must always be a system that gives to every person what is his. " It is settled law that in the interest of justice conversion of the petitions is allowed until and unless such conversion is not likely to thwart the ends of justice. In the present case the learned lower Court was at liberty, if it thought fit, to convert the appeal into an application. Accordingly I am of the view that without going into the controversy whether the petition was an appeal or an application, the Labour Court should have proceeded with the matter on its merits or at the most it should have treated the appeal as an application. In view of the Authorities quoted above I am of the view that an appeal as also an application lies in respect of the acceptance of the change of office‑bearers by the Registrar. In this view of the matter the present revision is allowed and the impugned order is hereby set aside. The matter is remanded to the learned Labour Court for proceeding on merits Le. the lower Court is to record evidence and then give the finding as required by the law. The two orders dated 28‑10‑1997 passed by the Registrar of Trade Unions will remain suspended till the matter is finally decided by the learned lower Court. The lower Court is directed to dispose of the matter within two months. The parties are directed to appear before Labour Court No. V at Karachi on 7th of March, 1998. H.B.T./241/Lb.S Revision allowed.