1992 PLP 364 (MLD)

Since the accused challenged the genuineness of the news reports, I felt that the evidence of the News Reporters was essential for the just resolution of the controversy. So, I summoned them for 20‑5‑1991.

4. On 20‑5‑1991, Naeem Mustafa, Special Reporter of daily `Nawa‑i Waqt' Lahore and `Muhammad Yousaf, News Reporter of daily `Jang' Lahore, appeared before the Court. The news items marked `A & B' were shown to them. Accepting the responsibility of the publication of these news items, they at the face of the respondent stated that the news items contain the true account of the speech made by him in a meeting arranged by `Anjuman‑e Tajran', Lahore, in Avari Hotel on 12‑5‑1991. They denied to have disorted the speech in any manner. According to them, whatever has been attributed to the accused in these news items was actually said by him in their presence and hearing. They were prepared to file affidavits in this respect. At this juncture, Mr. Muhammad Akram Sheikh, Advocate, produced photostat copy of the news item marked `D' published in daily `News' on 14‑5‑1991 and it was placed on record. In this, news items, it has been stated:‑‑ "The S.S.P. City, Rana Maqbool Ahmad on Sunday said that the scour age of heinous crimes like kidnapping and rape would go out of limits if it was not controlled by taking stringent legislative measures immediately. He was speaking at a gold medal distribution ceremony organized by Traders Association, Commercial Building, The Mall in honour of the police officials for working beyond the call of duty for the recovery of a kidnapped jeweller Mian Munir Ahmad." 5: On tentative assessment of the material before me, it appeared to me that there were sufficient grounds for believing that Rana Maqbool Ahmad, S.S.P., Lahore had committed the Contempt of Court and it was necessary in the interest of effective administration of justice .to proceed against him. So, I recorded the substance of the charge that `he in the speech delivered by him in a meeting arranged by Anjuman Tajran, criticised the judicial system in Pakistan and also the working of the Courts with intent to bring the authority of a Court and the administration of law into disrespect and disrepute. The speech reportedly made by him tends to prejudice the due course of judicial proceedings and also to lower the authority of the Courts'.

6. The respondent was present in the Court. He was informed of the grounds on which he was charged with the Contempt of Court. He was called upon to show cause why he should not be punished under section 4 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1976. He desired to file written reply to this notice. To enable him to do so, the hearing was adjourned to 21‑5‑1991. The learned Advocate‑General Punjab, Lahore was present in the Court. He was directed to nominate Law Officer, who would act as prosecutor.

7. On 21‑5‑1991, the accused did not file reply. Dc. Khalid Ranjha, Advocate appeared for him. He requested for adjournment on the ground that he was engaged only that day. In the interest of justice, the hearing of the case was adjourned to 25‑5‑1991. On 25‑5‑1991, the accused again failed to file reply to show‑cause notice. Instead, he requested for more time to file reply to the show‑cause notice dated 20‑5‑1991. So, the case was adjourned to 27‑5‑1991.

8. On 27‑5‑1991, the accused filed following written reply marked `E' to the show‑cause notice dated 20‑5‑1991, which is as under: ‑‑ "In response to the show‑cause notice dated 20‑5‑1991 issued by this honourable Court, it is respectfully submitted, that I tender unconditional apology and submit myself to the mercy of this honourable Court. While doing so, I may take this opportunity to submit that during the past 18 years of my unblemished service, I always held the Courts of our country in the highest esteem and also have instructed my subordinates right down the line, to show fullest respect, highest regards and total submission to the orders of the Court, at all levels. I sincerely express my remorse and assure this honourable Court that I feel penitent over the lapse. I undertake to be extremely careful in future. At the end I beseech this honourable Court that my apology may kindly be accepted and the notice issued to me be graciously discharged." He declined to contest notice, dated 20‑5-1991. He also refused to produce evidence in defence. It may be noted that the News Reporters Muhammad Yousaf and Naeem Mustafa remained in attendance on all earlier dates of hearing. Since respondent submitted unqualified apology which amounts to an admission of the charge and did not contest the allegations on factual side, so, the aforesaid reporters were discharged from appearance in the Court. The case was adjourned to 28‑5‑1991 for arguments.

9. On 28‑5‑1991, Dr. Khalid Ranjha, the learned counsel for the accused addressed arguments and the case was adjourned to 29‑5‑1991 for the arguments, of the Prosecutor/Advocate‑General. On 29‑5‑1991, before the learned Advocate‑General/Prosecutor could address the Court, Rana Maqbool Ahmad accused expressed his willingness to purge the offence publicly in the same fashion and in the presence of the press and the people by tendering apology in terms of unqualified apology marked `D'. It was a good gesture on his part, so to enable him to do so, the hearing of this petition was adjourned to 9‑6‑1991.

10. On 9‑6‑1991, the accused produced the news item marked `F in proof of the fact that he on.29‑5‑1991 had tendered `unqualified apology' publicly.

11. Dr. Khalid Ranjha, the learned counsel for the respondent had relied on Raja Munawar v. The State 1991 P Cr. L J 110, Ata Muhammad Zafar v. The State1990 S C M R 215,1985PCr.LJ2818and1978SCMR196, to contend that the accused had not only tendered unqualified apology before the Court on 20‑5‑1991 but has also purged the offence by tendering unqualified apology and placing himself at the mercy of the Court in the same fashion and before almost the same gathering in which he had used offending remarks about the judicial system and the judiciary. This furnishes the evidence of‑ real contrition, so he may be pardoned and notice be discharged. The learned Advocate‑General was of the view that unqualified apology was/is no defence to the charge of Contmept and the Contemner cannot be acquitted, as a matter of right, on the basis of unqualified apology and that unqualified apology is only a mitigating circumstance.

12. I have considered the arguments addressed by the Prosecutor/ Advocate‑General, Punjab, and the counsel for the accused carefully. The duty of the Court in cases of this kind is to review the entire material before it, at the close, before arriving at a conclusion with regard to the proof of the charge, gravity or otherwise of the impugned act, the quality of the apology tendered by the contemner and the effect of the apology on the fate of the contemner. All the factors favouring belief in the accusation must be placed in juxtaposition with the corresponding factors favouring the plea of the contemner, unqualified apology if tendered by him and the total effect should be estimated and evaluated in relation to four questions viz: ‑‑ (1) Does the impugned speech delivered by the accused constitute contempt of the Court, as defined in section 3 of the Contempt of the Court Act ? (2) Is commission of Contempt of Court satisfactorily established? (3) If the answer to question No.2 be in the positive, is the apology tendered by the accused `unqualified' a pure unqualified and unmitigated apology, or it is a subterfuge to avoid punishment. (4) If the answer to question No.3 be that the apology tendered by the accused/contemner is or was really unqualified then what would the effect of the unqualified apology on the question of the conviction and sentence of the contemner.

13. As for question at No.1, the criticism of a Judge by itself may or may not be contempt in the given circumstances, but criticism which interferes with the administration of justice by shaking public confidence in the Court is certainly contemptible. The utterances made by the contemner, which have the tendency of bringing the Courts into contempt or lower its authority is a contempt and should not be tolerated for it is essential for the proper administration of justice, that any unwarranted attack on the judiciary and the working of the Court should not be allowed to be made with impunity. In the impugned speech reproduced in para. 1 of the judgment, very serious reactions and reflections have been made about the working of the Courts, their efficiency to punish the true culprits or to make suitable orders granting or refusing bail in serious cases. His speech was an open, naked and inflammable assault on the dignity of the Courts inasmuch as he publicly lashed at the judicial system and maligned the Courts, criticised the efficiency of the Judges/Magistrates to punish or refuse bail to offenders of serious crimes knowing well that the Courts/Judges always remained exposed. Judges/Magistrates cannot enter into debates/dialogues and cannot refute or contradict allegations which may be levelled against them through press or meetings private or public and cannot defend themselves by making speeches relating to their working or efficiency and cannot offer any explanation against attack on them from any plateau or platform. The accused holds office of discipline and responsibility. As a Police Officer, he owes profound respect to the Courts. He was obliged to respect the dignity/honour of the Courts not as a matter of his grace but as a matter of his duty. But fully knowing his obligations/duties towards the Courts and his position vis‑a‑ vis the Courts, had publicly criticised the efficiency and working of the Courts much beyond the scope of his authority as S.S.P. and that too under the direct nose of the High Court of the Province, the Chief Executive of the Province and over and above Inspector‑General of Police. So much so he proudly admitted to have killed the dacoits and criminals and also expressed his determination to break the hands of the culprits, which could not be possible unless he takes the law into his own hands. Confining myself to proceedings in Contempt, I refrain from making any comments on the remaining portion of his speech relating to the murders of the dacoits and culprits and his determination to break the hands of the offenders leaving it to the Government to think. The accused was/is a man of mature mind and with an experience of about 18 years as a Police Officer on his credit. He fully knew whatever he was saying could scandalise Courts and thereby shake the confidence of people in the Courts of the country. There remains no doubt that his audacity to make contemptuous speech was intended or tended to bring the authority of the Courts and the administration of law into disrespect and disrepute and had also the tendency to prejudice the due, course of judicial proceedings and also to lower the authority of the Courts. The speech he made would be the Contempt of the Court unless it is uttered by an insane person or by a person under fit of insanity or under intoxication of his powers or authority annexed to his Office to say whatever he liked without fear of accountability. It may be noted here that the accused was neither insane nor drunk at the time of his speech. It is well‑settled that if a person scandalising the Courts was/is not found to be of unsound mind or incapable of knowing what he was saying, then his speech cannot be defended by any argument. The Police Officers like an individual and any other Institution are duty bound to maintain the dignity and authority of the Courts. For these reasons, I have no hesitation in holding that the impugned speech made by the contemner was grossest kind of Contempt.

14. Adverting to question No.2, I find that the Contemner has not contested the substance of the charge of Contempt of the Court explained to him on 20‑5‑1991, on factual side. After seeking adjournments to file reply to the notice as to why he should not be punished for contempt, he ultimately declined to contest the charge or to lead evidence in defence, although he was afforded fullest opportunity to deny the charge, cross‑examine the news reporters, contest the allegations and produce evidence in defence. There is abundant authority for saying that in these circumstances, the tender of unqualified and unmitigated apology in response to the show‑cause notice given under section 7 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1976, amounts to admission of the allegations/charges of Contempt of Court. So, the commission of Contempt of Court punishable under section 4 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1976 by the contemner stands fully established.

15. Adverting to question No.3, it may be noted that the contemner has tendered apology before the Court on two occasions, i.e. before the charge and after the charge. On the first date of hearing, when asked to show cause why proceedings in contempt be not initiated against him, he vehemently and rigorously denied to have made the impugned speech. However, in his written reply filed on that date, he made an attempt at `denial' of the news story and in the end of his statement tendered self‑styled unqualified apology which was certainly not a pure or sincere and was by no means `unqualified'. In view of the plea of `denial' coupled with allegations of destoration of his speech against the news reporters, the news reporter, were summoned for 20‑5‑1991 for evidence. On 20‑‑5‑1991, the news reporters stated at his face that impugned speech was made by him in their presence and hearing and they were prepared to filed affidavits in this respect. Since on tentative assessment of the material before me, it appeared to me that there were sufficient grounds for believing that the contemner had committed the contempt of Court, so I recorded the substance of the charge. He was informed of the grounds on which he was charged with the Contempt of Court. He was asked to show cause why he should not be punished under section 4 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1976. Instead of tendering `unqualified apology' forthwith, he requested for time to file the reply to this notice. So, the hearing of the case was adjourned to 21‑5‑1991. On 21‑5‑1991, he again requested for adjourment. He did not tender unqualified apology on this date. In the interest of justice, the hearing was adjourned to 25‑5‑1991. On 25‑5‑1991, the contemner again requested for adjournment. He failed to file `unqualified apology' on this date. On his request, the case was adjourned to 27‑5‑1991 on which date, he did file apology without using the word `if and without any attempt at justification or denial. It may be noted here that the news reporters responsible for publication of the impugned contemptuous speech remained present on all the earlier dates. They were also present on 27‑5‑1991 for evidence. When asked as to whether or not the contemner wanted to contest the allegations or produce any evidence in defence, he stated that he neither wanted to contest the charge nor wanted to produce evidence in defence. No request on his behalf to cross-examine the News Reporters, present in the Court, was made. From the natural flow of the circumstances, stated above, it seems to me that the `unqualified apology' tendered by him on the second occasion i.e. after the charge, was neither sincere nor sufficient to purge the offence. Since the News Reporters had remained intact throughout, therefore, the contemner had made retreat and reluctantly tendered unqualified apology after seeking three adjournments. I am convinced that the apology tendered by the contemner on 20‑5‑1991 was designed subterfuge to avoid punishment and does not qualify the criterion/test for `unqualified apology laid by the superior Courts and, as such, it could hardly be accepted as sufficient amends for his contemptuous conduct. Needless to say that it is always easier to commit Contempt of the Court and subsequently eat away the contemptuous words or the contempt by utterance of `sorry' or `my apology'. The Courts always insisted that the unqualified apology should not only be tendered at the earlier stage but it should precede and not succeed the plea of denial or attempt at justification or any other exculpatory plea because an attempt to refute the charge and at the same time to express regret for the contempt is contradiction in terms.

16. On 28‑5‑1991, the learned counsel for the contemner had, addressed arguments and the case was adjourned to 29‑5‑1991 for the arguments of the Prosecutor. Before the Advocate‑General could address the Court, contemner showed his willingness to purge the contempt by tendering apology in the presence of the Press and public. It was a good gesture on his part. So, to enable him to tender unqualified apology in the same fashion and in the same way in which he had maligned the Courts, the hearing of the case was adjourned to 9‑6‑1991. The news marked `F' reveals that in furtherance of the offer made by him in the Court, the contemner tendered unqualified apology publicly on the same day. This was the third occasion when the contemner tendered unqualified apology and exhibited his respect to the Courts. The manner in which the contemner felt repentance exhibited respectful attitude towards the Court, tendered unqualified apology before Press and Public, will show that by this time, better sense has prevailed upon him. He has adopted the correct attitude and has come on the right path. So, I hold that the apology him on the third occasion was unconditional and unqualified and tendered by was tendered with the earnest desire to make amends.

17. This brings me to the last question i.e. the effect of the unqualified apology tendered by the contemner on the third occasion. It is well‑settled that unqualified apology is not a complete answer to the charge of contempt. The contemner cannot claim discharge or acquittal of the charge of contempt of the Court as a matter of right on the basis/strength of or in return to or as a reward to his act of tend ring unqualified apology irrespective of its quality or the gravity of the contempt or the absence of a firm resolve not to commit contempt of the Court and harm the judiciary. No rule or law exists indicating or regulating the manner in which the Courts have to act on tender of apology. So, the matter remains in the realm of discretion of the Court. What order may be passed on apology tendered in a particular case depends upon the facts and circumstances of that case and the Court can deal with the matter in its discretion in such a manner as would meet the ends of justice as also to fulfil the purpose of law of Contempt. Under the Contempt of Court Act, 1976, and under the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, it has been left to the discretion of the Court to discharge or punish the contemner on an apology having been made to the satisfaction of the Court.

18. Now I proceed to determine whether on this apology, the contemner may be punished or discharged or what order would be appropriate so as to meet the ends of justice as also to fulfil the purpose of the law of the contempt. After having reviewed the apology tendered by the accused in the light of the allegations, its gravity, academic qualification of the contemner, the office he holds, the experience at his credit, the fashion in which he condemned and criticised the Courts of the country and that too in a hotel before the audience and the fact that he was not a rustic, incapable of understanding the implication of his speech, I find, on the one hand, that if the present judicial system is to survive, then its existence and dignity have to be safeguarded jealously against reckless onslaughts including any implied or insinuated attempt made consciously or unconsciously to bring the judiciary into disrepute, disrespect or expose it to ridicule. So, it was/is necessary for the effective administration of justice that the contemner/accused should not go unpunished. On the other hand, the contemner has been offering the apology in the Court as well as in the public. I have already found that the apology tendered by him on the third occasion was/is unqualified and unconditional. So, now the position is that in one part of scale, there is grossest contempt committed by him and in the other, there is repentance, regrets, apology and contrition. Both parts seem to be evenly balanced and the grain of mercy in contemner's part may tilt the balance in his favour. In the instant case, the contemner has apologized in an unprecedented manner and has begged for mercy. I am afraid, the refusal by the Court to show mercy to him may go against the Islamic Law of Jurisprudence that: ‑‑ "`To him who repents after his transgression and makes amends, mercy will be shown' and of the Islamic rule of administration of justice i.e. Adal Bil Ehsaan." The 'contemner` has also made a `firm resolve' to be extremely future. He repented in the public. I also found him fully careful in future repentant in the Court. The manner m which he exhibited his repentance furnishes evidence of purge and real contrition. There can be no two opinions that the manner in which the contemner has purged the offence and eaten away the offending words uttered by him against the judiciary is by no mean's less than the legal punishment prescribed under section 4 of the Contempt of the Court Act. Furthermore, he has been facing the agony of prosecution for the last three weeks. In these circumstances, I feel that awarding of legal punishment under section 4 of the Contempt of Court Act would be harsh from the legal, moral and Islamic point of view.

19. The contempt is a matter between the Court and the contemner. The Court can deal with the matter in its discretion in such a manner as would meet the ends of justice and also to fulfil the purpose of the law of Contempt. I am convinced that in this case, the object of the law of ‑ contempt has been achieved. So, the notice issued to the contemner under section 7 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1976, is i discharged with the warning that if, in future, he (contemner) repeats the offence of the Contempt of the Court, he will not only be prosecuted for fresh offence but will also be retried in this case because there is no legal bar for the retrial of a person after the discharge of notice and the authority which forgives can withdraw forbearance. It goes without saying that but for his repentant conduct demonstrated openly and repeatedly before the Court, the contemner would have been sentenced to imprisonment for maximum term provided under section 4 of the Contempt of Court Act for such kind of grossest

20. Before parting with the judgment, I would like to record my appreciation for the News Reporters, namely, Muhammad Yousaf and Naeem Mustafa. It was and is their resolute and courageous stand to stick to correctness of their version of contemner's contemptuous speech which has compelled the contemner to purge his contempt by tendering unqualified apology. Had it been otherwise, the contemner. could have very easily managed to escape the rigours of law of contempt. They may be genuinely apprehending revengeful attitude by the police. So, 1 would make it clear that any attempt to harm them or teach them lesson for making statement in the Court against the S.S.P. would constitute serious contempt of the Court for which the contemner (Rana Maqbool Ahmad) will be personally liable to prosecution under the Contempt of Court Act, 1976. N.H.Q./S‑1021/L. Order accordingly