1999SCMR2167 (PLP)

MUHAMMAD BASHIR JEHANGIRI, J.

We propose to dispose of abovementioned 3 appeals by this common judgment as questions of law and facts involved therein are identical.

2. In these appeals, leave to appeal was granted to consider whether it is ah sine qua non for a pre-emptor to specify in the plaint the names of the witnesses in whose presence Talb-i-Muwathibat' under section 13 of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act (X of 1987) (hereinafter called as the Act)' was made by the pre-emptor and the place, date and time of making the said ' Talab' .

3. In Civil Appeal No. 44 of 1997, the learned Judge in Chambers of the Peshawar High Court, while setting aside the judgment of the two Courts below containing concurrent findings on the point of 'Talabs' having been made validly, in para. 7 of the impugned judgment, observed as follows:- "The second attack of the learned counsel for the petitioner was with regard to the fulfillment of''Talb-i-Muwathibat' and 'Talb-i-Ishhad' etc. As it is a pure question of fact, therefore, one would revert to the pleadings as well as the evidence in accordance therewith. The mutation having been attested on 12-10-1989, the pre-emptor claims to have had attained the knowledge on 20-10-1989 when he announced his intention to pre-empt. According to the plaint, it was at Latambar but, it was never mentioned as to what gathering it was, as to who were the persons present around and who was the one who brought the news of the sale transaction. All that was suppressed by the pre-emptor in order to make necessary arrangements at the relevant time in accord with his own convenience. "

4. In Civil Appeal No. 573 of 1997 the purchase of the disputed land was pre-empted by Shakarullah appellant which was resisted by the respondent therein, inter alia, on the ground that the appellant has not fulfilled the requirements of section 13 of the Act. The learned trial Judge held on the crucial issue of Talabs under section 13 of the Act that the appellant has utterly failed to prove that he has made the requisite Talabs within the contemplation of section 13 of the Act and, therefore, non-suited the appellant. In appeal, a learned Additional District Judge, on the strength of Abdul Qayyum Khan v. Musa Khan (1995 CLC 729) and Mehboob Khan v. Sher Baz Khan and another (1993 CLC 1939) found that "plaintiff failed to mention as to when he got information about the sale, as to where it was and in whose presence he made compulsorily required declaration without which even the right of pre-emption would not come into existence, in absence of all such factual allegation in plaint, right of pre-emption would not accrue to plaintiff". The learned Judge in the ,Peshawar High Court' in exercise of his Revisional jurisdiction observed in para. 2 of the impugned judgment as follows:- "The main ground of dismissal was the non-fulfillment of 'Talb-i Muwathibat' and 'Talb-i-Ishhad'. Mr. Abdul Samad, learned counsel for the pre-emptor challenged the findings on the ground that the pre emptor had led evidence, of course, qua the factum of 'Talb-i Muwathibat' and hence the suit was wrongly dismissed. A perusal of the available record would suggest that the evidence, if at all, led by the pre-emptor was never in support of any pleadings qua a pure 'question of fact. The very right of pre-emption becomes activated only and only if 'Talb-i-Muwathibat' is made by a prospective pre-emptor. As it is a pure question of fact and as a question of fact is bound to be pleaded in they pleading, therefore, it was incumbent upon the pre-emptor to have had alleged the same in the plaint. Right from beginning of the plaint till the end, the pre-emptor has never even alluded to the factum of 'Talb-i-Muwathibat'. He has even not mentioned such words from where one could draw a remote inference regarding 'Talb-i Muwathibat'. Both the Courts below have come to a correct conclusion. "

5. In Civil Appeal No. 574 of 1997, the pre-emption suit brought by the appellant against the respondent was decreed in the trial Court but was dismissed by the first appellate Court on the ground that he had failed to fulfill the-pre requisite of 'Talb-i-Muwathibat'. In revision petition before the Peshawar High Court, the learned Judge in Chambers observed that in para.3 of the plaint, "the pre-emptor/appellant happens to make assertion the due fulfillment of 'Talb-I Muwathibat He has specifically given the date as 8-4-1994 but he withheld, rather suppressed the name of the informer as well as the names of the witnesses and the place where he received information'. 6. 'Learned counsel appearing for the appellant had drawn our attention to the relevant paras in the plaint, 'about the Talabs' indicating that the statutory Talabs had been made and, therefore, the findings of the learned Judge in the High Court on. this subject are not sustainable. Learned counsel in support of the contention that the name of the witnesses in whose presence 'Talb-i Muwathibat' was made and the time and the place of making the 'Talb-i Muwathibat' need not be made in the plaint, has placed reliance on the case of Amir Jan and 3 others v. Haji Ghulam Muhammad (PLD 1997 SC 883).

7. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, urged that the pre-emptor having not mentioned in the plaint the date of making the 'Talb-I- Muwathibat', the place of acquiring knowledge of transaction and the name of any witness thereto would not be deemed to have complied with the requirements of section 13 of the Act. In support of this contention, learned counsel invited our attention to the precedent of Khani Zaman v. Shah Hussain (PLD 1998 SC 121).

8. It is a fundamental law that the pleadings of the parties should contain the material facts only and are not required to plead its evidence or to give name of witnesses. In Mati Lal Poddar v. Judhistir Das Teor and others (AIR 1916 Calcutta 658) the requirement to set out the evidence in the pleading was not approved in the following paragraph:-- ' "It is absolutely essential that the pleading, not to be embarrassing to the defendants, should state those facts which will put the defendants on their guard and tell them what they will have to meet when the case comes on for trial. This much the plaintiff is bound to do. though he need set out the evidence whereby he proposes to prove the facts which given him the title." (Underlining by us provides emphasis). In Taakur Prasad Sahu v Muhammed Musa and others (AIR 1925 Patna 410), the law laid down was that the evidence has no place in pleading. In this connection, the learned Division Bench observed as under:- "The fact that the deed of agreement was executed in the presence of Muhammad Ismail who was a well-known and respected pleader in Monghyr, was perhaps important evidence in support of the plaintiff's case that the transaction entered into was genuine and above all suspicion. But it was evidence only, and it was not only unnecessary to enter that fact in the pleading but it was altogether contrary to the express provisions of Order 6, rule 3 which provides what a pleading shall contain, The rule states that every pleading shall contain and contain only a statement in a concise form of the material facts on p which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence as the case may be but not the evidence by which they are to be proved." (Underlining is ours again for providing emphasis). In Jwala Singh Sani Singh and another v. The Province of Punjab (AIR (35)1948 East Punjab 59), it was ruled that the parties relied on Wajib-ul-Arz to support the alleged custom and does not refer to Manual of Customary Law in the pleading, cannot prevent him from relying upon it at appellate stage. Reference was made to the provisions of Order VI, Rule

2. In Raja Muhammad Afzal Khan v. Ch. Manzoor Elahi and 6 others (PLD 1975 Lahore 1276), a learned Division Bench of the Lahore High Court had repelled the contention that before the Election Tribunal, the stand taken by the respondents that the appellant was a Member of the Firm which was admittedly a Government Contractor, but he had ceased to be its Member before the relevant date who incongruous with the statement in the affidavit presented to the Returning Officer which contains a denial simpliciter of the allegation that he was a Government Contractor, and it held as under:- "The allegation before the Returning Officer being that he was a contractor on the relevant date engaged in doing work relating to Government activity, all that the appellant was required to say was whether he was such a contractor or not. He chose to submit that he was not such a contractor. He was not required to g-o into the details and to further clarify that although at one time he was a contractor he had ceased to be so on the relevant date. This was neither required by law nor was it necessary for the proper and complete rebuttal of the allegation made against him before the Returning Officer. He was not called upon to state how he had ceased to be a contractor on the relevant date. The submissions made on this score, therefore, fall to the ground." (Underlining is ours). In Muhammad Amjad Mir v. Government of Sindh and another (1982 CLC 2634), we approve the ratio propounded therein that the requirement of the respondent pleaded on the ground of bona fides of his personal need though the ground of illness of his wife and his son on the basis of which the personal need was claimed had not been specifically mentioned therein but the parties are not obliged to disclose their entire evidence in their pleadings and that the respondent was not under any legal obligation to disclose the entire basis of his personal requirement in the application itself. A learned Division Bench of Peshawar High Court in a recent case of Manager, Forest Development Corporation and others v. Haji Gul Zaman and others (PLD 1991 Peshawar 117) has reiterated the well established law of pleadings with particular reference to Order VI, Rule 2, C.P.C. that the pleadings would contain only a statement in a concise form of material facts on which party pleading had relied for its claim or defence, but not the evidence which they were to prove. In Falak Sher v. Muhammad Mumtaz and 2 others (1992 MLD 1879) with eference to section 35(1) of the Punjab Pre-enlption Act, (IX of 1991) has held and which we also approve that it is firmly settled law that the pleadings are not the evidence whereas the pleas raised in the pleadings are to be proved by producing evidence. In the case of Abdul Maleque Laskar v. Begum Tayabunnessa and others (PLD 1966 Dacca 217), the principle enunciated was as under:- "According to rules of pleadings, the names of witnesses are not given either in a plaint or, a written statement. Such principle applies, mutatis mutandis, in case of applications and written objections, one does not normally except the name of a witness in the pleadings that are submitted to Court and to reject the evidence of a witness not because his evidence does not inspire any confidence but because his name does not appear in the pleading of the party which produced him, is a course which amount to a serious misdirection in the appraisal of the evidence before us."

9. It would, thus, be noticed that the material facts on which a party relies are known as factum probandum and the evidence or the fact by means of which they are proved or term as factum probantia. The pleadings should, therefore, only contain factum probanda and not factum probantia. (See "A Concise Law 'Dictionary" by P.G. Osborn, Fifth Edition (1964) page 132).

10. The above survey of case-law would, thus, lead us to the conclusion that the pleading of the parties should contain only material facts and are, therefore, not required to contain the gist of evidence and names of witnesses The suit for pre-emption is no exception to this general proposition which is by now well-entrenched in our judicial system.

11. No doubt in the case of Khani Zaman (supra) learned the Division Bench of this Court has held that if no date of 'Talb-i-Muwathibat' is mentioned in the plaint nor place of acquiring knowledge of transaction is mentioned therein, nor the name of any witnesses are given then the 'Taln-i-Muwathibat' cannot be proved. in evidence. However, it appears that the ratio in the case of Amir Jan earlier decided by a learned Division Bench had not been brought to the notice of the learned Judges of the Division Bench which was seized of the case of Khani Zaman (supra). Had it been brought to the notice of the learned Judges who have decided the case of Khani Zaman (supra) they would certainly have proceeded to follow the law laid down by another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Amir Jan (supra). We are inclined to follow the earlier view expressed by the learned Division Bench in the case of Amir Jan (supra) as it has placed reliance on the provisions of Order VI, Rule 2, C.P.C. and held as under:- "No doubt Order VI, Rule 2; C.P.C. provides that material facts are to be stated in the pleadings but it does not mean that evidence through which such material fact is to be proved shall also be stated in the pleadings. In our view it would be sufficient requirement of law if it is alleged in the pleadings that after having come to know of the sale pre emptor declared his intention to pre-empt the sale, this material fact has to be proved at the trial through evidence on the issue framed in this regard. The evidence to be led need not be alleged in the plaint: However, if the plaintiff fails to mention the material fact that he has made Talb-i-Muwathibat on his having gained knowledge of the sale would be debarred from leading evidence on the material fact of Talb i-Muwathibat. " While making pointed reference to (i) Muhammad Ayub Khan v Muhammad Zaman (PLD 1990 Peshawar 181) and (ii) Shah Hussain and 9 others v. Khani Zaman (PLD 1996 Peshawar 73), the learned Judges of a Division Bench in the case of Amir Jan (supra) approved the following observations of the learned Single Judge in the case of Muhammad Avub Khan (supra): "For a layman to understand this newly introduced concept of Talbs m law, more particularly the first Talb-i-Muwathibat, with all its factual and legal intricacies; is not easy to comprehend and it will take some time for him to get himself acquainted with and particularly as to precisely what kind of evidence shall be required to prove it to the satisfaction of the Courts. I am of the view that till such time as they get adequately acquainted with the law, the Courts shall have to show indulgence in matters of testing the proof forthcoming, on the point of making Talb-i-Muwathibat; on the touchstone of established principle of scrutiny." It would be seen that the ratio deductible from the precedent of Amir Jan (supra) is that the material facts having not been stated in the pleading, the evidence led cannot be ignored if the pre-emptor succeeds, in proving through evidence that Talb-i-Muwathibat has been made. The proposition that pleadings K are to be liberally construed is the cordinal principle of law. In the instant case Talb-i-Muwathibat is alleged to have been made in the plaint, issue in this regard framed and evidence led on such issue, even if the fact is not stated with clarity and in detail in the pleading, therefore, the Court is empowered to give finding on such issue in the light of the evidence led.

12. We have, therefore, no hesitation to, hold that it is not, a sine qua non for a pre-emptor to specify in the plaint the names of, the witnesses in whose presence he had made 'Talb-i-Muwathibat' and also specify the time and the place to make the 'Talb-i-Muwathibat' under section 13 of the Act. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 44 OF 1997.

13. Mian Hisamuddin, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the appellant then contended that the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, was not competent in undertaking its own appraisal of evidence in the face of the concurrent finding of the two Courts below, in the absence of any jurisdictional error of material irregularity. The finding of the trial Court on issue No. 7 that the appellant had made the Talbs in accordance with section 13 of the Act was affirmed by the learned District Judge, Kark, in an appeal filed by. the respondent, which was dismisssed on 6-10-1994. In a revision petition filed by the appellant, the learned Single Judge in the Peshawar High Court, however, reversed the concurrent finding recorded by the two Courts below, on the ground that no 'Talab' has been made as envisaged by section 13 of the Act. was, therefore, concluded that the two witnesses, namely, Ishquddin and Ayub Khan were introduced as witnesses of Talb-i-Muwathibat without having been named in the plaint. Clearly the decision of the learned Single Judge impugned in this appeal turns on the determination of the question of fact as pointed out by this Court in Muhammad Umar Baig v. Sultan Mahmood Khan (PLD 1970 SC 139) which has been followed subsequently by this Court consistently that revisional powers under section 115, C.P.C. are primarily intended for correcting errors made by subordinate Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction. Also ordinarily erroneous. decisions of fact are not revisable, except in cases where the decision M is based on no evidence or inadmissible evidence was relied upon or the order sought to be revised is so perverse that grave injustice would result therefrom. Reference may also be made in this context to the similar observation made by their Lordship of Privy Council in Venkatagiri v H.R.E. Board, Madras (PLD 1949 PC 26).

14. The enunciation of the scope of revisional powers by the Privy Counc and this Court vested in the High Court clearly shows that, no interference w called for in this case and in upsetting the conclusion of the Court below on the question of fact by means of a re-examination of the evidence, in revision the High Court unfortunately over stepped the limits of i jurisdiction.

15. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment in this appeal is no sustainable and is hereby set aside. In the result the appeal succeeds and the judgment of the trial Court duly affirmed by the appellate Courts is restored but there shall be no order as to costs.

16. The trial Court gave a finding on issue No. 3 on the question o statutory 'Talabs' against the pre-emptor-appellant, holding that he had "mad 'Talb-i-Muwasibat' and 'Talb-i-Ishhad' 11 months after the attestation o mutation" and, therefore, reached the conclusion that requirements of section (ibid) have not been fulfilled.

17. Finding of the trial Court, on issue No.3, was affirmed by the teamed Additional District Judge Swabi, in an appeal filed by Shakirullah pre-emptor which was dismissed on 26-7-1995 holding as under:- "In the instant case also, the plaintiff has not mentioned in plaint as to when and at what place he got information and in whose presence he made Talb-i-Muwathibat. Exh. PW-2/2 is the copy of notice dated 8-12-1990 allegedly sent to vendee by way of Talb-i-Ishhad. Perusal of this document shows that the ,relevant details regarding Talb-I Muwathibat was not furnished in the said notice, Mehboob Ullah and Khalid Mahmood were examined by plaintiff as witnesses of the said notice. Both of them are brothers inter se and nephews of the plaintiff. They are highly interested aforesaid position their testimony can be hardly relied upon. So, it can be reasonably concluded that, the story of acquiring knowledge by plaintiff on 5-12-1990, and making of alleged Talabs, is an afterthought, because nothing was specifically mentioned regarding Talb-i-Muwathibat in the plaint." Likewise the revision petition filed by Shakirullah in the High Court also met with the same fate.

18. Mr. Abdus Samad Khan Zaida, learned counsel appearing to support of this appeal, strenuously assailed the findings of the two Courts below on issues Nos.3 and 5 and those of the High Court on issue No.3 on the ground that in the plaint no specific mention was made of having, made 'Talb-i-Muwathibat'. He contends that the notice of 'Talb-i-Ishhad' clearly indicated that 'Talb-I-Muwathibat' had been made. Mr. Abdus Samad Khan while elaborating his argument urged that the intention of the law is that Talabs should be performed and proved, and, therefore, the mention in the notice of 'Talb-i-Ishhad' accompanied by the notice with the plaint with the indication therein that 'Talb i-Muwathibat' was made was a sufficient compliance of the law. Then he fitted that the two Courts below and the High court had. legally erred to submitted hold on issue No. 4 that "as both the parties are co-sharers in the suit, they have equal right of pre-emption" and, therefore, the plaintiff has got no superiority of pre-emptive rights.

19. Controverting aforenoted contention, Mr. M. Zahoor Qureshi, learned Advocate Supreme Court, reiterated before us the arguments which had found favour with 'the two Courts below and maintained that 'Talb-i-Muwathibat' being sine qua non for pre-empting the sale of agricultural land and having not been specifically mentioned in the plaint it was not sufficient compliance of the requirements of section 13 of the Act. He did not address us on the validity of the findings of the two Courts below on issue No-5. 20, We have followed the principle enunciated by a learned Division Bench in the case of Amir Jan (supra) on the non-desirability of stating in the plaint the time. and place of making 'Talb-i-Muwathibat' and the names of the witnesses before whom it was made. We are also inclined to hold that assertion in para. 3 of the plaint coupled with the indication in the notice of 'Talb-i-Ishhad' having made ' Talb-i-Muwathibat' is sutttcient compliance of requirement of section 13 (ibid).

21. The learned trial Court as also the learned Appellate Court seem to have not gone through the provisions of the Act at all. Had they done so, they would have noticed section 20 of the Act which provides in terms unequivocal that where the pre-emptor and the vendee fall within the same class of pre-emptors and have equal right of pre-emption, the property shall be shared by them equally.

22. We are, therefore, inclined to set aside the findings of the High Court and those of the two Courts below on issues Nos. 3 and 5 which are not sustainable in law.

23. In the result the judgments and the decrees non-suiting the pre-emptor-appellant passed by the two Courts below and duly affirmed by the learned Single Judge in the High Court are set aside and a decree for possession by pre-emption of half of the disputed land on payment of Rs.55,500 is passed. The pre-emptor-appellant is presumed to have deposited a sum of Rs.37,000 as pre-emption money in the trial Court. The,balance of half of the sale consideration determined by the trial Court which comes to Rs.18,S00 and having not been challenged in appeal, revision or before this Court a sum of Rs.18,500 is directed to be deposited in the trial Court within 3 months. There shall be no order as to costs. CIVIL APEAL NO. 574 OF 1997.

24. The trial. Court gave a finding on issue No 3 on the question of statutory Talabs in favour of the pre-emptor-appellant holding that he had made 'Talb-i-Muwathibat' and 'Talb-i-Ishhat' in accordance with section 13 (ibid). The finding of the trial Court on issue No. 3 was set aside by the learned Additional District Judge, Bannu in an appeal filed by Amir Nawaz Khan etc. vendees respondents which was accepted on I1-7-1997 and the appellant before us was non-suited holding as under:- "The nutshell of my above discussion of that the plaintiff failed to prove through cogent and convincing evidence that he had made ' Talb -Muwathibat' immediately after acquiring knowledge about the sale of suit land. Over and above this neither the plaintiff nor any other P. W. stated that who was the person who broke news about the sale of suit: property before them. Not only that they did not disclose the name of the informer rather the plaintiff did not produce him before the Court in support of this contention and in absence of disclosing the name of informer or his production before the Court, it cannot be said that the plaintiff might have been informed in the chowk by some one in presence of the P.Ws. and he would have declared his intention to pre empt the suit land. In the light of what has been stated above, I am of the view that the plaintiff has failed to prove the first ingredient of Pre emption i.e. the making of 'Talb-i-Muwathibat', and on this ground this suit is liable to be dismissed."

25. We could not have the assistance of learned Advocate Supreme Court representing the appellant. Nonetheless since we had heard the arguments of Mr. Abdus Samad Khan learned Advocate Supreme Court and Mr. Abdul Karim Khan Kundi, learned Advocate Supreme Court in the connected cases fixed for hearing today we find that we have been duly assisted on the legal aspects of the case particularly on the proposition raised in the leave granting order: whether it is sine qua non for the pre-emptor to specify in the plaint the names of the witnesses and the time and place of making the ' Talb-i-Muwathjbat' under section 13 of the Act (X of 1987)". We have in paras. 8 to 12 ante reached the conclusion that it is not a sine qua non for a pre-emptor to specify the names of the witnesses in whose presence he had made Talb-i-Muwathibat' and also specify the time and place to make the Talb-i-Muwathibat' under section 13 of the Act.

26. Mr M. Ismail Fahmi, learned Aovocate-on-Record, representing the respondent, however, pointed out that no doubt the appellant has proved to have made 'Talb-i-Muwathibat but admittedly he had come to know of the disputed transaction at Chowk alongwith Falak Naz and Muhammad Rehan and approached the vendees for the transfer of the land to him but they were not ready- to do so and that after two days, the two witnesses and the appellant drafted notice which was signed by the appellant and that it was not sufficient compliance of section 13 (ibid) particularly when the mutation in question was attested on 26-12-1993 and was, thus, not made "as soon thereafter as I possible." In this context reliance was placed by Mr. Muhammad Ismail Fehim learned Advocate-on-Record, on the ratio propounded by this Court in Zafar I Ali v.. Zainul Abidin (1992 SCMR 1886). No doubt the transaction in this case I was completed by mutation attested on 26-12-1993 and the pre-emptor- I apppellam got the knowledge on 8-4-1994. The explanation to subsection (1) of section 13 of the Act provides that 'Talb-i-Muwathibat' being immediate demand by a pre-emptor in the sitting or meeting (Majlis) in which he has come to know of the sale declaring his intention to exercise the right of pre-emption, the note appended to the explanation would show that any word indicative of intention to exercise the right of pre-emption is sufficient. The objection of Mr. Fahmi is that the manner of declaration made as averred in the statements of pre emptor and his witnesses was not indicative of the true intention of the exercise of right of pre-emption. We are, however, not impressed by this contention in view of the explanation to subsection (1) section 13 (ibid) read with the note appended thereto,

27. No doubt under subsection (3) of section 13 of the Act, it has been ,provided that where a pre-emptor has made 'Talb-i-Muwathibat' under subsection (2) he shall as soon thereafter as possible but not later than 2 weeks from the date of notice under section 34, or knowledge, whichever may be earlier make ~Talb-i-Ishhad' by sending a notice in writing attested by two truthful witnesses, under registered cover acknowledgement due to the vendee, affirming his intention to exercise the right of pre-emption. The precise objection of Mr. M. Ismail Fahmi, learned Advocate-on-Record to the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad was that it was not made "as soon thereafter as possible" within the contemplation of section 13 (ibid) but was made after 2 days. In the instant case, the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad was got drafted in the Courts through a counsel and sent on the same day to the respondent. These two days were consumed in contacting the counsel and getting the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad drafted. Obviously no loss of time was made discernible on the record. In this factual background we are of the considered view that as the appellant learnt about the sale, he had without any delay declared that he would exercise right of pre-emption against the sale in the same Majlis in which he had learnt about it and further that he had sent notice of Talb-i-Ishhad as soon thereafter as possible. In this view of the matter there was a sufficient compliance of section 13 of the Act.

28. We are, therefore, inclined to set aside the finding of the AppellatE Court duly affirmed by the High Court on issue No.3 which are not sustainable in law. In the result, the judgments and decrees non-suing the pre-emptor appellant passed by the Appellate Court duly affirmed by the learned Single Judge in the High Court are set aside and a decree for possession by pre emption on payment of Rs.20,000 is passed in favour of the appellant. The pre emptor had deposited a sum of Rs,6,d66.d7 In the Trial Court as pre=eruption money. The balance of the pre-emption money is directed to, be deposited within 3 months If it has not been already deposited failing which the suit shall stand dismissed, The respondent would be entitled t receive District Council Fee as well, As directed by the trial Court the receipt of the same can be produced during execution proceedings. The parties shall bear their own costs, M. B. A./S-I-I8/S Order accordingly,