P L D 1965 (W (PLP)

(a) Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act (III of 1938); S. 5, Explanation & 3‑West Pakistan Money Lenders Ordinance (XXIV of 1960), Ss. 3 (5) & 10 read with Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Rules, 1939, rr. 14 & 1 S‑Money lender applying for renewal of licence much earlier than one month before expiry of licence‑No action taken on application by licensing authority Original licence deemed to be elective, irrespective of any period prescribed for grant or renewal of licence, till such time as appli cation not disposed of. A person who carries on a lawful business of money lending by virtue of licence granted to him under the Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act, 1938 or the West Pakistan Money Lenders Ordinance, 1960, can, after the expiry of his licence, do nothing more than apply for its renewal. So long as his application, made within prescribed time, is not disposed of lie can continue his business validly not by the virtue of the licence or its renewal but in pursuance of the statutory provisions contained in the Explanation to section 5 of the Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act, 1938 or in clause (5) bf section 3 of the West Pakistan Money Lenders Ordinance, 1960. The period prescribed (3 years) for the grant or renewal of the licence has no bearing on licence continues to be effective because of the failure on the part of the licensing authority to dispose of expeditiously the, application for renewal of the original licence. (b) Interpretation of Statutes‑Rules framed under Act Cannot override specific provisions of statute‑Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act (III of 1938) read with Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Rules, 1939. (c) Interpretation of Statutes‑

Adding or altering words statute or restoring cases omissus‑Not permissible. A Court is not entitled to read words into an Act of the legislature unless a clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. Its duty is neither to add to, nor to take from, a statute anything unless there are good grounds for thinking that the Legislature intended something which it has failed precisely to express, Where no such inference is possible, words cannot be added in the provisions of the statute. It is not permissible to make additions or alterations or restore cassus omissus in the statute without a suitable amendment. The Court cannot remedy either of these defects. This judgment will dispose of Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 286, 287 and 288 of 1960 as a common question of law is, involved in them.

2. Dad Muhammad Khan, petitioner in Civil Revisions Nos. 286 and 287 of 1960, instituted two suits, one against Bassa respondent in Civil Revision No. 286, and the other against Mst. Miraj Bibi, respondent in Civil Revision No. 287 of 1964, for the recovery of Rs. 240 on the basis of a promissory note dated the 6th of August 1957 and Rs. 200 also on the basis of a promissory note dated the 25th of August 1958, respectively. These suits were instituted on the 6th of August 1960. Khan Muhammad Khan petitioner in Civil Revision, No. 288 of 1960 similarly filed a suit against Ch. Abdur Rhman, respondent m Civil Revision No. 288 of 1960, for the recovery of Rs. 224 based on three promissory notes dated the 8th of May 1959, 7th of June 1959 and 1st of August 1959. The suit of Khan Muhammad Khan petitioner was filed on the 17th of September 1960. In all the three suits the learned Judge Small Cause Court held that the amounts were due to the petitioners, but he dismissed the suits on the 14th of November 1960 on the grounds that they were not in possession of valid money‑lenders' licences and that the suits were barred by section 3 of the Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act and section 10 of the West Pakistan Money Lenders Ordinance, 1960. The petitioners have come up in revision against the aforesaid orders of the learned Judge Small Cause Court.

3. The relevant facts are that the petitioners had obtained money‑lenders licences under section 5 of the Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act (1II of 1938). The licence of .Dad Muhammad Khan petitioner was to expire on the 1st of January 1954, while that of Khan Muhammad Khan petitioner on the 5th of June 1954. Dad Muhammad Khan petitioner applied for the renewal of his licence on the 29th of August 1953 and Khan Muhammad Khan petitioner made an application in this behalf on the 1st of May 1954; under Rule 14 of the Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Rules, 1939, which prescribes that such an application should be made not less than one month before the expiry of the licence. No order was passed on these appli cations till the institution of the suits by the petitioners. Under section 3 of the Act a suit by a money lender for the recovery of loan was liable to be dismissed unless the money lender at the time of the institution of the suit or at the time of the decreeing the suit was registered or held a valid licence. This Act was repealed by the West Pakistan Money Leaders Ordinance 1960 XXIV of 1960). The relevant provisions of section 10 of the said Ordinance, which are identical with the provisions of section of Act III of 1938, read as follows:‑ "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment, a suit by a money lender for recovery of loan or an application by a money lender for the execution of a decree relating to a loan shall be dismissed unless at the time of the institution of the suit or at the time of the presentation of the application for execution of the decree, as the case may be, the money lender holds an effective licence granted under section 3,"

4. The applications of the petitioners for the renewal of their licences under Act I11 of 1938 had not "been disposed of at the time Ordinance XXIV of 1960 came into force. By virtue of the fact that the same Act was repealed, the applications made under the repealed Act are deemed to be pending under the new, Ordinance. The petitioners claimed, that the licences issued to them earlier, which had not been renewed after 1954, were deemed to be effective under Explanation to section 5 of Act.111 of 1938 and after its repeal under clause (5) of section 3 of Ordinance XXIV of 1960. These two provisions are identical and read as follows:‑ "When an application for the renewal of a licence has been received from a money lender before the expiry of the period of his licence, the existing licence shall be deemed to be effective until orders on the application have been made." The petitioners were to apply under Rule 14 for the renewal of their licences not less than one month before the expiry of the licences. The applications for renewal of the licences having been made more than one month before the expiry of the licences, were within time. No order on the applications had been passed, refusing or accepting them. According to the plain meaning of clause (5), the existing licences of the petitioners were to be deemed to be effective till orders on their applications were made. This provision has now been incorporated in the main body of the section. Earlier the same was in the form of an explanation to section

3. It is an undisputed proposition that when an enactment is explained by the Legislature, the Act is to be applied with the authoritative Explanation; for the very object of the authoritative Explanation is to enable the Court to understand the Act in the light of the Explanation. On the reading of these provisions I have no doubt that though the licences of the petitioners were not renewed, their earlier licences were still effective when the suits were instituted and the decrees were passed against them. The learned Judge Small Cause Court has held the suits to be barred. According to him, a licence could be issued or renewed for a period not exceeding three years and that the petitioners by virtue of the Explanation could be said to be in possession of valid money‑lenders licences up to a maximum period of three years which expired in the case of Dad Muhammad Khan petitioner on the I st of January 1957 and in the case of Khan Muhammad Khan petitioner on the 5th of June 1957. What impressed him was that if a licence could not be granted or renewed for more than three years, it could not be possible that the same could remain effective for a larger period under the Explanation. The learned Judge Small Cause Court, in my opinion, misconceived the entire position of law. According to the tenor of the rule, the renewal at a time can be, indeed, for three years, but there is no limit as to the number of times at which the renewal can be granted. Moreover, the period of the licence is prescribed by Rule 15, and the same cannot override the specific provision of the statute. In case of conflict, the statute must prevail over the provision of the rule. There is, moreover, no inconsistency between the rule and the Explanation in the present case. The rule applies only to cases of grant and renewal of licences. The Explanation is attracted to cases where for some reason the licensing authority has failed to pass orders on the applications for renewal before the expiry of the licences. The situation covered by Explanation to section 5 of Act III of 1938 or by clause (5) of section 3 of the Ordinance, is entirely different and is not covered by the rule. There was, therefore, no justifi cation to import the provisions of the rule in the application of the Explanation to section

5. It amounts to reading wards into the Explanation to say that the existing licence shall be deemed to continue for a period of three years. A Court is not entitled to read words into an Act of the Legislature unless a clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. Its duty is neither to add to, nor to take from a statute anything unless there are good grounds for thinking that the Legislature intended something which it has failed precisely to express. No such inference is possible in the present case. In fact, these words cannot be added unless we take away from the provision the words "until orders on the application have been made." It is not permissible to make additions or alterations or to restore cassus omissus in the statute without a suitable amendment. The Court cannot remedy either of these defects.

5. Clause (5) of section 3 (Explanation to section 5 of the earlier Act) is otherwise consistent and in accord with reason and justice. A person by virtue of the licence carries on a lawful business of money lending. The licence expires. He applies in accordance with the rules for its renewal. He could do nothing more. Having performed his duty, it thereafter pertains to the public duty of the Collector of the district to pass orders on the application. The fact that the application is to be made not less than one mono before the expiry of the licence, is for the purpose that the licensing authority may have sufficient time to scrutinize the application in the light of some facts which during the continuance of the licence might have come to his notice. He should ordinarily take the decision on the application before the expiry of the licence. In the nature of things also it is necessary that action should be taken expeditiously. Under clause (1) of section 3 of the Ordinance no money lender can carry on, or continue to carry on, the business of money lending unless he holds an effective licence under the Ordinance. After the expiry of the licence he cannot continue his business unless the licence in renewed. . To keep the continuity of the licence, renewal in the ordinary course of thing must be made before the expiry. It, however, appears that the Legislature visualized that in certain cases it might not be possible for the Collector to pass an order of renewal before the expiry of the period of the earlier licence. To obviate hardship which was bound to be occasioned to the licensed money lender, provision was made by way of Explanation for deeming the existing licence to continue until orders on the application were passed. It leaves no room for doubt that so long as the appli cation is not disposed of, the money lender can continue his business. It is not by virtue of the licence or its renewal, but i pursuance of a statutory provision enabling him to do so. The period prescribed for the licence or its renewal is, therefore, note applicable to such cases.

6. I, however, cannot help observing that more than six years have elapsed since the applications for renewal were made but no order has been passed by the Collector of the district. No plausible explanation is forthcoming for this inordinate delay. The indecision on the part of the authority is inexplicable and is not such that it should escape being noticed. The orders on the applications should have been passed in all propriety before the expiry of the period of the licences. At any rate, it should have been done within a reasonable time. The fault is entirely on the part of the Collector. The petitioners cannot be made to suffer for the fault of others.

7. As observed by me in the earlier part of this judgment, the learned Judge Small Cause Court has held the petitioners entitled to the amounts respectively claimed by them. This finding of the learned trial Judge has not been challenged before me. I, therefore, uphold the finding.

8. In the view of the matter I take, the revision petitions are accepted, the orders of the learned Judge Small Cause Court are set aside to the extent indicated above and the suits of the petitioners are decreed against the respondents with costs. K. B. A. Petition accepted.