P L D 1957 (W (PLP)

SHABIR AHMAD, J.‑

By this Writ Petition and Writ Petitions Nos. 594 to 598 of 1957, the British Cotton Growers Association Ltd., Khanewal, to be referred to, as B. C. G. A. in the sequel, .wants an appropriate writ, direction or order quashing the judgment passed by the Board of Revenue, Lahore, on the 1st of June 1957, particularly in so far as it directs the restoration of possession to the tenants of the B. C. G. A. who had been ejected from the land in dispute. The six petitions raise identical questions and can be conveniently disposed of together. Another petition of which the material facts are not very different from those that arise in the above‑mentioned writ petitions is Writ Petition No. 705 of 1957 which has been presented by some persons who were inducted by the B. C. G. A. as tenants in place of some of the tenants who have put in the other above mentioned writ petitions. Writ Petition No. 705 of 1957, also will therefore, be disposed of by this order. Some of the material facts are these. The B. C,; G. A. took proceedings before a Revenue Officer for ejectment of some of its tenants and the Assistant Collector passed the order of ejectment on the 10th of April 1956. The tenants appealed against the order of the Assistant Collector to the Collector, who rejected the appeals on the 11th of June 1956. The tenants put in petitions for revision before the Commis sioner, who dismissed them on the 27th of August 1956. Against the order of the Commissioner, the tenants preferred petitions before the Board of Revenue. These petitions were heard by Mr. H. A. Majid who was then a member of the Board of Revenue. Finding that procedure applicable for ejectment of tenants for a fixed period, which the tenants in the cases before him were admitted to be, not having been followed, Mr. Majid held that the order of the subordinate revenue authorities could not stand. The tenants. had been ejected on the 13th of June 1956, i.e., two days after the Collector, Multan, had passed his appellate orders, and while accepting the petitions of the tenants, Mr. H. A. Majid directed that as they had been ejected without justification they must be put back in possession. It is against these orders of Mr. H. A. Majid that the Writ Petitions Nos. 593 to 598 of 1957 are directed. Khwaja Abdur Rahim, learned counsel for the B, C. G. A. and those tenants who are petitioners in Writ Petition No. 705 of 1957, contended that the Commissioner, Multan Division, having dismissed the petition for revision instituted by the tenants who are respondents to the present petitions, do revision lay against the order of the Commissioner to the Board of Revenue and the order of the Board must be declared to be invalid on the short ground that it was passed by an authority not competent to pass it. The second contention of khwaja Abdur Rahim was that assuming that a revision lay to the Board of Revenue the orders of Mr. Majid were ineffective because at the time when he passed the impugned orders no law authorised the Board of Revenue to hear petitions for revision with the result that intervention by this Court by issue of an appropriate writ was not only called for but necessary. I will take up the second of the above contentions first. In so far as the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners with regard to there being on the 1st of June 1957, when Mr. Majid passed the impugned orders, no law in force which authorized the Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, to hear the petition for revision goes the contention is not unfounded. However, on the 25th of July 1957, the West Pakistan (Adaptation and Repeal of Laws) Act, West Pakistan Act XVI of 1957, came into force. This Act by subsection (3) of its 3rd section said that the laws mentioned in Schedule III annexed to the Act shall be deemed to have been adapted to the extent and in the manner mentioned in column No. 5 of the said Schedule. Section 7 of this Act reads as under :‑ "7. (1) Notwithstanding the appeal of the West Pakistan (Adaptation of Laws) Order, 1955, the expiry of the West Pakistan (Adaptation of Laws) Ordinance, 1956, and the West Pakistan (Adaptation and Repeal of Laws) Ordinance, 1956, or any judgment, decree or order of any Court, Tribunal or other Authority, everything done, action taken, obligation, liability, penalty or punishment incurred, inquiry or proceedings commenced, officer appointed or person authorised, jurisdiction or power conferred, rules made and order issued under any provision of any existing law, in pursuance of the amendments, omission, modifications or repeals made by or under the said Order or the said Ordinances shall be deemed to have been validly done, taken, incurred, commenced, appointed authorised, conferred, made or issued and be continued, and if not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been respectively done, taken, incurred, commenced, appointed authorised, conferred, made or issued under any such existing law as adapted or repealed by this Act. (2) Everything done, action taken, obligation, liability or penalty incurred or proceeding commenced, officer appointed or person authorised, jurisdiction or power conferred, rules made and order issued after the date of expiry of the West Pakistan (Adaptation of Laws) Ordinance, 1956, and before the 18th day of October 1956, under any provision' of an existing law which could have been done, taken, incurred, commenced, appointed, authorised, conferred, made or issued under any such law, in pursuance of the amendments, omissions, modifications or repeals made by or under the said Ordinance if it had been in force during the said period, shall be deemed to have been validly done, taken, incurred, commenced, appointed, authorised, conferred, made or issued and be continued and, if not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been respectively done, taken, incurred, commenced, appointed, authorised, conferred, made or issued under any such existing law as adapted or repealed by this Act." It is manifest that section 7 of the West Pakistan Act XVI of 1957 validates all decrees, judgments and orders passed during the period between the expiry of the West Pakistan (Adaptation and Repeal of Laws) Ordinance, 1956, and the A coming into force of the West Pakistan Act XVI of 1957, as if the Act were in force on the date when the decree, order or judgment was passed. Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, was amended by the entries in the 3rd Schedule to West Pakistan Act XVI of 1957, and in its amended form reads as follows :‑ "84. (1) The Board of Revenue may at any time call for' the record of any case pending before, or disposed of by, any Revenue Officer or Revenue Court Subordinate to it. (2) The Commissioner or Collector may call for the record of any case pending before, or disposed of by any Revenue Officer or Revenue Court under his control. (3) If in any case the Collector has called for a record he is of opinion that the proceedings taken or the order or decree made should be modified or reversed, he shall submit the record with his opinion on the case to the Commissioner who will take such action which could be taken by the Board of Revenue under subsections (4) and (5) after observing the procedure prescribed in subsection (5). (4) If after examining the record called for under sub section (1), the Board of Revenue is of the opinion that it is inexpedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree, it shall pass an order accordingly. (5) If after examining the record, the Board of Revenue is of the opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may, under the law for the time being in force, interfere with proceedings or the order or decree of the Civil Court it shall fix a date for hearing the case, and may, on that or any subsequent day to which it may adjourn the hearing on which it may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as it may think fit in the case. (6) Except when the Board of Revenue fixes under sub section (5) a day for hearing the case, no party has any right to be heard before the Board of Revenue when exercising its power under this section." The above section of the Punjab Tenancy Act shall be deemed to be in force on the relevant date because of section 7 of West Pakistan Act XVI of 1957 and, therefore, if the Board of Revenue could hear a revision petition on or after the 25th B of July 1957, it could do so in the period that elapsed between the expiry of the West Pakistan (Adaptation and Repeal of Laws) Ordinance, 1956, and the coming into force of West Pakistan Act XVI of 1957. The learned counsel for the peti tioners urged that an enactment could not be made retrospec tive in its operation so as to validate orders which were invalid at the time when they were passed. It may be that it is bad policy for the Legislature to validate judgments, orders or decrees which were not valid at the time when they were passed or to invalidate judgments, orders and decrees which C were valid at the time when they were given, but there is no doubt that in law such a piece of Legislation is not invalid. I will now deal with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that even section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act as amended by West Pakistan Act XVI of 1957, did not authorise Mr. Majid to pass the impugned order. If the learned counsel for the petitioner wanted to contend that the order should have been passed by all members of the Board of Revenue sitting together, he was overlooking the provisions contained in section 6 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, West Pakistan Act XI of 1957, wherein it is provided that subject to the approval of the Government the Board may distribute its business amongst its members and that any order made or a decree passed by a member shall be deemed to be order or decree of the Board. There is nothing to show that one member of the Board of Revenue was not competent to dispose of a petition under section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, and in fact the presumption is to be to the contrary and it cannot, therefore, be said that the orders of the Board are to be deemed to be invalid on account of the fact that only one of its members passed them. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that in no case could orders in the exercise of power of revision have been passed by the Board of Revenue cannot be accepted. The provisions of section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act as amended by West Pakistan (Adaptation and Repeal of Laws) Act, 1957, give the Board of Revenue the power to call for the record of any case pending before or disposed of by any revenue officer or revenue Court subordinate to it and to pass orders mentioned in subsections (4) and (5) of the section. Commissioners in West Pakistan are revenue officers subor dinate to the Board of Revenue as is clear from the provisions of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act (West Pakistan Act XI of 1957) and the power of the Board to pass orders in revision against the orders by Commissioners though those officers may have passed orders in the exercise of the powers of revision given to them by section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act as amended, is so obvious that it can hardly be doubted. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that as no specific provision of the Punjab Tenancy Act could be invoked to direct the delivery of possession of a plot of land to a tenant from which he had been ejected, the order of Mr. H. A. Majid was without jurisdiction and made the issue of writ necessary. Now, under subsection (5) of section 84 as amended, the Board of Revenue could pass any order that it considered fit provided the other conditions of subsection (5) were fulfilled. Subsection (5) says, inter alia, that the Board of Revenue may exercise the powers of revision in cases in which a High Court can do so in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction with regard to orders of Civil Courts. The powers of the High Court with regard to revisions in civil matters are governed by section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is to the effect that if the High Court comes to the conclusion that a subordinate Court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested or has acted in the exercise of its juris diction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may pass any order that it deems fit. The main reason which Mr. H. A. Majid gave for setting aside the orders of the subordi nate Revenue Officers was that the applications for ejectment did not even mention the grounds on which a tenant for a fixed term could be ejected. It can hardly be doubted that if an order of ejectment of a tenant is passed on grounds on which it could not have been passed at all, the Court or officer who passes that order is acting without jurisdiction or at any rate in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity. Mr. Majid could, therefore, set aside the order passed by the Revenue Officers subordinate to him and the fact that there is no provision in the Punjab Tenancy Act which specifically authorised the putting into possession of a tenant .who had been ejected under an invalid order of a Revenue Officer cannot take away the jurisdiction of the revisional authorities to do justice between the parties. The orders of the Revenue Officers subordinate to Mr. H. A. Majid were not warranted and it would be strange if a superior Court could not undo the wrong that had been done. It will be noticed that the powers given to the Board of Revenue under subsection (5) of the Punjab Tenancy Act as amended are H very wide because it is enacted that the Board may pass such order as it thinks fit in the case and it can hardly be doubted that the order' of Mr. Majid was entirely legal and attacks 1 On it are not warranted by any provision of law or general principles. Coming to Writ Petition No. 705 of 1957, which is, as mentioned already, brought by some persons who have been inducted as tenants of the B. C. G. A. after the original tenants had been ejected, the question to consider is whether the new tenants are entitled to the grant of any relief by this Court. I am prepared to concede that the new tenants were acting in good faith when they took possession of the land given to them by the B. C. G. A., the landlord, but their good faith, though it may entitle them to claim compensation from the landlord, cannot entitle them to remain in possession because the landlord even is not entitled to remain in posses sion on account of the order of the Board of Revenue passed by Mr. H. A. Majid. In view of what I have said above, I hold that there is no occasion for issue of writ in any of the Writ Petitions Nos. 593 to 598 of 1957 and Writ Petition No. 705 of 1957, and I would, therefore, dismiss all the petitions. In view of the fact that at the time when Mr. Majid passed the impugned orders there was no provision of law in force which authorised him to pass them, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs. I may, however, add that as the ejectment order by Mr. Majid was stayed by this Court, the respondents in Writ Petitions Nos. 593 to 598 of 1957 will be entitled to get immediate possession. J. ORTCHESON, J.‑

I agree. A.H. Petitions dismissed.