CLC 2005

2005 PLP 224 (CLC)

BAHAWAL KHAN alias MUHAMMAD IQBAL‑‑‑Petitioner Versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, CHISHTIAN and 2 others‑‑‑Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
Lahore
Decided Date
Writ Petitions Nos.3821, 3867, 3871 of 2003/BWP, 1036 and 2480 of 2004/BWP, decided on 27th July, 2004.
Honorable Judges
Sh. Hakim Ali, J
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 2005 PLP 224 (CLC)
Forum / Court Lahore
Bench Members Sh. Hakim Ali, J
Parties BAHAWAL KHAN alias MUHAMMAD IQBAL‑‑‑Petitioner Versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, CHISHTIAN and 2 others‑‑‑Respondents
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2005 PLP 224 (CLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2005 PLP 224 (CLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Lahore bench comprising: Sh. Hakim Ali, J.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 2005 PLP 224 (CLC) (BAHAWAL KHAN alias MUHAMMAD IQBAL‑‑‑Petitioner Versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, CHISHTIAN and 2 others‑‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Ch. Manzoor Ahmad and Mrs. Samina Qureshi for Petitioner.
  • Ahmad Mansoor Chishti A.A.‑G. and Sardar Muhammad Aftab Khan Baloch, for Respondents.
  • Date of hearing: 26th July, 2004.

Headnotes / Summary

(a) Conciliation Courts Ordinance (XLIV of 1961)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Ss. 2(ff), (h) & 5(2)‑‑‑Punjab Local Government Ordinance (VI of 1979), S.182‑‑‑Punjab Local Government Ordinance (XIII of 2001), S.196(1)(iii)‑‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199‑‑‑Constitutional petition‑‑‑Jurisdiction‑‑‑Conciliation Court had decreed the suits for recovery of amount‑‑‑Appeals 'against such decrees had failed‑‑‑Validity‑‑‑Suits were not based on any written contract‑‑‑Conciliation Courts could not be constituted‑‑‑Suits could not be entertained, heard and decided‑‑‑Constitutional petitions were accepted and judgments and decrees, passed by Courts below were declared illegal and unlawful in circumstances‑‑‑Repeal and saving clauses in the Local Government Law cannot affect Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961. (b) Conciliation Courts Ordinance (XLIV of 1961)‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Ss. 2(ff)(i), (j), 4 & 5‑‑‑Punjab Local Government Ordinance (VI of 1979), S.102‑‑‑West Pakistan General Clauses Act (VI of 1956), S.7‑‑ Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199‑‑‑Constitutional petition‑‑ Repeal‑‑‑Saving clause‑‑‑Conciliation Courts‑‑‑Musalihati Anjuman‑‑‑Clauses (ff), (i) and (j) of S.2 of Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961 were not creation of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance of 1979‑‑ No nexus of Musalihati Anjuman with that of Conciliation Court as to declare the law of Conciliation Courts to have become inoperative and infructuous‑‑‑Section 7 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956 had rescued the life and existence of Conciliation Courts. Musa Kazimi v. K.M. Sheriff and another AIR 1959 Mad. 542; The University of the Punjab, Lahore and 2 others v. Rehmatullah PLD 1982 Lah. 729; Gulab Chand v. State and another 1963(2) Crl.LJ 589 (Vol.) 67, C.N.177 rel. (c) Conciliation Courts Ordinance (XLVI of 1961)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Ss. 4 & 5‑‑‑Constitution of Conciliation Court‑‑‑Chairman of Union Council or the member representing the ward can be the Chairman of the Conciliation Court‑‑‑Other two representatives are nominated by each party‑‑‑Sole person who is necessarily to be Chairman of the Conciliation Court is the person who has to act through, election/selection/nomination held under any Local Government law' and who has to become the Chairman and has to be borrowed from Local Council. Musa Kazimi v. K.M. Sheriff and another AIR 1959 Mad. 542; The University of the Punjab, Lahore and 2 others v. Rehmatullah PLD 1982 Lah. 729; Gulab Chand v. State and another 1963(2) Crl.LJ 589 (Vol.) 67, C.N.17, rel.

Judgment & Decree

7. The other sections of the Ordinance of 1961, which require the interpretation by this Court are sections 4 and

5. The same are reproduced hereunder for ready reference::‑‑ "

4. Application for constitution of a Conciliation Court.‑‑‑(1) Where a case is, under this Ordinance, referable to conciliation any party to dispute may, in the prescribed manner, and on payment of the prescribed fee, apply to the Chairman of the Union Council concerned [or, as the case may be, to the member representing the ward, or, in the case of a ward which has more members than one, to such one of them as may be determined in the prescribed manner,] for the constitution of a Conciliation Court for the settlement of the dispute, and unless the Chairman *[or, As the case may be, the member], for reasons to be recorded in writing, rejects, the application, he shall proceed to constitute in the prescribed manner, a Conciliation Court for the purpose: Provided that no application under this section shall be made against person of unsound mind. (2) Any person aggrieved by an order of rejection under subsection (1) may, on the ground that the order is mala fide or substantially unjust, prefer, in the prescribed manner and within the prescribed time an application for revision to the Controlling Authority, or to such other authority as may be prescribed.

5. Conciliation Courts, their composition, etc.‑‑‑(1) a Conciliation Court shall be a body consisting of a Chairman and two representatives to be nominated, in the prescribed manner, by each of the parties to the dispute. (2) The Chairman of the Union Council, [or, as the case may be, the member representing the ward, or, in the case of a ward which has more members than one, such one of them as may be determined in the prescribed manner,] shall be the Chairman of the Conciliation Court, but where he is, owing to illness or any other cause, unable to act as Chairman, or does not, on account of any personal consideration, wish to do so, or his impartiality is challenged by any party to the dispute, any other person appointed in the prescribed manner not being a person nominated by any party, shall be the Chairman of the Court. (3) If either party to the dispute consists of more than one person, the Chairman shall call upon the persons constituting that part to nominate the two representatives on its behalf, and if they fail so to nominate, shall authorize anyone of such persons to do so, and thereupon the person so authorized shall alone have the right to nominate such representatives. (4) Where representatives required under this section ‑ to be nominated are not nominated within the prescribed time, then (a) if the case falls under Part I, of the Schedule, the Conciliation Court shall, without such representatives, be deemed to have been validly constituted for the purposes of this Ordinance, and conciliation shall proceed accordingly; and (b) if the case falls under Part II of the Schedule the *[Court] shall issue a certificate that conciliation has failed."

8. According to section 4 of the Ordinance of 1961, when a party to a dispute intends to get the constitution of a Conciliation Court under the above rioted Ordinance of 1961, it has to apply to the Chairman ‑of the Union Council concerned, or to the members representing the ward or if there are more members, then anyone of the members of the ward. Upon the receipt of this application, the Chairman or the member, as the case may be whom such an application under section 4 of the Ordinance of 1961 has been presented, has to form the Conciliation Court. Section 5 of the Ordinance, 1961 prescribes the manner of composition of the Conciliation Court. In other words a Conciliation Court, according to section 5 of the Ordinance of 1961, is a Court consisting of three persons, one of them is the Chairman and the other two are the representatives to be nominated by each of the party to the dispute. From the reading of this section 5 of the Ordinance of 1961, in fact the Chairman of the Union Council or the member representing the ward can be the Chairman of the Conciliation Court, if a member has been asked to officiate under section 4 of the Ordinance of 1961. Even according to section 5 of the Ordinance of 1961, the Chairman of the Union Council is not the sole person, who in all situations/events is to act as Chairman of the Conciliation Court. He can be replaced and his office for the purposes of Conciliation Courts can be enjoyed/officiated when the following situations arise:‑‑ (i) The Chairman is unable to act due to his illness; (ii) does not on account of any, personal consideration wish to preside that Court; (iii) his impartiality is challenged by any party to the suit; (iv) any other person is appointed in the prescribed manner for the office of Chairman of the Court; or (v) due to any other cause.

9. There is another important fact to be dilated upon is that the Chairman is the Chairman of a Union Council or he is a member of the ward. In other words, a member of a ward of a Union Council can become Chairman if an application is given to him to act as Chairman under the Ordinance of 1961. For the nomination of two representatives, I have not found any limitation or pre‑condition from the aforesaid law that those representatives must be members of the Union Council concerned. The parties to the dispute have been granted the choice to nominate any person whether member or not to act as their representative in the constituted Conciliation Court. So, from this discussion, the sole person, who is necessarily to be Chairman of the Conciliation Court is the person, who has to act through election/selection/nomination held under any Government Ordinance is the only person who has to become the Chairman and has to be borrowed from a Local Council. This interpretation is supported by the fact, when the elected representatives' councils were suspended and the administrators were appointed and they were authorized to act as Chairman of the Conciliation Courts.

10. The next question is as to what is the impact of the referred repealed law (Local Government Ordinance, 1979) found in clause (ff) of section 2 of the Ordinance, of 1961, especially upon the composition of Conciliation Courts?, To be more explicit on this proposition, learned counsels' contention is that with the repeal of the Ordinance of ‑1979, Union Councils constituted and wards created under that law had vanished. Therefore, the Chairman who was the Chairman of Local Council was not officiating/holding the post of Chairman at present, due to the enforcement of new law of Ordinance of 2001, which has brought drastic changes not only in the constitution of Local Councils but in their powers/jurisdiction and concept also. The office of Chairman of Local Council created by the Ordinance of 1979 is nowhere provided in the new law, and section 196 of the Ordinance of 2001 has repealed the old law of Ordinance of 1979. But clauses (ff), (i) and (j) of the section of Ordinance of 1961 having not been substituted by a new authority/Member/Tehsil Nazim/District Nazim or by the Ordinance of 2001, the Conciliation Courts have become an old story having no legal presence and existence. The Conciliation Courts are only in existence in the statute book, having no physical life and existence and these Courts cannot be constituted under the present enacted Ordinance of 2001.

11. The learned A.A.‑G. has tried to defend the constitution of the Local Councils by referring to the provisions of subsection (2) of section 196 of the Ordinance of 2001 to contend that the laws made under the repealed Ordinance of 1979, which were not inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance were saved and continued to be in force until amended or varied by the competent authority. The old subsection (2) of section 196 of the Ordinance of 2001 is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:‑‑ "196(2). Notwithstanding the repeal of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 (VI of 1979), and dissolution of all Metropolitan Corporations, Municipal Corporations, Municipal, District Councils, Municipal Committees, Town Committees and Union Councils created under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 (VI of 1979), under subsection (1), subject to sections 4 and 23 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1958 (W.P. Act VI of 1956); all rules, regulations and bye‑laws made under the repealed (Punjab) Local Government Ordinance, 1979, so far those are inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance shall continue to be in force until amended or varied by the competent authority: Provided that, until otherwise decided by the Government, the Local Government Boards established under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 (VI of 1979), for the administration of officers and officials of the Local Council Service shall continue to function."

12. It may be noted here that this subsection (2) was substituted by another subsection (2) through the Punjab Local Government (Fifth Amendment) Ordinance No.XXXV of 24th June, 2002. So, this provision, referred to by the learned A.A.‑G. is not on the statute book.

13. I have examined minutely the provisions of section 196 of the Ordinance of 2001 and cannot agree with the contention of the learned A.A.‑G. that this provision was savior of the Conciliation Courts.

14. It may be pointed out here that section 196 is the repeal and saving section. It has only saved those things done which are explained in subsection (2) of the aforesaid section

196. But the question is as to whether this section has got any repercussions on section 2, clauses (ff), (i) and (j) of the Ordinance of 1961. The aforesaid clause's were not saved and cannot be presumed to have been saved by this section 196 of the Ordinance of 2001 because those clauses were not creation of the Ordinance of 1979. The Ordinance of 1961 was in fact an independent created enactment. It has only borrowed the provision, for the purposes of providing definition in clauses of section 2 of the Ordinance of 1961, therefore, the Ordinance of 1979 was not the creator of the provisions of the Ordinance of 1961. The, provisions of the Ordinance of 1979 had not given birth to Ordinance of 1961. So, section 196 cannot be referred to as savior of those provisions of section 2 of above referred Ordinance of 1961.

15. In fact after making the efforts and keeping in view the above laws, the provisions of the Ordinance of 1961, are to be interpreted in such a way so as to save their life and existence unless contrary intention appears in the new enacted law. The reference of learned counsel to section 102 of the Ordinance of 2001, which has created a new institution of Musalihati Anjuman and on the basis of which, learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that Conciliation Courts have become a dead horse, cannot be accepted. Musalihati Anjuman created under section 102 of the Ordinance of 2001 is a new creation of this Ordinance of 2001 and cannot be equated or be considered as substitute of the Conciliation Courts as no such intention appears from the provisions of section 102 or from the Ordinance of 2001. Although the creation of multiple and various institutions has been provided for the settlement of disputes of the public yet, this concept cannot be appreciated because manifold and large number of Courts/Tribunals/Forums unless necessary by compelling circumstances, is not conducive to the benefit of general public. Because general public would be pushed into labyrinths and instead of getting relief, they would be perplexed and lose interest for getting justice from different Courts/Tribunals/Forums/Authorities. I have not found any nexus of Musalihati Anjuman with that of Conciliation Courts as to declare the law of Conciliation Courts to have become inoperative and infructuous.

16. In fact, according to my mind, section 7 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956 has come to rescue to save the life and existence of Conciliation Courts. The principle framed under that section is that when a law has been repealed and afterward the same law with modification or without modification is re‑enacted, then the reference in any other enactment or in any instrument to provision so repealed shall unless a different intention appears, be considered as reference in any other enactment or in any instrument to provision so repealed shall unless a different intention appears, be considered as reference to the provision so re‑enacted. To be more clear on this point, it can be seen that the Ordinance of 1979 with regard to the Local Government was repealed and a new Ordinance of 2001 was re‑enacted, so as per force of section 7 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956, the reference contained in the provisions of Ordinance of 1979 shall be construed and be presumed to have been placed upon re‑enacted law of the new enacted provisions of Ordinance of 2001, unless a contrary intent appears from the new Ordinance of 2001.

17. So, the words "Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979", used in section 2(ff) or "Union Council" as provided in clause (i) or "ward" in clause (j) of section 2 of the Ordinance of 1961 has to be construed and deemed to have been referred to the new enacted law of Ordinance of 2001. Therefore, the office of Chairman, which is referred to in sections 4 and 5 of the Ordinance of 1961 would be presumed to have been substituted, by Union, Tehsil, District and their heads i.e. Nazims to be Chairman as found and envisaged by Ordinance of 2001. I am strengthened in this view by the following authorities:‑‑ Musa Kazimi v. K.M. Sheriff and another AIR 1959 Mad. 542, The University of the Punjab, Lahore and 2 others v. Rehmatullah PLD 1982 Lah. 729, Gulab Chand v. State and another 1963(2) Crl.LJ 589 (Vol.) 67, C.N.177.

18. It may be noted with benefit that the Local Government since its inception is continuing its perpetual life through one or other enactment. Although it is changing its apparent frame, shape and name, yet the purpose and intent is the same, to provide good governance to the general public through their local representatives. Therefore, the law of Local Government, which is framed and repealed, enacted and re enacted have got (generally) the same words, meaning, scope, interpretation and reference with some variations. Therefore, viewed from this angle, Local Councils created under the Ordinance of 2001, are the same Local Councils with some modification, alterations, substitutions, somewhere expanding and on the other situation increasing or decreasing the powers but the perpetual succession has remained the same. So, the words used in Ordinance of 1961 are to be considered with reference to the Ordinance of 2001.

19. Accordingly, it is held that the Conciliation Courts had not been abolished and the law enacted through the Ordinance of 1961 still holds the field and is not obsolete. The Musalihati Anjuman, created under the Ordinance of 2001, are new created institution having no repercussions on the Conciliation Courts, created under the Ordinance of 1961.

20. As regards the facts in all these writ petitions, it is a common' fact that all the suits filed in the concerned Conciliation Courts were not based on any written contract. So, the Conciliation Courts could not be constituted and the suits could not be entertained, heard and decided by the Conciliation Courts. The following citations are supportive of the above‑noted proposition:‑‑ Zamiruddin Ahmad v. Havas Khan PLD 1969 SC 57; Maulvi Mehraj Din v. Shah Muhammad and others 1985 MLD 364; Muhammad Hussain Jaffri v. Mst. Mariyam Bibi and 2 others 1985 CLC 451 and Abdur Rehman v. Hamid Khan 1988 SCMR 1146.

21. It has also been argued by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners that the parties to the suits were not of the same Union Council or of the wards of the same city, therefore, Conciliation. Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the suits, but this and the other objections raised are not being discussed as the judgments and decrees of these Courts are not being upheld due to above‑noted fact of these suits having no basis of written contract.

22. The result of the above‑noted discussion is that law of the Ordinance of 1961 is although in existence and is operative yet the decisions of all these suits by the respective Conciliation Courts against which the above mentioned writ petitions have been filed, are not sustainable in the eye of law, because of the suits entertained on the basis of alleged oral contracts. Accordingly, all the writ petitions are accepted and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Conciliation Courts in these writ petitions are declared illegal and unlawful, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. M.I./B‑48/L Order accordingly.