P L D 1962 (W (PLP)

SHABIR AHMAD, J.‑A house belonging to a non‑Muslim who is now an evacuee, which is situated on Davis Road, Lahore, and bears the number S‑16‑1~3‑B in the register kept by the Rehabilitation and Settlement Department, was in possession of three families, namely, that of Mst. Mahmuda Begum, that of Mst. Jamila Begum and that of Syed Masud Akhtar, of whom the first‑named two could be considered to be claimants, while the third could lay no claim to such a status. All three of them put in forms for transfer of the house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 and the matter was dealt with by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner I, Lahore, who by his order dated the 18th of January 1960 transferred the entire house to Mst. Mahmuda Begum and made a passing remark in the order that the bungalow in dispute was indivisible. Against this order of the Deputy Settlement Com missioner, Mst. Jamila Begum and Syed Masud Akhtar lodged separate appeals before the Additional Settlement Commissioner, Lahore Division II. These appeals were heard by Lt.‑Col. J. D. Malik, Additional Rehabilitation and Settlement Commissioner, Lahore Division, who by his order dated the 19th of March 1960 dismissed both of them, the appeal of Syed Masud Akhtar being dismissed on the ground that he was a non‑claimant and that of Mst. Jamila Begum on the ground that while the claim, on the basis of which Mst. Mahmuda Begum had sought the transfer of the house, stood at Rs. 1,21,650, that of Mst. Jamila Begum was only Rs.

500. Against the order of Lt. Col. J. D. Malik, two revision petitions were lodged, one by Mst. Jamila Begum and the other by Syed Masud Akhtar. These revision petitions were heard by Khan Farzand Ali Khan, Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore Division, who by his order dated the 13th of May 1960 dismissed both of them mainly on the grounds on which Lt.‑Col. J. D. Malik had dismissed the appeals. . Against the order of Khan Farzand Ali Khan, Mst. Jamila Begum filed another revision, petition under section 2C (?) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation] Act, 1958. 1‑his petition was accepted by Pir Ahsan‑ud‑Din the Chief Settlement Commissioner, West Pakistan, on the 22nd of December 1960 to this extenso that Mst Jamila Begum was given one‑half of the house while the other half was left with Mst. Mahmuda Begum. With regard to the application of Syed Masud Akhtar, the Chief Settlement Commissioner stated in his order dated the 22nd of December 1960, whereby the revision petition of Mst. Jamila Begum was disposed of, that as he was a non‑claimant displaced person, he was not entitled to any portion of the house. Dissatisfied with the order of Pir Ahsan‑ud‑Din, Chief Settlement Commissioner, Mst. Mahmuda Begum presented a petition (Writ Petition No. 210/R of 1961) in this Court, impleading the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, West Pakistan, and Mst. 'Jamila Begum, as the two respondents. This writ petition was heard by my brother Masud Ahmad, who, by means of his order dated the 17th of April 1961, dismissed it. Against this order of dismissal of her writ petit‑ion, Mst. Mahmuda Begum has presented the present Letters Patent Appeal.

2. Syed Masud Akhtar, who had not been impleaded as a party in the writ petition presented by Mst. Mahmuda Begum and was, therefore, not impleaded as a respondent in the present Letters Patent Appeal, presented a petition (Writ Petition No. 453/R of 1961) with a view to getting the orders of the Chief Settlement Commissioner and those of his subordinates with regard to the house in dispute made ineffective and one- third of the house which had ‑ been in his possession for a con siderable time being given to him, and impleaded the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Mst. Mahmuda. Begum and Mst. Jamila Begum as respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3, respectively. As the questions that arise for the disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal and this writ petition are intimately connected with each other, the two matters will be disposed of by this order.

3. It was the Chief Settlement Commissioner, who, for the 'first time declared the house to be divisible because the order which was attacked before him by means of a revision petition under section 20 (2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, as well as the order of Lt.‑Col. J. D. Malik as that of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, I, Lahore, were to the effect that the house was indivisible. Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah, who appeared for the appellant in the Letters Patent Appeal, contended that the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to the effect that the house was divisible was without jurisdiction and consequently the orders of his subordinates held the field validly and the appellant was the transferee of the whole of the house in dispute. The argument of Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah on this part of the case was to this general effect. He said that acting under subsection (2) of section 31 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and by means of Notification No. 6481‑P‑Reh/59, dated the 14th of October 1959, Syed Hashim Raza, the then Chief Settlement Commissioner, Pakistan, had delegated to all Settlement Commissioners, Additional Settlement Commissioners and Deputy Settlement Commissioners in West Pakistan and Karachi the powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under provisos to subsections (4) and (12) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and, therefore, no power existed in the Chief Settlement Commissioner to set aside an order with regard to., the divisibility or otherwise, of a hose or , a shop if such order had been passed by ,any Of `his ,subordinates mentioned in the notification. If this contention is correct it is obvious that the appeal cannot but he accepted because it was the Chief Settlement Commissioner who had for the first time declared the house to be divisible though the ‑Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Lahore, Settlement Commissioner Lahore, and Additional Settlement Commissioner, Lahore Division, had held it to be indivisible.

4. The above‑mentioned contention of Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah cannot succeed for more reasons than one: The first of these reasons is that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner; Lahore, Settlement Commissioner, Lahore, and the Additional Settlement Commissioner, Lahore Division, had not declared the house to be divisible and as the power of the Chief Settlement Commissioner in this regai4 is to declare a house to be more houses than one, i.e. to be divisible, arid in the absence of such and order it was to be deemed to be only one house, it is obvious that the three authorities subordinate to him had` not exercised the power of the Chief Settlement Commissioner in the relevant regard and, therefore, he himself was not incompetent to exercise it. This would be the position even if it be held that after he had delegated his powers under the provisos to subsections (4) and (12) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, the Chief Settlement Commissioner cannot exercise the powers of revision with regard to the orders passed by one of his subordinate authorities though, as I will presently show, such powers would continue to exist under the provisions of subsection (2) of section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act,'1958.

5. The second ground on which I consider that the Chief Settlement Commissioner could declare the house to be divisible is that I am clear in my mind that by the act of delegating his powers by virtue of subsection (2) of section 31 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. the Chief Settlement Commissioner does not repeal the other provisions of the Act. Subsection (2) of section 31 is in the following terms: ‑ "(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, the Chief Settlement Commissioner may, by notifi cation in the Official Gazette, delegate all or any of his powers under this Act to any Settlement Commissioner or an Additional, Deputy or Assistant Settlement Commissioner subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the notification." I am of the view that even though the order which only the Chief Settlement Commissioner could pass under the Act were passed by an authority subordinate to him by reason of the fact that power to pass the order had been delegated to such authority by means of an order issued under subsection (2) of section 31 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, the power of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to revise any order passed by any of his subordinates would exist, and the power of revision could be exercised by him in appropriate cases.

6. My third reason for holding that the argument of Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah that in the circumstances of this case the Chief Settlement Commissioner could not declare the house to be divisible cannot succeed is that the notification of delegation of powers was issued on the 14th October 1959 by Mr. Hashim Raza who was then the Chief Settlement Commissioner, while the present Chief Settlement Commissioner is Pir Ahsan‑ud‑Din. It would appear that unless and until Pir Ahsan‑ud‑Din issues a notification delegating his powers to, Settlement Authorities subordinate to him or declares by words or deed that he is bound by the order of delegation passed by Mr. Hashim Raza, the notification issued by Mr. Hashim Raza cannot 'act as a delegation of powers by Pir ‑Ahsan‑ud‑Din. But even if it be held that the delegation of powers by Mr. Hashim Raza, who held the office of the Chief Settlement Commissioner immediately before Pir Ahsan‑ud‑Din, was binding on the latter, he was competent in the circumstances of this case to pass the order that the property was divisible. The first contention of Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah cannot, therefore, but be held to be without force and is hereby repelled.

7. The second contention raised by Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah was that as the Settlement Authorities subordinate to the Chief Settlement Commissioner had held that by reason of the fact that her claim was insignificant in comparison with the claim of the appellant, Mst. Jamila Begum could not claim transfer of any part of the house, the Chief Settlement Commissioner was in error in transferring a part of the house to Mst. Jamila Begum and that the whole house should have been left with Mst. Mahmuda Begum to whom it had been transferred under the orders of competent Settlement Authorities. This contention cannot be accepted. It is not a proper exercise of jurisdiction of this Court to come to the conclusion that a writ should issue because the Chief Settlement Commissioner had passed an order which though it was within his jurisdiction did not appear just to the Court, because if the Chief Settlement Commissioner has the jurisdiction to pass the order, the fact that the order of the Chief‑Settlement Commissioner though legal may not appear to this Court to be just cannot be a ground for issuing a writ. There is a fundamental difference between the power to hear appeals or revisions and the power to issue writs. A Court which is competent to hear an appeal or a revision is competent to set aside the order of a Court sought to be appealed from or revised on the ground drat in the circumstances of the case the order was not proper or just, but when the question to consider is whether or not a writ should issue, the consideration before the Court has to be whether or not the order against which the issue of a writ is sought was within the jurisdiction of the authority which had passed it, and a writ will not issue on the ground that though the order was within the jurisdiction of the tribunal or authority which had passed it, the circumstances of the case demanded that it should not have been passed. What I am emphasising is that there is a vast difference between the expression "the order could not have been passed" and the expression "the order should not have been passed". If what is mentioned in the first of these two expressions has happened, occasion for issue of a writ arises, but it does not arise if what is mentioned in the second of the above‑mentioned two expres sions is all that can be urged against an order. Consequently the second contention of Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah must also be held to be without force.

8. The contentions of Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah relating ex clusively to the Letters Patent Appeal having been disposed of, I proceed to consider the other contentions that were raised on behalf of different parties‑.. The more important of these conten tions were these:‑ (1), That though the Chief Settlement Commissioner was competent to say that the house in question was not one house but more than one house, he was not competent to say that it was two houses when in fact three families had been living in the house (2) that even assuming that the Chief Settlement Commis sioner could alter the demarcation of the property which existed on account of the possession of different parties, he could not do so in a manner that would result in depriving one of the occupants of the part of the house occupied by him; and (3) that a non‑claimant could not be allotted a house or part thereof when a claimant wanted it. The first two of the above three contentions can be disposed of together. It was argued on behalf of Syed Masud Akhtar by his learned counsel Khawaja Abdur Rahim, Advocate, that by dividing the house into two when there were three residents, the Chief Settlement Commissioner had traveled beyond the powers given to him by the relevant law because by saying that the house consisted of two parts while actually it had been occupied by three families, the Chief Settlement Commissioner had deprived Masud Akhtar of the property which under the law he was entitled to get transferred to him. What the Chief Settlement Commissioner had done was to direct that that part of the house which was in possession of Masud Akhtar and about half of that part of the house which was in possession of Mst. Jamila Begum shall be treated as one house and about half of that part of the house which was in possession of Mst. Jamila Begum and the part of the house which was in possession of Mst. Mahmuda Begum shall be treated to be as another house, Mst. Jamila Begum getting one of such parts and Mst. Mahmuda Begum the other. The reply on behalf of Mst. Jamila Begum, Mst. Mahmuda Begum and the Chief Settlement Commissioner to, the above‑mentioned contention of Khwaja Abdul Rahim, Advocate, was that if the Chief Settlement Com missioner could have the house treated as one house by declining to declare it to be divisible it does not stand to reason that he could not pass an order that a house which was occupied by more than two families be deemed to be two houses. The matter is governed by subsection (4) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, which is in the following terms: ‑ `House' means evacuee residential premises of any value in an urban area, or of the value of ten thousand rupees or more in a rural area, together with the gardens, grounds, garages and outhouses, if any, attached to or appurtenant to such premises, notwithstanding that any such garden, ground, garage or outhouse is in the possession of 'a person other than the person or persons in possession of such residential premises, but does not include any residential building situated within the premises of an industrial concern, or a building or premises declared under paragraph 16 of the Schedule to be a big mansion or hotel: Provided that where any building or premises not so declared consists of more than one residential unit, and such units are in the possession of several persons, then unless the Chief Settlement Commissioner orders otherwise, the whole of such building or premises shall be deemed to be a house: Provided further that where the area of the gardens and grounds attached or appurtenant to 'a house exceeds three times the plinth area of the house including outhouses and garages, if any, the area so in excess, or such part thereof as the Chief Settlement Commissioner may determine, shall not be treated as part of the house." This subsection is negatively worded, i.e., it only says that if a house consists of more units than one and the units are in possession of different families, the house will still be treated as one house unless the Chief Settlement Commissioner chooses to direct that it shall be treated as more than one house. Nothing is said in the above reproduced provision of law to indicate that if the Chief Settlement Commissioner has decided that the house is to be treated as more than one house he has to say that it is as many houses as there are units. On the plain wording of the statute, therefore, it is not possible to repel the above‑mentioned contentions raised on behalf of the opponents of Masud Akhtar. It is well‑settled that when a Court sets out to interpret a provision of law, its duty is to find out what the intention of the law maker was. However, the power of the Court in this regard is not unlimited because if the words of the statute, which has to be construed are clear they must be given the meaning that they appear to have. I the law itself gives a meaning to the expression used the meaning has to be attached to it but if the law itself or any of the general Acts dealing with interpretation of statutes, such as the General Clauses Act, which is in force in this country, does not attach any particular meaning to an expression, the dictionary meaning of the expression has to be taken to have been intended unless the Court comes to the conclusion that was not the intention. When it is not easy to attach a meaning to the expression used by the law‑maker the Court) can in order to find out the real intention of the law‑maker take into consideration other matters such as the state of the previous law and the object of the law under consideration. It is bearing this method of interpretation of statutes in view that I will proceed to consider whether the objection raised to the, Chief Settlement Commissioner's action in having held the house to be two houses though it was inhabited by three families, was open to any valid objection.

9. Before subsection (4) of section 2 of `the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, attained its present form, it was in the following terms: " `House' means evacuee residential premises of any value in an urban area, or of the value of ten thousand rupees or more in a rural area, together with the gardens, grounds, garages and outhouses, if any, attached to or appurtenant to such premises notwithstanding that any such garden, ground, garage or outhouse is in the possession of a person other than the person or persons in possession of such residential premises, 'but does not include any residential building situated Within the premises of an industrial concern, or a building or premises declared under paragraph I S of the First Schedule to be a big mansion or hotel: Provided that where a building 'not so declared consists of more than one residential premises and such premises are in the possession of several persons, the premises in the possession of any one of such persons shall be deemed to be a house:" It will be noticed that before the amendment brought about by means of Ordinance ,LIII of 1959, the Chief Settlement Com missioner could not declare a house to consist of either more or less units than it actually had. In other words, if the house could be said to be divided into three parts by reason of the fact that three different families lived in .it', the Chief Settlement Commissioner had to 'treat it as three houses and could not have said either that it was one house 'or two houses or that was four or more houses. By the change in the law, the Chief Settlement Commissioner has been given the power to say that if the house is divided into more than one part by reason of the fact that more than one family lived in it, it was not one house, but till an order is passed to the effect that the parts m possession of different families are to be treated as separate houses the house is to be deemed to be declared to be one house: The question arises, however, whether in case he held that a residential premises is to be deemed to be more than one house, the Chief Settlement Commissioner is bound to hold that there are as many houses as the families residing in the building. In other words, can the Chief Settlement Commissioner say for example that though three families are living in a residential premises it is to be deemed to be two houses only, for the purposes of transfer under the Displaced Persons (Com pensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. I am clear in my mind that as worded, clause (4) of section 2 of the Act authorises the Chief' Settlement Commissioner to pass an order that a residential premises consists of less or even more houses than the` number of families occupying them. This interpretation flows from the language of the relevant provision of law and when one bears in mind the fact that that provision of law attained its present form after an amendment in the language of the provision that existed formerly, no doubt is left that the powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner in this regard are as wide as they ; are clearly stated to be. If the Chief Settlement Commissioner can treat a residential premises occupied by a number of families to be one house,. I do not see on what logical ground it can be held that once he declares that the premises consists of more than one house he must say that the number of houses are as many as the number of families that live on the premises., I 'would, therefore, hold that the 'first two of the three contentions mentioned in the last paragraph cannot be accepted.

10. As regards the third of the contentions mentioned in paragraph 8, I need not say anything because that contention does not require determination in view of the fact that the other two have not been accepted. In the result, I would dismiss the Letters Patent Appeal as well as the Writ Petition but, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case would leave the parties to bear their own costs. A. S. FARUQUI, J.‑I agree. A. H. Petition dismissed.