P L D 1967 Dacca 6 (PLP)

TALUKDAR, J.‑This is an application under Article 98 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. This application has been presented by one Haji Mojakkir Ali self and Secretary, Sylhet Dhakandakshin‑Bhadeswar Bus Association of Chandighat, Sylhet for an order directing the Regional Transport Authority, Sylhet to refrain from giving effect to their resolution No. 2 dated 2‑5‑64 granting 14 Stage Carriage permits on the Sylhet‑Bhadeswar route and for. declaration that the said permits have been granted without lawful authority and are of no effect. His case was that he was a Secretary‑member of the said association and himself had a Stage' Carriage permit for running a motor bus on the aforesaid route. Altogether 9 such Stage Carriage buses belonging to the said Association had their subsisting interest and right to the said route permits. The said Sylhet‑Bhadeswar route extending over 17‑miles is amalgamated or overlapped by another bus route, namely, Sylhet‑Starkandi Zakiganj‑Baraigram route extending over 11 miles from Sylhet -Gopalganj on which portion of the said route other bus owners were plying their vehicles. Accordingly only 6 miles out of 17 miles long route, the petitioners' Association has exclusive right to ply their buses. At the present time, 12 motor buses are regularly plying in addition to 42 buses of other associations or owners which have overlapped this route for 11 miles. In that state of things, the transport facility provided by the petitioner's Association has become unremunerative and there was no scope for granting further permits on this route. On the 5th February 1962, the Secretary, the Regional Transport Authority, Sylhet by a public notice published in a local weekly paper "The Awaz" invited applications for six more permits on the Sylhet‑Bhadeswar route. Applications were required to be filed on or before 28‑2‑

62. Any objections or representations were also invited requiring them to reach the Secretary on or before 14‑3‑

62. Thereafter, it is alleged that the Secretary of the petitioner's Association submitted objection,, or a representation, stating that grant of ,any motor route permits would make their transport services very unremunerative. For quite sometime, the petitioner did not get any intimation as to the hearing of the aforesaid application and also representation. Only in early 1964, he came to know that 14 additional permits for the said route had been granted by R. T. A. at a meeting held on 2‑5‑

64. It is alleged that the said decision of the Regional Authority was taken without hearing the peti tioner's representations in accordance with the provisions of section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is contended that under the law, the R. T.' A. was bound before taking any decision to give a public hearing to the petitioner but since it was not done, there has been a violation of law and that decision was taken without jurisdiction or at least in excess of jurisdiction. On the basis of such a plea, the petitioner moved this Court in order to invoke the provision of Article 98 of the Constitution. This application has been opposed by the Regional Transport Authority, Sylhet and 8 others. Two separate affidavits‑in -opposition have been filed, one for the Regional Transport Authority and .the other for the rest. The case of the R. T. A. was that there was a public demand and agitation for the increase of route permits in order to increase a quite good number of vehicles to meet the requirement of passengers which have increased by 15 times than previously. In the present case, since after advertisement and submission of applications and represen tations from various associations and public bodies, they took about two years for taking decision. The hearing of various parties particularly the representations by public and the local authorities such as police and large number of associations includ ing the petitioner took considerable time and during this period large number of more applications were filed and objections made and public demands were still growing. After full consi deration of the cases of various parties both for increase of permits and also against them, the authority in order to meet the requirement of the case particularly in the public interest decided the matter by passing, a resolution by which he granted 14 more permits. It is asserted on his behalf that he exercised his jurisdiction within the scope of the law and committed no violation or breach of any provision of the Motor Vehicles Act. Out of 14 other respondents, 8 of them have put in their affidavits- in‑opposition. Out of these 8 respondents, respondents Nos. 2, 3, 5, 9 and 13 claim to be members of the petitioner's Association. The petitioner did not positively deny that they were not the members of the said association. Only thing they stated is that these members were not regular. These respondents by their affidavits‑in‑opposition also denied the allegation made by the petitioner that their representations were not con sidered. They also asserted that after hearing all the parties including the petitioner, resolution was passed granting 14 more permits in the case and it was in order to meet the public demands and requirements of traffic on the lines by the large increase of passengers in the recent times. In point of fact, it is asserted, that even now after 14 more permits there is necessity for additional good number of permits since the passengers have increased another five times. It is further asserted by this group of respondents that the Regional Transport Authority had to take' considerable time in order‑ to give various considerations in the matter, both for and against the grant of new permits and it was in the interest of public requirement of traffic and for benefit of the people or the locality without any prejudice either to the petitioner or any other persons. Here in this case, as indicated above, the petitioner claims that since there was breach of certain provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act by the Regional Transport Authority and since the said authority acted beyond his jurisdiction or at least in excess of jurisdiction, he has a right to move this ‑Court and invoke Article 98 of the Constitution even without waiting for the result of an appeal which he had filed against the order of the said authority. Here in this case, the resolution was passed on 2‑5‑

64. The appeal was admitted on 15‑6‑64 and a date for hearing of the said appeal was fixed on 10‑7‑

64. The petitioner moved this Court on 22‑6‑64 for issue of a Rule under Article 98 of the Constitution. Now quite number of questions have arisen for the decision of the case before us. First question was whether the Regional Transport Authority was a judicial or a quasi‑judicial or a purely adminis trative body, secondly, whether there has been any excess in the exercise of jurisdiction vested in him by the Motor Vehicles Act or whether he has acted beyond his jurisdiction altogether. Next question‑whether there has been any violation or breach of any provision particularly sections 47 and 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Then comes the preliminary question, which was not taken in the beginning whether the petitioner has a right to maintain the petition for a writ jurisdiction of this Court. Next question was whether he can come direct to this Court to invoke Article 98 of the Constitution without having exhausted the remedies provided by the particular Act, namely the Motor Vehicles Act. Now, it is perfectly a settled law that the Regional Transport Authority is an administrative body. It is also settled that, normally the writ jurisdiction in the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution cannot. be exercised against the orders of a purely administrative tribunal. But if it is shown that the tribunal, although administrative, has either passed the order without jurisdiction or he has exceeded his jurisdiction in passing the order complained of, it has to be seen whether in this particular case the Regional Transport Authority has passed the order in question in excess of his jurisdiction or without jurisdiction altogether. First of all we propose to deal with the preliminary point although it was not taken at the preliminary stage of the hearing of this application. It is held in the case of the Tariq Transport Company v. The Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service, Sargodha (P L D 1958 S C 437):‑ "In a petition for a writ the first question that the Court has to consider is whether the petitioner has the locus stand! to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court, and it is a basic principle that a person seeking judicial review of administrative or quasi judicial action must show that he has a direct personal interest in the act." Here in this case it is not alleged that the petitioner being an Association has got any direct personal interest in the impugned order of the R. T. A. it is also obvious from what has bee stated in the petition that the petitioner has no such interest. In that view of the law, we respectfully following the said decision, hold that the petitioner has no locus standi to maintain the present application and the petitioner as self, cannot claim to maintain this application since he has not stated his case how he has been aggrieved by the said order. Actually this application has been filed on behalf of the Association, which has no direct personal interest. It has further been held in the same case that within the meaning of the said Article, the petitioner is not the aggrieved party and as such he cannot invoke this extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article

98. Following the above said Supreme Court case, it was held in a case Qamar Din v. Zawar Hussain (P L D 1964 Lah. 183) that application under Article 98 of the Constitution in a representative capacity is not competent. In a C similar case, namely, in Petition No. 114 of 1964 (yet unreported) " the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Sattar and Salahuddin, JJ. it has been held that Chittagong‑Cox's Bazar Bus Services Association, the petitioner in that case, was not an aggrieved party within the meaning of Article 98 of the Constitu tion and having not direct personal interest could not maintain an application and it was dismissed by their Lordships on that ground alone. In the present case we also hold that the present petition cannot be maintained by the petitioner as it has been presented here in a representative capacity. It has also been urged on behalf of the respondent that since the remedies pro vided by the statute, breach of which has been complained of, having not been exhausted the Court's writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked under Article 98 of the Constitution. It has been held by the Supreme Court in the above said case of the Tariq Transport Company v. The Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service, Sargodha (per Md. Munir, the Chief Justice of Pakistan):‑ "Having given careful consideration to this aspect of the matter, I am of the view that the present case was governed by the general rule that where a statute creates a right and also provides a machinery for the enforcement of that right, the party complaining of a breach of the statute must first avail himself of the remedy provided by the statute for such breach before he applies for a writ or an order in the nature of a writ. Since, the present case, .the statute under which the Respondent had a grievance provides an appeal in which that grievance can be set right, no writ of certiorari or mandamus or any other discretionary order of that nature should have been issued by the High Court." Here in this case, there is an express provision for an appeal against an order of the Regional Transport Authority under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In this case, actually, an appeal was filed and a date also was fixed for hearing on 10‑7‑

64. The petitioner without waiting for the result of the said appeal, moved this Court under Article 98 on 22‑6‑64, that is, only a few days after the said appeal was admitted on 15‑6‑

64. But the learned Advocate appearing for the Petitioner argued that such an appeal was useless formality and he was not bound before coming to this Court to wait for such an appeal. Law as stated above is positive that the parties normally are bound by the remedies created by ‑the statute the breach of which has been complained of by the petitioner. Only in exceptional cases, when the appellate authority either refuses to hear the case or takes no action thereof, the parties can come direct to High Court and move for issue of writ under Article 98 of the Constitution. The learned Advocate in support of his argument that he had right t6 come to High Court direct cited the case of Ikram Bus Service and others v. Board of Revenue and others (P L D 1963 S C 564). This was an extreme Case. In that case, also an appeal was filed against similar order of the Regional Transport Authority. The appellate Authority did not determine the appeal for over four years. In that situation, when the party came to the High Court and later on to the Supreme Court, it was held that in such a case, the parties had right to come direct and move the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution. The situation of that case is quite different from the one we are dealing with. In the present case, since the petitioner did not exhaust the remedy t provided by the statute under which he has come to complain, his application in our opinion for writ jurisdiction would not lie. . The finding on this preliminary question is sufficient to dispose of the matter before us. But since the merits of the application have been argued on both sides, we propose to decide the matter on merits also. On the allegation of facts both in the petition and in the affidavits‑in‑opposition by two groups of respondents, it is abundantly clear that before 14 route permits were issued by the Regional Transport Authority, he considered the merits of all the applications and objections or representa tions by public and various representative bodies and local authorities such as police including the representation made by the petition and it was after full consideration that he decided that there was actual necessity in the interest of the public, people of the locality and the requirement of traffic at the time to issue these permits. That being the position, it is futile to say that there has been violation of the law particularly certain provisions of sections 47 and 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act. There is hardly any scope for doubt that all representations have been considered and actually the order was passed in the public interest. Only question whether there was a hearing in public in the presence of the parties. It is not clear from the facts disclosed in the case whether there was a public hearing in the sense it is used in Court of law. The administrative tribunal such as the Regional 'Transport Authority, while exercising powers under certain statute, it is normally bound by law to follow the procedure laid down in the Act. Here in this case, the procedure as to how the application for permits and the representation or objection against the grant of such permits has been laid down under section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules under the Act. The relevant portion of the section 57 is one under sub section (5). It is in these terms: "When any representation such as is referred to in sub section (5) is made, the Regional Transport Authority shall dispose of the application at ‑a public hearing at which the applicant and the person making the representation shall have an opportunity of being heard either in person or by a duly authorised representative." It has been held in the above cited case of the Tariq Transport Company v. The. Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service, Sargodha (per Munir, C. J.) and his Lordship after considerable discussion in the light of the relevant sections particularly sections 47 and 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act, observed: ‑ "The conclusion to be deduced from this discussion is that where an administrative or executive officer acts under a law, the High Court will control the action by an appropriate order if he: (a) goes out of the law i.e. exercise a jurisdiction not vested in him by law; (b) wrongly denies or omits to exercise a jurisdiction; and (c) where the law under which he acts prescribes the manner in which he is to act, materially departs from that law. But the over‑riding requirement in all the three cases is that the excess or denial of jurisdiction or the irregularity in the prescribed procedure should have injuriously affected some justiciable right of a party." In the present case, there is no allegation of any excess or denial of jurisdiction and, as I have already shown, the irregu larity, if any, has not caused the respondent any prejudice or affected any of his legal rights. The High Court had, therefore, no legal grounds to set aside the licences granted in the meeting of 29th May including those granted to the several appellants before us." In the same case, it has been held that the main guiding principle on the part of the administrative tribunal was the interest of the public in‑the matter of policy and fairness. It is also held in that case unlike judicial bodies he is not bound to keep minutes of all of his actions or decisions and is not bound to grant appearance of the parties by lawyers or to grant certified copies of orders he passed. In the absence of any injury alleged irregularity com mitted by such an administrative tribunal cannot entitle the parties to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution. In this case, it is not clear from the facts disclosed by affidavits on both sides, whether public hearing of the parties was given. The learned Advocate for the petitioner contended that since, from minutes and other papers it is not shown by the respondent that public hearing was allowed, it should be presumed that no such public hearing was given in the present case. As an administrative body he is not bound to give certified copies of the orders or copies of minutes, it cannot be presumed that the parties were not given public hearing, on the contrary it can be persumed that the official duties were performed in accordance with law. And there being nothing to show that, the petitioner has sustained any injury, even assuming that there might have been some irregularities in the matter of procedure, this application cannot succeed. We take in the view that both on the preliminary objections as to the maintainability of the application by the petitioner in a represen tative capacity and on merits the application must fail. The Rule is accordingly discharged with cost, hearing fee being assessed at 10 gold mohars; each set of respondents, will get five gold mohars. HASAN, J.‑I agree. K. B. A. Rule discharged.