1998CLC517 (PLP)

6. The two orders of the learned Courts below have now been challenged in this revision petition.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued, that the jurisdiction of Civil Court was not barred, in view of the averments contained in the plaint. He submitted, that fraud was alleged to question the validity of the orders and if the existing averments were deficient in some respect, or some other particulars were required in the plaint, more particulars could be secured instead of rejecting the same.

8. Conversely, learned counsel for respondents argued, that particulars of fraud, as required in law were to be disclosed, which had not been disclosed in the plaint and general allegations would not show existence of. any cause of action. He further argued that whatever was urged by the petitioner, in the consolidation proceedings, was attended to by the competent authorities which decided the same and, therefore, to determine the questions which are exclusively triable by the authorities functioning under the Consolidation Ordinance, a suit could not be maintained. He also made a reference to the order passed by learned Special Judge Anti‑Corruption, Gujranwala, whereby the. complaint of the petitioner was dismissed.

9. The sole question which needs consideration, in this case is, as to whether the jurisdiction of Civil Court was barred to entertain and consider the grievance voiced in the plaint. Section 26 of West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960 provides that no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or application to obtain a decision or order in respect of any matter which Government or the Board of Revenue or any officer under the Ordinance is empowered to determine; decide or dispose of. The careful review of the provisions of Consolidation Ordinance, will show, that the preparation of Scheme for consolidation, allocation of various parcels of land and respective adjustment in the Scheme, to the various landowners and objections pertaining to the classification etc., are exclusively triable by the Authorities functioning under the Ordinance and the aggrieved persons have been allowed right of appeal to the Collector, Additional Commissioner and; thereafter, a revision to the Board of Revenue. The Ordinance provides an authority with Board of Revenue, for calling for the record of any proceedings, either at its own motion or on an application of an aggrieved person and to pass appropriate order in accordance with law, after giving opportunity of hearing to all concerned. Section 26 of the Ordinance, reads as follows:‑‑‑ "No Civil Court shall entertain any suit or application to obtain a decision or order in respect of any matter which Government or the Board of Revenue of any officer is by this Ordinance, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of".

10. In Waris and another v. Muhammad Aslam Khan and others (PLD 1966 (W.P.) Lahore 342, a Division Bench of this Court, while examining the effect of a similar provision of law in Punjab Consolidation of Holdings Act of 1936, observed as follows:‑‑‑ "We have underlined the relevant words which need our interpretation. Before considering section 22 of the Act, we may note that the observations made by their lordships of the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. AIR 1940 PC 105 that the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, will not apply to the present case because of the circumstances which we would presently mention. In the present case, the appellants rushed to the Civil Court without exhausting their remedy before the appellate and revisional Authority. The grounds on which the appellants challenged the consolidation proceedings in a Civil Court were such in respect of which, if well‑founded, the Appellate Court or the revisional Court could give its decision. Under section 22 of the Act, reproduced above, jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred in respect of any matter which the Provincial Government or any officer is by the Act empowered to determine, decide or dispose of. The learned Advocate for the appellants conceded before us that under subsection (1) of section 9 of the Act the Collector could rectify the mistake if any, committed by the Consolidation Officer. If the Collector failed, under section 9(2) of the Act, a second appeal could be filed to the Commissioner. There is a provision for revision also under section 24 of the Act. The learned Advocate for the appellants, however submitted that it was a case of wrong advice on behalf of the counsel for the appellants. In this connection he also submitted that when the appellants came to know about the consolidation proceedings, the appeal was much beyond time. At any rate, the admitted position is that a revision could have been filed to the Financial Commissioner stating the circumstances under which no appeal could be filed. Section 24 of the Act reads as under:‑‑‑ "The Financial Commissioner, may at any time for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by any Officer under this Act, call for and examine the record of any case pending before or disposed of by such officer and may pass such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit". The above provision of law puts no fetters on the power of the Financial Commissioner to reverse an order passed by the Consolidation Officer on the grounds on which the civil proceedings were instituted. The power of the Financial Commissioner is very wide and unfettered by any condition. We are of the view that in the circumstances of the present case the civil suit was barred under section 22 of the Act as the specific grounds on which the consolidation proceedings had been challenged in the Civil Court or matter which can be determined by the authorities maintained in section 22 of the Act.

11. In Mst. Begum Jan and others v. Attique Ahmed and others (1979 CLC 426), it was observed, that by virtue of section 26 of Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960, jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred as regard the matters arising under the Ordinance and that it is open to the aggrieved party to file necessary proceedings before Consolidation Authorities and that the suit could not continue. It was a case in which the proceedings were challenged on the ground that the same were taken at the back of the plaintiff therein and that the orders of the Consolidation Authorities were void and without jurisdiction.

12. In the matter which the Board of Revenue or an officer is empowered to determine, decide or dispose of in the hierarchy of the Ordinance, the same cannot be called in question by way of civil suit as there is a specific ouster of jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. A somewhat similar view was expressed in Bashir Ahmad and 13 others v. Maula Bakhsh and 24 others (1990 CLC 1241).

13. In Ahmad and others v. Karam Hussain and another (1986 SCMR 1384) while dealing with the proceedings arising out of civil suit to question the orders in consolidation matters and for seeking declaration of ownership, it was observed as follows:‑‑‑ "After hearing the learned counsel we feel that the petitioners have no cause for grievance. Such action is not only within the competence of the authorities dealing with consolidation matters but is, in fact, their duty to constitute compact blocks of scattered pieces of land belonging to different persons with a view to curtail fragmentation of land and to consolidate the holdings. The learned Civil Judge rightly held that he had no jurisdiction to interfere with a decision of this nature taken by the Consolidation Authorities. We are, therefore, not inclined to grant leave in this case."

14. It, therefore, becomes obvious, that the matters which are exclusively triable by the Authorities functioning under the Consolidation Ordinance, cannot be re-agitated in the Civil Court and the jurisdiction of Civil Court is expressly, barred by section 26 of West Pakistan Consolidation Ordinance, 1960. In the present case, the petitioner challenges the orders of the Consolidation Authorities, on the ground, that the classification of soil was not correctly made, the respondents were given better land as compared to the inferior quality of land received from, them and that her possession on certain portions was not kept in view.‑ These were the matters, which were exclusively triable by the Consolidation Authorities, as has been done in this case, which cannot be reagitated in the Civil Court.

15. As regard the plea, that the orders were also challenged on the ground of fraud, the plaint does not disclose material particulars of fraud. All that has been asserted is, that the husband of the petitioner, did not give any consent to the scheme. This particular ground, does not appear to have been raised in the proceedings before the Consolidation Authorities. Even otherwise the vires of the Scheme were considered on merits by the authorities functioning under the Consolidation Ordinance, which findings cannot possibly be questioned in the Civil Court by filing a civil suit. The petitioner has annexed with this petition, copies of the orders passed by Collector (C), Additional Commissioner (C) and Member, Board of Revenue (C). For the purpose of disposing of this revision petition, the contents of those orders can be looked into as the same are admitted proceedings between the parties and have been placed on record by the petitioner herself. The orders passed, on the consolidation side, by the different authorities, including the Collector, Additional Commissioner and Member, Board of Revenue, reveal, that the petitioner had been challenging the Scheme on the ground that the possession entries were factually incorrect and that the possession was changed, without any basis to extend benefit to the respondents. It appears that no efforts were made for correction of entries Khasra Girdawari nor any material was supplied to show them against facts. The order was not challenged, in appeal or revision, on the ground of non‑making of any consenting statement by the husband of the petitioner or on the ground of any forgery in regard to such statement. On the contrary, the main attack was in respect of the entries in the Khasra Girdawari. The matter pertaining to the correction of Khasra Girdawari was exclusively triable by the Revenue Authorities. It appears, that no efforts were made for the correction of the Khasra Girdawari nor any application for correction of the Khasra Girdawari was filed. The Consolidation Authorities did take note of the plea raised by the petitioner, in their exclusive jurisdiction and found, that there was no merits, regarding entries in the Khasra Girdawari. This being so, the petitioner could not be said to have any cause of action to reagitate this matter, in the Civil Court, particularly, when no jurisdictional error or violation of any particular provisions of law was highlighted in the plaint. Even material particulars to challenge the entries on the ground of fraud was also missing and instead, the order was being attacked on merits for having a retrial on the questions which stand conclusively determined by the authorities functioning under the Consolidation Ordinance. The averments in the plaint, do not show, that the orders passed by the Consolidation Authorities were without jurisdiction or suffer from any legal infirmity, so as to make out a case for interference in the general jurisdiction of the Civil Court, except the plea that the contesting respondents were sons of ex‑Governor which would hardly furnish any ground for indulgence by the Civil Court, especially, when the plaint does not disclose the particulars to make out a case of orders being without lawful authority, or violative of the provisions of the Ordinance itself.

16. For the reasons above, the two Courts below, did not commit any error, in concluding, that the petitioner had no cause of action and that the suit was not maintainable as jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred under section 26 of Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960.

17. There being no merit in this revision, the same is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own cost. A.A./F‑40/L Revision dismissed.