1999 PLP 1942 (CLC)
Sh. AJAZ RASOOL‑‑‑Petitioner Versus VICE‑CHANCELLOR, KARACHI UNIVERSITY,
| Citation | 1999 PLP 1942 (CLC) |
| Forum / Court | Karachi |
| Bench Members | Mrs. Majida Razvi and S. Saeed Ashhad, JJ |
| Parties | Sh. AJAZ RASOOL‑‑‑Petitioner Versus VICE‑CHANCELLOR, KARACHI UNIVERSITY, |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1999 PLP 1942 (CLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1999 PLP 1942 (CLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Karachi bench comprising: Mrs. Majida Razvi and S. Saeed Ashhad, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1999 PLP 1942 (CLC) (Sh. AJAZ RASOOL‑‑‑Petitioner Versus VICE‑CHANCELLOR, KARACHI UNIVERSITY,). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Abul Khair for Petitioner.
- Obaidur Rehman for Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 4.
Headnotes / Summary
Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Art. 199‑‑‑Constitutional petition‑‑‑Maintainability‑‑‑Aggrieved person‑‑ Petitioner being one of the Senior Professors, was appointed Chairman of Department of Microbiology‑‑‑Respondent who earlier had acted as Chairman of same Department of Microbiology and, later on, was removed from said Chairmanship, had raised issue of his removal before Syndicate‑‑‑Syndicate after discussion appointed a three‑member Committee to investigate issue of removal of Chairman and to make recommendations accordingly‑‑‑Before recommendations of the meeting could be heard by Syndicate and any decision could be taken, petitioner filed Constitutional petition praying for restraining Authorities from passing any order for his removal as Chairman till expiry of his appointment period‑‑‑Petitioner could not explain as to how he was an aggrieved person except apprehension that Syndicate after hearing report/recommendations of three‑member Committee could remove him from post of Chairmanship and appoint respondent/removed Chairman in his place‑‑‑No cause of action at the time when Constitutional petition was filed had accrued to petitioner as no orders whatsoever were passed against him, but only meeting of Syndicate was called to consider report of the Committee‑‑‑Neither any notice .having been issued to petitioner nor any action having been taken against him, petition filed by petitioner was premature and jurisdiction of High Court under Art.199 of Constitution of Pakistan (1973), could not be invoked as petitioner was not an "aggrieved person". Anjuman Arain, Bhera v. Abdul Rashid and others PLD 1973 Lah. 500; Muhammad Mehmood Ali v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance 1984 CLC 142 and Raja Muhammad Sadiq v. Water and Power Development Authority PLD 1978 Lah. 738 ref. Respondent No.3 in person.
Judgment & Decree
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2. Amendment of section 2 of Sindh Act XV of 1973.‑‑‑ In the Sindh Service Tribunals Act, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the said Act in section 2, after clause (a) the following new clause shall be inserted‑‑ (aa) 'Corporation' means a Corporation or Institution set up or established by a Provincial enactment'.
3. Insertion of sections 3‑E and 3‑F of Sindh Act XV of 1973.‑‑‑ In the said Act after section 3‑D, the following new sections shall be inserted‑‑ 3‑E Employee of a Corporation to be deemed Civil servants.‑‑ Notwithstanding anything contained in any Law, service of Corporation is hereby declared to be the service of the Province and every person holding a post in the Corporation, not being a person who is on deputation to the Corporation shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be a civil servant'. 3‑F Abatement of pending cases of an employee of the Corporation.‑‑‑ All Suits, appeals or applications relating to the terms and conditions of service of a person holding a post in a Corporation pending in any Court immediately before the commencement of the Sindh Service Tribunal (Amendment) Act, 1994, shall abate: Provided that a party to such suit, appeal or application may within ninety days of the Amending Act prefer an appeal to the Tribunal established under section 3." Thus, by virtue of the Sindh Government Gazette, dated 16‑1‑1995 the service of University were declared to be the service in connection with the Province of Sindh bringing all the employees of the University under the jurisdiction of the Services Tribunal being the Civil Servants. Section 40 (Chapter VIII) of the Code provides "appeal" to and review by the syndicate which is as under:‑‑ "
40. Appeal to and review by the Syndicate.‑‑‑ Where an order is passed punishing any Officer (other than the Vice‑Chancellor), Teacher or other employee of the University or altering or interpreting to his disadvantage the prescribed terms or conditions of his service, he shall, where the order is passed by the Vice‑Chancellor or any other Officer or Teacher of the University, have the right to appeal to the Syndicate against the order. and where the order is made by the Syndicate, have the right to apply to that authority for review A the order The appeal or application for review shall be submitted to the Vice‑Chancellor and he shall lay it before the Syndicate with his views." No documents have been placed before us if the respondent No.3 after being aggrieved of the order of his removal as Chairman filed any appeal before the Chancellor or approached any of the forum provided under law. We may also mention here that under section 19 of the Code of different Authorities have been named and the Syndicate is one of such Authority. Admittedly, Syndicate had appointed a three members Committee to look into the grievances of the respondent. Under section 27 of the Code it is provided that:‑‑ "
27. Appointment of Committees by certain Authorities.‑‑‑ The Senate, the Syndicate, the Academic Council and other Authorities may, from time to time appoint such standing, special or advisory committees, as they may deem fit, and may place on such committees persons who are not members of the Authorities appointing the committees. It has been admitted by the counsel for the respondents that the three members who formed the Committee were the members of the Syndicate itself and as such adverting to the above provisions of the Code in our opinion the said Committee was illegal. We have also no hesitation in holding that at the time which the 8 petition was filed no cause of action had accrued to the petitioner as no orders whatsoever were passed against him but only meeting of the Syndicate was called. In the case of Anjuman Arain, Bhera v_ Abdul Rashid and others PLD 1973 Lah. 500, wherein the land in dispute was an Evacuee Trust Property, the Anjuman Arain, Bhera, through one Faiz Muhammad, filed a writ petition praying that the allotment of the said evacuee land in favour of respondent No. 1, Abdul Rashid, be declared to be without lawful authority. The petition was dismissed in limine by the High Court with the observation that the Anjuman was not an aggrieved person and, therefore, it had no locus standi whatsoever to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962. The said decision was upheld in the Letters Patent Appeal. In the case of Muhammad Mehmood Ali v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance 1984 CLC 142, the petitioner, who was an Inspector in the Income Tax Department through the writ petition, questioned the action of the respondent in issuing a notice and a show‑cause notice to the petitioner and also the act of contemplating disciplinary action. The writ petition was contested by the respondent‑Government on its legal and factual aspects and questioned the very jurisdiction of the Court and competency of the writ petition as well. As to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, the learned counsel for the petitioner, relying on the case of Raja Muhammad Sadiq v. Water and Power Development Authority PLD 1978 Lah. 738, submitted that since the action proposed to be taken by the respondent is mala fide, void and without lawful authority, the petition under Article 199 of the Constitution would be competent. It was observed by the Honourable Court that in the case relied upon ' by the counsel, the writ petition was filed against final order whereas in the case before the Court at the relevant time only a show‑cause notice was served upon the petitioner. The Court observed as under:‑‑ "(5) As the case stands, in this case we cannot oblige the petitioner by issuing an appropriate writ in his favour on two‑fold ground, firstly admittedly his appeal before the Service Tribunal apparently was neither heard nor decided on merits, it was only on the question of law that his appeal was accepted and he, not having been exonerated by the Service Tribunal from the charge of misconduct, second inquiry on the same charges would neither be a bar nor without lawful authority and the case reported in PLD 1968 Lah. 786 relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents is applicable in this case wherein. their Lordships relying on PLD 1959 SC 276 have held‑‑ ' Needless to say that the proposed enquiry against the petitioner is wholly in public interest which cannot be throttled by the principles of natural justice which are not attracted for the present case, for the petitioner, we have no doubt will be afforded opportunity to defend himself as on previous occasion'. (6) The second ground on which the petition merits dismissal is that the writ petition is obviously premature. As we have earlier stated, in this case only a show cause had been served upon the petitioner and a writ petition., therefore, in such a situation would not be competent." In the instant case, as we have already observed hereinabove, only a meeting of the Syndicate was called to consider the report of the three members Committee. Neither any notice was issued to the petitioner nor any action was C taken against him. As such, this petition is premature and the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, could not be invoked as 'the petitioner is not an aggrieved person as envisaged in the said Article. As a result of the above discussion, this petition is accordingly dismissed in limine together with interlocutory applications. Petition dismissed. H.B.T./A‑202/K .