2026 PLP 647 (CLD)
MUHAMMAD YOUNIS and another — Appellants Versus CHAIRPERSON INSURANCE TRIBUNAL, MULTAN and 2 others — Respondents
| Citation | 2026 PLP 647 (CLD) |
| Forum / Court | Lahore (Multan Bench) |
| Bench Members | N/A |
| Parties | MUHAMMAD YOUNIS and another — Appellants Versus CHAIRPERSON INSURANCE TRIBUNAL, MULTAN and 2 others — Respondents |
| Primary Law | (b) Remedy, (a) Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act (XIV of 2013) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2026 PLP 647 (CLD)?
This judgment primarily cites: (b) Remedy, (a) Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act (XIV of 2013) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2026 PLP 647 (CLD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Lahore (Multan Bench) bench comprising: N/A.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2026 PLP 647 (CLD) (MUHAMMAD YOUNIS and another — Appellants Versus CHAIRPERSON INSURANCE TRIBUNAL, MULTAN and 2 others — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Kanwar Naveed Ahmad for Respondents Nos.2 and 3.
Headnotes / Summary
Ss.13, 14 & 18
Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000), S.130(2)
Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5 & 14
Federal Ombudsman forum invoked initially
Insurance Tribunal approached subsequently with the same claim
Election of remedies, doctrine of
Briefly, the appellants, being the brother and mother of the deceased, filed an insurance appeal after their claim under a family takaful policy was not paid in full, however, prior to approaching the Insurance Tribunal, they had already pursued the same grievance before the Federal Insurance Ombudsman, who passed an order awarding partial payment, followed by dismissal of their review petition, without availing further statutory remedies
The Insurance Tribunal dismissed their petition as not maintainable, and the present insurance appeal before the High Court raised the issue as to "whether, after invoking and exhausting the jurisdiction of the Federal Insurance Ombudsman, the appellants could lawfully re-agitate the same matter before the Insurance Tribunal in view of S. 18 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 and the bar of limitation?"
Held: Applicants/appellants asserted that the delay occurred due to a miscalculation during Eid vacations, which they argued constituted a sufficient cause, however, the explanation offered was vague, unsupported by any evidence, and did not qualify as "sufficient cause" under the strict interpretation of limitation law
Each day of delay had to be explained satisfactorily and casual or administrative oversights did not justify condonation
In the present case, no substantive cause had been made out to warrant relaxation of the statutory limitation
The applicants' plea of oversight due to vacations failed to meet the threshold required for condonation
Against order for dismissal by the Federal Ombudsman no representation was filed under S. 14 of the Act before the President of Pakistan as indicated by the record
In view of S.18 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013, the appellants' petition was not maintainable before the Insurance Tribunal
As per S. 18 of the Act, once the Federal Ombudsman had initiated proceedings or decided a matter, no court or tribunal could take cognizance of that matter
Moreover, through exercise of judicial review, High Court examined S. 18 in detail and found it to be legally valid, enforceable, and constitutionally compliant
Being a quasi-judicial forum, the Ombudsman could not assume the role of a litigant or act as a party to assert or defend its own orders in appellate or judicial proceeding
Appellant did not avail the remedies provided under S.14 of the Act 2013 as well as S. 130(2) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000
In the present case, the appellants themselves elected to file their claim before the Federal Ombudsman, accepted the adjudicated compensation, and also pursued a statutory review, which was dismissed
Having fully availed and exhausted the Ombudsman's jurisdiction, the appellants could not subsequently seek to re-agitate the same grievance before the Insurance Tribunal
The principle of finality squarely applied in said circumstances
Present appeal was barred under S. 18 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 and was hit by the doctrine of election as well as law of limitation
Application for condonation of delay was dismissed and the present appeal was found to be devoid of merit and was also dismissed.
Election of remedies, doctrine of
Scope
A litigant may, in certain situations, have multiple remedies available under the law
However, it is equally settled that once a remedy is elected and exhausted, the law does not permit the litigant to invoke a parallel or successive remedy before another forum on the same cause of action
This doctrine not only prevents forum shopping but also ensures finality in litigation
Multiplicity of proceedings undermines judicial discipline and opens doors to conflicting outcomes.
Judgment & Decree
SYED AHSAN RAZA KAZMI, J.
The petitioners/appellants have filed the instant Insurance Appeal under Section 124(2) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 read with Section 151, C.P.C. against the order dated 23.05.2024 passed by the learned Chairperson, Insurance Tribunal, Multan whereby their petition was dismissed as not maintainable in view of Section 18 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013.
2. Briefly stated, the case of the appellants is that Mst. Samina Bibi, wife of Asif, had obtained membership from Pak Qatar Family Takaful Limited under a "Share and Care Plan (Silver) Type Death Benefit" in March 2022, paid the first premium of Rs. 1,10,000/-, and nominated the appellants (her real brother and mother) as nominees in the event of her death. Upon her demise on 23.08.2022, a death claim of Rs. 40,00,000/- was submitted by the appellants, which the private respondents allegedly failed to pay despite repeated requests.
3. The appeal is accompanied by C.M. No. 02/2024, an application under Section 5 read with Section 14 of the Limitation Act, seeking condonation of delay in its institution.
4. We shall first take up the question of limitation.
5. The applicants asserted that the delay occurred due to a miscalculation during Eid vacations, which they argue constitutes a sufficient cause. However, the explanation offered is vague, unsupported by any evidence, and does not qualify as "sufficient cause" under the strict interpretation of limitation law. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has consistently held that each day of delay must be explained satisfactorily and that casual or administrative oversights do not justify condonation.
6. In the present case, no substantive cause has been made out to warrant relaxation of the statutory limitation. The applicants' plea of oversight due to vacations fails to meet the threshold required for condonation. Accordingly, C.M. No. 02/2024 is dismissed.
7. Even otherwise, it is an admitted fact that, prior to approaching the Insurance Tribunal, the appellants had already filed a complaint before the Federal Insurance Ombudsman regarding the same policy. The Ombudsman, vide order dated 21.06.2023, directed payment of Rs.1,10,000/- to the appellants equally. The appellants subsequent review petition filed under section 13 of Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 (Act) was also dismissed by the Federal Ombudsman on 27.09.2023. Against order dated 27.09.2023 no representation was filed under section 14 of the Act before the President of Pakistan as indicated by the record.
8. In view of Section 18 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013(Act), the learned Tribunal rightly held that the appellants petition was not maintainable before the Insurance Tribunal. The relevant portion of Section 18 provides: No court or authority shall have jurisdiction to entertain a matter which falls within the jurisdiction of an Ombudsman nor shall any court or authority assume jurisdiction in respect of any matter pending with or decided by an Ombudsman. A plain reading of Section 18 reveals that once the Federal Ombudsman has initiated proceedings or decided a matter, no court or tribunal shall take cognizance of that matter. The provision clearly bars parallel proceedings or subsequent litigation on the same subject before any other forum.
9. Learned counsel for the appellants argues that Section 18 does not bar the Insurance Tribunal from proceeding with the matter. He relies on a judgment reported as Wafaqi Mohtasib Secretariat, Islamabad and others v. SNGPL, Lahore and others (PLD 2020 SC 586), contending that the Federal Ombudsman s findings are recommendatory in nature, and not binding, and hence, do not preclude the Insurance Tribunal from independently adjudicating the matter.
10. The argument is misconceived. Firstly, the cited judgment is based on distinguishable facts and the same is not applicable to the present case. In fact, in the same decision, the Supreme Court of Pakistan deliberated upon the institutional character of the Ombudsman Secretariat, clarifying its jurisdiction, binding authority, and statutory mandate within the legal framework. Moreover, through exercise of judicial review, this Court has examined Section 18 in detail and found it to be legally valid, enforceable, and constitutionally compliant. It was further held that being a quasi-judicial forum, the Ombudsman cannot assume the role of a litigant or act as a party to assert or defend its own orders in appellate or judicial proceeding. Reliance is placed on the case of Muhammad Asif v. Federation of Pakistan and others (2017 CLC 767).
11. A perusal of the record reveals that multiple legal remedies were available to the petitioner under the statutory framework. The petitioner, if aggrieved by the order passed by the Federal Insurance Ombudsman, could have invoked the remedy of filing a representation before the President of Pakistan, as envisaged under section 14 of the Act. However, no such recourse was taken. In addition, Section 130(2) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 provides a specific right of appeal against the order of the Ombudsman before the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, which too was left unavailed. Although originally Section 130(4) of the Ordinance saved the remedy of civil suit, however, enactment of section 18 of the Act has repealed the same by implication being a legislative expression to the contrary later in time
12. There is no dispute with the general principle that a litigant may, in certain situations, have multiple remedies available under the law. However, it is equally settled that once a remedy is elected and exhausted, the law does not permit the litigant to invoke a parallel or successive remedy before another forum on the same cause of action. This doctrine not only prevents forum shopping but also ensures finality in litigation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has consistently held that multiplicity of proceedings undermines judicial discipline and opens doors to conflicting outcomes. Reliance is placed on the case of Chief Executive Officer NPGCL, GENCO-III, TPS Muzaffargarh v. Khalid Umar Tariq Imran and others (2024 SCMR 518).
13. In the present case, the appellants themselves elected to file their claim before the Federal Ombudsman, accepted the adjudicated compensation, and also pursued a statutory review, which was dismissed. Having fully availed and exhausted the Ombudsman s jurisdiction, the appellants cannot now seek to re-agitate the same grievance before the Insurance Tribunal. The principle of finality squarely applies.
14. Accordingly, this appeal being barred under Section 18 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 and hit by the Doctrine of Election as well as law of limitation, is found to be devoid of merit and stands dismissed. No order as to costs. UN/M/180/L Appeal dismissed.