P L D 1973 Lahore 339 (PLP)

SARDAR MUHAMMAD IQBAL, J.‑

The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court alleging that he was in possession of an evacuee plot on Jhang Road, Lyallpur, on which ho had raised construction and was, therefore, entitled to its transfer, in virtue of Settlement Scheme No. VI, under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, but, had been served with a notice of ejectment by the Municipal Committee which notice was illegal, void, inoperative and without lawful authority, for the reason that the property was in compensation pool and the Committee had no right in or dominion over it. The writ petition was dismissed by the learned Chief Justice by order dated the 26th of August 1970 which has been assailed in this Letters Patent Appeal.

2. On behalf of the appellant, it is contended that he was entitled to the transfer of the property under sub‑para. (3) of paragraph 13 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Com pensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 (Act XXVIII of 1958), read with Settlement Scheme No. VI. Sub‑para. (3) of para graph 13 lays down that in an evacuee building site which has been "in unauthorized possession of any person and that person has constructed a permanent building on it, then that site shall be transferred to that person on payment of the prevailing market value plus fifty per cent. of such market value". 1n order that a property be transferred under Act XXVIII of 1958, it is necessary that it should be in the Compensation Pool constituted under section 4 of the Act, consisting of "all evacuee property acquired under section 3". Unless an evacuee property is acquired and is thereby in the Compensation Pool, it cannot become the subject‑matter of transfer under the Act. The learned Judge had held that the property had not been acquired because the Central Government had accorded sanction for its sale to the Municipal Committee before the Notification was issued under section 3 of the Act. In subsection (2) of section 3 of Act XXVIII of 1958 it is provided: "As and when so required by the Central Government the Government of West Pakistan shall, for any of the purposes of this Act, by Notification in the official Gazette, acquire such evacuee property, other than agricultural land situated in the Province excluding the Federal Territory of Karachi, as the Cen tral Government may deem it necessary to acquire. The Central Government asked the Government of West Pakistan to acquire all immovable properties situate within the Province of West Pakistan, except properties of certain specified categories, and accordingly Notification No. U‑8‑79/3119, dated the 21st of August 1959 was issued, relevant part of which reads as follows:-- "Whereas, the Central Government, in pursuance of the powers conferred by subsection (2) of section 3 of the Dis placed Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act of 1958 (hereinafter referred to as `the said Act') have asked the Government of West Pakistan to acquire, for the purposes of the said Act, all immovable evacuee property situated within the Province of West Pakistan, other than :‑- (i) (ii) Property for the acquisition or sale of which sanction of the Central Government under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, or under any law for the time being in force for the administration of evacuee property 9n Pakistan, has been accorded before the date of this Notification ; (iii) (iv) Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (2) of section 3 of the said Act, the Government of West Pakistan is, hereby pleased to acquire, with immediate effect, all the said evacuee immovable property." Before the said Notification, the Central Government had accorded permission to the Custodian for the outright sale of the evacuee land in dispute for the establishment of Municipal Mar ket, and it was conveyed through Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of Pakistan's letter No. F‑16(59)/59‑P‑11, dated the 30th of June 1959, relevant part of which provided: " . . . in exercise of the powers conferred by section 25(2)(s) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957 (XII of 1957) the Central Government are pleased to accord permission for the outright sale of the evacuee land measuring 152 acres 4 kanals 15 marlas situated in Lyallpur for the establishment of Municipal Market at current market price to be determined by you".

3. It was contended by the learned counsel that the sanction given by the Central Government was ultra vires the provisions of section 25(2)(s) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Pro perty) Act, 1957, inasmuch as the Central Government gave sanc tion without reference from the Custodian, and that unless the Custodian had decided to sell the property and thereafter made reference to Government, the Government could not suo mote, or on the application of any person, grant the sanction. He relied on Mumtaz Sultana v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commis sioner (P L D 1964 Lah. 388) wherein It was observed by a learned Single Judge: "The powers under section 25(h)(s) are in fact the powers to be exercised by the Custodian and if the Custodian decides to exercise those powers be has to obtain the sanction of the Central Govern ment. In the present case there is nothing to show that the Custodian wanted to exercise his powers under section 25(ii)(s) and ho approached the Central Government for granting the re quired sanction. If the law requires a certain matter to be done in a particular manner it has to be done in that manner". In order to appreciate the contention, it is necessary to refer to clause (s) of subsection (2) of section 25 of Act XII of 1957, which reads as follows :-- "25. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the pro visions contained in subsection (1), the Custodian may, (s) transfer any evacuee property, notwithstanding anything contained in any law or agreement to the contrary relating thereto: Provided that the Custodian shall not under this clause or the next succeeding clause transfer any immovable evacuee property or any business or undertaking which is evacuee property, except with the previous approval of the Central Government:" The Custodian is empowered under this provision to transfer an evacuee property, but the exercise of this power by him is subject to the condition that there is a previous approval of the Government accorded for the same. What is required by law, therefore, is that there should be a previous approval by the Central Government before the Custodian can transfer the pro perty. The Act no where lays down that the Government should give approval only on a reference by the Custodian, or that the Custodian must decide to sell the property before the Central Government accords sanction thereto. If the Legislature had intended that the Central Government should convey its approval only after the Castodian had decided to transfer the property it would have provided for the same, which it did not do. To restrict the meaning of the words "except with the previous approval of the Central Government" only to the transactions of transfer which have been considered by the Cus todian will be doing a violence to the language of the statute and to read something in it which is not there. It Is a cardinal rule of construction of statutes in general that the intention of an enactment should be gathered from the language employed by it and if the language conveys a plain meaning, Courts are not justified in examining the intention of the Legislature while inter preting a provision of law. In Quebec Railway v. Vandry (AIR 1920 P C 181) while considering the Quebec Code, it was observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council that "the indispensable starting point is to take the Code itself and to examine its words and to ask whether their meaning is plain. Only if the enactment is not plain can light be usefully sought from exterior sources. Of course it must not be forgotten what the enactment is, namely, a Code of systematized principles and rules, not a body of administrative directions or an institutional exposition. Of course also the Code or at least the cognate articles should be read as a whole forming a connected scheme they are not a series of detached enactments. Of course again there is a point at which mere linguistic clearness only masks the obscurity of actual provisions or leads to such irrational or unjust results that however clear the actual expression may be, the con clusion is still clearer that no such meaning could have been intended by the Legislature. Whether particular words are plain or not is rarely susceptible of much argument. They must be read and passed upon. The conclusion must largely depend on the impression formed by the mind which has to decide". Similar views were expressed In The Australian Alliance Assurance Com pany v. The Attorney‑General for Queensland and others (AIR 1918 P C 352) and Babulal v. Emperor (AIR 1948 P C 130). If the meaning of the language used is unambiguous and is in accord with justice and convenience, the Courts cannot busy themselves with supposed intentions, how ever admirable the same may be, because, in that event, they would be travelling beyond their province and legislating for themselves. This was the view taken in King‑Emperor v. Dahu (A I R 1935 P C 89) Kamalaranjan v. Secretary of State (AIR 1938PC281) and Narayana Swami v. Emperor (AIR 1939 PC47). We would not, however, be understood to hold that no assistance can be taken for the purpose of interpretation from the intention of the Legislature where there may be ambi guity in the language. The structure of the proviso to clause is of subsection (2) of section 25 of Act XII is such that the language employed by the Legislature must be understood to mean that it the Central Government accords its approval to the transfer of a property and the Custodian subsequently sells the evacuee pro perty, the transfer shall be valid in law. To hold otherwise would be to put an unjustifiable strain upon the proviso, which must be read according to the ordinary usages of the English language. If, however, the Custodian wants to sell the property, he should obtain previous approval of the Central Government before completing the transaction of transfer. Thus, the view taken by the learned Judge in Mumtaz Sultana's case that there. should be "conscious act and decision of the Custodian which before being given effect to has to be approved by the Central, Government" is, with due respect to the learned Judge, not the correct interpretation of section 25(2)(s). In fact, it runs counter to the observations of the learned Judge himself which he made while distinguishing the case of Syed Ehsan Hussain v. The State (P L D 1961 Pesh. 156), viz. : "This authority does not support the contention of the learned counsel because in that case it was shown that the Custodian by his letter had conveyed his approval for the transaction of sale. Thus in the case cited by the learned counsel, the Custodian had taken a decision either before or after the approval of the Central Government for the sale of the pro perty In favour of the Defence Department. In the present case, there is nothing on the record to show that the Custodian either before or after the approval of the Central Government agreed to the transfer of the bungalow in favour of the Defence Depart ment". It is clear from these observations that in the view of the learned Judge himself the Central Government could accord its, approval before, and the Custodian could agree to the transfer subsequently.

4. In the Notification dated the 21st of August 1959, reproduced above, the properties which were excepted from being acquired included also the property for the sale of which sanc tion of the Central Government under the Pakistan (Administra tion of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, had been accorded before the date of the Notification, and not the properties which the P Custodian bad agreed to sell either before or after the approval was given by the Central Government. Once it is proved that the Central Government had accorded sanction of sale under section 25(2)(s) of Act XII of 1957 then the property went out of the purview of the Notification, with the result that it never, formed a part of the compensation pool. In Muhammad Jamil Asghar v. Improvement Trust (P L D 1965 S C 698) it was held : "The foundation of the jurisdiction of the Settlement officers for transfer of pro perty is that the property should be that which was evacuee: property, which has vested in the Central Government and which is liable to be transferred under the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act." The learned Judge had thus rightly held that the property was not a part of the compensation pool and, therefore, not liable to the incident of transfer under paragraph 13(3) of the Schedule to the Act, or Settlement Scheme No. VI made thereunder.

5. No other point is urged. The appeal has no merit and Is dismissed In limine. K. B. A. Appeal dismissed in limine.