P L D 1962 (W (PLP)

"It is for the Transport Authority to decide the need for temporary permits‑High Court will not interfere, because it considers that there was no need for temporary permit, unless the action of the Authority is mala fide."

8. On page 79 of the Report, however, the learned Judges have added a further clause: "or In utter disregard of the pro visions of law." It will be seen, therefore, that their Lordships did not lay it down as an absolute rule that the High Court will not examine whether the Regional Transport Authority was acting within the law or not. We are of the view that the High Court is not precluded from examining whether the action of the Regional Transport Authority falls within the purview of section 62, for the temporary permits envisaged by section 62 car be Issued only in the circumstances specified therein and the Regional Transport Authority does not enjoy unfettered or absolute discretion to act as it pleases. If its action is arbitrary, mala fide or clearly outside the purview of section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, we have no doubt that this Court will be justified in interfering with such an order. We, however, consider that this Court is not a Court of appeal and will not Interfere with the order of the Regional Transport Authority simply for the reason that in the Court's view a case is not made out for the issue of temporary permit, as long as the Regional Transport Authority does not traverse beyond the scope of section 62.

9. Before we deal with the main question involved in both these petitions, we may dispose of Petition No. 454 in so far as it is directed against respondent No. 1, Messrs Sher Brothers Limited. Mr. Gul Muhammad, Advocate, appearing for this respondent, pointed out that the temporary permits given to Messrs Sher Brothers were not in pursuance of the policy decision referred to above, but were granted independently on entirely different considerations, namely, that this respondent had imported seven buses from the United Kingdom by utilizing foreign exchange earned by it outside Pakistan. The learned counsel drew our attention to two documents, namely, Annexures R. A. and R. B., attached to this respondent's written statement (pages 113 and 115 of the file) which showed that the Central Government had permitted Messrs Sher Brothers to import seven buses and had requested the Provincial Government to grant permits for plying these buses. The Regional Transport Authority's decision in this case is Annexure "B" at page 77 of the file and is an independent decision, having nothing to do with the policy decision governing the case of other respondents. We find that the petitioner has not challenged the action of the Central Government in permitting the import of seven buses by Messrs Sher Brothers and In making a request to the Provincial Government for the grant of necessary route permits, nor has the petitioner attacked the decision of the Regional Transport Authority, at Annexure "B", granting the necessary permits to Messrs Sher Brothers. Petition No. 454 is, therefore, liable to be dismissed as against respondent No. I for the reason that there is no challenge to the decisions taken in favour of this respondent.

10. We now turn to the question whether the grant of temporary permits to the various respondent‑companies is or is not covered by the terms of section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act. This provision of law may be reproduced here for facility of reference :‑ "

62. A Regional Transport Authority may at its discretion, and without following the procedure laid down in section 57, grant permits to be effective for a limited period not in any case to exceed four months, to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily‑ (a) for the conveyance of passengers on special occasions such as to and from fairs and religious gatherings, or (b) for the purposes of a seasonal business, or (c) to meet a particular temporary need, and may attach to any such permit any condition it thinks fit. 2. * * * * * * * * * *

11. In the present context clauses (a) and (b) have no applica tion and we are concerned only with clause (c). The main argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, in the first place, the decision of the Regional Transport Authority does not show that it has any reference to section 62 at all ; and secondly, that in any case the considerations mentioned by the Authority indicate that there is a permanent need for increasing the number of route permits with the result that there cannot be said to exist "a particular temporary need" within the meaning of clause (c) of section 62.

12. In order to elucidate the meaning of the phrase "a particular temporary need", Sh. Bashir Ahmad drew our attention to some decided cases of the Indian High Courts, to which a brief reference may be made.

13. In K. Balagangadharan v. Regional Transport Board Quilon (A I R 1958 Kerala 144), the learned Judges observed that: `Where the need for the issue of permanent permit for plying motor service on the route was admitted, issue of a temporary permit until the issue of permanent permit and the finalisation of the scheme under Chapter 1V.A, does not amount to issue of temporary permit `to meet a particular temporary need' within the meaning of clause (c) of section 62 and is therefore illegal." 14 Again in State Transport Authority, Bhopal v. Sehore Ashta Joint Motor Service (A I R 1956 Bhopal 49), the view was expressed that: "Under section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, temporary permits could be issued for specified purposes only, i.e., for the conveyance of the passengers on special occasions, such as to and from fairs and, religious gatherings, or for the purposes of a seasonal business, or to meet a particular temporary need. When the additional passenger buses are to regularly ply on certain routes, it can rightly be inferred that the need proved to the satisfaction of the Transport Authority is of a permanent nature and not a temporary one."

15. More or less similar views appear to have been expressed in another case, namely, Kotah Transport Limited v. Regional Transport Authority and others (A I R 1954 Raj. 33). While discussing the question of the applicability of section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, their Lordships observed as follows:‑ "None of the circumstances mentioned in section 62 were before the Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur, at the time it resolved to grant temporary permits by its Resolution No. 5 dated 28‑8‑1952. The first circumstance which was considered by the Regional Transport Authority was the existence of a persistent demand on the part of the general public for plying more stage carriages on certain routes. The demand of the bus owners to ply their buses is not the demand of the public, this circumstance, therefore, does not come within the scope of section b

2. The other circumstance was that there was more traffic on the routes than could be met by the stage carriages of the existing permit holders. This again was a need which cannot be said to be temporary in its character."

16. As against these authorities, the learned counsel for the respondents referred us to Khandari Babu v. R. T. A. Udaipur, which has already been mentioned earlier in this judgment in another context. In the present connection, it was observed in this case as follows: ‑ "A permanent need may also, under certain given circums tances, give rise to the existence of a particular temporary need. For instance, if a particular bus, which is to run on a particular route at given times, goes out of order, and has either to be repaired or replaced, then during that interval the need may be a particular temporary need, even though that need is simply to keep the continuous permanent need fulfilled. Similarly, there may be increase of traffic on a particular route, and the authority may take steps to grant non‑temporary permits for the plying of more vehicles as stage carriages on that route, and in the meantime, if the need is considered immediate, take action to issue temporary permits, for a period not exceeding four months. The need in such a case may be non‑temporary need, but till arrangement can be made to meet it, action may be called for to meet the temporary exigency of increase in traffic. Till suitable arrangements are made for grant of non temporary permits, the arrangement for issue of temporary permits would be to meet a temporary need, and it would also be particular, because that particular want shall be met by grant of such temporary permits which it is not possible to meet by non‑temporary permits."

17. The view taken in the authority just cited was endorsed by the same Court in Jairamdas v. Regional Transport Authority and others (A I R 1957 Raj. 162.) and the earlier decision cited as A I R 1954 Rai. 33 was explained as being applicable to its own facts. The conclusion was expressed thus: ‑ "There was thus a shortage of the necessary number of vehicles on this route and the Regional Transport Authority had thought it fit to provide for this temporary need till a regular permit was granted after going through the procedure laid down under section

57. It, therefore, bad the jurisdiction in the circumstances of this case to grant a temporary permit."

18. Finally, reference may be made to Chandi Prosad v. The Regional Transport Authority, Gauhati and others (A I R 1953 Assam 74), in which it was held that: "Clause (c) of section 62, Motor Vehicles Act, is not restricted to a particular temporary need of any particular individual; it is very general in terms. Hence the inability of the Govern ment to provide immediately transport for the convenience of the public pending the nationalisation scheme for Motor transport, will create a particular temporary need within the meaning of clause (c) to section 62, and in order to meet that particular temporary need, the Regional Transport Authority is competent to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily."

19. We find ourselves in respectful agreement with the authorities which have taken a broad view, of the meaning and scope of clause (c) of section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The first two clauses of this section deal with specified situations, namely, the conveyance of passengers on special occasions, such as to and from fairs and religious gatherings, or for the purposes of a seasonal business, but clause (c) is intended to cover particular temporary needs which may arise due to a variety of circumstances. It is neither possible nor desirable to attempt an exhaustive enumeration of the situation which would be covered by clause (c), but it is clear to us that the clause cannot be interpreted so as to exclude a temporary or a short‑term need, which may arise due to the fact that permanent arrangements are bound to take time in accordance with the procedure prescribed in section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Until the permanent arrangements come into existence, there will exist a particular temporary need which must be met by the expedient of issuing temporary permits under section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In other words, as observed by their Lordships in Khandari Babu v. R. T. A. Udaipur, a permanent need may also, under certain given circumstances, give rise to the existence of a particular temporary need.

20. In the present case, the Regional Transport Authority was faced with the situation, where a large number of vehicles were being plied without route permits and there were frequent cases of overloading. The Regional Transport Authority, there fore. rightly concluded that there was need for liberalising the issue of permits. The issue of permanent permits was bound to take time as the procedure outlined in section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act had to be followed, and in the interregnum there was a particular temporary need for bringing more vehicles on the road so as to combat the twin evils of overloading and illegal use of buses without route permits. The Regional Transport Authority was, therefore, acting within the law as contained in clause (c) of section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act when it decided to issue temporary permits for this purpose. We are informed that applications for the issue of permanent permits have already been invited for the routes in question and the petitioners will be in a position to file regular objections, if so advised.

21. There was some argument as to whether an appeal was competent against the policy decision of the Regional Transport Authority, a Member of the Board of Revenue seems to have taken the view that, in the present case, the appeal was not competent, as the requirements of section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act were not fulfilled inasmuch as the petitioner before us was not a person who had objected to the grant of the temporary permits in question. In view of our interpretation of the meaning and scope of clause (c), as given above, we think it unnecessary to decide the question about the competence of the appeal.

22. For the reasons given above, we see no illegality in the Impugned policy decision and its implementation. Both the petitions, therefore, fail as the petitions raised a question of law, which needed elaborate consideration, we are of the view that there should be no order as to costs. A. H. Petitions dismissed.