1995 PLP 1123 (CLC)

JAVED IQBAL, J.‑‑‑This is a Constitutional petition preferred under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) on behalf of petitioner namely Abdul Razzaq with the following prayer:‑‑ "It is, therefore, prayed that order impugned herein may kindly be declared illegal, unlawful without jurisdiction, of no legal effect and consequence and order dated 5‑11‑1992 passed by Secretary Regional Transport Authority, Quetta may also be upheld and appeal filed by respondent No. 1 may also be dismissed. Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper may also be awarded." Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner is a Transporter and plies his carriage on Quetta‑Ahmedoon Gogi Route. The respondent No.1 is also a Transporter, who plies his private carriage. on Quetta‑Ahmedon Route and in this regard the time schedule has also been issued by the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority. A Route Permit bearing No.301/91 was sanctioned in favour of Muhammad Qasim (respondent No.1) by Chairman, Regional Chairman Authority, against which an appeal was filed by the petitioner before the Chairman, Provincial Transport Authority on 17‑9‑1992 on the ground that Route Permit sanctioned in favour of respondent No.1 was in violative of the relevant pro‑visions of Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) as the bus/carrier for which the abovementioned Route Permit was issued does not belong to respondent No.1 and furthermore, that he could not arrange a carrier/Bus even during the stipulated extended period of 25 days and resultantly Route Permit was cancelled. The Route Permit No. 310/91 issued for Mazda Bus QAF‑7197 was cancelled on 05‑12‑1992 and an appeal was to be filed within 30 days, which could not be done and on the contrary an appeal preferred under section 66 of the Ordinance on 15‑11‑1993, which was hopelessly barred by time, but entertained by the Chairman, Provincial Transport Authority, Quetta, which was accepted vide order dated 20‑1‑1994 by the Chairman, Provincial Transport Authority. Being aggrieved of the said order this Constitutional petition has been preferred.

3. It is mainly contended by Mr. Mohsin Javed, Advocate on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned order is contrary to facts law as well as principle of natural justice, and thus not tenable in the eyes of law and is liable to be set aside. It is next contended that the Route Permit of respondent No.1 had been cancelled on 5‑11‑1992 in accordance with relevant provisions as contemplated in section 62 of the Ordinance, as in spite of various opportunities he could not arrange a new bus for Route Permit No. 310/91. It is further contended that no attention seems to have been paid to the requirement as mentioned under sections 48 and 49 of the Ordinance, before granting a Route Permit No.301/91 to the petitioner. It is emphatically urged that the petitioner has not been impleaded as a party in spite of his written requests during the pendency of appeal filed by respondent No.1 before respondent No.2, thereby causing a serious prejudice and injustice to the petitioner. It is also pointed out that the Chairman, Provincial Transport Authority has totally failed to observe the prescribed procedure in this regard, which amounts to an arbitrary exercise of discretion, which is not permissible under law. It is also argued that it was beyond the jurisdictional ambit of Chairman, Provincial Transport Authority to entertain a time‑barred application without affording the petitioner a proper opportunity of hearing.

4. The above explained position has been strenuously controverted by Mr. Muhammad Aslam Chishti, Advocate, who argued with vehemence that the impugned order was neither arbitrary nor whimsical but passed strictly in accordance with law. He also drew our attention to the definition of `owner' as enumerated under section 2 (24) of the Ordinance read. with Rule 88 of Motor Vehicles Rules, 1969, whereby a procedure has been specified regarding the replacement of a vehicle or purchase of new one, and contended that there was neither any mala fide on the part of respondent No. 1 nor any factual position was ever concealed as alleged regarding the purchase of vehicle, but on the contrary an 'application for grant of extension of time was submitted by respondent No. 1 in order to procure a new bus for plying on the route as covered by Route Permit No. 310/91. It is also contended that petitioner had no locus standi to challenge the impugned order by invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court and he could have availed of the other remedies as provided under the Ordinance. It is also pointed out that the Order dated 17‑10‑1993 whereby the Route Permit was cancelled is void, ab initio and hence it was rightly struck down by the Chairman, Provincial Transport Authority and being a lawful order, it does not call for any interference.

5. We have carefully examined the respective contentions as adduced on behalf of the petitioner and respondent No. 1 in the light of relevant provisions of the Ordinance, Rules made thereunder and the. record made available. We have carefully perused the order dated 17‑10‑1993, which is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:‑‑ "Subject: Cancellation of Route Permit No. 310/91 meant for Ouetta Ahmedoon route. Route Permit No. 310/91 covering Mazda Bus No. OAF‑7197.

2. In this case you had been given 25 days' time to produce another bus in place of bus No. QAF‑7197 for Quetta‑Ahmedoon route, which was not held in your own name. Consequent upon your failure to comply with the order, your Route Permit No. 310/91 was cancelled on 5th November, 1992. As a result of an appeal in the Provincial Transport Authority, Balochistan, there‑ the case has been dismissed. You better seek remedy in the Court of competent jurisdiction. 17‑10‑1993 (Sd.) Secretary, Regional Transport Authority." A bare perusal would indicate that the Route Permit was cancelled on 5‑11‑1992 and the information was communicated on 17‑10‑1993 in flagrant violation of the prescribed procedure. The above referred to order itself is laconic and non‑speaking. No reasons whatsoever have been assigned for cancellation of the Route Permit. No doubt that respondent No. 1 could not comply the directions to arrange a vehicle within the stipulated period of 25 days, but it must not be lost sight of that an application of extension in the specified time was made, but the matter remained pending and unattended for an indefinite period and respondent No. 1 all of sudden came to' know vide letter dated 17‑10‑1993 as referred to above that his Route Permit was cancelled on 5‑11‑1992. The said cancellation was in violation of the provisions as contemplated in section 62 of the Ordinance, for the reasons that before passing the impugned order no opportunity of hearing was' afforded nor respondent No. 1 was called upon to offer his explanation. It has also been observed with grave concern that he was never informed in time regarding cancellation of his Route Permit. We may point out that the communication of such an information is not merely a formality, but mandatory under section 62 of the Ordinance. The impugned order was passed on 5‑11‑1992 and it was communicated on 17‑10‑1993, which is highly objectionable, on the one hand and in contravention of section 62(2) of the Ordinance, which is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:‑‑ "62(2). Where a transport authority cancels or suspends a permit, shall record in writing its reasons for the cancellation or suspension and shall give a copy thereof to the holder of the permit:"

6. A bare perusal of the above reproduced subsection (2) of section 62 of the Ordinance, would make it clear that it is obligatory for the cancellation authority to deliver a copy of the cancellation order to the holder of Route Permit. The binding nature of the said Route Permit cannot be violated. The object to incorporate such provisions seems to enable an aggrieved person to approach next higher forum for the redress of his grievances. We may point out that the Transport Authority being an independent quasi/judicial authority is expected to act fairly in a reasonable manner and without any taint of perversity. It seems open to a grave question whether Secretary, Regional Transport Authority could have kept an application unattended for an indefinite period, the answer would certainly be in negative. We have no hesitation to hold that in fact the order dated 17‑10‑1993 passed by Secretary, Regional Transport Authority was in flagrant violation of the relevant provisions of the Ordinance, and can be declared ab initio void. The respondent No. 1 has spent a huge amount on the purchase of vehicle, and therefore, cannot be deprived of his lawful right to ply the same on a route allocated in his favour for the sake of certain technicalities which can‑ be ignored safely for the sake of substantial justice, fair play and equity. The order dated 20‑1‑1994 passed by Chairman, Provincial Transport Authority does not call for any interference being free from any illegality or serious irregularity. Besides that what has been stated above the petitioner could not satisfy us that he in fact is an aggrieved party. It is well‑settled by now that "a person aggrieved must be a person, who has suffered a legal grievance, a person against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongly deprived him of something, or wrongfully refused him something of wrongfully affected his title to some thing" (PLD 1965 Dacca 231). In the case under consideration the petitioner has neither suffered a legal grievance nor wrongfully deprived of some thing nor his title affected as such in our considered view he cannot be declared an aggrieved party and, therefore, has no locus standi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, which is to be exercised with greate circumspection. In view of what has been stated above, the petition is dismissed, with no order as to cost. AA./534/Q Petition dismissed.