1981 PLP (Trib (PTD)

The assessee's case before the Sales Tax Officer was that chip board manufactured by it was covered by Item No. 62 of the above‑mentioned Notification as it was manufactured from the lingo‑cellulosic material. The Sales Tax Officer declined to accept the assessee's contention, with the observations :‑ "The plea of the assessee cannot be accepted because lingo cellulosic is a very wide term Paper board, corrugated board, straw board is also manufactured from the material containing lingo‑cellulosic material. If the intention of the Central Board of Revenue was to exempt goods containing lingo‑cellulosic the straw board and corrugated board would also have been exempted. The assessee was in fact a manufacturer of straw board. It has labelled these products as chip board to get the exemption." The Sales Tax Officer further observed that the assessee had used the same material to manufacture the straw board and chip board as was evident from the list of raw material consumed, given by the assessee during the Income‑tax proceedings. The Sales Tax Officer, therefore, repelled the assessee's contention that the sales of chip board were exempted from the sales tax and consequently he added them to the taxable sales in all the years.

3. Being aggrieved of assessments made on it by the Sales Tax Officer, the assessee carried appeals to the learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner. It was reiterated on behalf of the appellant before the first appellate authority that the sales of chip board were exempt from the sales tax vide Item No. 62 of the above referred notification. The learned Appellate Assistant Commis sioner also repelled the assessee's contention. He was of the view that there were different types of chip boards and the common and well known chip board in one which is used in the manufacture of furniture etc. This chip board, according to him, has a specific thickness and formica is pasted and fixed over it. After referring to the booklet, namely, "Pakistan Standard Specification for chip board", which was placed before him by the appellant's counsel at the time of hearing of appeal the learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner observed that it was evident from the definition of `chip board' as embodied in the forward of the said booklet under the head "Terminology", that there are different types of `chip board' and it was, therefore, to be seen as to what type of chip board was intended to be exempt from the levy of sales tax by the Central Board of Revenue. Referring to the item No. 62 of the Notification, the learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner stated that hard board has also been exempted which is also of non‑bending nature, like the chip board used in the manufacture. The learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner then proceeded to hold as under :‑ "The type of lingo‑cellulosic material, which has been explained in the definition of chip board mentioned under Item 62 of the above Notification, is predominantly of wooden nature such as wooden chips, wooden splinters and wooden flakes etc. and not of the nature of waste paper, cooked straw, begasse, or grass or mixture of these as explained in the booklet "Pakistan Standard Specification for chip board". It means that bard non‑bending chip board used in furniture and made of lingo‑collulosic material of predominently wooden nature has been made exempt vide Item No. 62 of the Notification No. S. R. O. 127(R)/67 dated 30‑6‑1967 and the chip‑ board produced by the appellant which is of bending nature and is made of lingo- collulosic material of the nature of cooked straw, waste paper, begasse, or grass or mixture of these has not been exempted by the C. B. R. It does not belong to the category of hard board. It is of the nature and family of straw board." Before we proceed to deal with the points raised for our consideration we would like to produce the contents of Item No. 62 of Notification No. 9, dated 27‑6‑1951 as amended by Notification No. S. R. O. 127(R)/67 dated 30‑6‑1967, which are as under :‑ "

62. Chip board, particle board and hard board made out of indigenous waste products. Explanation.‑The word `chip board' and 'particle board' as used in this entry means :‑‑ A sheet material manufactured from small pieces of wood or other lingo‑celfulosic material (e. g. chips, flakes, splinters, strands, silver etc.) agglomerated by use of organic binder together with one or more of the following agents, heat, pressure, humidity a catalyser etc."

4. Now a bare reading of the above reproduced Item No. 62 shows that having exempted the three products which are commonly known as chip board, particle board and hardboard made out of indigenous waste products, the rule‑making authority also added explanation giving meaning of the words "chip board" and "particle board". It has nowhere been stated in the definition so added that the word "chip board" means a sheet material which is predominently of wooden nature, non‑bending and used in furniture. The learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner bas fallen in grave error in reading something in the rule which is not there. It is definitely contrary to the rule of interpretation of law particularly in respect of taxing statute. Referring to the rules of construction of taxing statutes, we are reminded of the classic statement of Rowlett, in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commissioner ((1921) 1 KB 64), which still holds the field. It reads: "In a taxing Act, one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing; is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used." In the light of the above enunciation of the principle of interpretation of taxing laws, we have least hesitation in holding that the learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner was in no manner justified to interpret the above noted provisions of the Notification in the manner he has done. His approach is wholly fallacious.

5. Now, we proceed to record the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant before us. After reiterating the contention raised before the two officers below as noted above, the learned Authorised Representative of the appellant vehemently urged that both the officers have faded to make a reference to the `Test Report' issued by the Director, Central Testing Laboratories, Lahore, vide his letter No. C. T. L. 4(51) 71-72 dated 29‑10‑1971, with regard to the samples of the chip board manufactured by the assessee. It has been clearly stated in the Test Report that "as per description of tests, known as (1) Klemms Stain ; (2) Building Material ; (3) Manufacturing Process, "the test shows that the sheet is made of lingo- cellulosic material. It contains organic binder. It is observed that the material is manufactured with the help of heat and pressure". This test report, according to the learned counsel conclusively proves that 'chip board' manufactured by the assessee‑Company being of the same category as indicated by item No. 62 of Notification No. 9 dated 27‑6‑1951, is exempt from the sales tax. The learned Authorised Representative further submitted that earlier than another Test Report dated 2‑11‑1970, was submitted before the Sales‑tax Officer vide assessee's letter dated 16‑11‑1971, which was also to the same effect as the later report dated 29‑10‑1971. The learned counsel also sought to place reliance on a decision of the Appellate Tribunal, Karachi Bench, dated 18‑4‑1979, in S. T. A. No. 1308 (R B) of 1972‑73 etc. (of which one of us (the author hereof) was also a Member). In that case, it is pertinent to note, the Sales Tax Officer had himself allowed exemption in respect of sales of chip board. What was claimed by the appellant in that case was, that the items known as 'straw board' and 'grey board' which were made out of indigenous waste products and were manufactured from lingo‑cellulosic material and agglomerated, by use of organic binder were also covered by item No. 62; and hence it were exempt from the levy of Sales‑tax. Mr. Ghulam Murtama Khan, the learned Accountant Member, who wrote the judgment for the Bench in that case held as under :‑- "A plain reading of the Item 62 shows that it grants exemption from sales tax to certain items viz; Chip board, Particle board and Hard board. It was for the sake of convenience, and to provide clarification that while allowing the exemption. The Legislature explained the words 'Chip board' and 'Particle boards' by mentioning the raw materials utilized including the binding material and other agents utilized for giving then the shape of sheets. We are of size opinion that except for these three items, exemption cannot be allowed to other items even if they are more or less of the same type and are also manufactured from the same ingredients from which the exempted items are manufactured."

6. The considerations, which prevailed upon the assessing officer and which led him to hold that, "the assessee was in fact a manufacturer of straw board, paper board and corrugated board", and that, "it bas labelled these products as chip board to get the exemption" are uncalled for. Likewise, the learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner's findings that "the type of lingo‑cellulosic material, which has been explained in the definition of `chip board mentioned under Item No. 62 of the above Notification, is predominently of wooden nature such as wooden chips, wooden splinters and wooden flakes etc., and not of the nature of waste paper cooked straw, begasse, or grass or mixture of these ......... It means that hard non‑bending chip board used in furniture and made of lingo‑cellulosic material of predominently wooden nature has been 'made exempt vide item No. 62 of the Notification." are not based on any dependable material or export's evidence but on his own surmises and conjectures. It would, in our opinion, also be appropriate if we reproduce here under para. 4 of the combined order of the Tribunal dated 15‑5‑1975 passed on the appeals of this very assessee relating to assessment years 1967‑68 to 1969‑70 vide S. T. A. Nos. 48, 416, 417 of 1973‑74, which runs as under :‑‑ "

4. We must confess that we have not been able to follow the correct implications of the Sales Tax Officer's objections as chip board has been exhaustively defined and it would only be possible to determine with the help of technical expert, if necessary, whether chip board produced by the appellant is manufactured from the material and in the manner stated by this definition. In that event the appellant would be entitled to this exemption but if there is a distinction either in respect of the basis material used or in the process of manufacture as described, the appellant's claim may be negative but not before such an enquiry to do so at our stage, we would remit this issue back to the Sales Tax Officer for doing the needful and only thereafter decide the fate of this case."

7. Now, it is conclusively proved from the export's evidence produced by the appellant before the assessing Officer that the chip board produced by the appellant is manufactured from the material and in the manner stated by the definition. Consequently, the learned Appellate Assistant Commis sioner in terms of the Tribunal's order, referred to above, ought to have held that the appellant was entitled to the exemption claimed.

8. After careful perusal of the test report of the Director, Central Testing Laboratories, Lahore, as well as relying upon our decision dated 18‑4‑1979 we are clearly of the view that the departmental authorities have wrongly refused the benefit of exemption to the sales of chip board declared by the assessee in all the years under appeals.

9. In the result, all the five appeals succeed and are allowed. The Sales Tax Officer shall now allow exemption to the declared sales of chip board in each year, under appeal, as detailed above. A. A. ZUBERI (MEMBER).

Much as I would like to I am afraid, I cannot persuade myself to agree with the finding and conclusion. by the learned President. i set forth below my justification for dissent. The appellant firm is engaged in the manufacture of straw board, paper board, chip board and corrugated board. Exemption was claimed for chip board which appears as Item 62 in Notification No. 9 dated 27‑6‑1951, read with Notification No. S. R. O. 127 (R) 67 dated 30‑6‑1967. The assessing officer refused the exemption, as was done by him in the preceding year also, for the reason that according to him what the Appellant manufactured was straw board paper board and corrugated board but they had labelled some of these as `chip board' so as to obtain the benefit of exemption allowed to chip board as per Notification referred to above. In this immediately preceding years when this dispute came up before this Tribunal, the matter was adjudicated vide S. T. A. No. 417 of 1973‑74 etc., dated 15‑5‑1975. The Tribunal had then set aside the matter with the direction to the assessing officer‑to obtain the opinion of the `technical' expert so as to decide whether the type of board produced by the respondent is manufactured from the material and in the manner specified in the Notification from exemption. It was further observed by the Tribunal that in case there is a distinction, either in respect of the basic material used or in the process of the manufacture, the appellant would not be entitled to exemption. No such opinion has been obtained by the assessing officer nor re‑assessment for the preceding years complete. In the meantime this issue, concerning scope of exemption vide Item 62 of Notification dated 30‑6‑1967, came up before the Karachi Bench of the Tribunal as S. T. A. No. 1308 (H. B.) of 1972‑73 dated 18‑4‑1979. In that decision it eras unequivocally held that exemption vide Item 62 of Notifications dated 27‑6‑1951 and 30‑6‑1967 (Supra) was with respect to chip board, particle board and hardboard which could not be allowed to other items even if they are more or less of the same type and were manufactured from the same ingredients from which the exempted items are manufactured. To get to the bottom of things it is of crucial importance to determine as to what is (d) the basic raw material used for the manufacture of the product which has been labelled by the Appellant as `chip board' and (ii) the process of its manufacture; as both of these have to conform to the specification in Explanation to Item

62. This exercise had to be undertaken by the assessing officer to carry out the directions by this Tribunal in order dated 15‑5‑1975. Without even remotely condoning this laps of responsibility on the part of the assessing officer, I find the conduct of the Appellant intriguing inasmuch as the Test Report, which has been brought to us now by the Appellant, was not shown to the two officers below which fact singularly stands out because the report finds no mention in the order by any of these two authorities. This Report from Central Testing Laboratory, Lahore, is dated 28th October, 1971, while the assessment was framed in June, 1975, and the learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner passed the impugned order on 17th November, 1977. It is significant that the Appellant never claimed exemption for all their products but only for one item called `chip board'. The assessing officer held, in no uncertain terms, that the appellant used the same material to manufacture the so‑called `chip board' as for straw board, an item which admittedly is not exempt. Inspite of this damaging but unequivocal finding, the Test Report was still withheld from the learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner, thus raising the suspicion that the appellant could not get away from the fact that the raw material used by them for the manufacture of all their items was the one and the same, hence if one product did not conform to the requirements for exemption, how could the other ? This aspect assumes greater importance in view of our Karachi Bench decision dated 18‑4‑1979 wherein item 'more or less of the same type of chip board, particle board and hard board' were held to be beyond the scope of the exemption granted by the Government. The finding by the assessing officer that the Appellant manufactured straw board, paper board and corrugated board from the same material from which they produced to product now called 'chip board' has not been independently rebutted and the only evidence brought on record is the Test Report dated 28‑10‑1971. Sample for this `test' was not picked up by the assessing officer nor was the sample shown :o him before despatch to the 'exports' and, perhaps it is not without significance, when the Tribunal gave its decision for the preceding three years (on 15‑5‑1979), this 'rest Report was not utilized to draw strength or else the Tribunal would have considered it. In these attending circum stances, I would not attach any importance to the Report at this belated stage and following the foot-steps of my fore-bearers, suggest that the assessment be set aside to be made de novo after necessary independent enquiries at the inrtance of the assessing officer himself (or with his close collaboration) on the lines already indicated in our decision dated 15th May, 1975 (supra). MIAN ABDUL KHALIQ (MEMBER).‑‑These five appeals involving Sales Tax assessments pertaining to assessment years 1969‑70 through 1973‑74 have been laid before me because of difference of opinion amongst the learned President and the learned Accountant Member on the following point:-- "Whether the appellant is entitled to relief as ordered by the J. M.‑cum -President or the matter requires further investigation as held by the A. M."

2. The brief facts of the case giving rise to these appeals are that, the appellant, who is a Cooperative Society registered under the Cooperative Societies Act is engaged in the manufacture and sale of chip board, straw board, paper board and ticket board. The appellant had obtained on lease board making plant from Messrs Sethi Straw Board Mills Limited. The appellant is a licensed manufacturer under section 8 of the Sales Tax Act.

3. Before the Sales Tax Officer, the appellant claimed that chip board was exempt from levy of Sales Tax under Item No. 62 of Sales Tax Notification No. 9 dated 27‑6‑1951 as amended by Notification No. S. R. O. 127 (R)/67 dated 30‑6‑1967. The Sales Tax Officer turned down the appellant's claimed exemption on the plea that the appellant bad just labelled some of its products as 'chip board' and its contention that the same was manufactured from lingo‑cellulosic material was not enough to qualify for exemption. The Assessing Officer was of the view that the paper board, corrugated board and straw‑board were also manufactured from the same lingo‑cellulosic material and if the intention of the Central Board of Revenue was to exempt the goods containing lingo‑cellulosic material, the straw board and corrugated board would also have been exempted. It was concluded by the Sales Tax Officer that the appellant was, in fact, manufacturer of straw board, paper board and corrugated board but bad erroneously labelled its products as 'chip board' so as to become eligible to claim exemption from levy of sales tax. The learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner maintained the views of the Sales Tax Officer holding the, there were different types of chip board and under item No. 62 only hard non‑bending chip board used in furniture and made of lingo‑cellulosic material of predominently wooden nature was exempt. The learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner was further of the view that the appellant's products being of bending nature were made of lingo -cellulosic material of the nature of cooked straw, waste paper, beggasse or grass or mixture and hence did not qualify for the claimed exemption. It was concluded that the goods manufactured by the appellant did not come in the category of hard board, rather belonged to family of straw board.

4. In further appeals the learned President concluded that the item of chip board manufactured by the appellant was exempt from levy of Sales- tax. This conclusion was arrived at inter alia on the following basis :‑ (a) That a bare reading of item No. 62 of Notification No. 9 dated 27‑6‑1951 establishes that the products known as 'chip board' Particle board' and 'hard board' are exempt from levy of Sales tax. The explanation added on 23‑6‑1967 further clarified that exemption was available to chip board and Particle board manufactured out of indigenous waste products. (b) that as per contents of Test Report of the Control Testing Laborator ies, Lahore, sent vide letter No. C. T. L. 4/51 of 1971‑ 72 dated 29‑10‑1971 chip board manufactured by the assessee was covered by item No. 62 of Notification No. 9, dated 27‑6‑1951. (c) that even the explanation added by amendment prescribing meaning of the words 'chip board' and `particle board' does not lay out the distinction as adopted by the officers below. The explanation never says that the word 'chip board' means a sheet material which is predominently of wooden nature and non bending. (d) that the learned A. A. C. fallaciously interpreted the explanation dated 30‑6‑1967 by reading something not prescribed by the Legislature. (e) that both the officers below failed to appreciate and take into con sideration the Test Report of the Director, Central Testing Labo ratories, dated 29‑10‑1971. The test report conclusively proved that chip board manufactured by the appellant was of the same category as indicated by Item No. 62 of Notification No. 9 dated 27‑6‑1951. (f) that in S. T. A. No. 1308 (H. B.) of 1972‑73 it has already been held by another Division Bench that exemption from sales‑tax is available to items known as chip board, particle board and hard board and it was only for the purposes of clarification that the Legislature explained the items by amendment dated 30‑6‑1967. It was further held therein by the Tribunal that exemption from sales tax was granted to three items named in the notification and except for these items exemption will not be available to any other item even if manufacturing material and ingredients are more or less the same. (g) that the findings of the officers below on the issue involved were based on surmises and conjectures. The Tribunal's order dated 5‑9‑1975 passed in the appellant's own case for the preceding years stood duly complied with as the expert's evidence available on assessment record sufficiently established that the appellant's manufactured 'chip board' was in accordance with the relevant notification as well as the explanation and fully qualified for the claimed exemption.

5. The learned Accountant Member concluded that the matter be set aside for de novo decision by the Assessing Officers for the following reasons :‑ (i) In the appellant's own case in the preceding years, the same issue was remitted back by the Tribunal for de novo decision vide S. T. A. No. 417 of 1973‑74 dated 15‑5‑1975. (ii) in the order pertaining, to the preceding years the Tribunal had directed that in case there is a distinction either in respect of the basic material, used or in the process of manufacture, the appellant would not be entitled to exemption. Thereafter there being no opinion of the assessing Officer the matter needed further probe. (iii) in the Tribunal earlier decision in S. T. A. No. 13066 (H. B.) of 1972‑73 dated 18‑4‑1979, it was specifically held that exemption vide item No. 62 of Notification No. 9, dated 27‑6‑1951 and amendment dated 30‑6‑1967 was available to the items named `chip board' Particle board and hard board and the same could not be allowed to other items even if they are more or less of the same type and were manufactured from the same ingredients. In the appellants case in manufactured item of chip board, basic raw material as well as manufacturing process needs further probe so as to establish the claimed exemption. In the Tribunal's decision (Supra) items of more or less of the same type as chip board, particle board and hard board were held to be beyound the scope of exemption granted by item No.

62. The appellant's products having been manufactured out of the same material there did not exist any additional evidence on record for the claimed exemption. (iv) that the appellant's conduct was intriguing inasmuch as the test report was not shown to the two officers below as the same does not fined any mention in their orders. (v) that the appellant used the same material in manufacturing of chip board as of straw board but no such exemption was claimed in straw board. If one product of the appellant did not conform to the requirements of the exemption, how could the other be.

6. I have heard at length the learned Authorised Representative of the appellant as well as the learned Departmental Representative. Both the representatives reiterated the plea as mentioned in the orders of my learned brothers. I have also consulted the assessment record with the help of the learned Departmental Representative.

7. After carefully perusing the erudite order of the learned President, I substantially agree with him and his conclusion. Before making my own observations on the point of difference of opinion, I proceed to deal with the conclusion arrived at the learned Accountant Member.

8. At the outset I feel that the facts of the case could not be brought to the notice of the learned Accountant Member as the material evidence available on record has been totally omitted. The Departmental Representa tive conceded that Test Report from the Testing Laboratory dared 19‑10‑1971 is available on the record and I have perused the same with the help of the representatives of both the parties. The contents of that report need not be reproduced, the same having been mentioned in the order of the learned President. In the appellants own case for the preceding years the Tribunal's order on the issue involved was passed on 15‑5‑1975 but the test report dated 19‑10‑1971 was very much before the Assessing Officer, the same having been received in his office on 11‑11‑1971 vide receipt No. 602 of even date. On receipt of the Tribunal's order dated 15‑5‑1975 the Assessing Officer visited the appellant's factory premises on 21‑8‑1976 and examined the complete process. Samples of products were again obtained in compliance with the directions of the Tribunal. The Assessing Officer referred those samples to the Control Testing Laboratories, Frere Road, Karachi on 29‑9‑1976 and thereafter report dated 15‑11‑1976 was received and is available on record. In this second report, it was again confirmed that the `chip board' manufac tured from lingo‑cellulosic material and the process was stated to be the same as provided in the explanation dated 30‑6‑1976. Complete documentary evidence in the form of reports is thus available in the relevant cover of the assessment record and compliance of the Tribunal's order dated 15‑5‑1975 stands duly made. The conclusion of the learned Accountant Member that report dated 28‑10‑1971 presented to the Tribunal was not before the Assessing Officer of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is factually incorrect as both the reports dated 28‑10‑1971 and 15‑11‑1976 very well exist in the assessment record. The learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner while passing order on 17‑11‑1977 totally omitted both the Test Reports. A perusal of the appellant's following ground of appeal before the learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner also established that both the reports were there .on the record :‑ "That despite the fact that in the Appellate order dated 15‑5‑1975 against the assessment for the year 1968‑69, the Appellate Tribunal gave specific directions to determine only with the help of Technical expert, if necessary, whether chip board produced by the appellant is manufactured from the material and in the manner covered by the definition but nothing has been done, although, the appellant had itself filed Government Laboratories Reports with exports with expert opinion. That in any case when the material tests and reports had been filed by the appellant the learned Sales Tax Officer in good grace should have examined them to arrive at a positive decision regarding the exemption claimed by the appellant instead of resorting to arguments alone. This ground of appeal was taken up in each year. If the relevant cover of the assessment file was made available to the learned Accountant Member the factual position regarding existence of both the test reports before the officers below would have been noticed. In view of the availability of both the test reports on the assessment record, I very humbly do not endorse the views of the learned Accountant Member on the involved issue. Similarly, I cannot contribute to the view of the learned Accountant Member that the matter may be set aside as the same issue was remitted back by the Tribunal in the appellant's own case in the preceding years. The hard fact is that there after to Assessing Officer had himself visited the appellant's business premises and samples obtained therefrom were sent to the Central Testing Laboratories for testing report. Proper compliance of the Tribunal's order thus stood duly made. The existence of second report on record clearly establishes that there remained nothing to be further proved or resolved by the Assessing Officer. On the point of earlier decision of the Tribunal as mentioned in the orders of my learned Brothers, I should not take long to say that even there after another Division Bench of the Tribunal in the decision in S. T. A. Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 of 1978‑79 has confirmed the Appellate Assistant Commis sioner's view that item of 'chip board' is exemption levy of Sales‑tax under item No. 62 of Notification No. 9, dated 27‑6‑1951.

9. After agreeing and endorsing the eleborate reasons, in the admirable order of the learned President, I would however, like to make my own observations.

10. The word `chip board' is defined in detail in the explanation. The appellant's products will qualify for exemption from levy of Sales‑tax only if proved that it was manufactured from the same material which is prescribed in law and is made according to the laid process. Chip board manufactured by the appellant was reported by the Government Laboratories to have been manufactured by lingo‑cellulosic material containing organic binder and manufactured with the help of heat and pressure. If only the chip board made of wood was exempt from the Sales‑tax, the Legislature could have very conveniently specified that chipboard made of wooden chip will be exempt. The amendment made in the enactment is rendered meaningless if the exemp tion is restricted and limited to the chip board made from wooden chip. The words 'wood' or 'Lingo‑cellulosic material' as used in Explanation added to item No. 62 of Notification No. 9 dated 27‑6‑1951 are liable to be read dis junctively. Both the types of chip board made from `wooden Chips' as well as from `lingo‑cellulosic material' qualify for exemption. Both the learned officers below miserably failed to appreciate the spirit of law and principle of interpretation. Vide item No. 62 of Notification No. 9 dated 27‑6‑1951 exemption was allowed to chip board . . ... made out of indigenous waste products. Thereafter meaning of chip board was added by the explanation. It is well‑settled principle of interpretation of Fiscal Statutes that nothing is to be added or to be eliminated from the language used in the enactment and the subject‑matter is to be construed, strictly adhereing to the language used in the Act. A product cannot be subjected to Sales‑tax or granted exemption by intendments. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the case of Commissioner of Agricultural Income‑tax, East Bengal v. B. W. M. Abdul Rahman ((1974) 29 Taxation 212), has held that in interpreting fiscal statute only letter of law is to be looked into to examine whether or not a particular matter is within a taxing statute and there is no room for intendment, equity or presumption. The relevant portion of the order of the Supreme Court runs as under :‑ "In determining whether or not a particular matter comes within a taxing statutes, it is only the letter of law which must be looked into. There is ample authority for the proposition that in a fiscale case, form is a primary importance, the principle being that if the person sought to, be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, however great a hardship may thereby be involved but on the other hand ii the Crown cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, lie is free, however apparent it may be that his case comes within what might be called the spirit of the law".

11. The upshot of the above discussion, is that as per majority decision exemption claimed by the assessee is allowed for all the years under consideration and the impugned orders of the officers below are modified to that extent. All the appeals succeed accordingly. Appeal allowed.