P L D 1967 Dacca 397 (PLP)

SALAHUDDIN AHMED, J.‑On an application under Article 98 of the Constitution, the petitioner obtained a Rule nisi upon the respondents to show cause why the tax imposed upon entertain ments by respondent No. 1 by a notification dated the 23rd of October 1961, as also the orders passed by respondents. Nos. 2 and 3 dated the 4th of October 1965, and the 12th of August 1965, respectively, upholding the said imposition, should not be declared as having been made without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The petitioner is a proprietor of a Cinema Hall called "Picture Palace" of Khulna Town. His case is that all on a sudden, on the 4th of January 1962, the Manager of the Cinema Hall received a letter from the Chairman, Khulna Municipal Committee, intimating to the former that a tax on cinema had been levied at the rate of 10 per cent. of the total intakes excluding Government taxes with effect from the 1st of July 1961, under rule 4 of the East Pakistan Municipal Committee (Taxation) Rules, 1960 (hereinafter called the Rules). The petitioner asserts that he was not aware of any proceedings leading to the imposition of the said tax nor did he see or receive any notice prior to such imposition. On enquiry, however, he came to learn that the imposition of the said tax had been sanctioned by the Commissioner, Khulna Division, in the aforesaid notification which was published in Dacca Gazette, Part 1, dated the 9th November 1961. The petitioner objected to the imposition of tax on various grounds by his letter dated the 9th of January 1962. (Annexure `B' to the petition). The letter reads as follows: "To, The Chairman, Khulna Municipal Committee, Khulna. Sub : Tax on Cinema with effect from 1st July 1961. Ref : Memo. No. 19 (3) dated 4‑1‑

62. Sir, With reference to the memo. under reference we beg to note that as no tax was levied according to rule 45 (1) and (2) of the East Pakistan Municipal Taxation Rules, 1960, we were not in a position to impose it on the tickets and thereby to realise it from the spectator as indicated in the last sentence of rule 45(2), with effect from 1st July 1961 and as such we can hardly follow how we shall pay it now. In this connection, we beg to note further that at present amusement tax is realised @ 37% and if tax under rule 45 (1) and (2) of the East Pakistan Municipal Taxation Rules, 1960 imposed @ 10 % this business will become a failure as due to enhancement of the existing rate amusement tax and financial position of the country as well, the sale has already lowered down. If further enhancement of tax under the aforesaid rules is at all desired, it may be very nominal. Yours faithfully, For Sk. Peer Muhammad & Bros. (Picture Palace). (Sd.) Partner 9‑1‑62 For Ullashini Cinema. (Sd.) General Manager 9‑1‑

62. For Society Cinema. (Sd.) Partner 9‑1‑

62. Copy forwarded to: The Divisional Commissioner, Khulna. and The Dy. Commissioner, Khulna. for favour of information." This representation went unheeded and the Municipal Committee went on pressing the petitioner to submit a detailed statement for a particular period showing income and expenditure of the petitioner's Cinema Hall in order to take a final decision as regards the amounts of tax to be assessed on and recovered from the petitioner. Subsequently, on the 13th of March 1963, the rate of tax was modified by a resolution of the Municipal Committee and the tax was reduced to 5 % on collection to tickets up to 1st class was maintained at 10 % as before. As all efforts by the Municipal Committee for realisation of the said tax proved futile, the Chairman of the Municipal Committee wrote to the Deputy Commissioner, Khulna on the 24th of July 1963 requesting the latter to take steps for realisation of the tax through the same agency as amusement tax imposed by the Government as prescribed in sub‑rule (3) of rule 45 of the Rules. On the 14th of December 1963 the petitioner along with other Cinema owners submitted a representation to the Chairman of the Municipal Committee objecting to the imposition of the said tax. The representation is Annexure `F' to the petition and it is as follows: "To The Chairman, Khulna Municipal Committee, Khulna. The humble petition of Society Cinema Picture Palace and Ullashini Cinema of Khulna. Most respectfully sheweth (1) That your honour has been pleased to impose tax on the Cinemas at 5%, up to first class and 10 % above first class of the total in takes excluding Government taxes as Municipal tax on Cinemas. (2) That below is appended the nature and number of taxes which the respective Cinema is paying Annually to the Govern ment and the Municipality. (3) That the Distributors' share of the sale proceeds is never below average of 58 %. (4) That the tax proposed to be levied will have to be paid by the proprietors of the Cinema as neither any cut on the money payable to the Distributors nor reduction of the percentage is possible. (5) That the imposition of the tax will cause closure of the Cinema to the great detriment to the Government Revenue not to speak of the complete ruin of the business of the properties. (6) That on account of the recent publication of the Press note by the Central Government 85% of the local pictures will have to be compulsorily exhibited which will hit the Cinema heart for paucity of Standard Pictures involving incredible drop in the sale. (7) That "Morning Shows" exhibiting foreign films have scrapped off in many places of Pakistan and Khulna Cinemas will have to follow suit forthwith causing immense loss of income. In the above premises your supplicants most respectfully pray for staying your bands from imposing the proposed tax and they throw themselves at the mercy of your honour, And for favourable consideration of their case, your applicants will ever remain your honour's bidsmen. Nature and number of taxes (1) Amusement Tax. (2) Income‑tax. (3) Municipal Tax. (4) Shop tax (Agriculture Income‑tax). (5) Slide tax (do do) (6) Octroi tax. (7) Publicity Board Tax (Municipality). (8) Trade Tax. (9) Finance Tax. (10) Government Newsreel rent. Copy forwarded to. The Deputy Commissioner Khulna. for information and favourable consideration. Dated Khulna, the 14th December, 1963". This representation was also unsuccessful and the Chairman of the Municipal Committee by a memorandum dated the 21st of January 1964, asked the Petitioner to pay up the taxes up‑to‑date after due calculation. As the petitioner still failed to submit a detailed account of its Cinema showing the total in takes excluding Government tax, the petitioner was summarily assessed to a total tax of Rs. 1,34,117 for the period from July 1961 to June 1965 and it was asked to deposit the amount in the Municipal Fund by the 15th of June 1965. The petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal for redress of his grievances which was disposed of by the Additional Commissioner, Khulna Division by his order dated the 12th August 1965. In the said appeal, the petitioner challenged the validity of the imposition of the tax on two grounds, namely: (1) that the provision of rule 3 (3) of the Rules has not been complied with inasmuch as there was no prior publication of the proposal for imposition of the tax ; and (2) that as no arrangement was made for collection of the tax as required under rule 45 (3) of the Rules, the petitioner made no arrangement for collection of the tax on the Cinemagoers and consequently it was not possible for the petitioner to pay up the arrears of tax. Both these contentions were negatived by the Additional Commissioner. The Additional Commissioner held that as the petitioner was fully aware of the proposed imposition of the tax as well as the actual imposition and in fact there had been long correspondence between the petitioner and the Municipal Committee on the subject which finally led to the modification of the rate, the petitioner has not been prejudiced in any manner. On the question of arrangement for collection of the takes, the Additional Commissioner observed that there was no force in the argument of the petitioner that it could not realise the taxes from the Cinemgoers for the failure of the Municipal Committee to take effective steps for collection of the taxes. Having regard to the concession made by the Municipal Committee that it was agreeable to levy the tax affective from July 1962, and other facts and circumstances of the case, the Additional Commissioner thought it fit that the Municipal Committee should collect the tax from July 1963 and that the Collector, Khulna should arrange for collection of the same along with the amusement tax, and that for the arrears from July 1963, the petitioner should submit an account and pay up the same. From this order of the Additional Commissioner, the petitioner went up on review before the Commissioner and challenged the validity of the imposition on the self‑same grounds as urged before the Additional Commis sioner. The Commissioner observed in his order dated the 4th of October 1965 that the petitioner has had enough notice about the proposal of imposition of the tax and therefore he found that the petitioner could not have any grievance on this score. The Commissioner further observed that the review petition was not competent. The review application was, therefore rejected. The validity of both the orders passed by the Additional Commissioner and the Commissioner, Khulna Division dated the 12th of August 1965 and 4th of October 1965, respectively has also been challenged before us in addition to the validity of the imposition of the tax itself. On behalf of respondent No. 1, namely, the Khulna Municipal Committee, an affidavit‑in‑opposition sworn by the Chairman of the Municipality has been put in, In this affidavit, it has been categorically stated that the East Pakistan Municipal Committee (Taxation) Rules, 1960 have been fully complied with. It has been specifically stated that copies of the proposed taxes were published on the Notice Board of the respective Union Committees concerned and also at other conspicuous places of the Municipal area inviting suggestions or objections to the proposed taxes. It has further been stated that the notification imposing the tax was duly published in the Dacca Gazette and that in none of its two representations to the Authorities did it object to the imposition on the ground of non‑compliance of the rules particularly the rules regarding the preliminary steps required to be taken before the grant of actual legal sanction to the tax. The affidavit also categorically asserted that the Govern ment had duly delegated its power to sanction the imposition of the tax to the Commissioner. On behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury has challenged the imposition of the tax on several grounds. He has contended that the impugned tax is in the nature of an income‑tax and therefore neither the Municipal Committee nor the Provincial Government has any authority to sanction the imposition of such a tax. It has been argued that tax on income being item No. 43 (c) of the Third Schedule to the Constitution it ~q a subject within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Central Legislature to legislate upon (vide Article 131 (1) of the Constitu tion). It has also been argued in this connection that by whatever name the tax is called, since it is really a tax on income of the petitioner, it is an income‑tax. Section 33 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960 (Ordinance X of 1960) (herein after referred to as the Ordinance) was passed by the President before the promulgation of the present Constitution. Under Article 225 of the present Constitution, this Ordinance must be deemed to "continue in force, so far as applicable and with the necessary adaptations, until altered, repealed or amended by the appropriate Legislature". Sections 33, 34, 35, 36 and 38 of the Ordinance run as follows "

33. Municipal Taxation.‑A Municipal Committee, with the previous sanction of the Government, may levy, in the prescribed manner all or any of the taxes, rates, tolls and fees mentioned in the Third Schedule.

34. Notification and enforcement of taxes.‑(1) All taxes, rates, tolls and fees levied by a Municipal Committee shall be notified in the official Gazette and, unless otherwise directed by the Government, shall be subject to previous publication. (2) Where a proposal for the levy of a tax, rate, toll or fee or for a modification of tax, rate, toll or fee which is in force, is sanctioned, the sanctioning authority shall specify the date for the enforcement thereof, and such tax, rate, toll, or fee or the modification shall come into force on such date.

35. Model tax schedules.‑The Government may frame model tax schedules, and where such schedules have been framed, the Municipal Committees shall be guided by them in levying a tax, rate, toll or fee.

36. Directions with regard to levy of tax, etc.‑(1) The Government may direct any Municipal Committee‑ (a) to levy any tax, rate, toll or fee which the Municipal Committee is competent to levy under section 33; or (b) to increase or reduce any such tax, rate, toll or fee, or the assessment thereof, to such extent as may be specified, or (c) to suspend, abolish or exempt any person or class of persons or property or class of property from the levy of any such tax, rate, toll or fee. (2) If a direction issued under subsection (1) is not complied with, within the specified time, if any, the Government may make an order giving effect to the direction.

38. Collection and recovery of taxes.‑(1) All taxes, rates, tolls and fees levied under this Ordinance shall be collected in the prescribed manner. (2) All arrears of taxes, rates, tolls, and fees, and other moneys claimable by a Municipal Committee under this Ordinance, shall be recoverable as a public demand or as arrears of land revenue. (3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (2), the Government may empower any Municipal Committee to recover arrears of taxes, rates, tolls, fees and other moneys claimable by the Municipal Committee under this Ordinance by distress and sale of movable property belonging to the person concerned or by attachment and sale of the immovable property belonging to him. (4) The Government may by rules specify the officials or classes of officials by whom the power under subsection (3) shall be exercised, and prescribed the manner in which it shall be exercised." Item No. 11 of the Third Schedule mentioned in section 33 above reads as follows: "

11. Tax on cinemas, dramatic and theatrical shows and other entertainments and amusements." Section 33 read with item 11 of the Third Schedule, therefore, makes it perfectly clear that the tax is levied on cinema shows and other entertainments and amusements and that it is no tax on income. Tax on cinemas and other entertainments and amusements not having been included in the Third Schedule to the Constitution, the Provincial Legislature has jurisdiction under Article 132 of the Constitution to legislate on this subject. Our attention has been drawn to item No. 10 of the impugned notification dated the 23rd October 1961 published in the Dacca Gazette, Part I, dated the 9th of November 1961, which reads as follows: "Name of tax, rate, etc Rate sanctioned.

10. Tax on cinema, dramatic and theatrical performance and other entertainments and amusements. 10 percent of the total intakes excluding Govern ment taxes." . With reference to this item in the notification, it has been argued that, since the tax has been levied at the rate of 10 ` of the total intakes which, it is claimed, is the income of the petitioner from the cinema shows, it is a tax on income inasmuch as precisely the same method is employed in levying income‑tax. Our attention has also been drawn to rule 45, sub‑rule (2), of the Rules which is contained in Chapter V of the Rules. Rule 45 (2) is as follows: "Subject to the maximum rate sanctioned by the Government the Municipal Committee at a meeting shall determine such tax at a fixed percentage of the value of the fee for admission collected from the spectators." Learned Advocate‑General appearing on behalf of the respondents has, on the contrary, argued that the imposition under section 33 of the Ordinance is not a tax on income and that one has to examine the essential nature of the tax to see whether it is income‑tax or not. Learned Advocate‑General has also argued that although the tax is on the value of the fee for admission collected from the spectators, the petitioner, as Cinema proprietor, is liable under the law for the payment of the tax and the rate fixed by the Provincial Government. In support of their respective cases, several decisions have been placed before us. Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury has cited the case of Western U. P. Election Power and Supply Company Ltd., Etawah v. Town Area, Jaswant Nagar and others (A I R 1957 All. 433) in support of his argument that a tax, by whatever name it may be known, if it is based on the income derived by their profession or calling, it is income‑tax and therefore cannot be enforced by the Provincial Government. In the case under report, a tax known as "Circumstances and property tax" was levied under a Provincial Act, namely, U. P. Town Areas Act, 1914 and it was contended on behalf of the applicant‑company that the power to tax on income vested only in the Parliament under the Indian Constitution and consequently the rules framed by the State Government authorising Town areas to tax a person on his gross income must be held to be ultra vires and the assessment of the applicant on the basis of gross income was consequently illegal. Section 14 (1) of the U. P. Town Areas Act authorised the Town Area Committee to impose a tax on persons assessed according to their circumstances and property not exceeding such rate and subject to such limitations and subject to such limitations and restrictions as may be prescribed by the State Government in that behalf: According to the rules framed under the U. P. Town Areas Act, a tax was to be assessed on (1) circumstances and (2) property, if any, owned by him, and the aggregate of the sums to be determined on both the counts shall constitute the total composite amount payable by the assessee as circumstances and property tax. A certain limit was also put, namely, that the total amount of tax assessed on any person shall not, in any year, exceed a sum of Rs.

250. It was observed in this case that the tax had been levied on the gross income of the applicant which was the income which he received from his property or his business. It was therefore held that although the tax was a tax on income, it was not invalid because of the fact that the Indian Constitution (Article 276=Article 141 of our Constitution) had saved the imposition of such a tax provided it was kept within the limits mentioned in the Article. In the case before us, as has already been noticed, the tax is not levied on the income of the petitioner but on the cinema shows and entertainments provided to the spectators and on the value of the fee for admission collected from the spectators. We, therefore, do not think that the Allahabad case has any application to the facts of the present case. We do not accept the contention of the petitioner that as the Central Legislation has not fixed the limit by any Act Article 141 of the Constitution is a bar to the levy of the tax in question. Learned Advocate‑General has placed before us several decisions in support of his arguments that the pith and substance of the tax should be considered to find out the nature of the tax. This point of view is supported by a decision of the Privy Council reported in 1936 Appeal Cases 352 corresponding to (1936) 2 A E R

111. In the case under report in a similar case of apparent conflict of legislative jurisdiction to levy tax on income which by section 21 (1) of Government of Ireland Act, 1920 is expressly excepted as ultra vires the Parliament of Northern Ireland vis‑a‑vis the poor rate imposed under section 3 of the Finance Act (Northern Ireland) 1934 it has been observed by the Privy Council that it is the essential characteristic of the particular tax that is to be regarded, and the essential difference in character between income‑tax and rates is that the former is a tax on income generally, whereas the latter are levied in respect of the occupation of hereditaments irrespective of the rate prayer's income generally and irrespective of whether he is in fact deriving profits or gains from such occupation. In the case of Balla Ram v. The Province of East Punjab (A I R 1949 F C 81) certain tax levied under Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act of 1940 was in question, and it was observed by the Federal Court of India that "Wherever the annual value of Property is the basis of a tax, that tax does not necessarily become a tax on income. There are other factors to be taken into consideration. It is the essential nature of the tax charges and not the nature of the machinery which is to be looked at." In the case under report, certain observations by Lord Atkin in Gallahagher v. Lynn (1937 A C 863 at p. 870) was quoted with approval; "It is well established that you are to look at the true nature and character of the legislation Russell v. The Queen, the pith and substance of the legislation. If on the view of the statute as a whole, you find that the substance of the legislation is within the express powers, then it is not invalidated if incident ally it affects matters, which are outside the authorized field. The legislation must not under the guise of dealing with one matter in fact encroach upon the forbidden field. Nor are you to look only at the object of the legislator. An Act may have a perfectly lawful object, e.g., to promote the health of the inhabitants, but may seek to achieve that object by invalid methods, e.g., direct prohibition of any trade with a foreign country. In other words, you may certainly consider the clauses of an Act to see whether they are passed `in respect of the forbidden subject." Considering, therefore, the essential nature of the tax, we have no doubt that it is not a tax on income. The petitioner has contended that under Rule 45 (2) of the Rules the tax is to be collected from the spectators on the value of the fee for admission and he is, therefore, not liable to pay the tax. Under rule 45, sub‑rule (2), of the Rules, the tax is fixed at a certain percentage of the value of the fee for admission collected from the spectators. This tax, under rule 45 (3) of the Rules, the Municipality may arrange to collect directly in accordance with any scheme duly approved by the Controlling Authority. In the absence, however, of any such arrangement by the Municipality, the tax can be collected through the same agency as the amusement tax imposed by the Government under the Bengal Amusements Tax Act, 1922 (Bengal Act V of 1922). It does not appear from the facts placed before the Court that any arrangement was actually made by the Municipality concerned to collect the tax except that the Municipality kept on calling upon the petitioner to submit an account of his intakes from the cinema shows to enable the Municipality to arrive at a decision regarding the amount payable by the petitioner. As the petitioner failed to submit the account as required, as certain amount was summarily assessed as payable by the petitioner to the Municipality and the petitioner was asked to make the payment to the Munici pality. Section 7 of the Bengal Amusements Tax Act, which provides for the manner of payment prescribes that the entertain ments tax, in the case of admission otherwise than by stamped ticket, shall be recoverable from the proprietor. One other manner of payment prescribed is that, in the case of admission by stamped‑ticket, the tax shall be paid by means of the stamp on the ticket. In the absence, therefore, of any arrangement by the Municipality prescribing the procedure for the collection of the tax, the tax should have been collected in the manner mentioned in section 7 of the Bengal Amusements Tax Act, namely, in the case of admission by stamped tickets, the tax was to be paid by means of stamps on the tickets, and in the case of admission otherwise than by stamped tickets, the tax was recoverable from the proprietor of the Cinema. Presumably as the petitioner was already paying the amusements tax under the Bengal Amusements Tax Act spectators were admitted into the Cinema shows by issuance of stamped tickets and, therefore, the petitioner could collect the tax by means of stamps on the tickets. In any event, even if there was no admission by stamped tickets, the petitioner remained liable for the recovery of the tax under section 7 (2) of the Bengal Amusements Tax Act, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 45 (2) and (3) of the Rules. We are, therefore, unable to accept these contentions of Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury. It has next been contended that the power of the Provincial Government to levy tax cannot be delegated to the Municipal Committee in a manner it has been done in section 33 of the Ordinance. We are unable to accept this contention. The Ordi nance has clearly given the power to the Municipal Committee, with the previous permission of the Government, to levy in the prescribed manner all or any of the taxes, rates, tolls and fees mentioned in the Third Schedule of the Ordinance. In the context of the present Constitution, it is the Provincial Govern ment who could sanction the tax under section 33 of the Ordinance. It appears from the facts placed before us that this sanction was duly obtained by the Municipal Committee. It has been contended that it is only the Provincial Government that can give the sanction and not the Commissioner who has actually given the sanction in the present case. Section 125 of the Ordinance authorises the Government, namely, the Provincial Government in this case, to delegate its powers under the' Ordinance or the rules thereunder to a Divisional Commissioner or any other officer subordinate to it. By notification dated the 4th of March 1961, the Governor of East' Pakistan delegated to the Divisional Commissioners the powers of the Provincial Government in regard to the sanction under section 33 of the Ordinance to levy all or any of the taxes, rates, tolls and fees mentioned in the Third Schedule of the Ordinance by the Municipal Committee. There is therefore no doubt that the impugned notification dated the 23rd of October 1961, issued by the Commissioner, Khulna Division, giving sanction to the tax, is perfectly legal. It has also been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the rules requiring previous publication of the proposed levy were not complied with and therefore the subsequent levy was illegal. We have considered the statements made in this behalf in the affidavit‑in‑opposition filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 with reference to the facts of the case and we find no reason to doubt the statements made in the affidavit that the rules have been substantially complied with. In any event, having regard to the fact that the petitioner has had notice of the tax and it objected to the levy of the tax on several occasions, and the fact that ultimately the petitioner and other proprietors of Cinema are now required to pay tax from 1st of July 1963 instead of 1st of July 1961 as originally required, we do not think that the petitioner has in any way been prejudiced. It is pertinent to note that in none of Authorities concerned did the petitioner ever challenge the validity of the imposition on the ground of non compliance with any provision of the Ordinance or the rules framed thereunder, Lastly, it has been contended by Mr. Hamidul Haq Choudhury that inasmuch as the Ordinance has laid down no policy and has given no guidance as to the imposition of the tax,; section 33 of the Ordinance empowering the Municipal Committee to levy the tax is illegal on the principle forbidding complete; abdication of legislative function in favour of the Government. It is a well‑settled principle of law that the Legislature cannot abdicate its essential legislative functions in favour of any outside agency. The decisions on this point are unanimous that the legislation must contain the policy of the Legislature in regard to a particular matter and must contain certain norms and standards P with reference to which any outside agency may be delegated the power of subordinate legislation for the purpose of assisting the Legislature in the effective exercise of its legislative function. Applying this principle to the provisions of the Ordinance, we find that section 33 limits the power of the Municipal Committee to levy the taxes, rates, tolls and fees to matters contained in the Third Schedule and therefore the Municipal Committee cannot travel outside the subjects mentioned in the Third Schedule. Reading the Ordinance as a whole, it appears to us clear that the Ordinance has been promulgated to consolidate and amend the law relating to Municipal administration in Pakistan. Chapter I under Part III of the Ordinance provides for the constitution of the Municipal Fund. The constitution of Municipal Fund necessarily requires the constitution of a source for the fund. Section 33 of the Ordinance has, therefore, authorised a Municipal Committee to levy taxes on certain subjects mentioned in the Third Schedule. This taxation can only be made with the previous sanction of the Government and in conformity with the rules made under the Ordinance. Section 34 of the Ordinance gives another guidance, namely, that the taxes levied by Municipal Committee shall be subject to previous publication and that the sanctioning authority shall specify the date for the enforcement of the tax. Section 35 of the Ordinance provides that the Municipal Committees shall be guided by model tax schedules that may be framed by the Government. Other sections that follow also give certain directions in regard to the liability on account of taxes and the collection and recovery of taxes. The Ordinance also proceeds to prescribe the methods by which parties aggrieved by assessment under the Ordinance can have their grievances redressed. We do not think, therefore, that the Ordinance has failed to lay down the policy or give an guidance in regard to the imposition of the tax. It appears that the foundation of the present application before us is the petitioner's grievance in regard to the notification dated the 23rd of October 1961. That being so, there seems in ordinate delay on the part of the petitioner to approach this Court for a remedy of the kind envisaged under Article 98 of the Constitution. Therefore, on the ground of inordinate delay also, we think that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. For the reasons stated above, the Rule is discharged. Having regard to the facts of this case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs, Leave asked for under Article 58 of the Constitution is refused. A. M. SAYEM, J.‑I agree. K. B. A. Rule discharged.