1987 PLP 31 (SCMR)

Subsection (9) of section 22‑A reads as follows:‑ "The Commission may, on the application of a party, or of its own motion,‑‑ (a) Initiate prosecution trial proceedings or take action with regard to any matter relating to its functions; ..

7. Mr. Noor Muhammad, learned counsel for the appellants urged that the case of Hoot Khan was not aptly relied upon by the learned Judges of the Division Bench in holding that a complaint can be filed before the Labour Court by a person other than the Registrar or a person authorised by him. He submitted that the competency of such a complaint can not be judged upon general principles in total discharged of specific provisions of the I.R.O. governing the matter. In the submission of the learned counsel this was a special law and had to be interpreted according to its own terms. He also pointed out that the National Industrial Relations Commission had more extensive powers, as would appear from the plain reading of subsection (9) of section 22‑A, to entertain a complaint in order to initiate prosecution with regard to any matter relating to its functions. Therefore, the counsel went on to argue that the same yardstick cannot be applied to a complaint before the Labour Court. Learned counsel argued that in order to ascertain the true intent and scope of the provisions under consideration, the history of legislation on the subject would show that the Legislature intended to place the matter of prosecution of offenders in respect of offences created by the Ordinance under the control of the Registrar. In this connection he invited attention to the relevant provisions in previous enactments, namely, the Trade Disputes Act, 1929, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, and West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968. According to the learned counsel in all these laws no private individual was permitted to launch a prosecution against any one by means of a complaint directly presented before the Court and in all these cases the Government was conferred the exclusive power of initiating such prosecution either directly or by authorization. The I.R.O. being a successor enactment on the same subject, according to the learned counsel, continued the same arrangement.

8. The relevant provisions in the various enactments to which reference has been made are in the following terms:‑ (i) Section 17(2) of the Trade Disputes Act, 1929: "No Court shall take cognizance of any offence under this section save on complaint made by, or under Authority from, the appropriate Government." (ii) Section 34(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: "No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act or of the abetment of any such offence, save on complaint made by or under the authority of the appropriate Government." (iii) Section 32(1) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance,1959: . "No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Ordinance or of the abetment of any such offence, save on complaint made by or under the authority of the appropriate Government." (iv) Section 39(1) of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance,1968: "No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Ordinance or of the abetment of any such offence, save on complaint made by or under the authority of Government." 9.Now the general rule under the Criminal Jurisdiction is that an person having knowledge of the commission of an offence may set the law in motion by a complaint even though he is not a person injured by the commission of the offence. However, in many enactments an exception to this general rule has been provided, so that in regard to certain offences the power of cognizance on a complaint has been restricted to complaints by specified persons. For instance sections 195, 196, 196‑A, 198 and 199 of the Criminal Procedure Code. These sections relate to prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, offences against public justice, offences relating to documents given in evidence, offence against the state, certain classes of criminal conspiracy, breach of contract, defamation and offences against marriage and offences of adultery and enticing a married woman. In all these cases no Court can take cognizance of such offences except upon complaint made by the specified person or authority. The object underlying these provisions is to prevent improper or reckless prosecution by private persons for offences in connection with demonstration of public justice, contempt of lawful authority of public servants, and offences of personal nature affecting individual aggrieved persons. These provisions of law are aimed at giving protection to parties and witnesses, against vexatious or frivolous prosecutions for their resorting to Court and giving evidence therein, and such protection is afforded by prescribing the necessity of a complaint by the public authority of the individual affected. It is well settled that provisions of this nature are mandatory and the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences mentioned therein, unless there is complaint in writing as required by the said sections. In all such provisions the prohibition from taking cognizance otherwise than on a complaint by the specified authority or person, is couched in negative terms, like 'no Court shall take cognizance'. Similarly, the provisions of the previous enactments referred to by the learned counsel are also couched in negative terms prescribing an absolute bar on the power of the Court to take cognizance of such offences except on a complaint made by or under the authority of the Government.

10. Coming now to the position under the I.R.O., it may be observed that the Labour Court is established under section 35 and has been empowered under section 35(5)(c) to "try offences under this Ordinance and such other offences under any other law as the Provincial Government may, by notification in the official Gazette specify in this behalf". Under subsection (3) of section 36 the Labour Court, for the purpose of trying an offence as aforesaid has the same powers as are vested in the Court of Magistrate Ist Class specially empowered under section 30 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The provision of section 190 of the said Code are, therefore, directly attracted and the conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings provided therein regulate the power of the Labour Court. Section 190 empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence, inter alia, upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence, except as provided otherwise like those pointed out above. Therefore, except where the law specifically placed an embargo on the power of the Magistrate to entertain a complaint only made by specified person or authority any person can present a complaint disclosing the facts constituting an offence to initiate a prosecution. Reading section 35(5)(c) and section 36 (3) together we find no embargo on the power of the Labour Court to take cognizance of an offence on the complaint of a person other than the Registrar or a person authorised by him. It is significant that the language of these provisions does not use the negative phraseology employed in provisions mentioned above whereby the power was subjected to the restriction of the complaint by specified person or authority. No legal restriction as is contended for can, therefore, be read into the aforesaid provisions which specifically regulate the procedure and the powers of the Labour Court. The clear and unambiguous language of these provisions of law does not admit the importation by implication of restriction on the basis of section 13 (b) of the I.R.O. which deals with the powers and functions of the Registrar. Section 13 is concerned only with the powers of the Registrar under the I.R.O. It purports to control him alone and not the Labour Court. Merely because it is one of the functions of the Registrar and he has been empowered to lodge or authorize any person to lodge complaint with the Labour Court, does not necessarily operate as a clog on the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to take cognizance of an offence on the complaint of any other person. We are unable to agree with the arguments of the learned counsel by adopting the historical approach with reference to the pre‑existing law for the obvious reason that there is material difference in the provisions in the present law. If the intention was to continue the same restriction with regard to a complaint under the authority of the Government, the Legislature would have simply re‑written 'similar provisions in the sections regulating the powers and procedure of the Labour Court. In the absence of positive and clear bar, the language cannot he strained to import the restriction merely on the basis of the previous enactments on the subject. Indeed to us it appears that departure from the previous position was intended by removing the restriction from the power of the Court.

11. An examination of the other provisions of the I.R.O. also fortifies the construction placed by us on the relevant provisions. In fact accepting the construction placed by the learned counsel would create certain anomalies. Subsection (9) of section 25‑A for the I.R.O. provides as under:‑ "No person shall be prosecuted under subsection (8) except on a complaint in writing:‑ (a) by the workman if the order of decision in his favour is not implemented within the period specified therein, or (b) by the Labour Court or Tribunal, if an order or decision thereof is not complied with." This provision clearly contemplates a complaint by a workman and not by the Registrar, although the offence created by subsection (8) is punishable under the Ordinance. Similarly subsection (9) of section 22‑A also contemplates initiation of prosecution on the application of any party, although the Registrar under section 13(b) is also authorised to lodge a complaint before the Commission. Reference was, however, made to section 23‑D, subsection (9) (iii) which empowers the Inspector to make a report in writing to the Registrar of any offence punishable under section 23‑E, in order to support the contention raised by the learned counsel, but this cannot be construed as a general rule, in view of the nature of the offence, namely, obstruction to the duties performed by the Inspector. This provision is a special provision like other similar provisions pointed out above, whereby the Legislature intended to control vexatious prosecution on flimsy grounds by the Inspector. At any rate the requirement to make a report to the Registrar, by itself cannot be sufficient to construe and limit the power of the Labour Court to entertain a complaint by any other person. Subsection (2) of section 23‑F which provides for penalty for offence under section 23‑B and section 23‑C, lays down as under:‑ "No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under subsection (1) except upon a complaint in writing made by the Registrar." This is a good illustration of the view taken by us, in that categorical language has been used clearly providing the taking of cognizance only upon a complaint by the Registrar, as generally done in similar provisions referred to above. If by itself section 13(b) had the same effect, it would not have been necessary to provide specifically in this section the pre‑condition of a complaint by the Registrar. No provision of a statute can be so interpreted as to make another provision redundant."

12. In view of all these reasons, we agree with the conclusion of the Division Bench that the cognizance by the Labour Court on the complaint lodged by the respondent No.2 was competently taken and no illegality was committed in that behalf.

13. In the result, this appeal is dismissed but as there was‑ no contest from the other side, we pass no order as to costs. M.I. Appeal dismissed.