2002 PLP 1790 (MLD)

(i) in subsection (1). for the words "High court" the words "District Judge having jurisdiction in the area where the premises in relation to which the order is passed" shall be substituted. (ii) After subsection (1), the following new subsections shall be inserted‑‑ "(1‑A) On such appeal being preferred the District Judge may hear it himself. Or refer it for disposal to an Additional District Judge. (1‑B) The District Judge may recall an appeal referred to an Additional District Judge and either hear it himself or refer it for disposal to another Additional District Judge. (1‑E) On the application of a party and after notice to the other party and after hearing such of them as desire to be heard: or on its own motion without such notice: (a) The appellate authority may at any stage withdraw any application pending with a Controller and transfer the same for disposal to any other Controller (b) The High Court may at any stage withdraw an appeal pending with any appellate authority and transfer the same for disposal to another appellate authority competent ,to dispose of the same'. "

6. In the said Ordinance, after section 21 the following new section shall be inserted "21‑A. All appeals filed under this Ordinance and pending in the High Court immediately before the commencement of the Sindh Rented Premises (Amendment) Ordinance, 2001, shall stand transferred to the District Judge having jurisdiction as provided in subsection (1) of section 21, for disposal: Provided that the appeals as are fixed for judgments shall be disposed by the High Court." After the aforesaid amendments, any person aggrieved by an order of the Controller instead of filing an appeal in the High Court is now required to prefer the same before the District Judge having jurisdiction in the area where the premises in relation to which the order is passed is situated. It may be added here that pursuant to the insertion of section 21‑A all appeals which had been filed under the S.R.P.O. and were pending in the High Court immediately before the promulgation of the Sindh Rented Premises (Amendment) Ordinance, 2001, stood transferred to the District Judge having jurisdiction as provided in subsection (1) of section 21 for disposal of the same. Now section 3 of the Sindh Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 specifies that besides the Court of Small Causes established under the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1887 and the Courts established under any other enactment, there shall be the following classes of Civil C Courts, namely: (a) The Court of the District Judge; (b) The Court of Additional District Judge; and (c) The Court of the Civil Judge. Mr. Mubeen Khan, learned counsel for the applicant contended that under section 21‑A of the Amended S.R.O.P., the District Judge to whom all appeals pending in the High Court stood transferred to the District Judge having jurisdiction means the District Judge as a "persona designata" who is the only judicial officer to dispose of all the appeals and that he does not have any power to transfer such appeals to any other person and referred to the case of Khadim Mohyuddin and another v. Ch. Rehmat Ali Nagra and another PLD 1956 SC 459 where the Honourable Supreme Court held that the District Judge as .persona designata under section 15 of W.P. Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, is not competent to transfer an appeal filed before him to the Additional District Judge. It appears that learned counsel has not noted that the Honourable Supreme Court was interpreting the law as it was originally enacted which did not include any reference to Additional District Judge and that by amendment of 1962 the words "and Additional District Judge" were inserted in section 15 of the said Ordinance. Further, the wordings of section 15 of W.P. Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 are very different from the wordings of section 21, S.R.P.O., 1979, as amended. In the former Ordinance the Government was empowered to confer on such District Judge as it thought fit the powers of appellate authority while in the S.R.P.O., 1979, the Government has no such power and all District Judges having jurisdiction in the area where the property is situated have the power to hear appeals against the orders of the Controller. The amendments made in 2001 in section 21 of S.R.P.O., 1979, now empower the District Judge to assign matters to any Additional District Judge without any limitation or condition. The principle discussed in the case of Khadim Mohyuddin cannot therefore be applied to the present circumstances as the wordings of section 21, S.R.P.O., 1979, are very different from those of the W.P. Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. His further argument that the word "prefer" used in section 21(1)(A) has been used in the present tense and not in the past tense and therefore would apply only to those appeals which are filed after the amendment, also carries no weight. No doubt, the Rent Controller under the provisions of S. R. P.O. , 1979, does not enjoy the same powers as that of a Civil Court, however, it has been held by the Honourable Supreme Court that although the provisions of C.P.C: are not strictly applicable to the proceedings conducted by the Rent Controller, the principles of C.P.C. are applicable to the proceedings under S.R.P.O. (see PLD 2001 Karachi 60 at 66). Now section 24, C.P.C. reads as follows: "

24. General power to transfer and withdrawal.‑‑(1) On the application of any of the parties and after notice to the parties and after hearing such of them as desire to be heard, or of its own motion without such notice, the High Court or the District Court may at any stage‑‑ (a) .............. (b) withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceedings pending in any Court subordinate to it, and (i) try or dispose of the same; or (ii) transfer the same for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same; (iii) ............... (2) ............... (3) For the purpose of this section, Courts of Additional and Assistant Judges shall be deemed to be subordinate to the District Court. (4) (Emphasis. added). In view of the above provision it can be argued that under the general principles and, the spirit of section 24, C.P.C., to facilitate smooth working and expeditious disposal of cases, the District Judge is empowered to withdraw any appeal or other proceedings pending in any Court subordinate to it and transfer the same for disposal to any Court subordinate to it which includes the Courts of Additional District Judges who have been declared to be subordinate to him. It would be appropriate to refer here to the Sindh Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 which was promulgated to consolidate the law relating to, inter alia, the creation and working of the various Civil Courts existing in the Province and the powers to be exercised by them. Section 6 of the Sindh Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 reads as follows: "

6. Additional District Judges.‑‑‑(1) Government may, in consultation with the High Court, appoint as many Additional District Judges as may be necessary. (2). An Additional District Judge shall discharge such functions of a District Judge as the District Judge may assign to him, and in the discharge of those functions he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge." (Emphasis added). The question whether the District Judge has the power to transfer a matter pending before him to the Court of Additional District Judge and whether an order or judgment passed by an Additional District Judge in a matter assigned to him under a special statute has come up for consideration before the superior Courts in several cases. In the case of Bahari Lal‑Bulaki Ram v. Kundan Lal and another AIR 1922 Privy Council 361, involving the winding up of a company, a question arose whether the order of winding up passed by the Additional District Judge instead of the District Judge was competent. The learned Judges of the Privy Council while discussing the powers of the District Judge and the Additional District Judge under the Punjab Courts Act, 1888 observed as follows: "This matter appears to be settled by the Punjab Courts Act, 1888, which by section 6 provides as follows: "The following section shall be added to the Punjab Courts Act, 1884, namely: 75.‑‑‑(1) When the business pending before any Divisional Court consisting of any Judge, or before the Court of any District Judge, requires the aid of any Additional Judge for its speedy disposal, the Local Government may appoint to the Court an Additional Divisional Judge or an Additional District Judge, as the case may be. (2) An Additional Judge so appointed shall discharge any of the functions of a Divisional Judge or District Judge, as the case may, be, which the Divisional Judge or District Judge may assign to him, and shall, as regards the discharge of those functions and subject to the provisions of the next following subsection, be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be a Divisional Judge or District Judge. " There is no doubt that the District Judge has assigned to the Additional District Judge all the functions of supervising this liquidation. He discharged these functions apparently without any objection for a considerable time and made many orders, and no point was taken till this appeal was made at an advanced stage of the liquidation. He had jurisdiction, and the question which remains to be decided is the property of the order which he made." (Emphasis added) The Privy Council consequently held that the Additional District Judge was competent to hear the petition and pass an order of winding up under the Companies Act, 1913. A similar question about the propriety of the judgment and decree passed by an Additional District Judge in a suit for dissolution of marriage was raised in a writ petition filed in the Lahore High Court on the precise ground that the learned Additional District Judge did not preside a District Court as provided under section 14(1)(b) of the W. P. Family Courts Act, ‑1964 and therefore the decree passed by him in appeal was without lawful authority. The learned Division Bench observed as follows:‑‑ " ..A District Court is a Civil Court presided over by the District Judge, Civil Courts are constituted under West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance (Ordinance II of 1962). Under section 3, three classes of Civil Courts namely the Court of the District Judge, the Court of the Additional District Judge and the Court of the Civil Judge are established. Section 5 enables the Government, in consultation with the High Court, to appoint as many persons as it thinks necessary to be District Judges and post a District Judge to each district. It further provides that the same person may be appointed to be District Judge of two or more districts. Similarly, under section 6, the Government may, in consultation with the High Court, appoint as many Additional District Judges as may be necessary. Subsection (2) further provides that an Additional District Judge shall discharge such functions of a District Judge as the District Judge may assign to him, and in the discharge of those functions he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge.

9. From the provisions mentioned above, there remains no doubt that the Additional District Judge is not the District Court in itself, but when assigned with functions of the District Judge by the District Judge, he would, in the discharge of those functions, exercise the same powers as the District Judge. 10. ........We are of the opinion that similarly District Judge would be competent to assign an appeal or function of hearing an appeal under subsection (1)(b) of section 14 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, to an Additional Judge." (See Mst. Malookan v. Sher Muhammad and 2 others PLD 1977 Lahore 718). In light of the above discussion, the learned Court rejected the objection and dismissed the writ petition. In view of the provisions of section 6 of the Sindh Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 and the aforesaid two judgments, it is clear that the District. Judge under the provisions of the Sindh Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, is empowered to assign his functions and powers to Additional district Judge (s) and the latter in the discharge of those functions have the same powers as those of the District Judge. It is also indisputable that transferring or making over case to the Additional District Judge by the District Judge amounts to an assignment and any order passed by the Additional District Judge in the matter assigned to him would be competent in law. Therefore, the transfer of the Rent Appeal by the District Judge to the IInd Additional District Judge, Sukkur in the present case was competent in law and the order passed by the latter is valid and enforceable as an order passed b y the District Judge himself. Mr. Mubeen Khan also contended that the provisions of section 24, C.P.C. would not be attracted to the present case as they relate to general civil procedure and that special provisions always prevail over the general provisions of tam i.e. the provisions of S. R. P.O. , 1979, shall prevail over the general provisions of C. P C. or Sindh Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962. There is no cavil about the above proposition of law that where specific provision is provided under a self‑contained statute for transfer of case, resort must be made only to such 'remedy. However, it would not make any difference in the conclusion if we apply the aforesaid principle of law to the, present circumstances. Specific provision relating to transfer of appeals by the District Judge to the Additional District Judge is provided in section 21(1‑A), S. R: P. O. , 1979, as amended by the 2001 amendment. It is not denied that several amendments were made in the S.R.P.O. which included the amendments of section 21 by addition of several subsections and insertion of section 21‑A. Both these changes were made simultaneously by a single stroke and form part of the S.R.P.O. as it exists today. According to Mr. Mubeen's arguments all the special I provisions relating to appeal existing in the S.R.P.O. shall prevail over the general provisions of section. 24, C.P.C. and‑ the provisions of the Sindh Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 assuming that the latter is also not applicable in the present circumstances. It is an established principle of interpretation that words should be given their plain ordinary dictionary meaning and the provisions of a statute must be interpreted in a manner to bring harmony between its different sections and avoid any inconsistency between them if such appear to exist. Both, the newly ‑inserted section 21‑A and the amendments made by addition of five subsections in section 21 i.e. subsections (1‑A) to (1‑F) cannot be read in isolation but must be read together and given their ordinary dictionary meaning. If this is done, it is crystal clear that the District Judge has the , power to assign or transfer any, appeal before him to the Additional District Judge under subsection (1‑A): If the interpretation of Mr. Mubeen is accepted, after the 2001 amendment in the law, there would be two classes of cases; one class to be decided exclusively by .the District Judge and not transferable to Additional District Judge and the other class to be decided by the District Judge or by the Additional District Judge at tire discretion of the District Judge. I am convinced that it could not have been the intention of the Legislature to provide one mode for disposal of the appeals transferred from the High Court to the District Judge as appellate authority and another mode to decide the appeals filed before him‑ as an appellate authority after the amendment when the nature of the appeals in both situations is the same and the power of the appellate authority i.e. the District Judge and .the Additional District Judge to decide the appeal is also the same. Section 21(1‑A) relating to the power of the District Judge to refer an appeal to the Additional District Judge for disposal is a part of S.R.P.O. alongwith section 21‑A transferring the pending appeals to the District Judge having jurisdiction in the matter. Following the principle of simple grammatical interpretation, it is obvious that section 21(1‑A) applies to all appeals whether transferred from the High Court to the District Judge or preferred by an aggrieved party before the District Judge under section 21(1). In both cases, the District Judge has the power and authority to hear the appeal himself or refer it for disposal to an Additional District Judge as permitted by section 21(1‑A). If the interpretation advanced by Mr. Mubeen Khan is accepted, it would create an absurd situation whereby the District Judge of the area would be burdened with thousands of cases on transfer from the High Court when he already has on his roster thousands of other civil and criminal matters to decide and also pass administrative orders for smooth working of the District Court which would not be humanly possible for a single person to do. The Legislature intentionally empowered the District Judge under section 21(1‑A) to transfer the cases to the, Additional District L Judge to facilitate smooth and efficient working of the Courts and expeditious disposal of the Rent Appeals, which is the requirement of the day. In view of the discussion, it is clear that the power of the District Judge to transfer and assign cases to Additional District Judge is well‑settled for over 80 years by virtue of various statutes referred to above including the Sindh Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 M generally and section 21(1‑A), S.R.P.O. specially. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the applicants are frivolous and vexatious. They have no merit. The applications are accordingly dismissed. The above are the reasons of the Order dated 31‑5‑2002 dismissing the Civil Transfer Applications in, limine. M.B.A./M‑368/K Applications dismissed.